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In recent decades, transnational advocacy networks (TANs) for women’s rights have 
become major players in the international arena, but have also struggled to maintain 
egalitarian and democratic practices within their ranks, as members from different 
world regions attempt to have their voices heard.  In this dissertation, I question what 
strategies TANs can employ to more effectively and democratically push states for 
change on important social issues.   
 To address this question, I carry out a case study of the development of the 
Russian movement against human trafficking from 1998 to 2008, with particular 
focus on the organization that served as leader of this movement, the Angel Coalition.  
To better understand the global forces that gave rise to this development, I examine 
two transnational movements that collided in Russia in the late 1990s: the 
contemporary transnational movement against human trafficking, and the movement 
  
by the United States and other Western governments to promote the growth of civil 
societies in developing and post-socialist countries as part of democracy aid 
programs.   
 This dissertation contributes to transnational civil society theory and 
transnational feminist theory.  The Angel Coalition, an organization run by activists 
from Russia, other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
Western countries, and which received the majority of its funding from Western 
governments and foundations, overcame obstacles both to organizing across cultural 
and power differences and to influencing policy of the Russian Federation, a state 
known to reject the influence of foreign governments and foreign-funded civil 
society.  I argue that two factors were especially important to the success of the Angel 
Coalition, as part of a transnational counter-trafficking network, in pushing the 
Russian state to take action against human trafficking: 1) counter-trafficking activists 
demonstrated a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia; and 2) 
activists effectively communicated to the state how it would benefit from 
collaboration with civil society.  Finally, I argue that organizational practices of the 
Angel Coalition, as a multinational NGO, facilitated its ability to implement these 
strategies.  Most importantly, activists utilized their differences as resources and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Over the past several decades, the transnational women’s movement has emerged as a 
major player in the international arena, wielding the power to challenge economic 
globalization practices that accelerate inequality and demonstrating the ability to 
influence the policies of states and intergovernmental organizations on important social 
issues.  While directing its energy to advocating for gender equality and social justice in 
countries around the world, the transnational women’s movement also faced the 
challenge of overcoming patterns of domination and inequality within its own networks.  
Replicating global hierarchical power relations, women from the North and West often 
served as leaders of these networks, determining the structure of network interactions and 
deciding which issues were most worthy of network attention, while women from the 
South and East reported feeling underrepresented and having their concerns marginalized 
by the movement.  As a result of such conflicts, in recent years, transnational feminists 
have increasingly placed as much emphasis on strengthening equality within the 
movement as on lobbying states and intergovernmental organizations for egalitarian 
policies.  In this dissertation, I examine one particular transnational network for women’s 
rights, as I address the question of how activists around the world can overcome cultural 
and power differences to work towards shared strategic goals.   
 To address this question, I carry out a case study of the development of the 
Russian movement against human trafficking from 1998 to 2008, with particular focus on 
the organization that served as the leader of this movement, the Angel Coalition.  To 




transnational movements that collided in Russia in the late 1990s: the contemporary 
transnational movement against human trafficking, which had been gaining momentum 
since the 1970s, and the movement by the United States and other Western countries to 
promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries as part of 
democracy aid programs, which had been in existence throughout the cold war era.  
Additionally, in order to understand the domestic factors that contributed to the 
development of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement, I examine the social, economic, 
and political conditions that characterized the post-Soviet transition and that facilitated 
the rise of human trafficking in Russia as well as the development of state-civil society 
partnerships to fight this crime.  I devote particular attention to the effects of the post-
Soviet transition on women, who became one of the population groups most vulnerable to 
human trafficking while at the same time gaining the right to form independent women’s 
organizations and crisis centers on the issue of gendered violence, which would be the 
first to respond to the problem of trafficking in Russia.   
 In this dissertation, as I chart the development of the Russian movement against 
human trafficking, I engage in conversation with three bodies of literature.  First, I review 
literature on the provision of foreign aid by the United States and other Western states to 
developing and post-socialist countries for the purpose of building civil societies, with 
particular focus on the provision of such aid to Russia.  This literature examines the 
intentions behind the implementation of such aid programs by Western countries, the 
conditions in recipient countries that made their governments amenable to the acceptance 
of aid, and the consequences of aid for the development of civil societies in these 




such aid programs were expected to foster the values of democracy, participation, 
horizontal networking, and solidarity between citizens, scholars writing in this field have 
documented ways in which the structure of aid programs often had the opposite effect.   
Especially in post-Soviet countries such as Russia, where an independent civil 
society had just begun to take root, foreign aid at this early stage of civil society 
development had a significant impact on the emerging shape of the sector.  Namely, a 
plethora of competitive grant programs offering short-term funding for the production of 
certain outputs, i.e., the organization of conferences, the publication of newsletters, etc., 
contributed to the fragmentation, hierarchization, NGO-ization, and unsustainability of 
much of Russia’s civil society.  In this dissertation, I engage with this literature in 
discussing how foreign aid both facilitated and posed challenges to the development of 
Russia’s movement against human trafficking and how its leading organization, the 
Angel Coalition, responded to and overcame many of these challenges.   
 Second, I engage in conversation with literature on transnational feminism and 
women’s movements, with particular attention given to the Russian women’s movement 
and Western-Russian women’s networks.  Focusing on the development of the 
contemporary transnational women’s movement since the 1970s, I review the 
achievements of this movement on the international scene; its strong connections to the 
United Nations, including the movement’s expansion through the UN World Conferences 
on Women and the incorporation of many of its concerns into UN structures and agendas; 
and efforts within the movement to develop more inclusive, egalitarian, and 
representational forms of organizing.  This literature outlines the issues that most inspired 




especially the issues of economic justice and violence against women, the latter of which 
was defined to include trafficking in women.  I analyze the formation of transnational 
advocacy networks (TANs) among women activists as an effective organizing practice 
that strengthened the women’s movement’s ability to influence governments and 
intergovernmental organizations on issues concerning women’s rights.   
Additionally, I review literature specifically on the growth of the Russian 
women’s movement and its links to movements in other countries and regions.  
Reflecting the themes identified in the literature on civil society reviewed above, this 
literature addresses the impact of foreign aid on the development of Russia’s women’s 
movement and ways in which historical power differences and cultural 
misunderstandings between Russian and Western women activists posed challenges to 
their relationships.  I engage in conversation with this literature as I discuss how the 
transnational feminist issues of violence against women and human trafficking were 
adopted and reframed by Russian women activists to fit the Russian environment, and 
how the Russian women’s movement provided the foundation out of which the counter-
trafficking movement later emerged.   
 Third, I engage in conversation with the literature on human trafficking and the 
development of transnational movements against human trafficking, both historically and 
in the contemporary period.  This literature addresses conditions that have fueled 
practices of human trafficking since the late-nineteenth century to the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, consequences of these practices for the individuals involved, and the 
responses of societies on both sending and receiving ends of trafficking networks.  




against these practices, from the movement against “white slavery” at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and the fading attention to the issue in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, to the resurgence of activism against human trafficking beginning in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  By 2000, the burgeoning transnational movement against human 
trafficking had drawn the attention of states and intergovernmental organizations to the 
issue and propelled them to take action, resulting in the passage of the United States 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) and the United Nations 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (UN Protocol on Human Trafficking), two of the leading international 
instruments in the global campaign to combat human trafficking.   
In conversation with this literature, I examine the development and 
implementation of these international instruments, the strong influence of counter-
trafficking TANs on these processes, and the political divisions between states and TANs 
in debates over whether to focus on the abolition of prostitution as the best tactic to fight 
human trafficking or whether to increase recognition of sex workers’ labor rights in order 
to make them less vulnerable to this crime.   
Finally, I devote attention to the specific patterns of human trafficking into, out 
of, and within Russia in the contemporary period; ways in which the implementation of 
international counter-trafficking norms and funds have both facilitated and limited the 
development of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement; and ways in which Russian 
counter-trafficking organizations have responded to the Western-led debates on the issue 
of prostitution and either found a way to fit themselves into these debates or resisted the 




 My dissertation puts these literatures into conversation with each other as I draw 
upon and contribute to all three while providing a detailed and robust case study of the 
Russian movement against human trafficking.  I demonstrate how the far-reaching global 
forces of transnational feminism, the international movement against human trafficking, 
and the Western push to develop civil societies coalesced in Russia to facilitate the 
emergence of an activist network that took the lead in the Russian movement against 
human trafficking and successfully lobbied the Russian government to take action against 
the problem.  At the same time, I highlight the agency of Western and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
1
 activists who took advantage of the opportunities made 
available through these global movements to develop a unique organization, the Angel 
Coalition, which proved capable of overcoming tremendous obstacles to secure long-term 
and consistent levels of funding, develop collaborative relations with a government 
known for its distrust of independent civil society and of foreign influence within its 
borders, and provide services to large numbers of the Russian public.  Thus, while 
providing a historical contextualization of the rise of this movement, I specifically 
examine the organizational factors and personal attributes that enabled the Angel 
Coalition to successfully work across cultural and political differences to lead a strong 
and sustainable activist network capable of influencing the actions of the Russian state.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 Although the focus of my study is the Russian movement against human trafficking, counter-trafficking 
activists from other  CIS countries are involved in this movement and categorize themselves collectively as 
a group separate from Western activists, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  The CIS is a 
union comprised of most of the states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, and was formed in 
December 1991.  While the CIS has few supranational powers, its member states have entered into 




1.1 Theoretical Perspective and Research Methodology 
In outlining the research methods I will use in this study, I will first discuss my 
theoretical orientation, since the methods researchers choose to employ are of necessity 
influenced by our epistemological assumptions.  This follows the importance I place on 
making self-evident the assumptions and politics that lay behind the production of 
knowledge.
2
  I draw upon the work of feminist sociologist Nancy Naples, who asserts 
“Our epistemological assumptions also influence how we define our roles as researchers, 
what we consider ethical research practices, and how we interpret and implement 
informed consent or ensure the confidentiality of our research subjects.”
3
  Because my 
work focuses on the reproduction of and resistance to inequalities both within feminist 
communities and within our larger globalizing world, I am especially attentive to the 
potential for power imbalances to affect the research process.  As a result, I choose 
methods that reflect my aims of reducing power differences between researcher and 
participant, making clear my theoretical assumptions and my position in the field, and 
honoring the voices of my participants, the meanings they assign to their work and lives, 
and the theoretical framework though which they understand their counter-trafficking 
activities.   
1.1.1 Theoretical Perspective 
Reflecting my research goals, I choose to make clear that I employ a theoretical lens that 
closely follows the “materialist feminist” framework as outlined by Naples, a framework 
that facilitates the production of knowledge for social change and that seeks to confront 
                                                 
2
 See Nancy A. Naples, Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 12.   
 
3




inequities in the knowledge production process.
4
  Therefore, before discussing my 
research methodologies, I will provide some background on the material feminist 
perspective and how I will apply it to my topic of study.  In utilizing this perspective, I 
build upon the work of many materialist feminists, including Naples but also Rosemary 
Hennessy, Chrys Ingraham, and Valentine Moghadam.  Hennessy and Ingraham explain 
that materialist feminism developed out of Marxist feminism and socialist feminism and 
“was the conjuncture of several discourses—historical materialism, marxist and radical 
feminism, as well as postmodern and psychoanalytic theories of meaning and 
subjectivity.”
5
  Although materialism and postmodernism are often viewed as opposing 
theoretical approaches, Naples too highlights the intersection of these viewpoints.  She 
writes, “I view my development of a materialist feminist standpoint theory that 
incorporates important insights of postmodern analyses of power, subjectivity, and 
language as a powerful framework for exploring the intersections of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, region, and culture in different geographic and historical contexts.”
6
 
 While materialist feminism draws upon these various approaches, what 
distinguishes this perspective is its emphasis on the division of labor and class as 
determining features of human life.  According to Hennessy and Ingraham, historical 
materialism “takes as its starting point real living individuals and what they need in order 
to produce their means of subsistence, that is, in order to survive.”
7
  Historical 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 12. 
 
5 Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys Ingraham, “Introduction: Reclaiming Anticapitalist Feminism,” in 
Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference, and Women’s Lives, ed. Rosemary Hennessy and 
Chrys Ingraham (New York: Routledge, 1997), 7.  
 
6
 Naples, 7. 
 
7




materialism sees the production of life as a collective process that takes place through a 
system of related activities.  As Hennessy and Ingraham note, “Historically, these 
activities have taken the form of divisions of labor or relations of production.”
8
  Under 
capitalism, the relations of production have been between a small number of people who 
own the means of production and a larger number of people who actually produce.   
Discourse analysis is important to this arrangement since cultural ideologies can 
legitimize labor relations.  Because an elite group owns the majority of mainstream media 
sources, it has the ability to broadcast its views of “reality” and “normality” through the 
many publishing companies, television channels, film production companies, etc., owned 
by members of this group.  However, in a democracy, oppositional groups also have the 
ability to voice their knowledge of the world and to contest the mainstream “norm.”  
Thus, not only material bodies and goods are important in materialist feminism, but also 
the culture and ideologies that affect how individuals live their lives.  Hennessy and 
Ingraham state, “The tradition of feminist engagement with marxism emphasizes a 
perspective on social life that refuses to separate the materiality of meaning, identity, the 
body, state, or nation from the requisite division of labor that undergirds the scramble for 
profits in capitalism’s global system.”
9
 
 While traditional Marxism has been criticized for its gender-blindness and 
Marxist feminism criticized for analyzing class and gender to the exclusion of other 
sources of oppression, the materialist feminist approach I utilize recognizes the multitude 
of identities that affect individuals’ positioning in contemporary economic and social 
structures.  In past decades, the ascendancy of postmodernism has exposed the multiple 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 4. 
 
9




and shifting identities of human beings and the complexity of power relations.  Antonio 
Callari and David Ruccio describe the postmodern perspective: 
Because… subjects are multiple and irreducible, social spaces (economic, 
political, and cultural) are characterized not as homogeneously structured 
spaces…, but as spaces or sets of processes punctuated by states of contingency, 
fragmentariness, and decentering.  Moreover,… [subjects] will not have singular 
identities, …but rather multiple identities, coalesced and condensed in no fixed 
ways…. It is the postmodern current that, in our view, has elevated these states of 
contingency, fragmentariness, and decentering and the surplus of being of social 
subjects to the status of strategic privilege.
10
 
The materialist feminist approach that I use incorporates some of the insights 
generated by postmodern theorists by acknowledging the importance of race, sexuality, 
religion, ability, ethnicity, age, and many other identities in analyzing individuals’ 
position in social systems.  My perspective takes up Callari and Ruccio’s call for 
“identities and forms of political struggle [that] are concretely determined outside and 
apart from any single functional logic.”
11
  “Politics,” they write, “is a practice of 
negotiation and struggle among emergent social identities and agents that is not governed 
by any origin, subject, or end.”
12
  The challenges postmodernism has posed for 
materialism have led it to become a more inclusive and flexible theoretical and political 
perspective.   
                                                 
10
 Antonio Callari and David F. Ruccio, “Introduction: Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist 
Theory,” in Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian 
Tradition, ed. Antonio Callari and David F. Ruccio (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 5-6.  
 
11
 Ibid., 42. 
 
12




 Following this, a second critical feature of materialist feminism is that it is both a 
theory of society and a theory for social change.
13
  As Callari and Ruccio contend, 
“Marxist theory cannot construct an identity of itself as merely a theory about society, a 
reflection of an already constituted position in that society, but must recognize its own 
involvement in the process of social change, as part of the universe of competing 
discursive formations, in the creation of social identities, particular forms of perception 
and agency.”
14
  Similarly, Hennessy and Ingraham write, “Historical materialism offers a 
systemic way of making sense of social life under capitalism that simultaneously serves 
as an agent for changing it.”
15
  Like Callari and Ruccio, I believe materialism continues 
to be a necessary theory for social change as it provides both “a class analysis of social 
processes and formations and an imaginary of social transformation.”
16
   
 A third important feature of materialist feminism is its emphasis on the 
connection between epistemology and methodology.  While researchers are commonly 
advised to use the method that is most appropriate for their specific research questions, 
Naples cautions that “the methods we choose are not free of epistemological assumptions 
and taken-for-granted understandings of what counts as data, how the researcher should 
relate to the subjects of research, and what are the appropriate products of a research 
study.”
17
  As illustrated by Naples, our epistemological assumptions infuse every aspect 
of the research process.  As such, she echoes the assertion by many feminist researchers 
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that there is no neutral knowledge.  Instead, materialist feminism encourages an 
embodied perspective though which the researcher explicitly reveals her roles in the 
research process.  Similar to Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges” and 
Sandra Harding’s concept of “strong objectivity,” an embodied perspective “emphasizes 
how researchers’ social positions (not limited to one’s gender, race, ethnicity, class, 
culture, and place or region of residence) influence what questions we ask, whom we 
approach in the field, how we make sense of our fieldwork experience, and how we 
analyze and report our findings.”
18
    
 Drawing upon these “standpoint” epistemologies, I aim to “situate” my research 
in two important ways.  First, by naming my theoretical perspective, I attempt to make 
apparent the assumptions that guide my examination of this research topic.  Namely, 
employing a material feminist perspective, I see the growing class divide as a major 
source of the oppression of women and other vulnerable groups in the contemporary 
world.  Here, I work with a broadly defined concept of “class” in referring to how social, 
political, and economic structures benefit certain groups of people at the expense of 
others.  Much feminist research has demonstrated how modern globalization processes 
have heightened inequalities among groups within nation-states and among nation-states 
themselves.  These gendered, racialized, and class-based processes have accelerated the 
profitability of multinational corporations while making it more difficult to identify the 
owners of this capital and creating divisions among workers who produce this profit.  
Although the concept of “scattered hegemonies”
19
 illustrates how the subjectivities of the 
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oppressors and the oppressed are multiple and shifting, I see these local and flexible 
hegemonies as supported by the global political economy, whose wealth is concentrated 
in multinational corporations based in Western and Northern countries, in institutions of 
global governance such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and in Washington, D.C.
20
  I share Valentine Moghadam’s belief that the “nexus of 
capital, class, and gender determines how women and men are involved in and affected 
by the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization in various parts of the 
world.”
21
      
 In addition to naming my theoretical perspective and locating myself within the 
research process, my work can also be considered “situated” through the historical, 
contextualized approach I take to my research topic.  By definition, a materialist feminist 
approach situates its subject matter both temporally and geographically and analyzes the 
economic, political, and cultural processes that shape any topic of study.  I contextualize 
my study of the development of the Russian counter-trafficking movement by analyzing 
the positions of CIS and Western activists within the capitalist world-system and within 
the counter-trafficking networks in which they participate.  This includes examining the 
economic positions of various activists and their roles within these networks as well as 
analyzing broader economic and political developments in and relationships between 
activists’ countries of origin.  I explore political relations between Russia and Western 
countries and relationships between transnational counter-trafficking networks and these 
national governments.   
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 Viewing my subject matter through a materialist feminist lens, I acknowledge the 
class differences between CIS and Western activists.  On the whole, during the time 
period of my research study, Westerners had more access to resources and more 
publishing power, and hailed from countries that provided the majority of funding for 
counter-trafficking work.  In contrast, Russia was the country receiving counter-
trafficking funds and was viewed as a main site of the problem where intervention needed 
to take place.  My analysis of class differences will of necessity recognize the complex 
nature of class relations between activists.  In the networks that I observe, there is not a 
dichotomous relationship between two separate and distinct classes, but more complex 
patterns of interactions involving multiple subjects and groups.  Thus, for example, I 
must be sensitive to the positioning of disaporic CIS or Western activists who participate 
in the counter-trafficking networks I study, in addition to others who do not neatly fit into 
the “CIS” or “Western” categories.       
 Finally, as a materialist feminist, my research is geared not only to theorizing 
about counter-trafficking networks but also to participating in change within these 
networks.  As a Westerner engaged in relationships with activists while also analyzing 
these relationships, my presence and my research necessarily impacted my field site.  
Drawing upon Naples’s discussion of standpoint epistemology as “achieved in 
community” and as “shifting over time and place,” I, like Naples, “recognize the agency 
of research subjects who also contribute to what can be seen and how to interpret what 
comes into view.”
22
  As such, I incorporated the insights of my participants in collecting 
and analyzing my research data.  While my participants assisted in the gathering of my 
research material, I also hope that the research process provided them with valuable 
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insights about their relationships and their work.  In addition, while in the field, I 
attempted to constantly improve my role as a researcher in that particular setting and 
improve my ability to contribute to the organization’s work.   
 
1.1.2 Research Methodology 
In light of the dual aims of my research project both to historically contextualize the 
development of the Russian movement against human trafficking through a broad 
analysis of the economic, political, and societal factors that gave rise to this movement, 
and to carry out a detailed case study of the work and achievements of the Angel 
Coalition, the movement’s leading organization, I employ a range of methods to tackle 
these goals.   
 First, to provide an historical contextualization of both the global forces and the 
particular conditions in Russia that gave rise to this movement, I carry out an analysis of 
primary and secondary textual materials.  The primary sources that I analyze in 
constructing this history include the texts of international conventions, national laws, 
speeches by national officials, and reports from United Nations conferences.  In addition, 
I consult secondary sources that analyze these materials and that examine the history of 
the international movement against human trafficking, the international women’s 
movement, and the movement by Western countries to develop civil societies in 
developing and post-socialist countries, as well as sources on contemporary 
developments in these fields.  The secondary sources I consult include both scholarly 
analyses in books and journal articles, and journalistic accounts in newspapers and 
magazines.  These textual materials enable me to contextualize the development of the 




analyze the economic, political, and social processes that shaped this movement.  
Additionally, I draw upon textual materials in order to better understand the political 
relationships between Russian and Western countries, and relationships between national 
governments and counter-trafficking networks.   
 Second, to provide a detailed case study of the work of the Angel Coalition (AC), 
I employ the qualitative methods of participant observation, interviewing, and analysis of 
textual materials produced by the AC.  By utilizing the methods of interviewing and 
participant observation, I seek to understand AC activists’ worlds and the meanings they 
impart to the processes and structures in which they are involved.  In particular, I inquire 
into the roles the participants play in the organization, their views on human trafficking, 
the goals they have in their activist work, and their relationships with other activists.  
Additionally, I carry out an analysis of AC publications, such as research reports, 
newsletters, pamphlets, brochures, and website materials, as further sources of 
information which may support and/or contradict the data I gather in interviews.  I 
compare the “official” representation of organizations’ work through their published 
documents with what I learn from individual activists.   
 My use of qualitative methods in conducting a case study of the AC reflects my 
purpose of seeking to understand my participants’ worlds.  My understanding of 
qualitative research closely follows that of Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln: 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world.  It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible.  
These practices transform the world.  They turn the world into a series of 




recordings, and memos to the self.  At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world.  This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or 
to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.
23
 
In my research, I draw upon several components of this definition.  Working from 
a materialist feminist perspective, I aim not only to describe the world, but also to 
participate in its transformation.  Hence, I was an active participant in the organization I 
studied.  Following this, I remained aware of my presence in the research site and I 
located myself within the site in my research data and findings.  I recognize how my 
research findings arose through interpretation and through interactions with my 
participants and do not represent some supposed “objective reality.”  For this reason, I 
follow an interpretive, interactionist approach to qualitative data collection and analysis.  
Because of these goals, maintaining dialogue with my participants and reflecting on my 
role within the field setting was important during the duration of my fieldwork.       
Employing these methods will allow me to gain a deeper understanding of the 
participants’ worlds and to better convey this understanding to my audience.  As argued 
by many qualitative researchers, the use of multiple methods strengthens research 
findings.
24
  While this approach has traditionally been referred to as “triangulation,” 
Laurel Richardson replaces the image of a triangle with that of a crystal in her conception 
of the research process.  In contrast to the concept of “triangulation,” which implies that 
an object of study can be fully understood by viewing it from all sides, “crystallization” 
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recognizes that there is no singular reality, but instead multiple perspectives, voices, and 
interactions that continuously shape the world and the representations that researchers 
construct of the world.  Richardson writes that the crystal “combines symmetry and 
substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, 
multidimensionalities, and angles of approach.  Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not 
amorphous.  Crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and refract within 
themselves.”
25
  In recognizing the multiple influences that shape my findings, not only 
my research methods, but also my theoretical perspective, the voices of my participants, 
and the interactions among all these influences, I draw upon the crystal as an organizing 
metaphor for my research project.  While I do not aim to capture “objective reality” in 
my research, I do seek to represent the meanings that circulate in my research setting and 
that drive the work of counter-trafficking networks.   
 Following this, the methods that I choose also reflect my theoretical perspective 
as a materialist feminist.  Working from this perspective, I am aware of the unbalanced 
power relationships that are common in transnational activist networks, but also of the 
power imbalance between researcher and participant.  Therefore, like other feminist 
researchers, I attempt to utilize methods that will help to reduce the power difference in 
the researcher-participant relationship.  Although the methods of open-ended 
interviewing and participant observation that I employ are generally seen as addressing 
this power divide because they give participants greater voice in how they are 
represented, these methods also create new challenges in the research process.  Namely, I 
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must work to balance my voice with participants’ voices in the final research report and 
to avoid exploitation of friendships forged through the research process.   
I attempted to address these challenges by maintaining reflexivity and dialogue 
with participants throughout the research process.  In regards to reflexivity, I engaged in 
reflexive memoing during the processes of data collection and analysis, and I discuss my 
role in the research setting in the report of my case study in chapter 6.  In following a 
dialogic approach, I explained my research goals and procedures to participants before 
beginning data collection and asked them to review and sign informed consent forms, 
which had been approved by the University of Maryland, College Park Institutional 
Review Board.
26
  During the data collection stage, I privileged participants’ voices when 
seeking out leads for further questioning and inquiry.  During the early data analysis 
stage, I requested participants’ feedback regarding emerging themes and findings.  
Remaining in dialogue with my participants during the research process allowed me to 
privilege their words, their conceptual frameworks, and the connections they draw 
between different phenomena, instead of trying to fit their lives into a predetermined 
theoretical framework.  However, my dialogic approach had limits, as I was not in 
dialogue with my participants during the final stages of my research analysis and the 
writing up of my dissertation, and the final conclusions are mine alone.  Expanding the 
role of participants in the data analysis and writing up stages of research is a goal I would 
like to pursue in future research endeavors.  I discuss my processes of data collection and 
analysis in more detail in chapter 6.   
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The validity and reliability of my case study are strengthened by the interactive 
analysis of data from the multiple methods I employ.
27
  In addition, I enhance the validity 
of my study through quality craftsmanship throughout all stages of the research process.  
Following Steinar Kvale, I understand quality craftsmanship to include “continually 
checking, questioning, and theoretically interpreting the findings.”
28
  As Kvale states, “In 
a craftsmanship approach to validation, the emphasis is moved from inspection at the end 
of the production line to quality control throughout the stages of knowledge 
production.”
29
  In applying this approach to my research, I built regular checks into my 
processes of data collection and analysis.  These checks included considering many 
different interpretations of the research data, looking for evidence that contradicted 
emerging themes and theories, analyzing exceptions or extreme cases to emerging 
patterns to better understand the complexity of my participants’ worlds, attempting to 
validate patterns by checking for multiple instances of such patterns, discussing my 
emerging themes with participants, and being reflexive about the assumptions I bring into 
the research process and the effect I have on the research setting.  In addition, I checked 
the validity and reliability of my study by considering my conclusions in light of research 
conducted in similar topical areas.  This approach to validity complements the 
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1.2 Research Questions and Chapter Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six chapters that enable me to chart the 
myriad of forces that influenced the development of the Russian movement against 
human trafficking.  While I seek to illuminate the specific historical factors that gave rise 
to this movement, I also aim to apply insights from my study to more general questions 
about how transnational advocacy networks operate and how they can more effectively 
and democratically produce change on the national and international levels.  Therefore, in 
this dissertation, my research is directed at answering the following questions: 
1. What social, political, and economic conditions existed in Russia during this time 
period (1998-2008) that allowed human trafficking to flourish while also enabling 
the development of a movement to counter this practice?   
2. How can TANs, such as transnational advocacy networks against human 
trafficking, influence the policy and practice of states on important social issues, 
such as the issue of human trafficking? 
3. What insights can transnational feminist theory offer to enhance the effectiveness 
and egalitarian practices of TANs? 
 In chapter 2, “The Concept of ‘Civil Society,’ and the Push by Western 
Governments to Promote Civil Society Growth in Developing and Post-Socialist 
Countries,” I discuss the theoretical development of the concept of civil society, review 
various understandings of the concept, and set out the definition of “civil society” that I 
use in this dissertation.  In addition, I review the establishment of foreign aid programs 
by Western governments, especially the United States, designed to promote the growth of 




purposes behind these programs by donor governments and the effects of such programs 
on the countries in which they were implemented.  Although civil society aid programs 
grew out of Western development and democracy funding to countries in Latin America, 
Africa, and South Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, they were extended to Russia and other 
post-socialist countries after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  This chapter provides 
the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the following chapters, in which I 
specifically examine Russian societal conditions that contributed to the emergence and 
operation of the Russian movement against human trafficking. 
 In chapter 3, “The Development of Russian Civil Society, 1991-2008,” I narrow 
my focus to examine the development of civil society in Russia in the post-Soviet era.  I 
review the political, economic, and social changes that occurred during the transition 
period and discuss how these changes impacted the emerging shape of Russia’s civil 
society.  Additionally, I examine the flow of foreign aid from the West, primarily from 
the United States, to Russia to assist in the economic and political transition, and consider 
how the implementation of these aid programs affected the developing post-cold war 
relationship between Russian and the West.  While analyzing civil society aid programs 
in terms of their impact on Russian-Western relations, I highlight the agency of Russian 
civil society activists who took advantage of available foreign funds to construct a civil 
society that was in line with their activist visions and responsive to the needs of their 
communities.  Thus, while both Russian governmental policies and the availability of 
significant amounts of foreign aid impacted the growth of Russia’s post-Soviet civil 




utilized available resources and navigated around political and economic obstacles to 
play the lead role in establishing the scope and direction of civil society growth.    
 Chapter 4, “The Development of the Russian Women’s Movement, 1991-2008,” 
examines the particular impact of the post-Soviet transition on women and the emergence 
of a women’s movement to counter the negative consequences of the transition period 
and to provide a platform for women to contribute their voices to the important social 
reforms occurring during this period.  I begin with a brief overview of women’s 
organizing in Russia from a historical perspective, particularly focusing on the gendered 
structure of life under the Soviet Union and women’s responses to opportunities or lack 
of opportunities to improve their lives during this era.  Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, women activists seized the opportunity to organize and to work for the 
betterment of their communities.  I discuss the arrival of Western feminists in Russia, 
their contributions to the development of Russia’s women’s movement, and the growing, 
but often challenging, relationships between Western and Russian women activists.   
Likewise, I analyze the arrival of foreign aid targeted towards Russian women’s 
organizations, and discuss how the availability of these funds shaped the development of 
Russia’s women’s movement.  Although civil society aid specifically directed at Russian 
women’s organizations had many of the same impacts as did aid directed at Russian civil 
society as a whole, the Russian crisis center movement on the issue of gendered violence 
proved to be an exception to the pattern of short-term, unsustainable funding that had 
stimulated the founding, and eventual closure, of many women’s organizations.
30
  
Instead, the relatively large amounts of aid directed at crisis centers, the commitment of 
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the movement’s leaders, and the resonance of crisis centers with the needs of Russian 
society enabled the crisis center movement to flourish and to provide a strong foundation 
out of which the Russian movement against human trafficking would emerge at the turn 
of the twenty-first century.   
 In chapter 5, “Transnational Movements against Human Trafficking, 1800s to 
2008,” I review the development of international movements against human trafficking, 
from campaigns against white slavery at the turn of the twentieth century, the decline in 
attention to the issue in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and the revival of a 
strong movement against human trafficking at the turn of the twenty-first century.  I 
discuss the work of feminists in initiating and leading movements against human 
trafficking, and explore how feminist debates regarding prostitution and sex work have 
informed the broader counter-trafficking movement and helped to shape the political 
divisions that mark the contemporary movement.  I examine the emergence of strong 
TANs on both sides of the prostitution debate, and the role of these TANs in the 
development and implementation of international counter-trafficking instruments, 
including the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and the U.S. Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act.  Finally, I examine the spread of counter-trafficking 
activism to Russia in the late 1990s, specific patterns of human trafficking that existed in 
Russia, and the unique counter-trafficking movement that developed through the 
combined influence of international counter-trafficking norms and funding, the assertion 
of Russian state interest concerning this issue, and the determination of activists to induce 




 In chapter 6, “A Case Study of the Angel Coalition, 1998-2008,” I present the 
findings from my qualitative study of Russia’s leading counter-trafficking organization.  I 
discuss the factors that contributed to the organization’s development and the many 
counter-trafficking projects it carried out to raise the awareness of the Russian public 
about the issue, directly assist affected individuals, develop a national response system to 
the crime, and serve as a leader of the national movement.  I analyze the AC both as a 
part of Russian civil society, examining its struggle to survive as an NGO in an 
environment with limited funding opportunities and burdensome government regulations 
on foreign-financed NGOs, and as a part of a transnational network against human 
trafficking, exploring its stance on the prostitution debate, its alliance with like-minded 
organizations and funders, and its participation in international policymaking forums.  
Through this case study, I demonstrate how a unique combination of personal and 
organizational factors enabled the AC to thrive as a sustainable organization in a volatile 
environment and to amass the influence needed to push the Russian state to action on the 
issue of human trafficking.   
 In chapter 7, “Conclusion,” I summarize my research findings and suggest how 
these findings can contribute to the further development of theory on transnational civil 
society and transnational feminism.  My contribution to scholarship on transnational civil 
society is to suggest ways that NGOs in states with closed political environments can 
utilize their resources and their transnational ties to navigate around political obstacles 
and press their governments for change.  In regards to scholarship on transnational 
feminism, I draw upon insights from my case study of cross-cultural activists working 




networks can further promote the values of egalitarianism, democracy, and respect for 
diversity within their ranks.  I argue that, through the development of progressive, 
egalitarian organizing practices, transnational feminist networks can serve as leaders in 
the area of cross-cultural communication in the growing transnational civil society arena.  
In strengthening communication and organizing practices among their diverse members, 
transnational advocacy networks will only enhance their effectiveness in acting as 
representatives of the global public and in pushing states and intergovernmental 




Chapter 2: The Concept of “Civil Society” and the Push by Western 
Governments to Promote Civil Society Growth in Developing and Post-
Socialist Countries  
 
In charting the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking and 
the founding of its leading organization, the Angel Coalition, it is important to 
understand the domestic and international factors that gave rise to this movement.  
The confluence of several global forces, namely, the international women’s 
movement, the international movement against human trafficking, and the push by 
Western countries to promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-
socialist countries, created conditions in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s that 
facilitated the emergence of a domestic counter-trafficking movement.  In this 
chapter, I examine the efforts by Western countries to strengthen civil societies in 
developing and post-socialist countries in order to illuminate the political goals and 
interests that lay behind such foreign aid programs and the impact such programs had 
on bilateral relations between countries providing such aid and those receiving it.   
 As will be discussed in this chapter, “civil society aid” programs administered 
by Western countries grew out of their more general “democracy aid”
1
 programs to 
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 and later, post-socialist countries.  Thus, one of the main purposes of 
civil society aid programs was to promote the development of democratic political 
systems in line with Western understandings of democracy.  As a “healthy civil 
society” came to be seen as an essential component of a “healthy democracy,” 
Western countries, led by the United States, increasingly incorporated aid directed at 
civil society development in their foreign aid budgets.  In the eyes of Western 
policymakers, this approach had the added benefit of placing assistance funds directly 
in the hands of activists or average citizens in these countries, and bypassing 
government officials, many of whom had come to be seen as corrupt after 
mishandling funds provided under earlier democracy aid programs.  Such democracy 
aid programs existed alongside other foreign aid programs, including programs of 
economic and military aid.   
 As democracy aid programs emerged during the cold war era, they were 
largely aimed at providing assistance to developing countries, which were viewed as 
vulnerable to Soviet influence.  Hence, an implicit goal of such programs was to draw 
these countries closer into the U.S. sphere of influence and away from the threat of 
Soviet cooptation.  Thus, when Russia itself, the former leader of the Soviet Union, 
became a recipient of these aid programs in the 1990s, it made for a unique, and 
paradoxical, situation.  As the former head of an expansive empire, Russia was 
accustomed to doling out funds and benefits to its allied countries, not the other way 
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around.  However, with the fall of the Soviet Union causing a major shift in global 
power relations, Russia was open to a new global structure, in which it renewed its 
allegiance with “the West” and accepted Western assistance to rebuild its economic 
and political systems to more closely resemble the Western models. 
3
   
In this chapter, I tell the beginning parts of this story, as I review the 
development of Western programs to promote democracy and civil society and the 
initial efforts to implement such programs in the former Soviet Union in the early 
1990s.  In the next chapter, I will continue this story and go into more detail on the 
specific consequences of such Western aid to Russia.  However, first, I begin with a 
theoretical discussion on the concept of “civil society,” and on the relationship of 
“civil society” to “the state,” which takes different forms in different national 
contexts, in order to better understand the interest of Western countries in promoting 
the development of this societal sector.  I examine different models of “civil society-
state relations” in Western and post-Soviet countries, and review how these models 
reflect the differing social histories and political structures on which they are based.  
Although civil societies can take on the role of either cooperative partner or 
opposition figure to the state, the very existence of a civil society implies a degree of 
democracy, in that independent social or political organizing is permitted to occur 
outside of state structures.   
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2.1 Understanding the Concept of “Civil Society” 
What is “civil society” and how is it related to government?  Various literatures 
employ contrasting meanings of the concept and include different actors under this 
umbrella term.  In this section, I provide an overview of the development of the 
concept of civil society, discuss differing ways the concept is used in the literatures to 
be covered in this dissertation, and present the definition that will be employed in the 
remainder of this text. 
 
2.1.1 History of the Concept of “Civil Society” in Western Thought 
Although many theorists throughout the history of Western thought, including John 
Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, G. W. F. 
Hegel, Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and Alexis de Tocqueville, among others, have 
contributed to the development of this concept,
4
 civil society was much neglected in 
the modern era both as a subject of scholarly interest and as a tool for political 
analysis until capturing popular attention in the 1980s.  A major catalyst for this 
renewal of interest was the emergence of the dissident movements in Eastern 
Europe.
5
  After decades of authoritarian rule in Soviet bloc countries, usually with 
little space for the organization of groups not sponsored by the government, the 
success of these movements in uniting populations and igniting revolutions that ended 
Soviet rule led scholars, policymakers, grant providers, and average citizens to gain 
interest in the concept of civil society as a positive, constructive force that can help 
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maintain democracy in the world.  During this same period, human rights movements 
developed in South America as countries on that continent adopted democratic forms 
of government, which strengthened the conclusion that a strong “civil society” is 
important to promoting democracy.
6
   
 One of the most influential scholars to publish during this period was Robert 
Putnam, whose 1993 book Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy laid out a neo-Tocquevillian theory of civil society upon which both scholars 
and practitioners of democracy aid would base their work for years to come.  In the 
book, Putnam examines the development of regional governments across Italy 
starting in 1970 and argues that the “more civic” regions, characterized “by a dense 
network of local associations, by active engagement in community affairs, by 
egalitarian patterns of politics, by trust and law-abidingness” established more 
effective governments with greater levels of citizen satisfaction than “less civic” 
regions characterized by lack of citizen involvement in civic associations, suspicion, 
corruption, and lawlessness.
7
  He contends that “social capital,” such as networks and 
norms of reciprocity and trust among individuals, promotes collaborative decision 
making, which is an essential feature of democracy.   
Putnam invokes Alexis de Tocqueville often in his work, reviving 
Tocqueville’s emphasis on the importance of associations for democratic governance.  
A Frenchman visiting “the most democratic country on the face of the earth” in the 
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 Tocqueville sought to understand the benefits and dangers of the American 
form of democracy in order to transport its most favorable aspects to French soil.  
Arguing that the United States was the only country “where the citizens enjoy 
unlimited freedom of association for political purposes,” Tocqueville examined the 
impact of such freedom on democracy.
9
  He notes, “When the members of a 
community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will 
combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones.”
10
  Furthermore, 
“Civil associations… facilitate political associations; but, on the other hand, political 
association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes.”
11
  
Admiring the American tendency to “constantly form associations” for a multitude of 
purposes,
12
 Tocqueville concludes: 
Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be 
more precise and clear than all others.  If men are to remain civilized or 
become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same 




Building upon Tocqueville’s argument, Putnam contends that when citizens 
interact frequently in voluntary associations (Putnam emphasizes non-political 
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associations such as soccer clubs, choral societies, bird watching groups, literary 
circles, etc.), they build “habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness,” 
democratic values that incline them to become involved in public affairs.
14
  When 
such values are deeply imbedded in a society, the population is more likely to become 
active in decision-making processes and to be willing to compromise with other 
individuals and groups.  At the same time, citizens in “civic” communities expect 
better government and are prepared to act collectively to achieve it, leading to more 
stable and effective democratic institutions.
15
  Thus, Putnam concludes, a vibrant civil 
society strengthens democratic governance.  He later furthered this conclusion with 
his research on civil society in the United States.
16
  In the transition period in post-
Soviet countries, practitioners of democracy aid and scholars on the region’s growing 
civil societies seized upon Putman’s argument to support the idea that active and free 
civil societies would help democracy succeed in the region.   
Putnam’s theory of civil society helped popularize the concept in modern-day 
scholarship and has guided the efforts of many practitioners of democracy aid since 
the early 1990s; however, to better understand how the term is employed in the 
literatures of concern, I will review the broader theoretical foundations of the concept.  
Historically, the concepts of “civil society” and of “democracy” have often been tied 
together, because civil society, as understood by many theorists, emerges when the 
public is no longer subsumed under state domination and instead establishes an arena 
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that can interact with the state.  As Adam Seligman argues, “It is after all the very 
existence of a free and equal citizenry—of that autonomous, agentic individual—of 
the private subject that makes civil society possible at all.”
17
 He notes: 
The concept of civil society as a collective entity existing independently of the 
State has… been critical to the history of Western political thought…. And 
although the concept of civil society was defined differently by the different 
theorists of the French, Scottish, and German Enlightenments, what was 
common to all attempts to articulate a notion of civil society was the 
problematic relation between the private and the public, the individual and the 




Seligman traces the emergence of the concept of civil society to the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a period of societal and economic 
transformation across Europe and North America.  Seligman writes, “The general 
crisis of the seventeenth century—the commercialization of land, labor, and capital; 
the growth of market economies; the age of discoveries; and the English and later 
North American and continental revolutions—all brought into question the existing 
models of social order and of authority.”
19
  As people began to challenge the 
generally accepted notion of social order as determined by an external force, such as 
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God, King, or tradition, the concept of civil society arose in European social thought 
as a model for explaining the workings of society.
20
 
Jurgen Habermas, like Seligman, locates the advent of civil society (which he 
refers to as the “public sphere of civil society”) in Europe to the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, but focuses specifically on the role of the early capitalist 
commercial economy in bringing about this societal development.  Whereas under 
feudal society, rulers presented laws to their subjects with no expectation of debate, 
early capitalism produced a class of merchants, bankers, and entrepreneurs that was 
influential enough to challenge state regulations disagreeable to their interests.  Early 
capitalist commercial economies and the nation states that arose on their basis shook 
up the old social order and required new understandings of the “public” and the 
“private” spheres.
21
  This development was understood as ending state domination, by 
requiring laws to be debated in public by members of the “bourgeois public sphere,” 
which, in truth, was formed by a small minority of people.
 22
    
In the eighteenth century, publics expanded due, in part, to the proliferation of 
the press and campaigns for general franchise.  Whereas, previously, the bourgeois 
public sphere presented a relatively unified front to the state, the entry of the 
“common people” into the public sphere created an arena of competing interests.  
Habermas notes, “Laws passed under the ‘pressure of the street’ could hardly be 
understood any longer as embodying the reasonable consensus of publicly debating 
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  In place of a sphere that stood in opposition to state domination, 
the enlarged public sphere was composed of competing interest groups lobbying the 
state with their individual demands, which contributed to the formation of a 
centralized, bureaucratized state to meet these demands.   
Habermas contends that these societal changes led to the “breakdown of the 
public sphere”: “While it penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its 
political function, namely: that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to the 
control of a political public.”
24
  Habermas’s description of the public sphere as a force 
opposing state domination, or in its weakened form, serving as a check on state 
power, differs from the theory set out by Tocqueville and Putnam, which focuses on 
voluntary cooperation between civil society and the state, and plays an important role 
in current scholarly debates on the function of civil society.   
In recent years, many civil society scholars have emphasized contradictions in 
theorizations of the concept and have developed models to explain variations in civil 
society development in differing contexts.  Michael Foley and Bob Edwards review 
what they call the “two broad versions of ‘the civil society argument’” and find fault 
with both of them due to a lack of attention to political variables.
25
  What they call the 
“Civil Society I argument,” represented by Putnam and Tocqueville, among others, 
stresses the importance of voluntary associations in inculcating norms of trust, 
reciprocity, and cooperation among citizens and groups of citizens.  In this version, 
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cooperative relations between civil society and the state help to maintain healthy 
democratic practices.  Putnam, their chosen spokesperson for the Civil Society I 
argument, stresses the importance of “inclusive” and “cross-cutting” nonpolitical 
associations, such as choral societies or bird-watching clubs, that do not lobby for 
special interests and that are open to all individuals, regardless of political orientation, 
because they enable citizens with diverse backgrounds and interests to come together 
and learn the value of cooperation and compromise.
26
  Foley and Edwards contend 
that Putnam’s neglect of political associations is due to “the fear that if such 
associations follow too closely the pattern of divisive political solidarities, they may 
well sharpen social cleavages and actually undermine the capacity for effective 
governance.”
27
   
In contrast to this position, the “Civil Society II argument,” which Foley and 
Edwards maintain was advocated by scholars on and activists involved in the 
democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, emphasizes civil 
society as a sphere that is separate from the state and is capable of guarding against 
tyrannical rule.  In this version, the oppositional nature of civil society is said to 
strengthen democracy by preventing the state from backsliding into authoritarianism.  
This argument stresses the importance of nonpolitical associations because, “[i]n 
contexts of democratic transition, …where established political parties have been 
repressed, weakened, or used as tools by the authoritarian state, autonomy from 
traditional politics seems to be a prerequisite for oppositional advocacy.”
28
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Foley and Edwards argue that both broad civil society arguments neglect the 
“political variable,” and they emphasize how specifically political associations and 
advocacy groups do much of the work of upholding democratic practices.  Theorists 
of civil society, they argue, must pay attention to the context in which these theories 
developed.  Tocqueville and Putnam discovered more cooperative relations between 
civil society and the state, they maintain, because they were studying established, 
stable democracies where the rules of the game had already been set.  In contrast, 
activists in Eastern Europe and Latin America were attempting to create an 
independent sphere to counter state tyranny, and thus they focused on the 
oppositional nature of civil society.  Additionally, Foley and Edwards stress that 
theorists must recognize the interdependence between the spheres of civil society and 
the state.  The “paradox of civil society,” they explain, “is that a democratic civil 
society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require 
a strong and responsive state.”
29
  Thus, in their theorization, civil society in most 
contexts is neither subservient to the state nor totally opposed to it.  Instead, the 
relations between these two spheres remain complex, with multiple checks of power 
and overlaps characterizing their relationship.       
 
2.1.2 Liberal and Statist Models of Civil Society: Which Model is Best for Russia? 
Scholars have developed models of civil society with the specific aim of explaining 
the different trajectories of civil society development in the West and in Russia.  
While some scholars use other labels for these contrasting models, here I follow 
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Henry Hale, who has provided one of the most thorough discussions on such theories, 
in referring to them as the “liberal model” and the “statist model.”
30
  
To summarize such theories, a liberal conception of state-civil society 
relations is based on the assumption that states tend towards authoritarianism and that 
the function of civil society is to prevent the state from becoming too powerful.  
These assumptions are based on the writings of such theorists as John Locke and John 
Stuart Mill, who, according to Vladimir Shlapentokh, “distinguished ‘natural liberty’ 
and the freedom to choose one’s government as the necessary conditions ‘for the 
progress of civilization.’”
31
  In a liberal civil society, groups and organizations should 
be as autonomous from the state as possible and should promote the interests of their 
constituency to the state in a setting in which other groups and organizations are 
representing their own constituencies.
32
  Thus, such a model assumes competition 
between groups for scarce resources.  Structurally, this model “envisions society as a 
set of associations standing between the private sphere (encompassing individual and 
family activities) and the state, acting independently of the state.”
33
   
George Hudson argues that such a model of civil society develops when 
independent groups form at the beginning of the nation-building process, as occurred 
in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In such a “bottom-up” 
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model, as Hudson refers to it, “civic groups form spontaneously and influence the 
government, directly or indirectly.”
34
  Hale adds that, while support for the liberal 
model is not unique to the United States: 
[T]he dominance of this view in American policymaking and academic circles 
can be seen as growing out of the American political experience…. The 
founders of the American polity proceeded from a strong tradition of local 
self-government.  Their ability to realize the benefits of a larger polity, given 
this tradition of localism, could only be achieved politically by building in 




In contrast to the liberal understanding of civil society, the statist conception 
of state-civil society relations is based on the assumption that a strong state is 
desirable and that civil society should support the strengthening of the state.  This 
model draws from classical thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, who “believed that 
‘order’ and effective law enforcement were the primary conditions for human 
survival.”
36
  In place of interest groups competing to gain state resources for their 
own particular constituencies, the statist model prefers a stable mechanism of “two-
way transmission of interests between the state and nonstate society.”
37
  With less 
time wasted in debates and lobbying sessions, it is assumed that a cooperative 
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relationship between civil society and the state will allow the state to more effectively 
meet the needs of its citizens.   
While the liberal model advocates that civil society should structurally be 
independent from the state, the statist model “sees the state and society as integrally 
related, part of the same organic whole.  Indeed, the state itself grows out of and 
cannot be distinguished clearly from society since the state is inhabited, constituted, 
and continually reconstituted by individuals who are themselves ‘also’ part of society 
in capacities outside their roles as state employees.”
38
  This model assumes that a 
cooperative relationship between civil society and the state will prevent the state from 
becoming too powerful, but that the state must also place restrictions on civil society 
to prevent it from becoming destructive to the state, e.g., by criticizing national 
history and culture or becoming overly confrontational.  Thus, the state should take 
an active role in developing a civil society that would support state functioning.   
In such a “top-down” model, as Hudson refers to it, “the government may 
initiate or otherwise encourage the formation of civic groups by creating policies and 
procedures that, in turn, yield the conditions for the groups to be established.”
39
  Hale 
argues that support for a statist model of state-society relations in the Russian 
political establishment is due to Russia’s history and political culture.  Writing in 
2002, he states: 
[T]he experience of the past ten years, with its precipitous decline in stability, 
security, and incomes for a majority of people, has done much to associate the 
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lack of state control over nonstate society with problems resulting from the 
particular path chosen after communist rule collapsed.
40
 
Thus, Hale concludes, while Americans’ primary fear is tyranny, the most pressing 
fear for Russians is anarchy.  The models of civil society that have developed in these 
two states reflect their underlying national values and histories.   
Scholars on Russian civil society have debated which of these two models are 
more appropriate for post-Soviet Russia.  In the years preceding the collapse of 
communism, many scholars argue, the roots of a “liberal model” of civil society, or a 
model following the “Civil Society II argument” described by Foley and Edwards, 
began to take hold in Russia, with civil society opposing communist authorities and 
precipitating the fall of the Soviet empire.  While not amassing the strength of 
oppositional civil societies in some Eastern European countries, civil society actors in 
Russia did appear in the late 1980s to challenge the authority of the state.  
Shlapentokh writes, “The true expansion of Russian civil society began in 1987 when 
Gorbachev’s perestroika took its liberal course…. The advocates of liberal capitalism 
in the Soviet Union became committed enemies of the state.”
41
  Shlapentokh argues 
that a liberal civil society in Russia reached its peak between 1988-1991, when 
thousands of informal organizations were founded, a national miners’ strike led the 
population to put its faith in a new political opposition, and the first free elections 
were held in the Soviet Union.  By 1990, he writes, millions of people were 
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participating in political activism meetings across the country to oppose the 
Communist Party.
42
   
After 1991, however, liberal civil society declined as political and economic 
reforms such as “shock therapy” were put into place from above with little 
consultation with civil society actors.  Shlapentokh writes, “The process of 
privatization demoralized society, established corruption as a normal part of Russian 
life and made the masses politically indifferent and highly individualistic.”
43
  
Alexander Domrin argues that the refusal of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 
to meet with the Civic Union, “the most promising and influential democratic 
organization standing in opposition to the domestic and foreign policies of the 
Russian government in general, and to the disastrous course of Anatolii Chubais’s 
privatization and the experiments of market bolsheviks with the Russian economy in 
particular,” signaled that the state no longer desired to cooperate with civil society.
44
  
Shlapentokh contends that an even stronger message was sent in October 1993, when 
Yeltsin used tanks to dismantle the Russian parliament and arrest its leaders, 
symbolizing the end of the fledging liberal era of Russian civil society.
45
   
David Ost, writing about the role of civil society in ending communist rule in 
Poland, notes a pattern in many countries’ post-communist transitions: “[A]ll of civil 
society was now pushed to the background.  It had made political democracy 
possible, but now that democracy existed, its role was to accept these changes 
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  In Russia, in place of average citizens calling for change, after 1991, 
elites took control of the process of reform, many with the aim of obtaining personal 
advantages through the privatization of the economy.  In what several scholars 
recognize as the “betrayal of civil society,” intellectual leaders of the oppositional 
movements abandoned the masses to join the elites in seeking economic and political 
benefits in the transition period.
47
  Leaders of the liberal movement asked their 
followers for patience and trust as Russian authorities and their Western advisors 
steered the transition process; as they waited, the long-awaited outcomes of 




After 1991-1993, many scholars contend, a more statist model of state-civil 
society relations began to develop in Russia.
49
  Hudson writes, “Since 1991 the 
Russian government has been a sponsor and, it says, a protector of civil society by 
passing national legislation to guarantee the existence of civic groups and to regulate 
them at the same time….It thus reinforces the role of the center in civil society.”
50
  In 
Shlapentokh’s terms, after 1993, a liberal feudal civil society emerged in which the 
central government remained weak and a small elite “enjoyed freedoms and a degree 
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of influence on the ruling of society.”
51
  Namely, he writes, administrative officials, 
tycoons, oligarchs, and criminal structures disproportionately benefited from and 
exerted influence over developments in Russian society, while the central government 
and the masses played limited roles.  Shlapentokh contends that Russian leadership 
wanted to encourage a mix of liberal and statist elements in civil society that would 
pose the weakest challenge to the power of the president and the elite.
52
  He writes: 
When [Russian President Vladimir] Putin came to power he curtailed the 
activity of the NGOs that claimed to influence the central administration, 
while governors and mayors did the same at the local level.  Though the 
Kremlin made the development of genuine civil society impossible, it took 
great trouble to give the impression that it supported the creation of civil 
society.  The Kremlin was convinced that a good civil society should trust the 
government, cooperate with it “on the basis of dialogue” and offer “additional 
resources” that would help the state achieve its goals.  There was, of course, 
never a word about how civil society would influence the state.
53
   
Writing in 2003, Shlapentokh argues that, despite Putin’s firm approach, oligarchs 
continued to grow in power and even joined the Kremlin in creating mimicked 
independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs).   
Scholars remain divided, however, on which model is the most advantageous 
for Russia.  Shlapentokh notes that both liberal and statist influences existed in post-
Soviet civil society but emphasizes the importance and necessity of the statist 
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elements.  Shlapentokh points to the government’s establishment of the Civic Forum 
in 2001 as an illustration of the strengthening of the statist model.  While the stated 
purpose of the Forum was to unite the efforts of “all non-governmental organizations 
and the state for the creation of genuine civil society in Russia,” Shlapentokh notes 
that independent organizations perceived to pose a threat to the state were not invited 
to join the Forum.
54
  A reason for excluding the stronger organizations, Shlapentokh 
suggests, was the relative weakness of the Russian state, which made it ill-prepared to 
work constructively with oppositionist groups.  This weakness, Shlapentokh argues, 
stemmed from the liberal model of civil society pushed on Russia by native reformers 
and their Western advisors, a model that “downgraded the importance of an effective 
state, which is necessary for enforcing law in society.”
55
  In such a context, 
strengthening the state took precedence over developing a liberal civil society, as a 
strong state was needed to build and enforce a legal foundation upon which civil 
society could function.   
Like Shlapentokh, Domrin also stresses the need for order and the rule of law 
in supporting healthy state-society relations.  He argues that the reforms undertaken 
by supporters of the liberal system in the 1990s led to the pillaging of Russia and a 
host of economic and social problems that plagued Russia at the turn of the twenty-
first century.  Domrin writes, “To be successful, civil society in Russia must develop 
in tandem with the strengthening of Russian statehood…. Russians are tired of the 
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state-weakening activities of radical social groups and organizations that came to 
existence at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.”
56
   
Domrin supports his arguments by referring to the results of public opinion 
polls in Russia that he says demonstrate the public’s lack of trust in civic 
organizations and the democratic process.  One such poll, conducted in 2000, found 
that 81 percent of Russians believed that order was the “most important issue for the 
country at present,” “even if it is necessary to break some democratic principles and 
limit people’s personal freedoms to establish it.”
57
  Another poll, conducted in 2001, 
found that “only 5 percent of Russian citizens are active in public organizations, 73 
percent said they would not like to work in any public organization, versus 15 percent 
who said that they would.”
58
  Domrin notes that legal systems and national cultures 
develop gradually over centuries, and that a vibrant civil society cannot be expected 
to flourish in Russia only in a matter of decades.  Writing in 2003, he states that 
Russia was in a state of crisis and that “destitute people are unable to form a civil 
society.”
59
  Instead, he argues, Russians must focus on strengthening the Russian 
state.   
 While Shlapentokh and Domrin support a more statist model of state-civil 
society relations in Russia, Hudson and Hale suggest that a liberal model may in fact 
be more beneficial in the Russian context.  Like Shlapentokh, Hudson discusses the 
Civic Forum, but he views the event differently.  While Shlapentokh emphasizes the 
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groups that were excluded, Hudson stresses the Forum as a constructive first step 
taken by the government in developing a “partnership” between state institutions and 
NGOs.
60
  Hudson points to several trends that demonstrate the potential of a liberal 
civil society in Russia, including the large number and activity of NGOs, 
governmental efforts to communicate with civil society, the diverse funding sources 
of Russian organizations, and the guarantees of free speech and assembly in the 
Russian Constitution.  Based on the evidence he reviews, Hudson finds “a symbiotic 
relationship between NKOs [noncommercial organizations] and the Russian 
government that suggest a departure from the traditional Russian state-society 
relationships that Domrin discusses.”
61
  He argues that out of this symbiosis a 
vigorous civil society could grow in Russia.  
Similarly, Hale promotes the viability of a liberal model of civil society in 
Russia.  He argues that, while a statist model prioritizes the need to prevent anarchy 
over the need to prevent tyranny, the threat of tyranny is actually greater in Russia.  
He writes: 
The advantage attributed to the statist option depends on two important 
assumptions that are at least questionable in the Russian context.  The first is 
that autonomous nonstate social organizations are actually threatening to the 
state…. The second questionable assumption… is that the state itself is a 
functional institution, that it is not destructive of Russian nationhood, of 
society, or, indeed, of itself.
62
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Examining the government’s regulation of political parties, mass media, 
human rights organizations, and economic associations, Hale concludes that the 
Russian state poses a larger threat to national stability than does civil society.  He 
challenges Domrin’s conclusions regarding public opinion polls and suggests 
alternative readings of such polls.  Whereas Domrin references a poll showing that 
Russians prioritize order over democracy, Hale cites a 2000 poll that “found that only 
15 percent supported restoring order ‘at all costs’ and that a majority (51 percent) 
thought that this must be done ‘without violating rights.’” In addition, Hale notes that 
although polls have shown Russians to be mistrustful of civic organizations, they also 
show Russians to be mistrustful of state institutions.
63
  Domrin himself references this 
finding, but uses it to argue that state institutions must exert stronger control over 
Russian society.  In contrast, Hale contends that the statist approach has “tended to 
facilitate arbitrary abuses of power by state authorities, which ultimately have 
weakened the Russian state and caused the rest of society to suffer.”
64
  Hale argues, 
“[T]he uncontrolled realm of individuals that some statists fear only appears to be a 
problem because the state has not yet learned how to compromise and to work with, 
and not over, nonstate society.”
65
  While Hale agrees that the Russian state needs to 
be strengthened, he also suggests that a more independent civil society in the liberal 
tradition may be beneficial for Russia.        
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In the years after the 2002-2003 debate between the aforementioned writers, 
relations between civil society and the state continued to develop along statist lines.  
In the conclusion to their edited volume on Russian civil society published in 2006, 
Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Laura Henry write:   
Undoubtedly the Russian state plays the dominant role in state-society 
interaction.  The state’s traditional monopoly on organizational resources has 
led to its continued control over many of the institutions and funds that are 
commonly associated with civil society development.
66
 
They note that the strong presence of the state in civil society builds upon “the long-
standing Russian tradition of statism…which originated well before the Soviet 
period.”
67
  This trajectory of civil society development in Russia has led many 
scholars to question the expectation that a stronger civil society will keep the power 
of the state in check and promote democracy.  It has also caused many to debate the 
effectiveness of Western funding programs that are based on the assumption that 
Russian civil society will develop according to the liberal model.  These issues will 
be explored in more depth in chapter 3. 
 In place of the concept of “civil society,” some scholars on Russia prefer the 
idea of the “third sector.”  As James Richter explains: 
Civil society refers to an overlapping network of autonomous voluntary 
associations—formal and informal, political and nonpolitical—that creates a 
space for public action between the individual and the state…. The third 
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sector, on the other hand, refers more narrowly to the formal, functionally 
differentiated, and frequently professional nonprofit organizations that interact 
with state and market actors.
68
 
Structurally, a civil society model is based on the conception of three societal 
actors, namely, (1) the state, (2) private individuals and families, and (3) voluntary 
organizations standing between state institutions and individuals, with some theorists 
including private businesses in the civil sphere of voluntary organizations.  In 
contrast, a model of the third sector envisions a triad of (1) the state, (2) the market, 
and (3) voluntary organizations, each of which cooperates and negotiates with the 
other parties as equal partners.
69
  While the civil society model is unclear as to the 
role of private businesses, the third sector model downplays the contribution of 
informal social networks to the functioning of society.   
As norms associated with civil society, such as trust, cooperation, and 
solidarity among citizens, remained weak in Russia, some authors argue it is more 
appropriate to say that a third sector, not a civil society, emerged in the country.
70
  A 
strong civil society implies relatively open channels of communication between 
governmental institutions and citizens and the development of social movements that 
attract large constituencies based on shared beliefs among citizens.  In contrast, the 
professionalized, bureaucratized organizations that arose in Russia, often with the aid 
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of Western support, frequently served more as career-building vehicles for their staff 
than as institutions promoting horizontal, local ties among citizens.   
While arguing that a third sector has taken root in Russia, Julie Hemment and 
Richter critique the model’s suitability for the Russian context.
71
  The model is based 
on the assumption that NGOs can interact on an equal basis with the state; however, 
as noted above, the state plays the dominant role in state-society relations and permits 
limited input from civil society actors.  In addition, it is largely former elites who 
achieved leadership roles in the sector.  Thus, whereas the civil society model aimed 
to challenge the hierarchy of the old Soviet nomenklatura and give voice to the 
masses, the growth of the third sector simply reproduced traditional networks and 
practices, but this time with the support of Western governments and foundations.  
The third sector model fit easily with the Western goal of promoting democracy in 
Russia through short-term projects of building NGOs, but scholars such as Hemment 
and Richter argue that the model does not encourage far-reaching changes in Russian 
society that are necessary to sustain the democratization project.   
In light of the strong role of the state in Russian civil society, Janet Elise 
Johnson, a political scientist at Brooklyn College, sought an alternative to strict 
interpretations of liberal and statist models of civil society.  She examines and 
critiques the prevalence of “flex organizing” in Russia in which “there is a blurring of 
the lines between state institutions and [NGOs].”
72
  In this practice, “state social 
services and state university departments have created parallel NGO crisis centers so 
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that they exist as both state institutions and societal organizations.”
73
  In a situation of 
limited domestic resources, this permits such structures to be eligible for foreign 
grants to NGOs while remaining under some degree of state control.   
In place of the more statist approach of “flex organizing,” Johnson supports a 
“third way” in which state institutions and NGOs remain separate but coordinate on 
initiatives.  She discusses one of the few examples of such an arrangement that she 
found in Russia, a working group uniting activists on women’s issues and state 
officials in Barnaul that was successful in improving state-society communication and 
coordination on the issue of violence in the family.  Johnson contends that 
maintaining the boundaries between NGOs and state structures is important in 
promoting transparency in state-society relations and in strengthening democratic 
practices in Russia.  In a context in which the state is often suspicious of autonomous 
organizations, the third way allows state authorities a window into organizational 
activities while protecting the independence of NGOs and their ability to hold the 
state accountable for its promises.
74
  Johnson argues that such a delicate balance 
between independent organizing and state oversight illustrates a more realistic model 
for civil society development in Russia than the strictly liberal model of a civil 
society standing in opposition to the state.   
 
2.1.3 Outlining a Definition of “Civil Society”  
Before concluding this section, I will review definitions of civil society used in the 
literature and outline the definition to be employed in this dissertation.  Although civil 









society has been defined in a variety of ways, the definition I use must be suitable for 
the subject of this dissertation and must reflect the theoretical understandings of other 
scholars in the field, namely, the study of the democratization project of Russia and 
Eastern Europe.   
As scholars in the field recognize, many Western grant programs to aid civil 
society development in Russia were based on the theory of civil society laid out by 
Robert Putnam.  Putnam argued that voluntary associations among citizens, especially 
nonpolitical organizations, instill habits of trust, solidarity, and compromise among 
citizens that encourage them to become active participants in democracy.  Western 
governments and foundations drew upon this understanding to legitimize their aid 
programs in the region, contending that a more active citizenry would prevent the 
formerly communist regimes from slipping back into tyranny.  As scholars in the field 
note, however, most Western aid programs were designed specifically to fund NGOs 
that lobby the government on social and political issues, whereas Putnam based his 
theory on community groups without political agendas.   
The main area of contention in defining civil society in the field, then, centers 
on whether the definition should follow the theoretical understanding of civil society 
as encompassing all informal social networks, including those based on ethnicity, 
language, religion, or kinship, or follow the practical application of the concept by 
funding agencies, which centered on organizations involving citizens acting 
collectively, usually through NGOs. A broader definition of civil society as including 
all social networks could stretch the concept to such an extent that it loses its 




viewed as imposing a Western framework on a non-Western setting and obscuring 
local meaning-making systems.
75
   
As one of the aims of this dissertation is to better understand the effects of 
Western aid programs on Russian society, I draw upon the practical understanding of 
civil society in studying how NGOs and similar associations have impacted the 
dynamics of state-society interaction.  At the same time, I recognize the dangers of 
employing a definition that is too narrow.  Thus, throughout this dissertation, I remain 
aware of the differences between theoretical understandings of civil society and 
practical applications of the concept by funding agencies and acknowledge the many 
elements of Russian civil society beyond simply NGOs.   
Scholars in the field have debated which types of groups should be included 
under the umbrella term of civil society.  Most scholars are in agreement that civil 
society serves as an intermediary between state and society and that civil society 
organizations should be relatively autonomous from the state.  However, there is 
disagreement over which types of organizations serve this intermediary function and 
what degree of autonomy is necessary to be considered part of civil society.  For 
example, as discussed above, Foley and Edwards critique Putnam and others who 
downplay the role of political associations, such as political parties, in civil society 
and argue that such associations serve as the main intermediary between state and 
society by “mobilizing people and stimulating debate.”
76
  Among theorists 
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specifically studying Russian civil society, however, political parties are commonly 
left out of their definition, since most parties aim to take control of the state.  Laura 
Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom offer a definition representational of many 
scholars in the field: 
We contend that civil society is a space of citizen-directed collaborative 
action, located between the family and the state, and not directed solely 
toward private profit.  As a consequence, we exclude from our definition 
political parties (which aim to capture seats of government), business firms 
and organized crime groups (which are profit-oriented), groups employing 
violence to achieve their goals, and individual activities that are not publicly 
oriented.  Nonetheless, we argue that it is essential to consider the role played 
by business elites, organized crime networks, and for-profit and state-owned 
media outlets in the development of Russian civil society due to their 
influence on governance and the broader environment in which civil society 
operates in postcommunist Russia.
77
 
Speaking more specifically about what civil society does include, Sundstrom, 
elsewhere, writes, “Civil society is viewed most appropriately as a realm of 
collective, publicly oriented activity by non-governmental actors that is often 
formally organized (as NGOs, social movement coalitions, clubs, associations, and so 
on) but also includes many less formal networks of public discourse, such as 
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The definition of civil society that I use in this dissertation follows closely the 
above two definitions.  I employ the term civil society to mean citizen-led collective 
action, including both groups that push for societal change and those without any 
political agenda, but excluding political parties, businesses, and criminal groups.  The 
question of autonomy from the state is difficult, since many Russian NGOs are at 
least partially dependent on the government, but I include those groups led by private 
citizens and with at least some degree of independence from the state as part of civil 
society.  In addition, like most scholars, I consider that civil society groups must not 
be organized for profit or engaged in criminal activities.  While my main focus will 
be on the work of NGOs and related groups and their ability to interact with the 
government and influence change in society, I remain aware that other types of 
associations, often less formally organized, also influence societal developments and 
provide channels for state-society interaction.   
 
2.2 Democratization Programs and the Push for Civil Society 
While the previous section focused on theoretical understandings of the concept of 
“civil society,” this section explores the practical application of the concept in 
development and democratization programs.  The literature on development and 
democratization dates back further than the literature on civil society growth in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, initially examining aid programs in Latin America, 
Africa, and South Asia.  After communism collapsed and Western donors sought to 
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influence developments in the post-Soviet sphere, such programs were introduced in 
this region as well.  Examination of the broader literature is important in establishing 
the historical foundation of the aid programs that appeared in Russia.  Scholars on the 
development of Russian civil society have given little attention to this broader 
literature, although it provides insights that would be helpful in understanding the 
impact of democratization programs in Russian society.  In this section, I put these 
two literatures in conversation with each other, in order to highlight the common 
trends and impacts of democratization programs in developing and post-socialist 
countries.   
  
2.2.1 History of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs 
The movement to stimulate the development and democratization of “Third World” 
countries in the second half of the twentieth century was led by the United States, 
although several Western European states later joined this effort.  On January 20, 
1949, newly inaugurated President Harry S. Truman laid out his vision for a foreign 
aid policy that would come to serve as the foundation for many of the United States’ 
foreign aid programs in the modern era.
79
  President Truman declared: 
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas.  More than half the people of the world are 
living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are 
victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their 
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poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas 
…. I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the 
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their 
aspirations for a better life.
80
 
Of course, an underlying assumption of Truman’s foreign aid policy was that in the 
long run, the United States would benefit economically and politically from helping 
to advance the productivity of non-communist countries.
81
     
 To implement the new foreign policy to assist developing nations, Truman 
established the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in 1950.  By mid-1951, 
the TCA was working in 28 countries and the number of countries benefiting from the 
program increased annually.  Aid primarily took the form of technical assistance in 
the areas of agriculture, education, government administration, health, and 
transportation.
82
  The TCA changed names several times, becoming the International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA) in 1955 during President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
administration.  Eisenhower expanded the development aid program by adding 
financial assistance as a major component in addition to the sharing of technical 
expertise.  After several years of debate within his administration, Eisenhower 
proposed a Development Loan Fund (DLF), which Congress approved.
83
  DLF 
provided low-interest, long-term loans to support the national development plans of 
developing countries.  Samuel Hale Butterfield argues that, in the early 1950s, 
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Americans were “naively optimistic” about the potential of technical assistance to 
quickly transform the economies of developing countries.
84
  However, by the end of 
the 1950s, the U.S. foreign policy community had come to understand the complexity 
of this task and the need to provide longer term assistance.   
 Building upon the foundation for foreign aid programs established in the 
1950s, U.S. foreign assistance grew tremendously in the 1960s.  Thomas Carothers 
argues that foreign aid in the 1950s was based on a simple security rationale: 
“economic and security assistance would bolster friendly governments, whether 
dictatorial or democratic, against the spread of Soviet influence.”
85
  It was not until 
the 1960s that foreign aid began to be understood as a tool that could strengthen 
democracy abroad.  Known for its idealistic bent, the administration of President John 
F. Kennedy saw development aid as a beneficial foreign policy tool,
86
 and promoted 
the belief that the United States had the unique destiny to “help third world nations 
rise out of poverty and move from dictatorship to democracy.”
87
  The Kennedy 
administration based its strategy to achieve the dual goals of combating communism 
and supporting development on modernization theory.  As described by Carothers, 
[M]odernization theory conceived of development as a linear process ending 
up in an American-style social, economic, and political system…. Translated 
into policy terms, modernization theory promised that promoting economic 
development in the third world would simultaneously do good (reduce 
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poverty) and serve the goal of fighting communism: helping countries grow 
economically would prevent empty stomachs from making revolutions and 
would foster democratic, therefore pro-Western, systems.
88
 
Thus, although U.S. officials at the time began to link foreign aid with 
strengthening democracy in developing countries, they approached this goal 
indirectly, assuming that economic aid would accelerate development, which would 
in turn enhance democratic practices in these countries.  As a step towards achieving 
these aims, the Kennedy administration increased U.S. foreign aid by 33 percent and 
established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) by 
consolidating the ICA and DLF.
89
  This approach proved disappointing, however, 
when many of the Latin American countries that had received U.S. aid came under 
the control of military dictatorships during the decade.  As a result, the Kennedy 
administration abandoned its aim of strengthening democracy in the region, but 
continued to support military dictatorships with the expectation that such support 
would make the region less susceptible to Soviet influence.
90
 
 Later in the 1960s, some U.S. officials began to rethink the indirect approach 
to promoting democracy through economic aid, fearing that economic gains would 
fall mainly into the hands of elites instead of supporting widespread economic and 
political development.  Consequently, several members of the U.S. policy community 
began to push for a policy that would specifically support increased popular 
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participation in the development process.
91
  In 1966, Representatives Donald Fraser 
and Bradford Morse of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sponsored Title IX of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a legislative directive to USAID, which stated: 
In carrying out programs authorized by this chapter, emphasis shall be placed 
on assuring maximum political participation in the task of economic 
development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the 
encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions.
92
  
The language of Title IX represented a shift in foreign policy toward direct aid to 
build democratic institutions.  However, this shift was not reflected in practice.  Title 
IX resulted in a number of conferences and research projects on participation in the 
development process and in the establishment of a Title IX division within USAID, 
but not in concrete aid programs to promote democracy.
93
   
 By the end of the 1960s, disappointment over the failure of foreign aid to 
produce the expected results led to a questioning of modernization theory.
94
  In his 
1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington challenged 
modernization theory by arguing that “economic progress in underdeveloped 
countries did not lead inevitably to democratization but in fact was often destabilizing 
and conducive to the rise of authoritarianism.”
95
  Such a sentiment, shared by others 
in the U.S. foreign aid bureaucracy, contributed to the emergence of a new approach 
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to foreign aid under the administration of President Richard Nixon when the idea of 
the U.S. helping other countries democratize was shelved and instead the focus of aid 
shifted to providing assistance for governments to meet their citizens’ basic needs for 
food, shelter, medicine, and so forth.  By the mid-1970s, interest in promoting 
popular participation in development had waned, and Title IX was all but forgotten.
96
 
 In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter re-established the idea of the United 
States as moral leader in the world and made human rights, along with a standard of 
non-intervention into the affairs of other states, a focus of his foreign policy agenda.  
Carothers explains Carter’s human rights policy: “A human rights focus…meant 
attention to basic violations of rights—torture, political murder, and other serious 
forms of repression—rather than to higher-order political norms such as free 
expression, freedom of association, and the right to genuine, periodic elections.”
97
  In 
addition, instead of directly opposing human rights abuses in other countries, this 
administration emphasized the “universalistic grounding of human rights advocacy in 
international law.”
98
  As a result, the provision of democracy aid during Carter’s 
administration was limited, and few new democracy aid programs were initiated.  
Although Carter promoted a policy of non-interventionism, Carothers contends that 
his support for a human rights doctrine contributed to later democratic transitions in 
Latin America by drawing attention to issues of political freedom.
99
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 The attention Carter gave to human rights in his foreign policy agenda may 
have contributed to the shift in foreign aid policy in the 1980s when the 
administration of President Ronald Reagan expanded foreign aid beyond military 
assistance and humanitarian programs to encompass what came to be called 
“democracy promotion.”  These are, of course, the very kinds of programs that would 
permit funding of NGOs like the Angel Coalition, and yet the legacy of the Reagan-
era democracy promotion programs was contradictory. On the one hand, we can 
recognize in them the origins of the kinds of assistance that encouraged the 
emergence of a Russian civil society. On the other hand, because these programs, in 
the 1980s, were driven by Reagan’s anti-Soviet foreign policy agenda and, in 
practice, were used to support electoral parties and labor unions friendly to U.S. 
interests and to undermine more progressive or independent forces, they undoubtedly 
contributed to post-Soviet wariness of such programs.  Indeed, although some of the 
programs were funded by USAID, a significant number were funded by the newly 
established National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a “private foundation” 
created by Congress and entirely financed by public funds, that had been established 
to circumvent the limits Congress had earlier imposed on the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).  In Central American countries and the Philippines, NED legally did 
what the CIA had often done, secretly, in the post-World War II and Vietnam eras to 
counter leftist influences.  
 With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the heralded “worldwide 




programs both in the U.S. and around the world.
100
  The largest increase in 
democracy aid was seen in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU).   
President George H. W. Bush adopted a policy of directly supporting transitions to 
democratic governance and market economies.
101
  Carothers notes, “That policy had a 
strong diplomatic component consisting of high-level U.S. cajoling and pressure to 
encourage political and economic reforms.  It also had an assistance component.”
102
  
To provide aid to Eastern Europe, the Bush administration and Congress implemented 
the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program, which included 
economic, social, and political support, with funds of approximately $300 million a 
year.  After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they established a number of 
initiatives to aid former Soviet countries, including programs under the 1992 Freedom 
Support Act and the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, 
with funds of about $2 billion a year.
103
  In both the SEED program and assistance 
provided through the Freedom Support Act, the political component to promote 
democracy represented only between 5 percent and 10 percent of the total amount 
allocated, although the amount was still substantial enough to fund major democracy 
projects in the region.
104
  NED and the Eurasia Foundation, established by Congress 
in 1993, also provided democracy-related aid to Eastern Europe and the FSU.  
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Altogether, by the end of the 1990s, the U.S. government spent almost $1 billion on 




2.2.2 Democracy and Neoliberalism 
By the 1990s, a new understanding of development had emerged among aid providers 
that facilitated the expansion of democracy assistance.  Whereas, during the 1960s 
and 1970s, aid providers had conceived of development in largely social and 
economic terms and paid little attention to a country’s form of government when 
implementing aid programs, beginning in the 1980s, donors began to consider the 
importance of governance in a country’s economic success.
106
  By the 1990s, the idea 
that a country’s political development greatly influenced its socioeconomic 
development was widely accepted in the donor community and programs reflecting 
this new thinking began to emerge.   
At the same time, the trend in the 1980s towards market economics, or 
neoliberalism, strengthened the case for a united economic/political approach to 
development aid.  U.S. conservatives asserted a natural connection between so-called 
economic freedom (market economics) and political freedom (democracy).
107
  They 
argued that market reform policies “would strengthen democratization in developing 
countries by increasing economic growth…, shrinking ‘bloated’ government and 
creating new centers of power outside governments.”
108
  Democratization, in turn, 
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would support market reforms by “increasing government accountability and 
transparency, promoting the rule of law, and fostering respect for citizens’ rights and 
other limits on government power.”
109
  Although not everyone in the development 
community agreed with the necessity of linking democracy with market economics, 
neoliberal economic theory would come to infuse the foundation of many 
development programs and would spark the later focus on civil society expansion.   
As many scholars in the field recognize, a “New Policy Agenda” had come to 
dominate development policy in the post-cold war era.
110
  Steven Commins writes:   
The New Policy Agenda is a reflection of the triumphalism associated with 
the belief that the end of the Cold War has vindicated a market-centered 
approach to social organization and economic development.  The donor-
driven [agenda] emphasizes the central importance of free markets, efficient 
use of limited government resources, a reduced role for the state and the need 
for good governance in low income countries.
111
 
Analyzing the New Policy Agenda, Michael Edwards and David Hulme 
explain that it “is not monolithic—its details vary from one official aid agency to 
another—but in all cases, it is driven by two basic sets of beliefs organized around the 
two poles of neoliberal economics and liberal democratic theory.”
112
  The first set of 
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beliefs revolves around the assumption that markets and private initiative are the most 
efficient means of attaining economic growth and providing most services to a 
population.
113
  According to this tenet, “[g]overnments ‘enable’ private provision but 
should minimize their direct role in the economy; because of their supposed cost-
effectiveness in reaching those who are poorest, official agencies support NGOs in 
providing welfare services to those who cannot be reached through markets.”
114
   The 
second set of beliefs is based on the idea that NGOs and grassroots organizations 
(GROs) are “vehicles for democratization and…essential components of a thriving 
civil society, which in turn are seen as essential to the success of the agenda’s 
economic dimension.”
115
  NGOs and GROs are expected to act as a counterweight to 
state power by “protecting human rights, opening up channels of communication and 
participation, providing training grounds for activists, and promoting pluralism.”
116
  
The dominance of these assumptions in development aid programs led agencies to 
target an increasing amount of funds towards NGOs and GROs.   
As the New Policy Agenda became a major influence in the donor 
community, a growing number of NGOs and GROs had appeared to respond to the 
new funding mandate.  A review of the development field in the 1980s and 1990s 
reveals an “associational revolution” in developing and post-communist countries in 
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which the number of NGOs and GROs increased exponentially.
117
  Complementing 
this numerical increase, a number of key NGOs grew in size to service millions of 
people in developing countries.
118
  In addition, as Edwards and Hulme write, “NGOs’ 
access to decision makers in both North and South is greater than ever before; their 
advocacy role continues to expand, and they are courted in debates over policy and 
practice.”
119
  Edwards and Hulme contend, “The overall picture is one in which 
NGOs are seen as the ‘favored child’ of official agencies and as something of a 
panacea for the problems of development.”
120
  
Although I discussed general understandings of “civil society” in the previous 
section, it is also important to examine how this concept, along with the concept of 
“non-governmental organization,” is used by scholars in the specific fields of 
development and democratization.  The concept of “civil associations” has been 
discussed since the time of Tocqueville’s writings in the 1830s-1840s.
121
  Jude 
Fernando and Alan Heston write: 
Organizations similar to NGOs and the debate surrounding the meaning of the 
term go back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century…. Most of these 
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associations were known as public associations, voluntary associations, social 
welfare organizations, charities, and missions during the colonial period.
122
 
In 1907, when 132 international organizations decided to cooperate with each 
other, they declared themselves the “Union of International Associations.”   In the 
1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations referred to its liaisons with “private 
organizations.”
123
  The term “non-governmental organization” came into being with 
the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, which sought to differentiate 
participation rights for intergovernmental specialized agencies and international 
private organizations.
124
  The United Nations spelled out its participation policies for 
NGOs in Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter, which states: 
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consulting with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence.  Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
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This article provided for a consultative role with the United Nations for private 
bodies, which were understood as “independent from government control, not seeking 
to challenge governments either as a political party or by a narrow focus on human 
rights, non-profit making and non-criminal.”
126
  In 1948, the United Nations created 
the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the 
Economic and Social Council, which serves as “a watchdog of NGO interests in the 
consultative system and as a framework for NGO cooperation in a number of fields of 
common interest.”
127
  Although coined as a technical term by the United Nations to 
facilitate its work, “NGO” eventually became part of popular discourse, especially 
since the early 1970s.
128
 
While NGOs have participated in the work of the United Nations since its 
founding, their role in UN activities, and indeed in many national and international 
forums, has greatly expanded in recent decades as the “associational revolution” has 
touched all regions of the globe.  Scholars debate the reasons behind the rise of civil 
society, some highlighting the role of governments and agencies in pushing NGO 
development while others argue political and social trends “organically” led to the 
growth of a more active civil sector.  A United Nations report notes: 
Thousands of Civil Society Organizations today participate in the major UN 
conferences and participate in many other UN activities—increasingly as 
active participants, not just observers…. Is this huge industry all built on one 
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flimsy, conditional sentence in the UN's Charter?  This clause may have 
opened a door at the outset, but the importance of civil society within the UN 
system reflects more the changing nature of the world we live in and the 
contemporary challenges of global governance than the deliberate efforts of 
the UN to elevate the contributions of NGOs.
129
   
Edwards and Hulme contend, however, that “there is a good deal of evidence to 
suggest that the rise and growth of NGOs…are directly related to the increasing 
availability of official funding under the New Policy Agenda.”
130
  Most authors 
recognize the influence of both pressures from “below,” in the form of grass-roots 
initiatives, and from “above,” in the form of government or foundation support for the 
voluntary sector, in contributing to the upsurge in NGO activity.
131
   
An additional issue under debate by scholars is the effect of “globalization” on 
the growth of civil society.  While virtually all agree that globalization has played a 
role in strengthening civil society, there is disagreement over exactly what this role 
has been.  Definitions of globalization vary; however, the concept is widely 
understood within this literature to refer to the reorganization of the relationships 
among nation-states, their citizens, and international institutions.  As economic 
processes increasingly traversed national borders, international organizations gained 
control over global monetary flows and the role of the nation-state in providing for all 
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the needs of its citizens declined.
132
  As a result, NGOs began to increasingly take on 
responsibilities that had once been the realm of governments.  While some authors 
believe this trend reflects the “withering away” of state sovereignty, others maintain 




 As donor foundations and agencies became aware of the growing salience of 
the model of civil society, many began to direct funds to this area.  One of the key 
assumptions underlying this focus was the theorized connection between civil society 
and democracy promotion.  Scholars in the fields of civil society theory, development 
and democratization, and Russian civil society (to be discussed in the next chapter) 
have supported the proposition that a strong civil society encourages democratic 
practices.
134
   
 Development scholars have demonstrated how the growth in aid to civil 
societies over the past twenty-five years has been, in large part, fueled by funding 
agencies’ acceptance of a “myth” of civil society that lauds aid to NGOs as a 
“panacea” or “magic bullet” to solving the problems of development.
135
  The 
expectations of funding agencies that civil society assistance would serve as a 
temporary crutch to aid countries in transitions to democracy, however, were based 
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on mistaken assumptions and scant empirical evidence.  While aid officials and field 
workers tend to focus on finding immediate solutions to problems on the ground and 
providing positive reports to funders, few academics have stepped up to empirically 
study the results of democratization programs.
136
  Instead, aid programs remain based 
on assumptions by democratic states that “their kind of political system would be 
beneficial for people in nondemocratic or partially democratic countries and [they] 
would like to help them achieve it.”
137
  In turn, NGOs have “few reasons (and no 
money) to disseminate the positive lessons of development and many more powerful 
reasons to conceal the negative lessons than to institutionalize, remember, and 
disseminate them.”
138
  Stemming from a lack of shared knowledge among democracy 
promoters, common problems in the implementation of civil society programs tend to 
be repeated in developing and post-communist countries around the world.  In the 
section that follows, I examine some of the major achievements and challenges of 
civil society aid programs in developing countries.  Many of these same phenomena 
would repeat themselves in post-communist countries a decade later.    
 
2.2.3 Achievements and Limitations of Civil Society Assistance Programs  
In this section, I review some of the common outcomes of civil society assistance 
programs in developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, in order 
                                                 
136
 See Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 2-3; Blair 23. 
 
137
 Carothers (1999), 349. 
 
138
 Ian Smillie, “Painting Canadian Roses Red,” in Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and 
Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Michael Edwards and David Hulme (West Hartford, 




to compare and contrast these outcomes with programs implemented in post-socialist 
countries in the FSU. 
Civil society assistance programs grew out of two interrelated beliefs: first, 
that civil society constituted an arena separate from the state towards which donors 
could direct development funds in order to avoid governmental corruption and 
inefficiency; and second, that strengthening civil society would promote democratic 
governance in transitional countries by providing a check on state power and 
providing an avenue for citizens to express their needs to state authorities.  Despite 
the theorized separation between civil society and the state, the implementation of 
these programs in developing countries demonstrated the necessary interdependence 
of these two sectors.  Where governmental power was too weak to enforce policy, 
reforms advocated by civil society groups could not take hold.   
Scholars have argued that a strong state is necessary for a fully functioning 
civil society.
139
  John Clark contends that state-civil society relationships usually take 
one of three forms.  The first is where “NGOs are in a dependent client position vis-à-
vis the government, in which NGOs implement state-prepared programs and/or 
receive funding through the state (a dependency of money, ideas and resources).”   
The second type of relationship is “adversarial in which there are no common starting 
points and no wish from either side to search out areas of agreement.”  The third and 
most productive relationship, Clark argues, is “a collaborationist one in the sense of a 
genuine partnership to tackle mutually agreed upon problems, coupled with energetic 
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but constructive debate on areas of disagreement.”
 140
  Like Clark, many scholars in 
the development field believe that civil societies in transitional countries should 
support state growth as well as the growth of their own sector in order to achieve 
balance between the sectors and to advance the well-being of their countries as a 
whole.
141
  In so doing, they could avoid the trend of NGOs, in some countries, taking 
on past responsibilities of the state in the social welfare area, which reduces public 
resources and the state’s capacity to respond to the claims of its population.  
Evaluating the impact of civil society assistance programs across developing 
countries, many common outcomes are apparent.  For example, one assumption on 
which civil society assistance programs were based is the belief that NGOs’ special 
relationship with their beneficiaries and their moral commitment to the poor give 
them a comparative advantage over governmental institutions in carrying out 
development projects.  According to backers of this position, “Government-citizen 
relationships are said to be based on control and authority, whereas NGOs are able to 
form unambivalent relationships with their clients.”
 142
   
Although civil society aid programs generally assumed that NGOs are 
effective representatives of their communities, studies have revealed that 
organizations dependent on foreign aid often weaken their links with their 
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beneficiaries as they grow closer to the agencies funding them.  Hulme and Edwards 
write:  
What [seems] to be happening… is a more gradual and less visible process in 
which a significant proportion of NGOs move closer and closer to donors and 
to the support of donor interests.  It commences with the agreement to use aid 
monies: progresses with the adoption of donor techniques for programming, 
implementing, monitoring and accounting for performance…; subsequently it 
moves on to shaping the nature of appointments and the internal structures of 
NGOs with the recruitment of English speaking, logical framework experts 
and information departments which function as public relations units; 
eventually the organizational culture is attuned to donors—and the local, 




As NGOs devote increasing amounts of energy to fulfilling expectations of funders, 
such as quantifying the results of their programs and meeting short-term project 
goals, they become less able to respond to the needs of their constituents, which often 
call for a long-term commitment and gradual improvements.   
 As NGOs in developing countries have had to wrestle with their 
responsibilities to multiple parties, scholars have begun to speak of the importance of 
“multiple accountabilities” both upward to the state and donors, and downward to 
NGOs’ beneficiaries and members.
144
  Research has demonstrated the tendency for 
NGOs to prioritize upward accountability in order to retain funding and remain 
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  However, a focus on quantifying results for donors often detracts from 
the larger goals the NGO is trying to attain.   By contrast, NGOs can bring about 
sizable change only if they remain in tune with their constituents and act as 
representatives of their interests.  As NGOs work towards demonstrating 
accountability to their multiple stakeholders, scholars call for funding agencies to 
improve their practices by acknowledging and supporting the essential relationships 
between NGOs, their constituents, and local institutions that impact NGOs’ work.   
 An additional pattern resulting from NGOs’ dependence on foreign funding is 
problems with sustainability.  As Carothers writes, “A large percentage of the NGOs 
that the United States and other donors have funded in the name of strengthening civil 
society are almost entirely dependent on foreign financial support and would fold if it 
became unavailable.”
146
  Carothers notes that, when aid officials began developing 
civil society assistance programs, they focused on getting out funds quickly to help 
start up a large number of NGOs.  The sustainability of these NGOs for the long term 
was not a concern at the time.  When it became apparent that NGOs in developing or 
post-communist countries had few other sources of support, some aid officials began 
to examine the issue but found that there were few options if their funding was to end.  
Carothers writes:  
The difficulties are usually great: membership fees or personal contributions 
are difficult to collect or attract; corporate sponsorship is often not available 
due to lack of incentives, traditions, or sources; charging fees for services or 
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publications usually proves a limited source…. The NGO model pushed by 
U.S. civil society assistance simply may not be appropriate as a generalized 
approach to building civil society in many transitional countries.  The 
professionalized NGO model comes out of a society that has wealthy, private 
grant-making foundations, a large middle class with considerable 
discretionary income, and a corporate world with a tradition of philanthropy.  
The model does not do well in societies with none of those characteristics.
147
    
In attempting to address sustainability, aid officials began to include attention to the 
issue in their grant programs and to encourage “local resource mobilization,” an 
approach that encourages NGOs to find alternative sources of support.  While there 
have been some success stories, finding long-term support remains problematic for 
most NGOs in developing countries, and it has become commonplace for many 
NGOs to operate only temporarily on project-based grants.   
 Research has demonstrated several other patterns that frequently result from 
the implementation of civil society assistance programs in developing countries.  In 
contrast to the common perception that civil society signifies an arena of cooperation 
and reciprocity among grassroots groups lobbying for common interests, scholars 
have found that civil societies in many countries are dominated by NGOs staffed by 
members of the elite who compete with one another for funding and influence.  Thus, 
the availability of foreign funding has contributed to the fragmentation of civil society 
networks and to the development of a hierarchy of NGOs based on access to aid 
funds.  As recognized by scholars who prefer the concept of the “third sector,” NGOs 
have served as a vehicle for many well-connected individuals in transitional societies 
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to advance their careers.  Although claiming to represent civil society, these NGOs 
usually have a weak popular base.
148
   
 While funding agencies had begun by promoting civil society in developing 
countries, after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the FSU in 1989-1991, 
many agencies turned their attention to this region of the world.  Studying the impact 
of civil society funding in post-communist countries, scholars have found that, 
although there were some differences from the developing world, there were many 
similar outcomes as well.  When aid providers began funding NGOs in Eastern 
Europe and the FSU, they tended to import the same approach used in aid programs 
to developing countries, namely, the “external project method” in which the donor 
organization runs many aspects of the project, often using its own workers as staff.
149
  
While this method saw some successes in developing countries, it was less effective 
in Eastern Europe and the FSU, a region with a relatively well-educated population 
and in which many nations had even served as aid providers to parts of Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia.
150
   
Western aid was a sensitive issue in a region so accustomed to antagonistic 
relationships with the West.  During the so-called “honeymoon phase” of Russian-
Western relationships from 1991-1993, many Russian groups welcomed Western aid, 
believing that the United States and Western European countries had accepted the 
FSU as part of the democratic world and would honor their promises to help in the 
transition period.  As in many developing countries, aid to help democratize countries 
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of the FSU was tied up with economic assistance.  Larry Diamond argues that FSU 
countries accepted the “implicit bargain” that if they went along with the often radical 
and painful economic conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, foreign investment and voluntary bank loans would follow to help 
sustain their new market economies.
151
  However, both Diamond and Carothers 
contend that the failure of the West to follow through on their promises left post-
communist countries in financial crisis and dampened support for developing 
Western-style political systems.  Instead of the limited and short-term support offered 
by Western governments, Diamond and Carothers agree that a long-term commitment 
to economic assistance could have helped to stabilize the economies of Eastern 
Europe and the FSU, garnered support for the democratic process, and laid a strong 
foundation for the development of democratic institutions.
 152  
 
As with economic assistance to post-communist countries, Western donors 
approached aid for civil society as a short-term investment.  However, as transitions 
in many Eastern European and FSU countries progressed more slowly than expected 
and stagnated in some cases, civil society assistance came to be seen as a more long-
term endeavor and necessary to counter anti-democratic impulses in some places.  
Carothers writes: 
Western aid for civil society development in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union was originally conceived and portrayed as the key to an initial 
democratic breakthrough.  It has assumed a much wider, more lasting role, as 
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a critical tool in overcoming the many entrenched obstacles to the 
consolidation of democracy and the achievement of economic success.
153
   
In the next chapter, I will examine the consequences of aid specifically to Russia in 
more detail.   
 
2.3 Summing Up: The Impact of Civil Society and Democracy Aid Programs 
Development scholars have identified both achievements and limitations of civil 
society assistance programs.  One achievement has been to broaden democracy 
assistance from its initial focus solely on holding elections and reforming state 
institutions.  Grants to civil society provide funding agencies an additional avenue to 
encourage democratic values among average citizens and to guard against “show 
democracies” that nominally permit democratic processes such as elections but 
continue to limit political freedoms among its population.  Carothers points out that 
many local NGOs have teamed up with international networks in such areas as human 
rights, women’s issues, and the environment to bring ideas and resources into their 
countries.
154
  He contends that women’s NGOs have a particularly strong track record 
in transitional societies, as the commitment level of their leaders and members is 
often high and they represent true constituencies.
155
  Fernando and Heston note that, 
in many countries, NGOs have opened up dialogue about important social issues and 
drawn governmental attention to these issues.  In addition, they write: 
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[I]n situations where civil liberties are suppressed, NGOs are the only means 
of expressing people’s concerns.  NGO participation in the policy dialogue on 
international issues is likely to increase further, as NGOs are considered to be 




Finally, civil society promotion programs have been successful in that they, in many 
cases, served their function of strengthening democratic governance.  Diamond 
maintains that NGOs have accomplished this function in numerous ways, including: 
scrutinizing and containing the power of the state; educating people about 
public affairs, political issues, and their civic rights and duties; increasing 
citizen participation, efficacy, and skill; developing a democratic culture of 
tolerance, moderation, and willingness to compromise; providing additional 
channels for interest representation; recruiting and training new political 
leaders; monitoring elections and government performance; and generating 
democratic constituencies for market reforms.
157
 
Along with their achievements, civil society promotion programs have faced 
numerous limitations.  Most scholars in the field acknowledge that civil society can 
do little to transform political systems on its own.  It can draw attention to issues and 
lobby governments, but to be effective, forming relationships with other societal 
sectors is essential.  Civil society programs tend to find success in countries where 
governments are already receptive to democratic reform and civil society growth; in 
countries hostile to democratic reform, civil society programs are less likely to gain a 
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foothold.  Recognizing that civil society assistance programs do not bring about rapid 
or decisive change, Carothers stresses the need for long-term commitment from 
funders in order to work towards gradual improvement in cooperation with NGOs and 
government institutions of the recipient country.
158
  
Carothers also cautions that funding agencies should not assume recipient 
countries will develop democratic institutions following the Western model.  He 
argues that the “uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy 
and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of 
countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world.”
159
  In such 
countries, even small steps towards democracy should be considered a positive 
outcome.   
In addition, civil society assistance programs are hindered by many of the 
issues mentioned above: programs do not reach the poorest of the poor, participation 
of the grassroots in NGOs is weak, civil society often represents the interests of the 
established elite, NGOs struggle to achieve sustainability, etc.  Scholars and 
practitioners alike have strived to address these issues and to redesign aid programs in 
light of the lessons learned through the history of democracy and civil society 
funding.   
Research on the impact of democracy promotion and civil society assistance 
programs to NGOs in the developing and post-communist world is important, 
because, as many scholars recognize, such programs are here to stay.  Diamond notes 
that “the world community is embracing a shared normative expectation that all states 
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seeking international legitimacy should manifestly ‘govern with the consent of the 
governed’—in essence, a ‘right to democratic governance.’”
160
  He points out that the 
right to democratic governance is being articulated more and more forcefully in 
documents of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, the Organization of American States, and the European Union.  As a 
condition for membership, the European Union explicitly requires applicant states to 
exhibit democratic practices and institutions.   
As a result of this international consensus on democracy, most governments 
and other aid providers now tie development assistance with democracy promotion 
efforts, believing that development and democracy go hand-in-hand.
161
  Carothers 
points out that almost every established democracy engages in some type of program 
to encourage democratic governance in other countries.
162
  Although he believes that 
democracy promotion efforts will continue into the future, he emphasizes the limits of 
such efforts and the necessity of learning from past mistakes.  In order for the field of 
democracy assistance, and its subfield of civil society assistance, to grow and remain 
in tune with the changing needs of societies around the world, Carothers argues that 
aid officials must improve their knowledge of the countries in which they are 
working, base their efforts on proven methods, increasingly coordinate their 
initiatives with other aid agencies, and commit to longer term engagement in the 
recipient societies.  In addition, he calls for more scholars to become involved in the 
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development field to provide practical and critical analysis of efforts on the ground.
163
  
The experience and knowledge gained by democracy promoters in developing 
countries would be put to the test in the post-communist region beginning in the late 
1980s to early 1990s.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, learning has been slow, 
as many of the same difficulties with aid programs to the developing world would be 
repeated in post-communist Russia.  
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Chapter 3: The Development of Russian Civil Society, 1991-2008 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide a history of the development of Russian civil society from 
1991 to 2008, focusing on the influence of Western-led democracy promotion efforts 
and of Russian state laws and regulations on civil society.  I examine this period in 
order to better understand the influences and events shaping civil society growth at 
the time of the Angel Coalition’s founding in 1999 to the end of my fieldwork in May 
2008.  As I flew out of Russia on May 6, 2008, the day before Dmitry Medvedev was 
sworn in as president, the second term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency (if not Putin’s 
impact on political affairs) officially came to an end.  Hence, I limit my attention 
specifically to the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies in my discussion of Russia’s civil 
society development.  In this chapter, I also compare the effects of democracy 
promotion programs on civil society in Russia to the effects of similar programs in 
developing countries to demonstrate the common consequences of these programs 
across societies with very different social and political backgrounds, while making 
apparent the consequences that are unique to the Russian case.    
Although some scholars have framed the development of Russian civil society 
as a struggle for control between the Russian state and Western governments and 
foundations, I highlight the agency of civil society actors in negotiating with both 
Russian and foreign authorities to attain the resources needed to pursue their own 
goals.  This analysis of Russian civil society and its ties to international agencies and 
transnational networks is important to understanding the growth of the Russian 





3.1 Russia’s Post-Soviet Transition: Economic, Political, and Social Reforms and the 
Emergence of Post-Soviet Civil Society (1991-2000) 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars and funding agencies alike got caught up 
in the excitement over the newly discovered powers of “civil society.”  Credited with 
toppling monolithic communist regimes, civil society was seen by many in the West 
as the best hope of supporting democracy in the former communist bloc and reducing 
the threat of a slide back into authoritarianism.  Oppositional movements had played a 
role in the fall of communist regimes in several Eastern European countries, but the 
Solidarity movement in Poland was held up as the shining example of what civil 
society could accomplish.  Formed in a context in which the Communist Party held a 
monopoly on power and independent organizing was outlawed, Solidarity’s only 
option was to work in opposition to the state and to call for its abolishment, a goal it 
eventually achieved.   
Thus, the model of civil society extolled during this period was an 
oppositional model in which the main role of civil society was to keep the power of 
the state in check and guard against tyranny.  However, as scholars would later point 
out, this model of civil society is suitable only in a small of number cases, namely, 
when independent actors seek to oppose a tyrannical state.  In the majority of cases, 
including in the Western states exporting civil society promotion programs in the 
1990s, civil society has a more collaborative relationship with the state and many 
civil society organizations receive state funding.  Indeed, once oppositional 




they lost their unifying purpose and fractured, leaving a space for new civil society 
structures to develop in the transition period as new political and economic structures 
also took shape.  In this section, I examine the development of Russian civil society 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and analyze its relationships with the Russian state 
and with foreign, primarily Western, aid providers.   
 
3.1.1 The Reorganization of Russia’s Political, Economic, and Social Spheres during 
the Post-Soviet Transition Period and the Role of Civil Society  
For the purpose of understanding the growth of Russian civil society, this section 
views the post-communist transition as a political, economic, and social process that 
involved the reorganization of these three spheres and of the relationships between 
them.  Although civil society actors played a key role in bringing about the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, after its collapse, civil society as it was known in the 
perestroika period (1985-1991) dissipated as some activists dropped out of civil 
society to focus on their private concerns and others turned to new opportunities in 
the political or economic realms.  Relatively few remained to help construct the post-
communist “third sector.”  This opened the door for a drastic redesign of Russian 
civil society and of the separation of responsibilities and powers among the political, 
economic, and social spheres. 
 The late perestroika period was a time of tremendous change for the Russian 
state and its political system.  The mass mobilization of Soviet citizens expressed 
through the formation of thousands of independent organizations, the miners’ strikes 




1991 played a critical role in building momentum toward the defeat of communism.
1
  
On August 19, 1991, thousands of people rallied outside the Russian White House to 
protest the coup attempt by Communist Party hard-liners to wrestle control from 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The image of Boris Yeltsin, the recently elected 
Russian President, climbing atop of a tank that day to defy the coup plotters and 
defend the course toward Russian sovereignty and liberalization became a defining 
moment in the regime change.  Across the world, millions of people put their faith in 
Yeltsin as the leader of Russian democracy as the Soviet Union was officially 
dissolved a few months later, on December 26, 1991.   
However, in these chaotic times, Yeltsin feared losing control of the transition 
process if power was shared too widely.  The Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies 
granted Yeltsin dual powers as president and prime minister of Russia and gave him 
special decree powers for one year.
2
  Although many Russian supporters of 
democracy pushed for immediate elections, Yeltsin waited two years, until December 
1993, to hold the first legislative elections in newly independent Russia.  Yeltsin’s 
strategy was to eschew party politics and rely on a broad public mandate as the source 
of his executive authority.  However, instead of allowing Yeltsin to build support for 
his reform package, this delay only caused parties, in the absence of a clear unifying 
principle, to fragment.
3
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By failing to institutionalize strong democratic procedures and structures, 
Yeltsin’s power base was unstable, and by 1993 Yeltsin had lost his public mandate 
and the support of political society.
4
  As relations between Yeltsin and the parliament 
deteriorated, Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme 
Soviet on September 21, 1993.  The ten-day battle for power that ensued between the 
president and the parliament ended as the Russian army took Yeltsin’s side and 
arrested the leaders of the resistance.  Thus, the promise of a smooth transition to 
democracy in Russia, in which many had placed their hopes in August 1991, faded as 
the tough work of building the post-Soviet political system became apparent.  
 Equally momentous changes were occurring in the economy.  Long dependent 
on the communist state to provide goods and services, Russians lost their safety net as 
an economic crisis accompanied by rapid inflation and rising unemployment served 
as a shocking introduction to life under a market economy.  Karl-Olov Arnstberg and 
Thomas Boren provide a summary of the economic effects of the transition on the 
average Russian: 
In the end of 1992, retail prices went up 25 times, and wholesale prices 34 
times.  At the same time production fell by at least 35 percent.  The newly 
formed Russian state responded by printing more money, a measure which 
itself started an inflationary spiral that, apart from inhibiting investments 
oriented towards long-term production, made people’s—sometimes lifelong—
savings worthless.  This loss of one’s savings and the steep increase in prices, 
together with the irregular—if at all—payment of wages and pensions, were 
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generally speaking the most important changes in the structural part of 
people’s everyday economy.  For many it led to economic disaster.
5
  
As the economic crisis deepened, the state retreated and was unable to meet 
the needs of its population.  From 1991-1995, state spending on social issues, 
“including welfare, public health, education, and culture declined 39 percent.”
6
  As a 
result, “the state was unable to fully provide the social services—free education, 
universal health care, pension plans, and other aspects of the Soviet cradle-to-grave 
social-welfare net—it had guaranteed under communism.”
7
  By 1999, the United 
Nations Development Program declared, “A human crisis of monumental proportions 
is emerging in the former Soviet Union.  The transition years have literally been 
lethal for many people.”
8
 
 In the years immediately following the end of the Soviet Union, civil society 
actors were largely absent from decision-making processes, as political and economic 
elites took control of the transition process.  Although many scholars charged that the 
elites “smothered” civil society and excluded activists from the transition process, 
Marcia Weigle stresses the fact that civil society was too weak and fragmented to 
play a leading role in democratic reforms in any case.
9
  Although civil society had 
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united on the goal of ending the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, activists had 
widely differing opinions on how the post-communist state should be run.
10
   
A main reason for the weakness of civil society under the Soviet Union was 
the Communist Party’s strict limitations on independent organizing, which prevented 
Russians from gaining the experience and organizational skills needed to build strong 
coalitions.  Even in the perestroika era, state ministries restricted the autonomy of 
groups and tried to bring them under the control of the Communist Party.
11
  In the 
absence of a strong democratic movement promoting a coherent reform package, it 
fell to the state to steer the “post-communist liberal project.”
12
  As the strongest actor 
in the Russian political system, the state was charged with striking a balance between 
consolidating enough power to lead the country through the necessary reforms and 
institutionalizing enough limits on its power to permit the development of a liberal 
political culture.  As Weigle recognizes, given the history of authoritarianism in 
Russia, entrusting this much power to the Russian state was a dangerous step.
13
   
 As a dominant state replaced the mass mobilization of civil society as the 
main driving force for democratic and market reforms, what had been a revolution 
“from below” became a devolution “from above.”
14
  From 1991-1993, the Russian 
state consolidated its authority to lead the transition process.  During this period, 
elites, including many former managerial nomenklatura of the Communist Party, took 
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control of the project of state reconstruction, accumulating power and resources for 
themselves in the process.  Although the state hoarded power, it remained vulnerable 
due to its weak support base among the population and its failure to develop effective 
and transparent links with the legislature and political parties.  Democratic structures 
and mechanisms of communication among branches of the government and between 
the various societal spheres had not yet been institutionalized.
15
   
As the state and the economic elites looked to each other to secure control of 
the reform process, the interests of the elites came to overshadow the needs of the 
Russian population at large.  Weigle writes: 
The collusion between political leaders and business elite at both the regional 
and state levels would fundamentally shape the process of state construction 
and the path of the postcommunist transition in the first decade of Russian 
independence.  During this period, Yeltsin was caught between the demands 
of a market economy and the interests of the sectoral lobbies and oligarchs—
the most powerful group to emerge in the postcommunist period.  Not only 
did the oligarchs control much of the economy but, through their financial and 
media empires, had the potential to control the fate of the presidency.
16
          
 In 1992, the Russian state officially began transitioning to a market economy 
and Yeltsin appointed Yegor Gaidar prime minister to oversee the process.  Gaidar 
implemented the policy of “shock therapy,” which was designed to complete the 
transition as soon as possible and minimize unemployment and disruption to the 
industrial and business sectors.  Instead, the policy, supported by international 
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financial groups, only furthered the disparity between the majority of the Russian 
population, which experienced a drastic decline in its standard of living, and a small 
clique of business elites, who strengthened their hold on the Russian economy.
17
  
Russian activists in civil society, who had placed their hopes in a democratic 
transition process, were disheartened by the effects of the reforms and the corruption 
they perceived among those spearheading the process.  Weigle argues: 
The impact of liberal economic reforms in the first year of the postcommunist 
transition turned the tide of public opinion against “the democrats” and their 
liberal reforms: The vibrant associational life that emerged during the Soviet 
period seemed to dissipate into an empty shell of apathy and cynicism, 
produced by the perception that the great transition experiment had been 
reduced to “politics as usual.”
18
 
Although many of the more politically motivated activists dropped out of Russian 
civil society during this period, others who were focused on meeting the material 
needs of their communities began to organize associations to address the economic 
consequences of the reforms.  The work of these post-Soviet groups will be addressed 
later in this chapter.   
  
3.1.2 The Impact of Western Aid on the Transition Process and the Development of 
Russian-Western Relationships around Economic Aid 
Several scholars have examined the role that Western governments and international 
financial groups played in the Russian transition.  These analyses can help us better 
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understand the development of relationships between Westerners and Russians in a 
variety of spheres, including the economic, political, and civic realms.
  
On the 
Western side, the United States was a leader in pushing for economic reforms in 
Russia.  Although the break-up of the Soviet empire symbolized the end of the Cold 
War, the United States remained fearful of external threats and of a backsliding to 
communism.  George H. W. Bush, who was president of the United States when the 
Soviet Union collapsed, proclaimed the emergence of a new global order in which 
“great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door of 
freedom…[and] toward free markets through the door to prosperity.”
19
  Robert Ivie 
argues that Bill Clinton, who succeeded Bush as president, placed even greater 
emphasis on the leadership role of the United States in guiding the reform process in 
the former Soviet republics, especially Russia.  Reacting to both a sense of victory 
over the end of the Cold War and a fear of new threats, Clinton supported U.S. 
funding to guide the transition process in Russia as a means of promoting global (and 
U.S.) security.
20
   
 Much has been made of the West’s “failure” in Russia.  Instead of 
successfully integrating Russia into the Western democratic “community,” the 
Western-approved Russian reform package alienated many Russians through the 
devastating effect it had on Russia’s economy and the attitude of superiority that 
many Russians perceived from the experts dispatched to “help” Russia.  While 
opinions differ as to the extent that blame for the chaos of the transition period can be 
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laid on Western institutions, there is little debate that the West’s involvement left an 
overwhelming feeling of disappointment among Russians.
21
   
Janine Wedel argues that a severe disconnect between the expectations of 
Eastern Europeans and Russians and the resources provided by the West led to a 
sense of disillusionment that characterized East-West relationships for years to come.  
Following speeches by Clinton calling for support and investment in former 
communist countries, talk of a “new Marshall Plan” among U.S. policymakers, and 
optimistic promises by aid officials, those in Eastern Europe came to expect 
significant amounts of aid that could bring about substantial growth in their 
economies.
22
  However, while the Marshall Plan, which provided aid to rebuild 
Western Europe following World War II, consisted primarily of monetary grants, the 
billions of dollars promised to Eastern Europe largely took the form of loans and 
technical assistance, such as expert advice and training sessions.  Analyzing the 
impact of this approach, Wedel writes: 
Western donors had tended to assume that the East would take whatever was 
offered.  After all, the aid was a gift.  Why were they complaining?  What the 
donors had failed to see was that to many Central and Eastern Europeans, a 
gift was something that was designed to meet the needs of the recipients…. 
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Thus, the short “honeymoon” between East and West in the early 1990s, which 




 Even more so in Russia than in other Eastern European countries, Western 
donors dampened prospects for the development of stable economic and political 
structures by entrusting the majority of aid monies to a particularly small clique of 
“reformers.”
25
  As international lending institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Group of Seven (G-7) countries pushed for 
economic reforms and the privatization of state-owned industries, this clique, which 
Wedel refers to as the “St. Petersburg Clan,” came to control millions of dollars of 
donor funds.
26
  The Clan was comprised of a group of politically oriented, long-term 
friends from St. Petersburg, many of whom came to serve as advisors to Yeltsin and 
later in other governmental posts.   
The St. Petersburg Clan gained its advantage when it took part in 1991 
meetings with Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs and other Western economists.  The 
key Russians involved were Gaidar, the first “architect” of economic reforms in 
Russia, and Anatoly Chubais, who was a member of Gaidar’s team and who would 
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replace him as chief of reforms in December 1992.
27
  Throughout the course of the 
reforms, the Clan worked closely with the Sachs-affiliated Harvard University 
Institute for International Development (HIID), both pushing for policies of shock 
therapy and rapid privatization.  Together, the Clan, HIID, and HIID associates 
established a Moscow-based program, known as the Harvard Project, that attracted 
millions of dollars in USAID and G-7 aid, subsidized loans, and other Western 
funds.
28
  Explaining the connection between HIID and USAID, Wedel writes: 
Without experience in Russia and under obligation to carry out congressional 
spending mandates, an insecure USAID was persuaded to largely delegate 
responsibility for America’s role in reshaping the Russian economy to the 
Harvard Institute group.  The Institute’s first award from USAID for work in 
Russia came in 1992, during the Bush administration.  Over the next four 
years, between 1992 and 1997, with the endorsement of influential proponents 
in the Clinton administration, the Institute received $40.4 million from 
USAID in noncompetitive grants for work in Russia.  It was slated to receive 
another $17.4 million, but USAID suspended its funding in May 1997, citing 
allegations of misuse of funds.  Approving such a large sum of money as a 
noncompetitive “amendment” to a much smaller award…was highly unusual, 
according to U.S. officials.  Also highly unusual was the citing of “foreign 
policy” considerations—that is, the national security of the United States, as 
the reason for the waiver.
29
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Over time, Wedel writes, the interests of the Harvard Institute group and the 
St. Petersburg Clan became “one and the same.”
30
  Increasingly loyal to each other, 
group members were able to concentrate funds and privileges among themselves, 
preventing other voices from significantly impacting the reform process.   
Instead of encouraging the development of transparent channels of 
communication and accountable institutions in Russia, the behind-the-scenes 
collusion between the Russians and Westerners leading Russia’s transition only 
reinforced the patron-client relationships that had dominated Soviet-era political 
dealings.  The practice of obtaining benefits and goods, including food, household 
products, employment opportunities, and political positions through informal 
networks instead of through official channels was a common survival strategy in the 
Soviet Union.  In both the public and private spheres, Soviet citizens tended to 
privilege membership in small groups and personal connections to those in power 
over the need to form broad social networks.   
Although the stated purpose of many Western aid programs was to promote 
democratic practices and encourage increased social participation in decision-making 
processes, Wedel maintains that the actual process by which Western aid was 
implemented enhanced the power of small groups of well-connected elites.  As a 
result, many Russians “came to associate the terms ‘market economy’, ‘economic 
reform’, and ‘the West’, with dubious activities that benefited only a few people 
while others experienced a devastating decline in their standard of living—a far cry 
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from their secure lives under socialism.”
31
  After the high of the Triumphalism period 
of the early 1990s and the low of the phase of Disillusionment in the mid-1990s, 
Wedel argues that a period of Adjustment followed as both Russians and Westerners 
modified their expectations of the “other side.”  As Westerners learned more about 
the effects of aid in Russia and Russians took increased ownership over the transition 
process, East-West relationships stabilized and later projects were able to build on 
some of the lessons learned in the early post-Soviet years.   
 
3.1.3 The Emergence of Post-Soviet Civil Society in Russia 
As international lending institutions and Western governments were pushing for 
economic change in Russia, they also supported calls for the strengthening of civil 
society.  Hemment writes: 
In keeping with the neoliberal vision that was hegemonic at Cold War’s end, 
[international development agencies’] diagnosis for Russia was to cut back the 
state and place responsibility upon the individual or private actors…. 
According to this formulation, citizens groups and associations of civil 
society…would play an increasingly active role, fulfilling the responsibilities 
of the crumbling state sector.
32
 
Some of the patterns characterizing Russian-Western relationships in the 
economic sphere during the transition period would be replayed as Western donors 
began funding Russian civil society, but there were also differences.  In both spheres, 
Western donors tended to prioritize the development of relationships with a small 
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number of organizations or individuals with whom they could establish trust and feel 
comfortable granting further funds, sometimes for years to come.  Thus, one outcome 
was the concentration of a large portion of civil society funding in the hands of a few 
organizations and individuals.  In addition, cultural differences and expectations 
concerning the purpose of aid and the outcomes to be achieved through aid posed 
challenges in Russian-Western relationships.  Grant programs sponsored by Western 
donors often had different priorities than the issues pursued by Russian activists, 
leaving Russian activists to bridge the gap between the purpose of a grant and the 
needs of their local constituents.  Likewise, Western aid officials, especially in the 
early years of civil society funding, frequently had little knowledge of the social 
context in which Russian activists worked, including the rigid bureaucracy that had to 
be confronted to carry out projects in Russia, and expected results that were 
impractical in the time frame given.   
Despite similarities in Russian-Western relationships in both efforts to reform 
Russia’s economic sphere and efforts to build the civic sector, Sarah Henderson 
highlights important ways in which these efforts diverged: 
Civil society aid was spread out to enough recipients so that, even though it 
encouraged them to protect their funding sources, it did not evoke the same 
reaction as economic aid did among those controlling the state.  The state 
embezzled or misappropriated billions of dollars of economic reform loan 
money.  In contrast, civic activists did not steal the money; the money 
involved simply often provided incentives for them to value their own careers 




more long-term community ties.  The money was merely misused, 
occasionally wasted, but it was not stolen.  This in and of itself represents 
enormous progress from previous aid attempts that channeled money to the 
state.
33
    
Thus, in the early 1990s, concomitant with the political and economic changes 
occurring in Russia, civil society had also begun to reemerge.  Although the nascent 
civil society of the perestroika years had demobilized after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, new civil society actors surfaced to construct a post-Soviet civil society.  
Weigle explains that while the nascent civil society that formed in the Gorbachev 
period was not protected by law but rather dependent on the will of the hegemonic 
Communist Party and thus remained weak, it laid the foundation for an 
institutionalized civil society to emerge in the post-communist regime by establishing 
patterns of associational activity, demanding laws to protect an autonomous public 
sphere, starting independent newspapers, and promoting a culture of citizen self-
organization.
34
  Following Weigle, Henderson argues that a large portion of Russian 
activists’ energies throughout the 1990s went to “carving out a sphere of independent 
public activity protected by law.”
35
  They faced many challenges to achieving this 
goal, including gaining the respect of the state, which was accustomed to a quiescent 
public, and developing constituencies among average citizens, most of whom had 
retreated into the private realm in the turbulent transition years and were unfamiliar 
with the idea of a “third sector.”   
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In terms of numbers, the presence of civic groups increased drastically 
throughout the 1990s.  As a benchmark, it was estimated that 60,000 independent 
groups were active in 1989, before groups had achieved the right to autonomy.  After 
the right to form independent groups was established in 1990, NGOs began to register 
with the state, and by May 1993, 8,479 NGOs had been registered across Russia.  By 
January 1997, 160,000 groups had registered, and by January 2000, 274,284 groups.
36
  
As of 2001, more than 450,000 organizations had been officially registered.
37
  
However, Henderson contends that the numbers can be misleading as many 




 Of the organizations formed, most focused on materialist concerns of 
economic and physical security.
39
  Since the state was no longer meeting the needs of 
the most vulnerable populations, citizens’ groups organized to “fill in the gaps” by 
providing services for certain segments of the population, including the poor, 
veterans, the disabled, children, and pensioners.
40
  Some organizations, although now 
formally independent, were reconfigured Soviet-era groups, such as the Union of 
Women of Russia, which grew out of the defunct Soviet Women’s Committee.
41
  
Fewer in number than the materialist-oriented organizations, issue-oriented NGOs 
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also formed to advocate for social change.  The most popular causes taken up by 
Russian organizations included human rights, environmental protection, soldiers’ 
rights, and women’s activism. 
 Despite the dramatic increase in the number of Russian organizations, most 
were structurally weak, minimally integrated into the larger civil and political 
systems, and had few resources to draw upon.  Henderson argues that organizations 
“tended to be small, insular, and usually survived on the commitment of the 
founder.”
42
  She notes that the average staff size for NGOs was one to three people 
and that most employees held other jobs to support themselves.  Almost one-third of 
all NGOs had no paid staff.
43
  Outside of these small circles of staff and volunteers, 
most NGOs had poor connections to the Russian public.
44
  
State support to civil society groups was minimal; where it did exist, it was 
mostly in-kind, i.e., the provision of free or reduced cost office space or telephone 
lines, not funding to run programs.  Support by businesses or corporations was also 
miniscule; those corporate funding programs that did emerge in the late transition 
period were severely regulated by the Russian government, and support of any 
controversial causes was viewed with suspicion.  In addition, there was no tradition of 
check-book activism in Russia; most Russian citizens, in the event they even had 
resources to spare, had little incentive to pay dues to a sector they little understood.  
Given the dearth of domestic resources, many Russian organizations were eager to 
apply for grants by foreign donors when such an opportunity became available.   
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3.2 Foreign Aid Programs to Develop Post-Soviet Civil Society in Russia 
3.2.1 Overview of Civil Society Aid Providers and Programs  
The need for alternative sources of funding by Russian NGOs coincided with the new 
priority of many Western governments and foundations to promote civil society 
programs as a way of strengthening democracy in transitional states.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the assumption of such programs was that encouraging average 
citizens to participate in associations and become active in social and political affairs 
would help keep the power of the state in check and prevent a slide back into 
authoritarianism.
45
   
Many donors were inspired by the publication of Putnam’s Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, in which he argued that “the 
strength and stability of liberal democracy depends on a vibrant and healthy sphere of 
associational participation.”
46
  While drawing upon Putnam’s more collaborative 
model of state-society relations, donors also were influenced by the oppositional 
model of civil society glamorized in the downfall of communism.  Many donors thus 
promoted a vision of civil society in which average citizens were active, not primarily 
in collaborating with the state, as endorsed by Putnam’s theory, but in organizing 
independently of the state, lobbying for the interests of a particular constituency, and 
guarding against abuses of state power. In addition, in contrast to Putnam’s model, 
which highlighted the importance of many types of citizens’ associations, donors 
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targeted most of their funding to one specific associational type: the NGO, and, in 
particular, the advocacy NGO.   
 Although a few foreign donors were active in Russia in the late perestroika 
period, including the MacArthur Foundation and foundations affiliated with George 
Soros, it was not until after the fall of the Soviet Union that foreign funders arrived in 
mass to promote civil society in Russia.
47
  Henderson lists the leading sources of 
support: 
Major donors included government agencies of Western countries (primarily 
the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway) as well as 
multilateral organizations (such as the European Union, the United Nations, 
and the World Bank).  These efforts were supplemented by the work of a wide 
array of Western nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, ranging from 
large foundations (such as the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, 
the MacArthur Foundation, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation) to 
international nonprofit organizations (such as the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, 
World Learning, and the Institute for Sustainable Communities).
48
   
The United States was the leading promoter of civil society in Russia, both in 
ideological terms and in the total amount of funds allocated.
49
  In order to transform 
political support for the transition to democracy into material assistance, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in 1992 to provide aid to Russia and other 
former Soviet republics, which followed the Support for Eastern European 
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Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 that provided funds to advance democratization in 
Poland and Hungary.  Several U.S. governmental agencies became involved in 
assisting the Russian transition and developed programs to promote economic 
restructuring and democratic reforms, among other priorities.  Support for civil 
society was generally included under the category of democratic reforms.  Various 
U.S. governmental structures, including the State Department and the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), supported Russian NGO projects, but USAID controlled 
the largest portion of civil society funds.
50
  USAID created a Democracy and 
Government Program with the goal of promoting the rule of law, encouraging good 
governance, strengthening political processes, and supporting civil society.
51
  In 
addition, USAID developed an NGO sustainability index to measure the strength and 
viability of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and in Eurasia.
52
  Originally, 
the United States considered civil society assistance a temporary measure, with 
USAID predicting that their goal of strengthening civil society in Russia could be 
achieved by 1999.  Later, the date was extended to 2002, but in 2002, the idea of an 
exit date was dropped.
53
   
Only rarely does USAID grant funds directly to Russian NGOs; most often, 
USAID contracts out funds to U.S. NGOs or quasi-governmental agencies.  Some of 
its leading contractors have been quasi-governmental agencies such as the Eurasia 
Foundation, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic 
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Institute for International Affairs (NDI); nonprofit organizations such as the Institute 
of Soviet-American Relations, the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX), and World Learning; and Russian organizations such as the Sakharov Center 
and the Moscow Helsinki Group.
54
  
Although comprising only a small percentage of the total U.S. aid package to 
Russia, civil society assistance nevertheless has been significant enough to fund 
numerous NGOs and effect noticeable change in Russia’s civil sphere.
55
  According 
to Sundstrom, USAID spent $133.8 million in the category of “Democratic Reform” 
in Russia between 1992 and 1999.
56
  Overall, she estimates that, between 1990 and 
2002, the United States spent approximately $860 million to promote democracy in 
Russia.
57
  Although the dollar amount of civil society assistance is more difficult to 
calculate within the larger category of democratic reform, it was estimated that 
USAID devoted roughly $92 million to civic initiatives and NGO support programs 
in Russia from 1992 to 1998.
58
  Since the largest amount of foreign assistance to 
Russian NGOs, by far, came from the United States, Sundstrom argues that “it is the 
American version of NGO development assistance, with its relatively strict 
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predefinition of specific priorities and emphasis on infrastructural development, that 
has dominated the community of donors.”
59
 
While the United States was an early promoter of civil society aid as a means 
of encouraging economic and democratic reforms, the trend soon spread to other 
donor states and, by the late 1990s, nearly every foreign donor had developed 
programs directed at NGOs.
60
  After the United States, the European Union (EU) was 
the largest donor to Russian civil society.
61
  Until the late 1990s, all EU democracy 
assistance was through the European Commission’s Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program. Between 1991 and 2001, 
the TACIS program spent 750-800 million euro on democracy promotion programs in 
Russia.
62
  After a series of problems related to the running of TACIS, the program 
was redesigned in 1999, and its democracy component, now called the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), was put under the jurisdiction 
of the European Commission’s Delegation to Russia.
63
   
EIDHR offered three kinds of grants, for targeted projects, macro-projects, 
and micro-projects.  Targeted project grants were won by organizations from EU 
member states to carry out activities related to the European Commission (EC)’s 
current area of focus in Russia.  Macro-projects were substantially larger than micro-
grants and ranged in value from 500,000 to 1 million euro.  The process of obtaining 
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a macro-grant was extremely long; it took an average of eighteen months from 
proposal submission to proposal start date.  Micro-project grants were for smaller 
amounts, but the decision time for these grants was shorter, usually five to six 
months, since the program was administered by the EIDHR Moscow office.  The 
micro-projects program was mostly demand-driven, as Russian NGOs could propose 
their own ideas for projects within the broad categories of rule of law, 
parliamentarianism, independent media, and NGO development.
64
   
Several other Western governments provided significant amounts of funding 
to Russian NGOs.  The British government, another leading donor, funded projects to 
promote civil society, human rights, an independent media, trade unions, and 
women’s groups, among other initiatives, through the Department for International 
Development and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.
65
  The Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) funded civil society programs under its 
Good Governance portfolio, and the Canadian Embassy in Russia provided grants to 
organizations whose projects encourage “the emergence of an effective civil society 
in Russia.”
66
  The Swiss government implemented a program to support the growth of 
civil society in Russia and to promote human rights.
67
   The Netherlands provided 
funds for Russian NGOs through its Matra program, which aimed to support the rule 
of law, public participation in decisions, and proliferation of NGOs.
68
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In addition to states, private foundations have been major supporters of 
Russian civil society.  The leading funders have been the Ford Foundation, the 
MacArthur Foundation, George Soros’s Open Society Institute, and the Charities Aid 
Foundation, an independent charity in the United Kingdom.
69
  These foundations 
provide grants both directly to Russian NGOs and to Western NGOs seeking to 
promote Russian civil society.  Unlike governmental agencies such as USAID, 
private foundations are not reliant on a congressional mandate and thus have more 
flexibility in the types of grants they offer and the activities they fund.  In addition, 
they are able to make longer term commitments to working in a particular country.
70
  
To illustrate some dollar amounts directed at the building of Russian civil society, 
from 1993 to 2002, the Charities Aid Foundation Russia granted over $6 million; 
from 1994 to 2002, the Mott Foundation issued almost $12 million in grants; and 
from 1991 to 1998, the MacArthur Foundation distributed over $17 million to 
initiatives across the former Soviet Union.
71
  In 2000 alone, the Open Society 
Institute-Russia granted over $56 million to Russian NGOs.
72
  From 1999 to 2002, 
the Ford Foundation distributed more than $6 million in grants.   
A number of small private foundations have also granted funds to support 
Russian civil society.  For example, the U.S.-based Global Fund for Women and the 
Netherlands-based Mama Cash Foundation have provided grants in the area of 
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  Smaller foundations are usually not large enough to support 
overseas offices, and thus, most of their communication with Russian NGOs is by 
email, fax, or postal mail.
74
 
Finally, multilateral organizations and international non-governmental 
organizations have provided substantial support to Russia’s civil society.  As 
multilateral organizations, both the United Nations and the World Bank have 
developed programs aimed at strengthening civil society in Russia.
75
  International 
non-governmental organizations often receive funding from Western governmental 
agencies and private foundations “to administer grant competitions, workshops, and 
training to foster ‘citizen participation.’”
76
  Some of the international organizations 
most active in Russia have been the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, Save the Children, 
Institute for Sustainable Communities, and Initiative for Social Action and Renewal.
77
  
While international organizations administered grant competitions to Russian NGOs, 
they were dependent on larger donors to fund these competitions.
78
  As a result, the 
types of grants they offered and the priority issues they identified reflected the 
policies of their funders.   
 A key factor influencing the form and focus of civil society programs that is 
often overlooked is donors’ own need for survival.  Although the overall goal of most 
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foreign-funded civil society programs is to encourage the increased participation of 
Russian citizens in the political and civic arenas, the real constituents of funding 
programs are the citizens of the country providing the funding (for government 
agencies) or stockholders (for private foundations).  Henderson writes, “In addition to 
reflecting altruistic impulses and facilitating democracy, civic development is also a 
business—a multimillion-dollar industry that employs numerous academics, 
consultants, and practitioners whose careers depend on supplying justifications and 
rationales for continued civic aid.”
79
  Thus, the attention of Western donor 
organizations is necessarily divided between two constituencies, “the community they 
are supposed to serve abroad and the sources of their own funding.”
80
   
Given the great deal of competition among nonprofit organizations to receive 
grants from a foundation or governmental agency, organizations are under pressure to 
produce the quickest results possible.  As a result, implementing organizations tend to 
focus on short-term projects that can provide numbers (number of newsletters 
distributed, journals published, people serviced, etc.) and to utilize public relations 
techniques to advertise their “success stories.”
81
  Consequently, Henderson argues, 
long-term aims in building civil society are neglected as organizations are constantly 
writing up reports to validate their effectiveness to their home office.
82
  In addition, 
although many assistance programs attempt to work with local Russian communities 
and fund projects on issues of local concern, the topics they support are often limited, 
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and sometimes predetermined, by the source of their funding.  As noted, the many 
assistance programs supported by the U.S. government must reflect U.S. interests in 
order to receive congressional approval.
83
  While scholars have theorized on the 
power imbalance inherent in the donor-recipient relationships built through 
democracy aid, Henderson notes that Russian NGOs give their foreign supporters one 




 Although foreign funding represented the best option for many Russian NGOs 
seeking support, it was unpredictable and unable to afford NGOs a sense of security.  
Funding levels increased or decreased depending on the interests of the donor.  As 
donor agencies and organizations evaluated their programs and attempted to develop 
better methods of promoting civil society, Russian NGOs had to constantly adapt to 
the new requirements and new priorities set by their funders.  For example, in the 
mid-1990s, when several foreign funders sought to shift their focus outside of 
Russia’s largest cities to the regions, many Moscow- and St. Petersburg-based NGOs 
proposed networking projects in order to avoid the loss of funding.
85
  The 
development of the crisis center movement throughout Russia has been well 
documented as an example of women’s NGOs taking on the organizational form 
desired by donors in order to quality for grants.  Once successful in developing a 
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“crisis center,” organizations then had to adapt to changing priority issues, e.g., from 
rape to domestic violence to human trafficking, in order to maintain their funding.
86
   
While some changes in program priorities are attempts by donors to respond 
to the Russian context, other changes appear to simply reflect fads within the Western 
assistance community.
87
  Having to adapt to constantly shifting requirements of donor 
agencies and “chase” after funds limits NGOs’ ability to solidify their organizational 
focus and institutional identity.  In addition, as will be discussed below, these funding 
patterns have contributed to the emergence of a “supply-driven” civil society in which 
many Russian NGOs respond to the priorities of foreign donors while neglecting the 
interests and concerns of their local communities, which prevents them from building 
constituencies and weakens their sustainability.  Issues that may strike a chord with 
many Russian citizens, such as reproductive rights, are bypassed as being too 
controversial to gain U.S. congressional approval.
88
 
The reality of donors’ own funding sources and their multiple accountabilities 
belie the rhetoric of partnership and equality often used to describe the relationships 
between Russian and Western organizations.  Even when Russian-Western 
collaborations were officially presented as partnerships, they were usually based on 
the idea of Western experts teaching Russians how to correctly run their 
organizations.  For example, in the 1990s, USAID-funded programs such as World 
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Learning’s NGO Sector Support Program, the Institutional Partnerships Program, 
Sustaining Partnerships into the Next Century, and the Partnerships, Networking, 
Empowering, and Roll-Out Program were designed to pair start-up Russian NGOs 
with experienced Western NGOs to allow them to learn knowledge and skills from 
their “partners.”
89
  In addition to these federally funded programs, many smaller scale 
and grassroots programs, such as the U.S. sister city model, supported partnerships 
between Russian and Western NGOs.
90
   
Although these programs sometimes saw positive and effective results with 
Russian NGOs gaining valuable knowledge and the smaller programs allowing for 
especially close relationships to develop among participants, labeling such programs 
“partnerships” obscures the expert-recipient exchanges that structured these 
programs.  Both Hemment and Henderson note that the Western “experts” who 
developed assistance programs and ran seminars for Russians often had little 
knowledge of Russian language, culture, or history and devoted little time to learning 
about Russian realities.
91
  As a result, Hemment writes, “many of the Russian people 
who were initially most enthusiastic and Western-oriented grew steadily more 
disenchanted about the potential for these so-called East-West exchanges to offer 
arenas for dialogue, mutual learning, and respect.”
92
   
In addition, lying beneath the neutral-sounding slogans of “democratization” 
and “participation” were the political and ideological agendas of funding 
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organizations and governments.  Hemment argues that, as socialist ideology collapsed 
in the former Soviet Union, capitalism appeared victorious and democratization 
programs based on a neoliberal vision of economic development quickly arrived in 
the region to fill in the ideological vacuum.
93
  As described in chapter 2, a “New 
Policy Agenda” came to drive democratization programs in the hope of triggering 
economic growth and establishing new markets for Western investment.
94
  This new 
agenda, Hemment writes, “foresaw an economic restructuring process and a 
redrawing of state/societal relations along neoliberal lines, where, ideally, civil 
society is strong and the state ‘cut back’ like an unruly perennial.”
95
  The question of 
how NGOs would be financed was given little attention.  Most Western aid providers 
initiated civil society assistance programs with the expectation that funding was a 
temporary measure and would end once Russian civil society had been “developed.”
96
  
However, with little indigenous sources of support, most Russian NGOs had to 
drastically curtail their activities, or close down, when foreign funding ended.  The 
fact that the countries and institutions providing funds for NGOs to service the 
population were many of the same that had supported the policies of shock therapy 
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3.2.2 Outcomes of Foreign-Funded Civil Society Assistance Programs 
Given the fact that advocacy NGOs and Western-style social movements had scant 
roots in Russian society, the efforts of foreign funders to promote these new 
phenomena had a noticeable impact on the structure and functioning of Russia’s 
emerging civil society.  In this section, I examine the outcomes of foreign aid efforts 
to Russian civil society. 
 Although a common outcome of civil society assistance across world regions 
was the tendency for NGOs to direct much of their energy to building relationships 
with foreign supporters, this tendency was even more pronounced in Russia and many 
post-socialist states due to the influence of decades of state socialism.  As mentioned, 
the tradition of patronage that permeated Soviet life led citizens to value the 
establishment of small informal groups and close ties with individuals in positions of 
power over the need to form broad social networks.  Strict control of public life by 
the Communist Party led to a sense of powerlessness among the Soviet population in 
their ability to affect public policy. As a result, a system of patron-client relations 
came to dominate political processes, as those lower on the social ladder came to 
depend on connections with elites in order to wield influence or obtain benefits.   
As Henderson argues, the design of aid programs in which NGOs’ funding 
depended on satisfying the criteria of foreign funders resulted in a system of 
“principled clientelism.”
97
  Like Henderson, Hemment also contends that Russia’s 
third sector “reinforces old networks and hierarchies and enables the reproduction of 
old dependencies.”
98
  She presents the view of Valentina, the founder of a women’s 
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NGO, that foreign foundations have stepped “into the slot vacated by the Soviet state, 




Under socialism, we went to the government and asked for and received 
funds.  Now we go to foundations.  It’s the same process, the same 
psychology.  Capitalism or socialism—what’s the difference? .... We used to 
live from Party congress to Party congress, but now we live from grant 
deadline to grant deadline!
100
   
Instead of encouraging individual initiative and consciousness raising among the 
population, which Valentina had expected to develop through the budding third 
sector, she saw it as promoting the same mentality of passivity and complacency that 
had infused Soviet society.   
If civil society assistance programs aimed to foster equality, reciprocity, and 
strong horizontal networks, why is it that they so often promoted the opposing norms 
of elitism, competitiveness, and principled clientelism?  To better understand the 
effect that foreign assistance had on Russian organizations, Henderson compared the 
operation of funded NGOs to the operation of NGOs that received no foreign funding.  
Based on extensive research of NGOs across Russia, she concluded that “the 
activities, goals, and structure of groups that receive foreign assistance differ 
substantially from those who rely primarily on domestic funding.”
101
  While foreign 
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aid has provided for a degree of stability and enhanced the capacity of funded 
organizations, Henderson found four “paradoxical” results.
102
  First, although many 
Western agencies aimed to support grassroots organizations, funded NGOs tended 
toward top-heavy and bureaucratic organizational infrastructure.  Second, funded 
NGOs lacked sizable constituencies.  Third, by supporting those NGOs whose goals 
and language most coincided with the aims of donors, foreign funding furthered the 
establishment of a “civic elite” who were located primarily in Russia’s central cities, 
especially Moscow.  Fourth, while many donors sought to foster democratic values of 
cooperation and trust among groups, funded groups tended to hoard information and 
resources, engaging in competitive behavior with other organizations.
103
  These 
outcomes will be expanded upon in the discussion of the effects of foreign assistance 
below.   
As noted, the implementation of civil society assistance programs often 
reinforced the very values these programs claimed to reject.  While preaching norms 
of transparency and equal opportunity, foreign funders tended to rely on established 
contacts and closed personal networks in making grant decisions.  Consequently, 
many funders gave repeated grants to those individuals or organizations with whom 
they had already established trust.
104
  Russian activists quickly learned that links to 
foreign donors or membership in the emerging civic elite were the easiest way of 
obtaining grant money.    
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A related outcome of foreign funding was fragmentation of organizations into 
ever smaller NGOs or so-called non-governmental individuals.
105
  Since grants 
usually only provided for the salary of one or two leaders of an NGO, a way for other 
group members to obtain support was by breaking off and starting their own NGO 
through which to apply for funding.  While this practice could give the impression 
that the number of “new” NGOs was growing and donors were spreading funding 
among more organizations, a large portion of funding remained concentrated among 
Russia’s civic elite.
106
   
 In place of the egalitarian horizontal networks funders had hoped to encourage 
among Russian activists and NGOs, the civic elite soon came to dominate Russia’s 
third sector.
107
  As Henderson writes, “foreign aid strengthened the division of the 
civic community between the haves and the have-nots and centralized resources in the 
hands of the NGOs that had connections with the West.”
108
  A major criterion for 
membership in the elite was a track record of obtaining grants from foreign 
foundations, although such an approach often overlooked the extent to which grant 
monies had actually been put to effective use.
109
  A second criterion was location.  As 
noted, many of Russia’s civic elite were from Moscow and St. Petersburg, where 
activists made early contacts with donors, established trust, and served as project 
organizers when donors wanted to branch out into Russia’s regions.  Even in the 
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regions, a few strong resource centers built with donors’ funds tended to monopolize 
foreign connections and grants and serve as representatives of large expanses of the 
country.
110
  A third factor opening the door for an individual to enter the new civic 
elite was power and status gained in the previous regime.  As in the economic and 
political spheres, many former members of the Communist Party redirected their 
accumulated social capital to take advantage of opportunities in newly democratic 
Russia.  Eventually, many would utilize the practice of “flex organizing” by holding 
governmental positions while simultaneously presenting themselves as independent 
activists to foreign donors.
111
   
In fueling a dramatic increase in the number of Russian NGOs, especially 
advocacy NGOs that have not attracted large public support, foreign funding 
organizations have promoted a vision of “supply-driven” civil development, in 
contrast to “demand-driven” civil development where most of the pressure to 
organize comes from below.
112
  Overall, interest among Russian citizens in forming 
associations in the public sphere has been low, and those issues that evoke substantial 
concern among the Russian population, such as providing for the material needs of 
citizens and improving the social safety net, rarely fit into the frameworks of foreign 
funding programs.
113
  Supply-driven civil societies look different and attract different 
types of people than demand-driven civil societies.  Instead of rewarding the most 
talented and committed individuals, who may not speak the language of civil society 
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aid or be willing to change their mission to suit funders, the availability of large 
grants (compared to other sources of income in Russia) attracted many 
entrepreneurial personalities seeking to take advantage of a temporary opportunity.
114
 
Given that one of the leading purposes of the model of civil society promoted 
by foreign donors is to develop an arena for citizens to express their concerns to the 
state, citizen participation in civil society should be a key factor in measuring the 
success of these funding efforts.  Therefore, the absence of sizable constituencies 
among the majority of Russian NGOs is a surprising outcome of civil society 
assistance programs.
115
  One reason many Russians do not become involved in the 
third sector is lack of knowledge about the sector and lack of trust in its intentions.  
Numerous scholars have cited surveys showing that the majority of Russians do not 
trust civil society organizations and express little desire to work with such 
organizations.
116
  Henderson notes that Russia has one of the lowest rates of 
organization among formerly communist countries, which together have a low 
membership mean of 0.91 organizations per person, compared to a mean of 2.39 for 
older democracies.
117
  Given the public’s misinformation about and mistrust of the 
civic sector, it is especially important for foreign donors to encourage recipient 
organizations to strengthen ties to their local communities. 
 In her comparison of NGOs that had received foreign funding with those that 
had not, Henderson found that funded groups’ primary form of “interaction” with the 
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public was through the production and distribution of newsletters, brochures, or other 
materials instead of listening to a constituency and responding to their needs.
118
  In 
contrast, many unfunded groups focused their activities on “providing a range of 
support and services to members within the group, which included everything from 
providing a shoulder to lean on to finding alternative housing.”
119
   A second 
difference was in the language used by the organizations: “Groups that had received 
funding tended to reflect the post-materialist values of the donor, such as concerns for 
gender equity, environmentalism, or respect for human rights, rather than the 
survivalist, materialist bent of many organizations that relied solely on domestic 
sources of financial support.”
120
  Hence, while funded groups used theoretical 
language that helped them communicate with their funders and transnational 
networks, unfunded groups focused on the pragmatic concerns of daily life.   
On the other hand, a similarity between funded and unfunded groups was that both 
displayed little interest in boosting the size of their organizations.
121
  While funded 
NGOs focused on conducting informational projects with relatively small staff sizes, 
unfunded groups concentrated on serving small-scale support groups rather than 
searching for new members.
122
   
Comparing the objectives of funded and unfunded groups, Henderson notes 
that funded groups often aimed to effect large-scale change in the political and social 
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systems, while unfunded groups focused on finding practical solutions to members’ 
immediate life problems.  Based on her visits to offices of both funded and unfunded 
organizations, Henderson contrasts the work of these organizations.  Describing the 
work of unfunded groups, she writes:  
Often, in sitting down with these groups, I listened to a very articulate listing 
of problems, whether it was the price of medication, the status of health care, 
or the situation of disabled children…. They were more interested in adapting 
to the system than changing it.  Thus, they often had cultivated relations with 




By contrast, describing her visits to funded groups, Henderson states:  
Many donor-supported organizations had impressive offices, produced a large 
collection of NGO publications, and could speak the right language of 
advocacy, civil society, and democracy.  Some of them…were operating at 
full capacity and were working on timely, interesting projects that provided 
valuable services to their clientele.  But for the majority of funded 
organizations, the offices remained unvisited and the publications usually sat 
on a shelf with a multitude of other brochures, newsletters, bulletins, guides, 




Thus, Henderson concludes, building constituencies is one of the leading challenges 
for Russian NGOs.  While both funded and unfunded groups tend to be small in size, 
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donors can use their influence to encourage their grant recipients to devote more 
attention to developing constituencies, and thereby work to increase trust in the civil 
sphere among the Russian population. 
One factor that greatly impacts the success of civil society assistance 
programs is the degree to which the values they promote coincide with local norms.  
When projects supported by foreign funders complement local organizational cultures 
or demonstrate tangible improvement on issues of local concern, communities are 
likely to accept such projects and take advantage of the techniques they advocate.
125
  
In comparing soldier rights’ organizations to women’s organizations, Sundstrom 
found that organizations supporting soldiers’ rights were more successful in gaining 
recognition and respect in Russian society because they appeal to norms against 
bodily harm instead of to the theoretical concept of individual human rights.  While a 
legalistic discourse on human rights is popular in many Western countries, especially 
the United States, she argues that the norm against violations of physical dignity is 
nearly universal and is widely accepted in Russia.
126
  Thus, although employment 
discrimination and sexual harassment of women are pervasive problems throughout 
Russia, Sundstrom contends that foreign-funded campaigns on these issues failed to 
garner public support because they appealed to the importance of women’s rights, an 
idea largely rejected by the Russian public.
127
  One exception to the general 
invisibility of women’s organizations in Russia is the growth of the crisis center 
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movement.  Sundstrom maintains that foreign-funded crisis centers were able to gain 
respect in Russian society because they draw attention to an issue of bodily harm, 
namely domestic violence against women.
128
   
Another factor that impacts the effectiveness of civil society assistance 
programs is the local political atmosphere.  As Hemment notes, some foreign-funded 
NGOs have developed cooperative relations with local governments.
129
  Given the 
limited budgets of many local administrations, the availability of foreign funds to 
tackle some regional problems provides an incentive for officials to collaborate with 
NGOs they otherwise might have ignored.  In addition, some state institutions have 
created parallel NGOs within their own structures in order to qualify for foreign 
funding.
130
   
However, foreign funding has also produced negative outcomes in that local 
governments are sometimes suspicious of the motives of foreign groups and dismiss 
the relevance of NGOs with no domestic constituencies.  As president, Vladimir Putin 
furthered the suspicion of foreign-funded groups in both his speeches and his policies 
on the civic sector.  In his 2004 State of the Nation address, Putin argued that the 
primary purpose of some citizens’ associations is to obtain “funding from influential 
foreign or domestic foundations” or to service “dubious group and commercial 
interests.”
131
  As a result, he suggested, these organizations were not addressing the 
real needs of the Russian population.  Instead, Putin promoted the efforts of 
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organizations that share the values of the Kremlin leadership and that will assist the 
government in pursuing its goals for society.
132
  Putin backed up his rhetoric with 
measures to regulate the work of NGOs, such as establishing a Public Chamber 
comprising mainly Kremlin-friendly NGOs to represent the voices of the civic sector 
and increasing the registration requirements for NGOs, especially foreign NGOs.  In 
addition, the arrest and imprisonment of oil baron Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had 
founded the Open Russia Foundation (modeled after George Soros’s Open Society 
Institute), sent the message that domestic funding efforts that countered the interests 
of the Russian state would be punished.
133
   
As discussed, the neoliberal philosophy that lay behind many civil society 
assistance programs promoted a model of civil society in which citizens take on roles 
previously held by the state.  Many scholars have noted the role of Russian NGOs in 
“filling in the gaps” left when state-provided social services declined.  Studying the 
Russian environmental movement, Laura Henry finds that one of the main functions 
of environmental organizations is “filling in for partially dismantled state bureaucracy 
and services.”
134
  For example, grassroots groups “leapt in to fill the loss of recreation 
opportunities for children and public maintenance of city parks,” and professionalized 
groups “adopted tasks previously carried out by the state’s scientific research 
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institutions and environmental inspectorate, including monitoring, antipoaching 
efforts, and the development of green technology.”
135
  In contrast to grassroots and 
professionalized groups, which had minimal collaboration with state agencies, 
government-affiliated environmental groups were the most adamant that one of their 
main goals was to “help” the government or to enforce government regulation.
136
  
Scholars point out that, through their professional expertise, independent perspective, 
and sometimes private funding sources, NGOs are often expected to act as 
“innovators” of programs that, once proven effective, the government will take over 
and institutionalize.
137
  Such a collaborative arrangement between NGOs and the state 
depends, however, on the level of trust between the two parties and on the capacity of 
the state to take on new programs.   
Thus, the model of state-civil society relations promoted not only by civil 
society assistance programs, but also by Western-led economic and political reform 
efforts in Russia has influenced the developing relationship between Russia’s third 
sector and the state.  However, the neoliberal model imported from the West has 
collided with Russian political traditions that prescribe a dominant state.  The precise 
outcomes of the meeting of these dueling influences will be outlined in the next 
section.  
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 Overall, many scholars agree that foreign funding was successful in 
supporting the growth of a third sector, but not a civil society, in Russia.
138
  
Thousands of NGOs were active promoting their causes and finding ways to interact 
with, and sometimes partner with, local or regional governments.  Yet few NGOs 
reached out to more than a small number of Russian citizens, and the values that 
Western donors were so eager to inculcate among the Russian population, including 
trust in state and civil society structures, widespread participation in public life, and 
solidarity and reciprocity with other citizens, have shown scant evidence of taking 
root.  Henderson argues, “Ironically, although aid can improve NGO capacity, it can 
simultaneously discourage groups from functioning as a civil society…. Foreign aid 




Most aid programs are geared to generating fast, quantitative results to 
demonstrate productivity to stockholders or tax payers in the donor’s home country.  
This has resulted in what Henderson calls a “virtual civil society” in which “Donors 
and recipient NGOs to some extent kept up a pretext of carefully documenting 
activities, success stories, and future needs in order to justify their continued 
existence.”
140
  What this approach left out, however, was sufficient attention to 
building the infrastructure and teaching the values necessary to sustaining a strong, 
domestically oriented civil society.  Instead, civil society assistance programs have 
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often contributed to the decline of democratic practices as they encourage 
competitiveness and hierarchical relations among groups.
141
  A true “civil society” 
can only develop gradually, representing the interests and organizational culture of a 
domestic constituency and respecting the contours of domestic political power.  In 
order to support the growth of a sustainable civil society in Russia, donors must work 
toward longer term goals in civic development, broaden the types of citizen groups 
they fund beyond just NGOs, and practice what they preach in modeling transparent 
and egalitarian organizational procedures.   
 In terms of strengthening democracy in Russia, there is general agreement that 
the ability of foreign aid to institutionalize democratic practices or shift the balance of 
state-civil society relations is limited.
142
  While international aid has led to some 
changes, these changes are usually small (i.e., micro-level changes in the norms or 
behaviors of a group of activists, not macro-level changes in state behavior) and 
affect more the outward appearance of democratic structures than the functioning of 
these structures.
143
  Thus, a state may have a democratic constitution, hold regular 
elections, and permit a degree of independence in the media and civic sector but 
continue to manipulate the workings of power and employ autocratic means of 
governance.
144
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3.3 State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Soviet Russia 
In addition to foreign assistance, a major factor influencing the development of 
Russian civil society is the relationship between citizens’ associations and the 
Russian state.  By definition, civil society is meant to represent the voices of citizens 
organizing outside of state structures.  In reality, both in Russia and in most other 
countries, it can be hard to draw a strict line where state intervention ends and citizen 
initiative begins.  With a legacy of strong state control in Russia, the reach of 
governmental power into the civic sphere is potentially greater than in the liberal-
style civil societies of many Western countries.  Thus, although foreign assistance has 
played a large role in launching many citizens’ organizations, overall civil society 
development has followed a uniquely Russian path that reflects the historic relations 
between the public and a state that tends toward authoritarianism.  While the state is 
the dominant player in this relationship, citizens’ organizations have also benefited 
from the breadth of state power by drawing on state resources, such as office space, 
telephone lines, and university privileges, to carry out civic activities.   
In studying relations between civil society and the Russian state, some of the 
leading questions that scholars have posed are: (1) to what extent do state policies on 
civil society facilitate versus restrict the work of NGOs, (2) to what degree does the 
state seek to coopt NGOs versus partner with them on social initiatives, and (3) how 
closely can NGOs collaborate with state structures without losing the ability to 
critique state policy and push for change?  I address these questions as I examine the 
shifting relations between civil society and the post-Soviet Russian state in this 




 The legacy of the Soviet past continues to influence the development of civil 
society in “democratic” Russia.  As discussed previously in this chapter, independent 
organizing was strictly limited under the Soviet Union as the Communist Party sought 
to control all aspects of public life.  Sundstrom and Henry argue that, in the post-
Soviet period, the tradition of the strong state in Russia has led many citizens to 
“continue to believe that the state’s authority should be largely unquestioned” and 
“occupants of bureaucratic and political positions…to believe in the state’s extensive 
and unique role in governing all areas of society.”
145
  Russian activists and groups, 
used to appealing to the state for benefits, had to learn to interact with the state more 
as partners than supplicants.  For many Russian activists, seeing themselves as agents 




3.3.1 State-Civil Society Relations during the Yeltsin Era 
Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991-1992, the focus of 
the Yeltsin administration was to “demobilize” existing civil society in order to 
prevent opposition to shock therapy and other economic reforms.
147
  With the first 
post-Soviet elections not held until December 1993, Yeltsin initially directed his 
energy toward strengthening the executive branch of government at the federal and 
regional levels, gaining the support of former leaders in the Communist Party, and 
encouraging the emergence of new interest groups at the elite level.
148
  During this 
                                                 
145
 Sundstrom and Henry, 318. 
 
146
 Henderson (2003), 56.   
 
147
 McFaul, 112.   
 
148




period, Russian civil society was relatively passive, with few vocal critics of Yeltsin’s 
reforms.  Until the Russian Constitution was put into force in 1993, there was little 
legal foundation for groups to operate or attempt to collaborate with state structures; 
thus, they had scant influence on policymaking.   
While Yeltsin’s administration attempted to protect the government from 
societal pressures during this time, it did not seek to suppress the development of civil 
society.
149
  Indeed, Yeltsin’s government established the legal foundation upon which 
civil society could grow.  The 1993 Constitution granted the rights required for a 
functioning civil society: freedom of speech, press, religion, association, and peaceful 
assembly.  In 1995-1996, Yeltsin signed a series of laws concerning citizens’ 
organizations, the Law on Public Associations, the Law on Philanthropic Activities 
and Organizations, the Law on Noncommercial Organizations, and the Law on Local 
Self-Government, which established the legal status of independent groups, outlined 
the rules regulating their activities, and articulated their rights.
150
  Based on this legal 
framework, citizens could organize independently of the state, and even act in 
opposition to the state, for the first time in Soviet and Russian history.
151
  
 Despite this achievement, the Russian legal system remained weak and the 
laws were confusing and inconsistent at the federal, regional, and local levels.  In 
addition, few legal reforms followed to build upon these initial laws.  For example, 
unlike in some other democratic countries, there was no law allowing tax breaks for 
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individuals or businesses contributing to charitable organizations, providing one less 
incentive for Russians to contribute to a sector they little understood.
152
   
 An additional factor hampering the development of civil society was a lack of 
clear mechanisms for NGOs to communicate with state structures.  Organizations 
could attempt to form relations at the federal level with administrative offices, but 
such contacts were usually based on personal connections, not institutionalized 
channels of communication.
153
  Although civil society-state relations were covered in 
Russian legislation, as was characteristic of the Yeltsin era, there was a gulf between 
what existed on paper and the reality of the Russian political system.
154
   
While NGOs had little success in communicating with state structures at the 
federal level, they found more opportunity at the local and regional levels.  Most city 
and regional governments had an administrative unit specifically designated to 
communicate with “social actors,” defined as media, political parties, and/or 
NGOs.
155
  In addition, in 1994, the Yeltsin administration encouraged regional 
governments to set up public chambers (obshchestvennye palaty) for representatives 
of registered NGOs to take part in reviewing legislation before the regional Duma 
(legislatures).
156
  In 1995, a similar measure was included in the federal Law on Local 
Self-Government, which mandated that draft legal acts on the local level be subject to 
examination by representatives of civil society.  Based on this law, civil society 
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activists worked to create local “social-government” councils in which 
representatives of independent organizations and local officials came together to 
discuss pending legislation.
157
  However, the implementation of these initiatives 
varied widely, with some regional and local governments more accepting of 
cooperation with NGOs than others.   
 Thus, although Yeltsin did not actively seek to suppress civil society, the 
political system that he helped to construct presented few opportunities for civil 
society to influence policymaking.  Yeltsin’s focus on strengthening the executive 
branch on both the federal and regional levels led him to overlook the importance 
both of establishing a stable multi-party electoral system and of developing a 
mechanism for state-civil society communication.  With a weak party system and a 
weak legislature in Russia, NGOs looking to effect social change had to target the 
executive branch, which was the most difficult to reach.   
 Overall, the weakness of the Russian state and economy under Yeltsin 
presented the greatest obstacle to effective state-civil society collaboration.  With 
limited financial resources and a high level of corruption in the government, even if 
Yeltsin’s government had been willing to work with civil society actors, it would 
have had difficulty responding to their demands.  Many citizens’ organizations, with 
little incentive to lobby a weak state for benefits, instead became insular and focused 
on filling the gaps left when state social service provision dried up.  Analyzing the 
obstacles to civil society growth under Yeltsin, Weigle concludes:   
The absence of strong federalism, an effective state, a developed middle class, 
a free enterprise system, and independent news media that uphold ethical 
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standards are all cited by activists as contributing to the weakness of civil 
society development…. Russian activists consider an active middle class, a 
free enterprise system, and a vibrant civil society to go hand in hand.
158
 
Although many theorists and democracy assistance promoters stress the need 
for civil society to counter the development of an overpowering state, the opposing 
scenario of a weak state unable to respond to the demands of civil society is also not 
conducive to a healthy state-society relationship.  Weigle argues that Russian activists 
believe in the “strong state-strong society” model: “The institutionalization of state 
power is a prerequisite for civil society development, and a strong civil society is vital 
to ensuring the state’s democratic orientation.”
159
  This model would soon be put to 
the test during the regime of Vladimir Putin, who prioritized the strengthening of the 
Russian state during his terms as president.  In the meantime, Yeltsin’s “benign 
neglect” approach toward Russian society had permitted civil society to grow but 
severely limited its ability to influence political affairs.
160
   
 
3.3.2 State-Civil Society Relations during the Putin Era 
After Putin assumed the Russian presidency in 2000, he focused his attention on 
rebuilding the image and power that Russia once held in the international arena and 
putting Russia’s somewhat chaotic domestic affairs into order.  As part of his efforts 
to strengthen and stabilize the Russian state, he looked at the state’s relationship with 
civil society and implemented policies to increase state involvement with citizens’ 
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organizations.  His approach generated both positive and negative responses from 
Russian activists, with some appreciative of additional opportunities to communicate 
with state structures and others fearful that the state would attempt to control their 
organization’s activities.   
Activists’ reactions to Putin’s policies often differed according to their 
organizational type.  Those organizations that sought to “help” the state and that 
worked on one of Putin’s stated priority areas of improving Russians’ healthcare, 
housing, agriculture, or education largely benefited from the state’s increased 
attention and enjoyed a policy environment that helped them meet their goals.
161
  On 
the other hand, advocacy organizations that aimed to press the government for change 
or that received substantial funding from foreign donors sometimes felt unwelcome in 
a state where civil society’s interests were expected to coincide with the 
administration’s agenda.  In particular, Putin’s suspicion of foreign-funded groups led 
him to create obstacles for these groups’ operations in Russia and to promote a 
“nationalist approach” to civil society development both through improved 
communication channels between society and the state and through increased 
governmental funding of organizations supporting the state’s interests.
162
    
 Coming into office, Putin was faced with the political outcomes of Yeltsin’s 
“weak” leadership, namely, a system of “superpresidentialism” that neglected the 
development of other political institutions and a disorganized civil society that had 
scant influence on policymaking.
163
  Putin took advantage of both of these legacies in 
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rebuilding the Russian state.   With a strong grip on power and a weak civil society to 
check his actions, Putin was able to further increase the dominance of the executive 
branch while challenging the oligarchs with whom Yeltsin had shared power.   
However, Alfred Evans argues that, unlike the monopoly the Community 
Party held on power during the Soviet era, Putin sought a “hegemonic” centralization 
of power: 
so that many groups and institutions that retain token independence, 
remaining formally outside the vertical executive hierarchy of the state, have 
become…part of the base of support for the administrative structures headed 
by Putin.  It is also part of Putin’s mode of operation to offer rewards for 
organizations that are integrated into his pyramid of support, while he makes 
it clear, usually by deeds rather than words…that there will be penalties for 
resisting subordination to centralized authority.
164
 
Evans contends that, using this approach, within a few years after becoming 
president, “Putin was able to decrease pluralism in the mass media in Russia, curtail 
the independence of regional governors, ensure that the national parliament would 
accept his leadership with docility, and intimidate the ‘oligarchs’ of the business 
world so that they would not stand in the way of his political moves.”
165
  Under Putin, 
organizations or individuals who too blatantly challenged the government’s hold on 
power would be subject to penalties ranging from harassment to imprisonment.
166
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 Unlike Yeltsin, Putin extensively addressed the strengthening of civil society 
in both his speeches and his policies.
167
  For example, in his 2004 State of the Nation 
Address, he stated: 
Without a mature civic society, there can be no effective solution to people’s 
pressing problems…. There are thousands of citizens’ associations and unions 
working constructively in our country but far from all of them are geared 
towards defending people’s real interests.  For some of these organizations, 
the priority is rather different—obtaining funding from influential foreign or 
domestic foundations.  For others it is servicing dubious group and 
commercial interests.... It is, thus, necessary gradually to transfer to the non-
state sector the functions which the state should not carry out, or is incapable 
of carrying out efficiently.  It also makes sense to make use of the experience 
of the work of public chambers, gathered in a number of Russia’s regions.  
Such standing non-state organizations can ensure public scrutiny of the most 
important regulatory instruments which directly affect the interests of the 
country’s citizens.
168
   
As in many of Putin’s speeches, contradictions were apparent in this address.  While 
officially supporting the development of civil society and the “freedom” and 
“independence” of Russian citizens, Putin raised suspicion over organizations not 
representing “people’s real interests” and those receiving foreign funding.
169
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 In the conclusion to his 2004 State of the Nation Address, Putin states, “I consider that the creation 
of a free society of free people in Russia is our most important task…. It is the most important because 




In Putin’s vision, civil society organizations should work to support the 
government and to unify the population in support of the overarching goals of the 
Russian nation.  Thus, instead of a liberal model of civil society, in which diverse 
interest groups compete for influence or lobby for rights, Putin supports a more statist 
model of civil society.  In this model, “people, participating in civil society, will 
regard as of primary importance not so much the idea of freedom, not so much the 
idea of interests, as the idea of service to a certain common cause.”
170
  This vision, of 
course, calls for civil society to remain subordinate to the authority of the state and to 
work on issues that meet the state’s approval.   
Sensing danger in this approach, Evans argues that the Putin administration 
“interprets civil society as a network of organizations that, while remaining 
technically outside the state, will be co-opted to assist the leadership of the political 
regime in pursuing the objectives that it has chosen for society.”
171
  Again, however, 
unlike the Soviets, Putin did not seek to completely absorb civil society into the state.  
On this point, Evans notes: 
Putin seeks to dominate society but not to absorb it completely, partly because 
he does not want the state to shoulder full responsibility for providing material 
resources to all nongovernmental organizations.  Also, unlike the Bolsheviks, 
Putin is not inspired by an ideology that calls for comprehensive social 
transformation.  He has shown a tendency to create some key GONGOs 
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[government-organized non-governmental organizations], while manipulating 
rewards and punishments to ensure compliance from existing groups and 
marginalizing other groups that attempt to preserve their independence.
172
 
While Putin’s administration directly penalized only a small number of prominent 
organizations, Evans contends that, for most groups refusing to toe the Kremlin’s 
line, the result was simply irrelevance and lack of influence over the political 
process.
173
   
 Putin’s “nationalist” approach to building civil society led his administration 
to create hurdles in the path of foreign-funded groups and of organizations that too 
harshly criticized the government.  Evans argues that Putin’s administration had been 
putting pressure on human rights groups with foreign ties for two years prior to his 
2004 address.  In addition, from 2002 to 2004, “the Russian government had 
terminated the U.S. Peace Corps program, expelled the head of the AFL/CIO affiliate 
in Moscow, and pressed dubious charges against Russian researchers and journalists 
who were accused of having revealed state secrets to foreign governments.”
174
   
However, after Putin’s 2004 speech, attacks on organizations that did not 
enjoy governmental support became more blatant.  In the months following Putin’s 
speech, numerous newspaper articles and statements by government officials charged 
the Russian human rights movement with serving foreign interests intent on 
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weakening the Russian state.  In the central Russian city of Kazan, masked men 
entered the Human Rights Center and smashed computers and other equipment.
175
   
 While hampering the work of organizations that appeared to threaten the 
Kremlin’s interests, Putin also took constructive steps to develop a civil society in 
line with his vision.  One of his first steps was to convene a national Civic Forum in 
November 2001 with the goal of creating new channels of communication and 
encouraging greater cooperation between NGOs and the state.  Work on organizing 
the Forum began on June 12, 2001, when Putin and a few administration 
representatives met with ten civic leaders that had been chosen for the event by the 
Kremlin.  Meeting organizers Gleb Pavlovsky, Putin adviser and director of the Fund 
for Effective Policy, and Viacheslav Surkov, deputy head of the Presidential 
Administration, originally envisioned the Civic Forum as a means toward establishing 
a “Union of Civic Organizations” or another permanent structure through which civil 
society activists could communicate with federal officials.
176
   
After the June 12 meeting, NGO representatives that had been in attendance 
gave an address in which they called for the Civic Forum to contribute to the 
realization of a “Great Russia” founded on the “best national traditions of service to 
society.”
177
  They argued that “free citizens in close union with the government will 
be able to establish an order in which personal initiatives are not degraded and each 
individual realizes his own potential.”
178
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 Other civil society activists were skeptical of the purpose of the Forum and 
demanded changes if their organizations were to participate.
179
  Some feared the 
Forum was an attempt by the government to exert greater control over civil society 
and to coopt its resources toward governmental aims.   One reason for this fear was 
the proliferation of government-organized non-governmental organizations 
(GONGOs), such as Zeleny Krest (Green Cross), KEDR (Constructive Ecological 
Movement of Russia), and Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo (Civil Society), which had 
been used “to demonstrate ‘unity’ of opinion on policy between the administration 
and the public.”
180
  Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo participated in helping to select 
organizations across Russia to take part in the Civic Forum.   
Another reason that some activists were hesitant to participate in the Forum 
was that it too closely resembled Communist Party conferences, “whose attendance 
would be limited to reliable delegates and regional delegations hand-picked by 
Kremlin and local government structures.”
181
  If the Civic Forum followed this 
model, activists feared that the small number of NGO representatives invited to the 
Forum would vote on a permanent structure that would regulate state-civil society 
communication for all NGOs across Russia and that could be manipulated to 
demonstrate support of the current administration.
182
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Many of Russia’s largest NGOs, including Narodnaia Assembleia (People’s 
Assembly), an umbrella group of several established organizations such as the 
Moscow-Helsinki Group, Memorial, the Social Ecological Union, and others, had not 
been invited to serve on the organizing committee for the Civic Forum and refused to 
attend what they saw as a government attempt to coopt civil society for its own 
purposes.  The government, recognizing the negative publicity surrounding the event 
and the lack of support from influential and respected NGOs, realized it had to 
broaden its approach to the Forum.   
On August 20, Surkov went to the Moscow office of Memorial to meet with a 
group of NGO leaders to discuss the conditions under which they would consider 
taking part in the Forum.
183
  While some activists refused on principle to take part in 
a Forum initiated by the government, those willing to join the discussions demanded 
numerous changes.  First, they insisted that the Forum not serve as a congress for 
civil society representatives to make decisions for civil society as a whole and that no 
elections be held.  Instead, the Forum should be a “working gathering for NGO 
activists interested in some degree of cooperation with the government to jointly 
solve pressing social problems.”
184
  Thus, the Forum would comprise multiple 
roundtable discussions on a variety of topics.  Second, they demanded that the 
Forum’s organizing committee be restructured to include a broader range of societal 
representatives.  Members of the original organizing committee would constitute only 
one-third of the committee, while representatives of previously uninvited human 
rights and environmental organizations would make up another third, and members of 
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the Presidential Administration would make up the final third.
185
  Activists were 
adamant on the last point, as they saw the Civic Forum as an opportunity for civil 
society representatives to make direct contact with administration officials. 
In mid-September, after the administration agreed to the proposed conditions, 
the new 81-member organizing committee began the second-stage of preparations for 
the Civic Forum.  While some Narodnaia Assembleia representatives remained wary 
of the government’s intentions for the Forum, the new organizing committee quickly 
came to agreement on the composition of a 21-member working group to lead Forum 
preparations.
186
  In early October, the working group sent an open letter to the civic 
sector outlining the Forum’s new goals, welcoming input, and inviting all interested 
civil society actors to take part in the Forum.
187
  On October 12, the working group 
released a two-page statement, “On the Goals and Tasks of the Civic Forum,” that 
laid out the framework for all subsequent Forum activities.
188
  The statement, signed 
by both civic and governmental representatives on the committee, stated that the main 
goal of the Forum was to be “a working discussion on the developmental path of 
Russian civil society and its interaction with the government.”
189
  On the civil 
society-state relationship, the statement read: 
Civil society is not a vassal of the authorities, just as it is not an opponent of 
them.  It exists as a natural and equal partner of the government in the creation 
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of a strong and prosperous state.  And effective government similarly exists as 
a natural partner of civil society and its daily activities.
190
 
The confrontation between civil society representatives and the authorities in 
planning the Civic Forum demonstrates the strength that civil society had amassed in 
ten years of activity since the end of the Soviet era.  Well-known activists led the 
movement to reject the framework of the Forum as proposed by the original 
organizing committee and reformulated the purpose and goals of the Forum to better 
suit their interests.  However, while able to effectively assert its position against the 
authorities in this instance, civil society was still far from an equal partner to the 
government, despite the rhetoric of the Forum.   
With the working group of the organizing committee finalized in late 
September, it had only two months to complete preparations for a conference that 
would bring together several thousand civic leaders and governmental officials.
191
  
The committee worked with a federally sponsored budget of $1.5 million, but it also 
expressed hope that international donors would fund the participation of organizations 
that otherwise lacked the funds to attend.
192
  With the goal of extending participation 
to as many activists as possible, the organizing committee designed the following 
system to allocate five thousand participant slots: three thousand representatives of 
civic organizations (no more than one participant per organization); three hundred 
representatives of all-Russian and international organizations registered in Russia; 
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seven hundred “working group quota” participants; and one thousand guests, 
including government officials, journalists, and international observers.
193
   
In order to have representation of groups across Russia, a quota system was 
created with participant slots apportioned by region, based on formulas taking into 
account both population and level of civic activity.
194
  Civic organizations in each 
region were to form local organizing committees by mid-October, hold pre-Forum 
conferences to discuss issues of local concern, and process application forms for the 
Civic Forum that would then be sent to the central organizing committee.
195
  Sixty to 
eighty percent of participant slots were to be allocated based on this application 
process, with the remaining regional spots to be given to regional or all-Russian 
organizations that sent their applications directly to the central organizing committee.  
Although most regions followed this process in preparing for the Forum, about thirty 
regions failed to hold conferences, and thus some regions did not fill their quotas.  In 




Although the local and central organizing committees worked hard to prepare 
for the Civic Forum, preparations were rushed and programs were not fully fleshed 
out.  By early November, some were calling for the Forum to be delayed for a few 
weeks, but since the logistical arrangements had already been made, it was decided to 
hold the Forum, as planned, on November 21-22, 2001.   
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The Civic Forum began with a plenary session in the Great Kremlin Palace 
attended by the majority of forum participants.
197
  The keynote speaker and session 
chair was Moscow Helsinki Group leader Ludmila Alekseeva, who had been exiled in 
the Soviet era for her dissident activities.
198
  In her address, Alekseeva drew attention 
to the achievements of civic activists in Russia, but also noted the disconnect between 
civil society and governmental authorities, “which necessitates constructive efforts 
both at the forum and beyond it to create a dialogue to resolve sociopolitical and 
economic problems.”
199
   
Upon completing her address, Alekseeva introduced President Putin, who 
entered the room to greet Forum participants. Alexander Nikitin and Jane Buchanan 
write, “That Putin’s remarks followed Alekseeva’s introduction and that the president 
would then sit next to the former dissident symbolized that indeed profound changes 
in Russia were under way, despite continuing suspicion between government and 
citizens.”
200
   
In his speech, Putin voiced support for increased cooperation between civil 
society and the state and rejected the idea that the government desired to control or 
coopt civil society.  He argued that it is “absolutely unproductive and, in principle, 
impossible and indeed dangerous to attempt to construct civil society ‘from 
above.’”
201
  In addition, he recognized the diversity of independent groups in Russia, 
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“their different goals and expectations from the government, and the fact that many 
vehemently oppose the state on principle on questions of government policies.”
202
  
This diversity, Putin contended, was important for the functioning of a strong 
democratic state.  In his opinion, the state’s role was to create favorable conditions for 
the development of a flourishing civil society and to promote dialogue between the 
first and third sectors.  Toward this aim, he stated: 
We recognize that the efficacy of this dialogue to a considerable degree 
depends on us, on representatives of the state, on the state as a whole.  In this, 
we are prepared to take necessary organizational, and, if needed, legal 
measures, and are prepared to develop effective two-way communication 
between society and state apparatuses.
203
 
Putin called for “calm, concentrated, systematic work” to realize the goal of improved 
state-society relations and to “unite the resources of a strengthened state and the 
energy of a democratic society.”
204
 
After Putin finished his address, he took his seat next to Alekseeva and 
listened to the speeches of the other high-level governmental representatives in 
attendance.  When these speeches were completed, Putin departed along with the 
governmental representatives and did not have the chance to hear from any 
representatives of civil society.  As Nikitin and Buchanan write, “These actions very 
much gave the impression that not only was the forum not a priority for the president, 
but that those surrounding Putin arranged the schedule so that he would remain 
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insulated from information or situations that might have proved unpleasant for 
him.”
205
  In addition, despite Putin’s verbal recognition of the importance of civil 
society, Nikitin and Buchanan note that many activists doubted the sincerity of his 
comments since “what the president says so eloquently very often fails to correspond 
with events as they actually occur.”
206
  Weigle, on the other hand, emphasizes that 
even the verbal recognition of civil society by Putin was a hard-won achievement for 
civic activists.  She points out that “Putin is on record as recognizing the autonomy, 
diversity, and policymaking potential of Russia’s NGOs.”
207
  For many activists who 
had worked for nearly a decade in obscurity under Yeltsin, Putin’s words held 
significant meaning.   
After the plenary session, Civic Forum participants spent the remainder of the 
day engaged in twenty-one large group discussions (with up to three hundred 
participants).  Topics included local self-government, social policies, military reform, 
educational reform, mass media and freedom of information, public health and the 
environment, and Chechnya, among other issues.
208
  The goal of these discussions 
was to prepare positions or statements that would serve as the basis for the second 
day’s meetings with governmental representatives.
209
   
On the next day, NGO representatives met with government officials in 
smaller roundtable groups.  In these sessions, civil society and governmental 
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representatives successfully formed many working groups that would continue to 
meet after the Forum had adjourned.  However, the Forum produced few concrete 
agreements on issues of importance to civic activists, leaving many disgruntled with 
what they perceived as the state’s reluctance to accept civil society as an equal 
partner.
210
  Especially in discussion groups on controversial issues, such as 
environmental protection and Chechnya, conversations turned divisive with officials 
unwilling to fully answer activists’ questions.  In contrast, groups on less 
controversial issues, such as local government, proved more fruitful as officials and 
activists found greater common ground.  Again, much of the difference of opinion 
among activists on the success of the Civic Forum seemed to be divided according to 
organizational type: representatives of advocacy NGOs, including human rights and 
environmental groups, were disappointed that government representatives failed to 
fully address the issues they raised or to negotiate with them as equal partners, while 
representatives of other groups, especially service-provision organizations, expressed 
appreciation that the state was now paying them greater attention and respect.
211
   
At the end of the second day, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov represented 
the government in place of Putin, and Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko 
served as meeting chair at the closing plenary session.
212
  Twenty-one presenters gave 
summaries of results of the thematic discussions and roundtables, which, according to 
Nikitin and Buchanan, were “generally positive and relatively benign commentary 
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  One presenter, environmental activist Grigory Pasko, spoke 
about the importance of freedom of information and independent media, at which 
point the entire audience, including Prime Minister Kasianov, applauded.  However, a 
month later, Pasko, a former navy captain and journalist who had reported illegal 
dumping of nuclear waste by the military, was convicted of high treason and 
sentenced to four years in a hard labor prison.
214
  Of this case, Nikitin and Buchanan 
write, “For journalists, environmentalists, scientists, human rights advocates, and 
others, the results of the Pasko case deliver a much clearer message about the actual 
relationship between government and its citizens than any speech delivered during the 
two days of the Civic Forum.”
215
 
Some activists and scholars agreed with Nikitin and Buchanan’s skeptical take 
on the intent and outcomes of the Civic Forum.  Similar to the viewpoint of many 
advocacy organizations that were hesitant to attend the Civic Forum, Evans argues 
that the Forum was just one attempt by the Russian state to “make it gradually more 
difficult for existing NGOs to operate independently of state domination.”
216
  As 
suggested by the Forum’s proceedings, organizations that are too critical of the 
government may be marginalized and their concerns sidelined.   
On the other hand, other scholars, along with activists who sought to work 
with the government, identified a number of benefits produced by the Forum.  Weigle 
argues that activists left the Civic Forum “generally optimistic about the potential of 
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the forum to usher in a new era in Russia’s state-society relationship.”
217
  She notes 
that, following the Forum, “Follow-up conferences with local government officials, 
NGO representatives, the mass media, and forum participants took place throughout 
Russia.”
218
  Thus, although the event did not match its rhetoric of elevating civil 
society to equal partnership with the state, it did increase governmental officials’ 
awareness of the work of civil society, grant state approval to this work, and improve 
dialogue between civic and state actors.  Even Nikitin and Buchanan recognize that 
the Forum resulted in greater attention to the development of civil society in Russia, 
with the media producing an unprecedented number of articles on civil society and 
civic activists finding new ways to interact with each other and with state officials.
219
  
Finally, although some contend that the Kremlin sought to sow division within civil 
society, especially among opposition groups, through the Forum, the work of 
organizing the event actually encouraged these groups to strengthen their ties.  
Throughout preparations for the Forum, leading human rights and environmental 
groups made concerted efforts to present a unified front and avoid criticizing each 
other. 
220
   
If the Civic Forum was an early indicator of Putin’s approach to state-civil 
society relations, other measures would follow to make his intentions even more 
clear.  As did Yeltsin, Putin supported the idea of public chambers through which 
citizens could provide feedback on proposed legislation and governmental actions.  
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Such a permanent structure of citizen representation was similar to what the 
government had first proposed when preparing for the Civic Forum, but, as noted, 
opposition from activists prevented the Forum from morphing into such a structure.  
Three years later, in September 2004, following a series of terrorist attacks that 
culminated in the bombing of an elementary school in Beslan, Putin responded with a 
speech calling for greater state control over society and proposing the formation of a 
federal Public Chamber to serve as an official consultative body to the government.  
In December 2004, Putin submitted the bill on the Public Chamber to the State Duma, 
the lower house of the Russian legislature.  The bill subsequently passed and came 
into force on July 1, 2005.
221
  Describing the Chamber’s purpose, Henderson writes: 
The key function of the Chamber is to submit recommendations to members 
of the Duma about domestic policy and proposed legislation, and to request 
investigations into potential breaches of the law as well as request information 
from, and monitor, state agencies.  The members of the Chamber also serve on 
one of eighteen commissions that examine bills or provide advice and 
expertise to the Duma on a variety of pressing issues, such as public control 
over the activities of law enforcement and reforming the judicial system, 
communications, information policy and freedom of expression in the media, 
culture, healthcare, environmental policy, and so on.
222
 
Membership in the Public Chamber was elected from the top down.  The 
President chooses the first third of the members; those members then choose the next 
third; and these two-thirds choose the final third nominated by regional social groups, 
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for a total of 126 members.  This structure was replicated on a smaller scale in most 
of Russia’s eighty-nine territorial units.
223
   
As with the Civic Forum, the creation of the Public Chamber elicited both 
positive and negative reactions from activists and scholars.  Sundstrom writes, 
“NGOs that are independent of the state have heavily criticized the chamber as being 
designed to control civil society rather than to seek diverse input into policies.”
224
  
Constituted mostly by civic representatives who are supportive of governmental 
policies, the Chamber excludes activists openly critical of the state, resulting in a 
council that is not representative of the diversity of Russia’s civil society.  On the 
other hand, many citizens and NGO leaders receptive to the Kremlin’s favored model 
of state-society relations eagerly accepted the opportunity to serve as consultants to 
and collaborators with the government.   
The Putin administration also signaled its approach to civil society 
development with new legislation and financial support to NGOs.  The 2003 Federal 
Law on Local Self-Governance, which began to be put into effect in some regions in 
2006, further delineated the division of authority between federal, regional, and local 
power structures and provided avenues for citizen participation on issues of “local 
significance,” such as “the formation and execution of municipal budgets, the 
provision of utilities and other government services, and…housing reform and city 
planning.”
225
   
                                                 
223
 Ibid., 267. 
 
224
 Sundstrom (2006a), 181. 
 
225




In addition, the federal government provided funds for NGO activities, in part 
to lessen the dependence on foreign assistance.  In 2006, the federal government 
authorized the Public Chamber to disburse 500 million rubles (US $15 million) to 
NGOs through a grant competition.  In the following years, the amount disbursed was 
increased and the Public Chamber began contracting out management of the grant 
competitions to several NGOs.
226
   
Putin encouraged business leaders to support Russian civil society by 
declaring 2006 the year of philanthropy and calling on businesses to contribute to 
organizations working on Kremlin-defined priority issues.  While corporate giving 
has increased among Russian businesses, the range of NGOs supported in this manner 
remains small, mainly comprising service-oriented NGOs and organizations 
promoting Russian culture.  Advocacy NGOs have received little corporate support, 
especially following the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky and the closure of his 
philanthropic Open Russia Foundation.
227
 
In 2006, Putin pushed for the passage of a new law placing stricter conditions 
on the registration process and operation of NGOs.  This law, Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, amended existing laws regulating the 
civic sector.
228
  Although the Russian Constitution allowed citizens to form 
independent associations without formally registering with the government, 
registration granted organizations a number of privileges, including the right to open 
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a bank account, to own or rent property, to apply for government funding, and to bid 
for government service contracts, among other rights.
229
   
Before 2006, the most comprehensive law regulating the civic sector had been 
the 1995 Law on Public Associations, which outlined procedures for NGOs to 
register with justice authorities and set a June 30, 1999, deadline for all organizations 
registered under previous laws to re-register in order to retain their legal status.  
Depending on the territory and the scope of operations, organizations had to either 
register with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice or with a regional or local 
branch.  As Henderson points out, registration requirements were inconsistent and 
burdensome, with the location and cost of registration and the amount of necessary 
paperwork differing for various organizations.
230
  As a result of the ensuing confusion 
or a lack of time and money to complete the often extensive registration requirements, 
many NGOs did not re-register or did not submit their documents on time.   
According to the law, even organizations that did meet the deadline could 
have their registration denied for a variety of reasons, including “advocating the 
violent change of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, damage to the 
security of the state, creation of an armed organization, or inciting social, racial, 
ethnic, or religious conflict.”
231
  Although the stated purpose of the law was to 
remove NGOs formed for such illegal purposes or NGOs that were no longer active, 
John Squier argues that some officials used the law “to rid themselves of troublesome 
organizations—particularly trade unions and ecological and human rights 
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organizations—that were too openly critical of the officials or their policies.”
232
  
Contrary to the law, some organizations had their re-registration denied or delayed 
due to officials’ rejection of the organization’s name, structure, or (legal) activities.
233
  
Overall, Squier notes, the number of organizations officially registered with the 
government substantially decreased after the deadline to re-register passed.
234
   
Since 1999, organizations had been periodically required to re-register with 
state officials, ostensibly so that the government could keep accurate records of the 
number of NGOs operating in Russia.
235
  While the registration process allowed the 
government a degree of oversight over civil society development and permitted 
authorities to penalize those activists most critical of state policies, for the majority of 
NGOs, registration was simply a technical matter with little impact on their 
organizational activities except for the time spent filling out paperwork.  However, 
the stricter NGO law that Putin signed into effect in 2006 drew criticism from both 
foreign observers and Russian NGOs for dramatically increasing the state’s powers of 
supervision over civil society.  Passage of the law followed the “color revolutions” 
that occurred in the neighboring countries of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, in 
which foreign-funded organizations were credited with helping to put democratic 
leaders into office, and the law was interpreted as an effort by Putin to prevent foreign 
organizations from having such an influence in Russia.
236
  Indeed, Putin gave 
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credence to this interpretation by speaking out against the meddling of foreign donors 
on several occasions.
237
   
Earlier, and stricter, drafts of the 2006 law had resulted in criticism from 
members of the U.S. Congress and administration officials, “strongly worded 
statements from the European Council,” and public complaints by Russian NGOs and 
the Public Chamber.
238
  In response, Putin called on the Duma to modify the bill, 
leading the body to remove several of the harsher requirements.  Henderson cites this 
case as an example of the success Russian civil society can have in influencing state 
actions.
239
  Nevertheless, passage of the law was denounced both within Russia and 
internationally, and NGOs in Russia have had to deal with its new regulations.  
The 2006 law introduced several new requirements for both Russian and 
foreign NGOs.   Prior to the passage of the law, foreign NGOs had been operating in 
Russia with little oversight from the Russian government.  The new requirements 
“restrict who may form an organization in the Russian Federation, expand the reasons 
for which registration may be denied, and increase the supervisory powers of the 
state.”
240
  Foreign NGOs operating in Russia were particularly concerned with the 
condition that they can be denied registration if their “goals and objectives… create a 
threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, 
unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian 
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  Since these terms were not clearly defined in the law, it gave the 
registration authority a great deal of power in applying the law.   
The law also substantially increased the reporting burden on both Russian and 
foreign NGOs.  Russian NGOs were obligated to submit reports on their activities and 
finances on an annual basis, including all funds received from foreign sources and 
how those funds were used.  Foreign NGOs had to complete an extensive number of 
documents in order to register and then submit several reports each year on their 
accounts.  Finally, the law increased the supervisory powers of the registration 
authority by giving it the right to demand internal documents of NGOs, to send 
representatives to an organization’s meetings, and to ban foreign NGOs from 
transferring funds or resources to recipients in situations that are found to be 
threatening to the Russian state.  Overall, the law was seen as increasing the number 
of criteria for which NGOs could be penalized, thus, giving the state more power to 
selectively determine which NGOs could wield influence in the Russian political 
system.   
After the October 18, 2006, deadline to re-register passed, many organizations 
had their operations terminated or suspended, either because they failed to complete 
the required paperwork or because of officials’ rejection of the organization’s stated 
purpose or activities.
242
  Russian lawyer Olga Gnezdilova states that, as of January 1, 
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2009, 219,802 Russian NGOs had been removed from the government’s records.
243
  
Most, she notes, were removed for not turning in their accounts; thus, the registration 
authority made the assumption that they no longer exist.  However, some closures 
seem to be politically motivated.  For example, the British Council, which conducted 
English classes and sponsored cultural activities in Russia, had a long history of 
problems with the Russian government, reflecting strains in political relations 
between Russia and the United Kingdom.  In 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
ordered the closure of two regional offices of the Council, claiming that they were 
operating illegally.  When the British Council refused to shut down the offices, 
arguing that Russia’s actions violated international law, Russian Foreign Minister 
Mikhail Kamynin replied that “any other actions [besides closure] would be 
provocative and build up bilateral tensions.”  Ultimately, the offices were 
permanently closed, but Russia continued to take actions against the Council’s sole 
remaining office in Moscow.
244
    
In addition, a number of NGOs have had their applications for registration 
rejected because the authorities found fault with the organizations’ purpose or the 
wording of their charters.  Gnezdilova notes that the Ministry of Justice sets a quota 
each year for the number of organizations that will be denied registration.
245
  One 
case that attracted the attention of the human rights movement was the denial of 
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registration to the Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Organization "Rainbow House,” on 
the grounds that the group’s advocacy of “non-traditional sexual orientation” could be 
considered to undermine the “spiritual and cultural values” and the “territorial 
integrity” and “national security” of Russia.
246
   
One of the biggest problems the law caused for both foreign and Russian 
NGOs was the substantial paperwork now required to register or simply operate an 
NGO in Russia.  As the Moscow Helsinki Group and Human Rights without Frontiers 
note:  
It has been estimated that setting up a new NGO now requires submitting at 
least 60 pages of documentation and takes eight weeks or more, compared to 
ten days for a commercial company.  NGOs often resort to legal assistance to 
finalize their applications, and the total costs involved in registering NGOs 




In addition, a lack of clear guidelines on how to complete the paperwork and 
inconsistency in how the law was applied in different regions created a great deal of 
confusion and difficulty for NGOs trying to conform to the new requirements.   
 Henderson offers a different perspective on the 2006 law, arguing that most 
NGOs did not suffer negative consequences from the law’s implementation, apart 
from the increased paperwork that it required.  Citing a 2007 survey of NGOs in 
twenty regions of Russia, she notes that the majority of survey respondents had not 
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complied with the law.
248
  According to the Federal Registration Service, only 32 
percent of NGOs had submitted the required documents.   However, NGOs in the 
2007 survey did not report any penalties for lack of submission.  In addition, 
respondents did not feel that the law had been disproportionally applied against 
human rights or advocacy organizations.  Henderson suggests that advocacy groups 
may have been more likely to file their paperwork, due to fears that they would be 
targeted for any breach of the law.  Nonetheless, she states, “as of the end of 2007, 
the biggest cost to them of the legislation, according to Russian NGOs themselves, 
was time spent in filling out the papers.”
249
 
Compared to the Yeltsin presidency, Putin made stronger efforts both to 
increase civil society’s access to the state and to regulate its activities.  As Henderson 
notes, “The conventional wisdom regarding President Putin’s policy agenda toward 
NGOs is that he is trying to crush the sector by erecting too many barriers and 
imposing too many costs for most, if not all, advocacy organizations.”
250
  Evans 
concurs with this assessment, contending:  
While Putin has made many statements giving token endorsement for the 
development of civil society, it is now apparent that his vision is of a quasi-
civil society…in which social organizations are subordinated to the authority 
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He goes on to argue, “Putin has proved largely successful in narrowing the 
boundaries for the expression of competing interests arising from Russian society, but 
he cannot eliminate the root causes of pluralism in society.”
252
  Evans believes that 
the system Putin constructed will suffer from the same inherent weakness of the 
Soviet system: the lack of a mechanism to express the diversity of interests that 
emerge in a highly developed and educated society.  He maintains that, if only loyal 
NGOs benefit from the state-civil society relationship, the importance of personal 
connections and the pervasiveness of corruption, which characterized the Soviet era, 
will continue to dominate post-Soviet Russia.  Unless the Russian leadership learns 
from the Soviet past, Evans suggests, citizens may find more disruptive means of 
expressing interests that are not represented in established institutions.
253
    
 Henderson, in contrast, argues against the perception that Putin was trying to 
“crush” civil society.  Rather than seeking to suppress all advocacy NGOs, the Putin 
administration “has designed a system to favor the supply of NGOs that work on 
issues that align with the national interest.”
254
  While now having the power to punish 
NGOs that are too critical of the government, the Kremlin’s system rewarded NGOs 
that provided essential social services to the population or that addressed issues 
signaled as priorities by the state.  The system provided “domestic institutional 
incentives to replace the role of international donors in impacting supply and demand 
for advocacy.”
255
  In establishing institutions of civil society-state interaction, such as 
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the Public Chamber, and offering grants to organizations working on issues that it 
itself selected, the Kremlin diminished the influence of foreign funders on the 
development of Russia’s civil society.  Additionally, in contrast to the Yeltsin era, the 
increased legislative and policy infrastructure put into place by the Putin 
administration enabled NGOs, including advocacy groups, to increase their presence 
in both national and regional policy circles.
256
  Thus, instead of smothering civil 
society, Putin’s policies created more opportunities for NGOs, especially those in the 
regions, to communicate and collaborate with governmental officials and structures.  
In her research, Henderson found that: 
NGO activists, while wary of the intent and meaning of the changes at the 
federal level, were nonetheless cognizant that this provided a political window 
for many of them that had not existed previously.  For many NGOs,…the new 
opportunities offered by Putin’s changes meant they had to walk the fine line 
between cooperation and cooptation, but that this was an improvement from 
standing on the sidelines, watching policy being made without their input.
257
 
Maintaining that the civil sector largely benefited from Putin’s policies, 
Henderson argues: “[T]he largest problem facing NGOs today is not potential capture 
and cooptation by an all-powerful state, but the inability to captivate the average 
Russian citizen, who still remains suspicious and leery of organizational activity.”
258
  
NGOs would have more success collaborating with the state and lobbying for change 
if they could claim the support of large constituencies, not just foreign donors.   
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3.3.3 Overarching Themes Characterizing Civil Society-State Relations in the Yeltsin 
and Putin Eras 
Through the widely divergent presidencies of Yeltsin and Putin, several consistent 
themes emerged in the realm of government-civil society relations.  One of these 
themes was the extreme variation in the strength of such relations, and of civil society 
itself, in Russia’s various regions.  Under Yeltsin, civil society development was seen 
as a local, rather than federal, process due to this variation and the lack of centralized 
institutions or mechanisms of state-civil society interaction.
259
  This changed with 
Putin’s more heavy-handed measures, but Henderson notes that, at the end of Putin’s 
second term in 2008, governors still had “enormous latitude to interpret Kremlin 
policy as they see fit.”
260
  She argues that politically moderate or progressive 
governors and mayors interpreted Putin’s greater interest in civil society “as a sign to 
either initiate dialogue with or deepen preexisting relationships with NGOs, develop 
channels for policy input, or design relatively open government-funded grant 
competitions.”
261
  Thus, in these more progressive regions, steps were taken to 
replicate the measures occurring on the federal level in the sphere of state-society 
relations.  In addition, several local and regional governments passed legislation 
allowing NGOs to implement social policy and experimented with contracting out 
social services to NGOs.
262
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In contrast, in less progressive regions, leading officials saw Putin’s policies 
as a green light to “coopt civic actors and direct their activities.”
263
  In cities such as 
Rostov, Krasnodar, and Vladivostok, local administrations strengthened their ties to 
only select NGOs, disappointing the larger community of NGOs, especially those 
whose hopes had been raised by developments at the federal level.  Hence, while 
some local and regional governments viewed NGOs as potentially beneficial partners 
or contractors, others saw NGOs as threats to the stability of the current political 
order that needed to be either coopted or sidelined.
264
  Sundstrom notes that, even on 
the local level, NGOs pay consequences for challenging governmental authorities.  
She writes: 
These hindrances to NGO development often happen in the form of “random” 
tax inspection visits, pressure on media sources not to cover NGO activities, 
or restrictive regulations on public assembly.  In the most friendly cases, 
NGOs that are critical of the government are simply excluded from any 
institutionalized dialogue, if not actively punished.
265
 
Despite the difficulties in some regions, overall, Russian activists have been more 
successful in collaborating with government officials and influencing policy on local 
and regional, rather than on the federal, levels.   
Sundstrom also points out differences in the character of local government-
civil society relations in big cities as compared to small towns.  While activists in the 
largest cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg had a relatively ample number of 
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opportunities to meet with local governmental officials at conferences and 
roundtables to discuss policy matters, these activists often characterized their 
relations with the city government as “negative” since they did not find that officials 
actually implemented their policy recommendations.
266
  By contrast, in smaller 
towns, activists were more likely to report “positive” relations with the local 
government even when their policy recommendations were not implemented, and 
they seemed satisfied by the opportunity to merely meet with members of the local 
government.  Sundstrom believes part of the reason for this difference is the increased 
“transnational exposure” of activists in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  Knowledgeable 
on the more extensive role civil society plays in policy processes in Western nations, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg activists may have had greater expectations of what they 
could achieve at this still early stage in Russia’s civic development.
267
  Sundstrom 
also points out that activists in smaller cities felt “closer” to their local governments, 
which could lead to positive collaborations in cases where governments were open to 
working with civil society actors.
268
 
 A second theme characterizing state-civil society relations in the post-Soviet 
period was the tendency for these relations to replicate patterns common in the Soviet 
past.  Legacies of the past, including a tendency toward patron-client relations, 
patronage, and lack of transparency in filling position and organizing societal 
structures, continued to influence the development of civil society in post-Soviet 
Russia.  For example, when government structures were willing to work with civil 
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society, they frequently created GONGOs or engaged in practices similar to “flex 
organizing” in which the boundaries between government and NGO were blurred.  
State university departments and state social services created “hybrid” structures by 
forming parallel NGOs that existed as both state institutions and societal 
organizations.
269
  While this practice indeed encouraged state-civil society 
interaction, it also presented a misleading image of such organizations to the public 
and potential donors, and some critics claim it permitted too much governmental 
control over civil society.  In addition, the lack of transparency behind the 
development of hybrid organizations often led to charges of patronage, as friends and 
colleagues of the founders benefited from roles in the new organization.
270
   
  Following this, a third theme that characterized both the Yeltsin and Putin eras 
was the dominant role of the state in its relations with civil society, in other words, 
the emergence of a more statist model of state-society relations.  As the Russian state 
survived a period of disorder under Yeltsin and withstood calls by Putin for equal 
partnership with civil society, it maintained the upper hand in its interaction with the 
third sector.  With civil society unable to harness broad support from the Russian 
public, the state took increasing measures to keep the influence of civil society in 
check.   
Analyzing the dynamic between civil society and the Russian state, scholars 
emphasize the historical legacy of gosudarstvennost, or “statism,” which grew out of 
Russia’s traditional political culture.
271
  As Weigle explains, gosudarstvennost is the 
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tradition “of state intervention into social and economic processes.”
272
  As in Western 
European democracies, this tradition led Russia to establish a democracy in which 
“the state intervenes or plays a strong mediating role in social life and the 
economy.”
273
  With the tradition of gosudarstvennost firmly rooted in the minds of 
both the Russian public and Russian state officials, scholars and activists have come 
to find that the best approach to dealing with the state is not opposition, but 
collaboration.
274
  As Sundstrom and Henry argue, “organizations in Russian civil 
society are likely to make more progress in changing state policies and behavior in 
their issue areas by forming avenues of cooperation with state organizations than by 
opposing the state directly.”
275
  The challenge, many scholars have noted, is for an 
organization to establish such cooperation with the state without losing its own sense 
of identity and purpose.
276
  Sundstrom writes, “this balance of ‘constructive 
engagement’—neither standing in complete opposition to cooperation with state 
power, nor falling into a relationship of submission and dependency with state 
institutions—is extraordinarily difficult to achieve.”
277
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 Russian activists’ vision of a “strong state-strong society” has not yet been 
realized.
278
  While the tradition of gosudarstvennost led both governmental officials 
and activists to expect the Russian state to play the dominant role in state-society 
relations, the state was not as powerful as it often presented itself to be.  Jonathan 
Weiler argues that human rights abuses significantly increased in post-Soviet Russia, 
as the state withdrew much of its oversight over public life.  While the “neoliberal 
project” empowered Russia activists to organize into NGOs, including NGOs that 
monitor human rights violations, “larger social forces, especially the chaotic 
economic changes and the attendant social displacement…, have created large pools 
of individuals who are in socially vulnerable circumstances, and NGOs have done 
little to bring political elites closer to accountability for widespread suffering in the 
face of those larger forces.”
279
  These “socially vulnerable groups,” including women, 
prisoners, and residents of the Chechen region, were increasingly unable to defend 
their most basic rights in the face of widening economic inequalities and 
governmental indifference to their problems.
280
  Weiler contends that, without state 
commitment and monetary resources to defend human rights, NGOs have limited 
ability to act in this arena.   
Thus, as argued previously, a strong civil society cannot exist without a strong 
state.  In addition to protecting human rights, a strong state is necessary to provide the 
legal foundation upon which civil society can operate and to counter attempts by 
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oligarchs, mafia, and corrupt regional leaders to manipulate legal and economic 
processes for their own benefit.
281
  However, as Weigle points out, there is no 
guarantee that a strong state will act in the interests of its citizens.
282
  Therefore, as 
state power ebbs and flows, civil society must remain constantly vigilant to protect 
citizens’ interests against incursions by the state and to utilize opportunities to lobby 
for its rights in societal forums.   
 A fourth major theme characterizing state-civil society relations in the post-
Soviet era is the agency of Russian activists as they negotiated with the state to 
defend their autonomy and achieve their organizational goals.  Although the Russian 
state was the dominant player in the “partnership” with civil society throughout both 
the Yeltsin and Putin eras, Russian activists took advantage of opportunities to protect 
their position in the state-society balance of power.  As demonstrated in the 
discussion of the 2001 Civic Forum, activists opposed to the framework developed by 
the state were adamant on the changes they sought and participated in a redesign of 
the Forum to better suit their interests.  In addition, members of Russian civil society, 
including the Kremlin-backed Public Chamber, were vocal in contesting the 2006 law 
tightening the restrictions on NGOs, contributing to the Duma’s removal of the law’s 
harshest measures.   
Throughout the Putin era, while Western observers denounced the stringent 
measures imposed on civil society, most Russian activists remained committed to 
working with state officials and building long-term mechanisms of dialogue on social 
and policy issues.  Indeed, most accepted the statist model that came to define state-
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society relations and put their energies into the practical work of cooperating and 
compromising with officials to push their platforms forward.
283
  Countering the 
notion that Putin aimed to destroy civil society, Henderson writes: 
[T]he experience of NGOs indicates that there are numerous interests at work 
in shaping the civic space, and the variation in advocacy paths indicates a lack 
of monolithic state control, rather than an excess of it.  Local, regional, and 
federal elites all have different agendas, as do the NGOs that choose to try to 
leverage the increased points of access in the system.
284
 
With the state only one of many “partners” with whom Russian NGOs 
collaborated, activists exercised their agency in developing multiple relationships to 
maximize the benefits to their organization.  Many organizations formed relationships 
with foreign funders or international advocacy networks to take advantage of 
resources not easily obtainable domestically.  Thus, in negotiating with both state 
agencies and foreign funders, Russian activists demonstrated repeatedly that they are 
not merely pawns in the struggle for control of Russia’s civic sphere between 
Western interests and the Russian state.  Instead, I conceptualize Russian activists as 
playing the leading role in the development of Russia’s civil society.  They may not 
have reached the status of equal partners with the Russian government or with their 
foreign supporters, but many activists utilized their networking and organizational 
skills to navigate the systems in which they were embedded and make the most of 
opportunities presented to them.   
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3.4 Summing Up: Statist and Liberal Influences in the Development of Russian Civil 
Society 
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of Russian civil society in 
the post-Soviet era, from the “benign neglect” period under Yeltsin to the “vigilant 
state” approach of Putin.
285
  If under Yeltsin, the burgeoning growth in civil society 
was weakened by the lack of institutionalized connections to state structures, under 
Putin, the expanded role of some civil society actors in national affairs occurred along 
with the increased regulation and selective penalization of other types of NGOs.   
Both presidencies bore witness to the consequences of the collision of the 
neoliberal model of state-society relations promoted by Western interests with the 
statist traditions of Russian political society.  The neoliberal project supported by 
Western actors to restructure Russia’s economic, political, and civic spheres had both 
positive and negative consequences for the Russian population.  This project, in 
calling for increased civic activity along with reduced governmental intervention into 
the social and economic arenas, widened income inequalities and destabilized the life 
conditions of the most socially vulnerable populations, who could not depend on a 
weakened state to protect their rights.  At the same time, it stimulated the 
development of the most formidable civic sector that had ever existed in Russian 
society.
286
  Arguing that civil society development represents a “considerable 
achievement for Western democracy-building,” Squier writes, “For possibly the first 
time in Russian history, some counterweight to the Russian state’s ability to act 
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arbitrarily has been set in place.”
287
  In addition, scholars studying Russian civil 
society found that most Russian activists continued to place more trust in foreign 
agencies to provide funding than in the Russian state, which they perceived as a 
bigger threat to their long-term autonomy.
288
   
However, while the Western neoliberal project called for limiting the state’s 
reach into the social arena, Russia’s statist traditions prescribed that the state remain 
the preeminent player in all domestic affairs.  The historical legacy of 
gosudarstvennost led both governmental officials and the Russian public to expect the 
state to take the lead in societal development.  The post-Soviet Russian government 
permitted civil society to exist but expected civil society to support the priorities of 
the state and to work in collaboration with the state (as a junior partner) in pursuing 
shared goals.  Thus, while foreign funding made possible the scope and strength of 
Russian civil society, the Russian state established the rules that NGOs had to abide 
by in order to exert influence in the policy arena.    
Given the Russian government’s intervention into the civic arena, the question 
turns to how it intervenes and who benefits from this intervention.  One advantage of 
civil society is that it is more flexible than the government, which enables it to 
respond more quickly to new social phenomena.  As will be discussed in chapter 6, 
this flexibility allowed NGOs to initiate work on the issue of human trafficking 
before the Russian government passed comprehensive legislation on the issue.  A 
second advantage of civil society is that it is usually more pluralistic than the 
governmental bureaucracy, facilitating the expression of a greater number of 
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perspectives and interests.  For example, in a context in which there was little 
governmental attention to lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender issues, civil society 
provided an arena where such issues could potentially be discussed.  However, 
extensive governmental intervention into the civic arena, as occurred in Russia, 
restricts which voices may be expressed and, to an even greater degree, which voices 
are permitted to influence governmental decision making.  When the state sets 
national priorities and offers funds to organizations working on these priority issues, 
some groups are served while others are not.   
 In the statist version of civil society with its neoliberal influences that has 
developed in Russia, activists utilized their agency in taking advantage of the 
resources and contacts that were most beneficial to their organization’s growth.  
Neither Western nor Russian funding presented a perfect solution to the problem of 
NGO sustainability, but each offered distinct gains to organizations.  While foreign-
funded NGOs often lack constituencies at home, this type of funding is usually more 
substantial and reduces the threat of government cooptation.  In contrast, while 
Russian governmental funding by and large excludes NGOs addressing controversial 
issues, organizations that do receive this type of support and validation have a greater 
potential to impact governmental policy.  Responding to the opportunities presented 
by partnerships with foreign funders or with the Russian state, many activists 
carefully navigated a path to access the gains of these different funding sources while 




Although strong democracies and strong civil societies are theorized to go 
hand-in-hand,
289
 the potential for a “free” and “vibrant” civil society to develop in 
Russia is called into question due to the “limited” democracy that has been 
established in the Russian Federation.
290
  As scholars have observed, the values of 
“freedom” and of “order” have been in constant conflict in post-Soviet Russia.
291
  The 
development of Russia’s civil society from 1991 to 2008 presents a unique case that 
allows scholars to examine the collision of Western and Russian political traditions in 
this particular context.  This era was characterized by a new openness in Russia to 
international influences, but after a brief period of experimentation, Russia’s statist 
traditions again began to define the Russian political space.  As Russian civil society 
develops into the future, scholars continue to assess how its multiple influences will 
shape the outlines of Russia’s state-society relationship.  If future developments 
reflect past experiences, civil society actors will continue to defend their positions in 
negotiations with a dominant state and will utilize the resources and opportunities 
available to them in pushing their agendas forward.    
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Chapter 4: The Development of the Russian Women’s Movement,  
1991-2008 
 
In this chapter, I examine Russian women’s organizations, which comprise one 
segment of Russian civil society.  While illustrating in greater detail some of the 
tendencies of civic development described in the previous chapter, I also draw 
attention to the unique issues and debates shaping the Russian women’s movement, 
including understandings of gender and feminism and discussions of such previously 
taboo topics as domestic violence and rape.   
As women’s organizations represented one of the priority areas targeted by 
foreign donors, the development of the Russian women’s movement was strongly 
influenced by the models and values promoted through civil society assistance 
programs.  The crisis center movement that arose in Russia in the mid-1990s, 
supported largely through foreign funds, has been cited as one of the few examples of 
a liberal-style social movement developing in the post-Soviet period.
1
  Foreign 
funding was also one of the major triggers that led Russian women activists to begin 
addressing the issue of human trafficking in the late 1990s.  While responding to 
funding fads and drawing upon foreign models of social organizing, Russian women 
adapted these resources to fit the needs of their local communities and the demands of 
their local political environments.  As with activists in other areas of civil society, 
activists in the women’s movement demonstrated that flexibility, perseverance, and 
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the ability to negotiate with multiple partners were key to success in Russia’s civic 
arena.   
In this chapter, I chart the development of the Russian women’s movement, 
including both organizations that received foreign funding and those that depended on 
other sources of support, as they addressed issues important to women in the period 
from 1991 to 2008.  The women’s movement formed the foundation from which the 
movement against human trafficking would emerge in Russia at the turn of the 
twenty-first century; I will shift my attention to counter-trafficking movements in the 
next chapter.   
 
4.1 History of Russian Women’s Movements prior to 1991 
In order to better understand the development of Russian women’s movements in the 
post-Soviet years, it is useful to examine the legacies of women’s changing positions 
in Russian society and of Russian women’s organizing in previous historical periods.  
A Russian women’s movement that fought specifically for women’s rights is cited by 
scholars as beginning in the 1860s; however, historically, most Russian women have 
rejected activism that focused solely on women for what they saw as the more urgent 
causes of populism, socialism, loyalty to the Soviet Union, or state resistance.
2
  In the 
late nineteenth century, ravnopravniki (equal rights activists), mostly educated 
bourgeois women, were in dialogue with “first-wave” feminists from the United 
States, England, and other European countries.
3
  This pre-revolutionary Russian 
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women’s movement was not as large or as unified as many movements in Western 
Europe, but it was driven by passionate women espousing a variety of feminist 
perspectives.   
Beginning in the 1890s, women were involved in Marxist groups, and the 
main issue dividing feminist-oriented women turned to the appropriateness of class 
struggle.
4
   Socialist feminists believed that women’s emancipation would only be 
achieved through socialist revolution, while so-called bourgeois feminists focused on 
gaining political and economic rights.
5
  Both camps, however, saw the source of their 
oppression as the Tsarist state and advocated social change to liberate both women 
and men from Tsarist autocracy.
6
 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, a variety of political parties took on the 
“woman question” as a means of attracting support for their platforms.
7
  The promise 
to advance women’s rights was part of the platform of the Bolsheviks when they took 
power in 1917.  That year, women were given the right to vote by the Provisional 
government, and through the 1920s the Communist Party granted women rights to 
full employment, education, abortion, and fault-free divorce.
8
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Thus, Russian women achieved legal equality and concomitant rights earlier 
than women in most Western countries.  However, it has been widely noted that the 
“equality” granted on paper did not match the reality of Russian women’s lives in the 
Soviet Union.
9
   As Tatiana Klimenkova writes, “Only after women had won these 
rights did the extent of their insufficiency become clear; in practice they had only 
received the possibility to act on a masculine field with masculine methods.”
10
   
Holmgren notes that these rights were indeed not “won” by an organized women’s 
movement, but were instead “imposed…on an uninvolved populace” by the 
Community party-state.
11
  One of these rights, “the right to work” was granted more 
as a responsibility than liberation, and Soviet women ended up with the oft-cited 
“double burden.”
12
  While women were now expected to work full-time in productive 
labor, they were also expected to bear and raise children, keep house, and care for 
sick or elderly relatives.  The Soviet state did implement policies to help women 
manage their multiple roles, such as guaranteeing maternity leaves and providing 
state-run day-care centers, but it was widely acknowledged that these services were 
inadequate, with the demand for day care outstripping supply, for example.
13
    
Despite the official commitment to the equality of the sexes in the Soviet 
Union, virtually no attention was paid to the cultural bases for women’s oppression.  
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Holmgren notes that “essentialist notions of men’s and women’s capabilities and 
roles went unchallenged in daily practice and general social and cultural attitudes.”
14
  
While women were expected to work in the “masculine field” of productive labor, 
men were not encouraged to participate in the “feminine field” of domestic labor.
15
  
Instead of encouraging men to take on new responsibilities, as Soviet women had 
done, proposed solutions to women’s double burden usually involved increases in 
state services, such as widening access to day care and lengthening maternity 
leaves.
16
   One reason for this was the primacy the Soviet state ascribed to perfecting 
the public sphere, while widely neglecting, and devaluing, work done in the private 
sphere.  With the Soviet state regulating the lives of both women and men and tacitly 
approving of women’s double burden, Soviet women came to direct their grievances 
against the Communist Party.  As under Tsarist rule, Russian women perceived their 
oppressors not as men, but as the autocratic leadership that suppressed the potential of 
both women and men.   
 While women held influential positions in the Bolshevik party when it rose to 
power in 1917 and campaigned for women’s rights during the first years of the Soviet 
era, the number of women in leadership positions rapidly declined following the 
revolution and their concerns were sidelined by a singular focus on overcoming class 
divisions.  By the end of the 1920s, “any special emphasis on women’s social 
subordination in communist propaganda or campaigning came to be regarded as a 
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capitulation to bourgeois feminism; the [women’s] movement’s aim was no longer 
the advancement of women but their mobilization for the advancement of the 
Comintern.”
17
   
In 1930, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin declared that the “woman question” had 
been solved and closed the Women’s Departments (zhenotdely) that had been 
established to ensure women’s participation in societal affairs.
18
  Throughout most of 
the Soviet era, women’s issues were subordinated to issues of socialist development, 
which theoretically would lead to the full emancipation of both women and men.  In 
1941, a new women’s organization, the Soviet Women’s Anti-Fascist Committee, 
was formed in order to help mobilize women to support Soviet efforts in World War 
II.  After the war, it became the Soviet Women’s Committee, and it would serve as 
the only legal organization representing Soviet women until 1990.
19
  However, like 
other state institutions, the Soviet Women’s Committee was designed not to respond 
to the needs of the population, but to organize women to meet Party goals.
20
  Linda 
Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See write that the Committee “became the state’s 
chief propagandist on women’s issues, explaining how communism had solved the 
‘woman question.’”
21
  Women seeking to improve the position of their sex in the 
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Soviet Union had no authority to turn to and no legal means of organizing on their 
own.   
Although Stalin had ended discussion of the “woman question,” the less 
politically restrictive “thaw” period under Nikita Khrushchev during the late 1950s to 
early 1960s permitted debate on the topic to begin once again.
22
  Khrushchev 
encouraged the development of zhensovety (local women’s councils) to address issues 
of concern to women, mainly problems resulting from the combination of their family 
and work responsibilities.  Then, in the late 1960s, with the Soviet Union now under 
the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, Party officials admitted that unsolved problems 
and “nonantagonistic contradictions” remained in the Soviet Union, and the “woman 
question” became “unsolved.”
23
   
In the 1970s, falling birthrates in Russia led to the deployment of pronatalist 
campaigns that stressed women’s maternal roles, while continuing to proffer 
increased state services as the solution to women’s problems.
24
  As Party congresses 
drew attention to women’s double burden, some women journalists and writers began 
to document their lives in ways that contradicted the official representation of 
womanhood in the Soviet Union.
25
   By the late 1970s and early 1980s, what is now 
known as the second wave of Russian feminism had begun.  The first feminist 
samizdat 
26
 publication was the journal Almanakh: Zhenshchinam o Zhenshchinakh 
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(Almanac: For Women about Women), edited by Tatyana Mamonova in 1979, which 
covered issues such as “discrimination against women in politics, abortion, the 
appalling conditions in maternity hospitals and women’s prisons, violence against 
women, issues that officially did not exist in the USSR.”
27
  As with many other 
samizdat publications, distribution of this journal was suppressed, and its editors were 
imprisoned and then exiled to the West. 
 In the mid- to late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and 
glasnost softened some of the restrictions on individual expression and women found 
new ways to explore feminist issues.  Some of this activity occurred within 
governmental bodies.  In 1986, Gorbachev called for the expansion of zhensovety 
under the structure of the Soviet Women’s Committee.  By 1988, there were 
reportedly 236,000 zhensovety with approximately 2.3 million members across the 
Soviet Union.
28
  In this period of openness and renewed attention to women’s issues, 
members of the Soviet Women’s Committee broke with custom and critiqued the 
male domination of the Communist Party.
29
  At the All-Union Conference of Women 
in 1987, participants openly discussed negative aspects of women’s lives in the Soviet 
Union and made the novel proposal that men become more involved in housework 
and childrearing.
30
  However, outside of a few instances in which the Soviet 
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Women’s Committee and the zhensovety under its wings challenged the status quo in 
an effort to improve women’s lives, these organizations were largely politically 
passive and most Russian women viewed them as helpmates to the state.
31
   
In the late 1980s, interest in feminism and women’s issues also arose among 
individual scholars and small women’s groups.  Many of the leaders of this budding 
movement were feminist academics who had become acquainted through the state-
sponsored seminars on women during the perestroika years and began to set up their 
own informal organizations.
32
  These feminists, who worked in positions within or 
connected to state structures, found themselves in demand to conduct research on 
newly popular women’s issues.
33
  At the same time, interest in feminism arose among 
the younger generation of women scholars.  In research institutions, some scholars 
gained access to English-language feminist texts not available to the general public.
34
  
In addition, a few young women scholars, mainly in prestigious universities in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg, were allowed to write dissertations on women’s issues.
35
   
Thus, the late-Soviet “second wave” women’s movement differed in several 
ways from U.S. and Western European women’s movements.  In contrast to these 
more broad-based movements that sought popular support among women and geared 
much of their activity to advocating publicly for women’s social and political rights, 
the second wave Russian women’s movement was “the project of an urban, mostly 
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Moscow-based, well-connected privileged few” who used feminism as a lens to make 
sense of their lives at that particular point in time.
36
  For many, feminism was a useful 
tool for reviving the connection between Russian and European scholarship and 
debate, a tradition that had been stifled during the Soviet era.  For example, many 
women scholars were researching the work of early Russian suffragists and their 
international ties to suffragists in other countries, especially Germany and England.
37
  
In addition, many early women’s groups used feminism as a tool for “self-realization” 
and consciousness-raising.
38
   
Although Russian feminists drew inspiration from their Western counterparts, 
few had interest in building a broad-based movement uniting women on the basis of 
gender, like those that had arisen in the West.  After decades of “women’s 
emancipation” enforced from the top down and the Soviet Women’s Committee 
officially representing all women, most Russian feminists welcomed the opportunity 
to focus on individual development and avoid the imposition of another collective 
identity.  Hemment notes: 
Soviet feminists did not represent a nascent civil society waiting to rise up and 
engage in civic activities and democracy.  They were small circles and did not 
have broad legitimacy…. Their feminism was profoundly non-mobilizational, 
and few groups were truly open to newcomers.
39
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Furthermore, their feminism was directed primarily against the Soviet state, rather 




In contrast to the small groups of well-educated women embracing feminist 
principles, most Russian women rejected feminism as having any relevance to their 
lives.  Since Soviet leaders had branded feminism as a bourgeois capitalist ideology 
but claimed to have achieved “women’s liberation,” feminism was seen both as too 
Western and too Marxist.  While feminism was blamed for causing women’s double 
burden and the distortion of relations between the sexes under socialism, it was also 
denounced as a foreign ideology seeking to destabilize Russian society and turn 
women against men.
41
  Thus, for a variety of reasons, most Russian women saw little 
value in adopting a feminist perspective.   
Even the movement to return women “back to the home” in the 1980s and 
1990s drew little resistance.  Concern with the falling birthrate in Russia, plans for a 
streamlined labor force, and growing attention to the poor working conditions for 
many women led politicians and scientists at the time to once again take up the 
“woman question.”
42
  Breaking with the Soviet ideology of valorizing women’s dual 
roles as mothers and workers, politicians and scientists highlighted the special 
nurturing qualities of women, which they claimed made women more suited for the 
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roles of mothers and homemakers than of workers.
43
  In his 1987 book Perestroika: 
New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Gorbachev wrote:  
Over the years…, we failed to pay attention to women’s specific rights and 
needs arising from their role as mother and homemaker, and their 
indispensible educational function as regards children.  Engaged in scientific 
research, working on construction sites, in production and in the services, and 
involved in creative activities, women no longer have enough time to perform 
their everyday duties at home—housework, the upbringing of children and the 
creation of a good family atmosphere.  We have discovered that many of our 
problems—in children’s and young people’s behavior, in our morals, culture, 
and in production—are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and 
slack attitudes to family responsibilities.  This is a paradoxical result of our 
sincere and politically justified desire to make women equal with men in 
everything.  Now, in the course of perestroika, we have begun to overcome 
this shortcoming.  That is why we are now holding heated debates in the press, 
in public organizations, at work and at home, about the question of what we 




The answer to this “question” that received the most support within the 
Gorbachev administration was to encourage women to choose motherhood over 
career.
45
  However, it would be each woman’s individual “choice” as to whether she 
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wanted to be a worker or a mother.
46
  As Sue Bridger, Rebecca Kay, and Kathryn 
Pinnick write, “As the [1980s] progressed, this concept of ‘choice’ was energetically 
taken up by writer after writer in the Soviet press and earnestly discussed by the new 
generation of TV journalists.”
47
  Indeed, many women found the “choice” to remain 
at home “liberating.”
48
  After decades of trying to balance multiple responsibilities, 
Soviet women welcomed the idea that their workload would be reduced and that they 
would have more time for their children and families.  In addition, in a regime in 
which the state watched and regulated nearly all aspects of public life, the home and 
family became a site “of psychological and moral refuge.”
49
  Thus, while Western 
feminists interpreted the campaign to “return women to the home” as a way of 
limiting women’s societal participation, many Russian women embraced it as a sign 
that society finally valued their domestic work and as a way of staying on the 
sidelines of the maligned public sphere.   
 However, while the call for women to return to their “purely womanly 
mission” was framed in the language of “choice,” the state’s preference was clear.  As 
Barbara Alpern Engel notes, “virtually every policy initiative aimed to encourage 
women to bear and raise children, rather than to help them advance on the job or 
combat discrimination at the workplace.”
50
  Paid maternity leaves were extended, 
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time off for mothers to care for sick children was increased, and opportunities for 
part-time work were expanded.
51
  Scholars such as Engel and Racioppi and See have 
argued, however, that these policies actually disadvantaged working women.  First, 
these benefits applied almost exclusively to mothers, not fathers; thus, when women 
took time off work to care for children or other relatives, their professional 
qualifications dropped below the level of their male counterparts.
52
  In addition, since 
the costs for maternity leaves fell to the enterprise where a woman worked, many 
enterprises were reluctant to employ young women, especially those with children.   
As a result, women were often the first to go when an enterprise laid off workers, and 
many women who took maternity leaves were not welcomed back.
53
  Finally, while 
the ideology of returning women to the home appealed to many Russians, both 
women and men, it proved unrealistic for many families dependent on the earnings of 
a woman.   
 An ideological principle supporting the “back to the home” movement was an 
essentialist notion of the differences between women and men.  Although cultural 
understandings of the differences between the sexes never disappeared during the 
Soviet era, many argued that Soviet engineering to treat women and men as complete 
equals had distorted relations between the sexes.  Men were “emasculated” as the 
Soviet state took over their fatherly functions, and women were “over-emancipated” 
by having to work like men, often in hard-labor and agricultural jobs.  By the 1970s, 
such engineering came to be viewed as contributing to a falling birthrate in Soviet 
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Russia and, as noted, pronatalist campaigns were developed to emphasize women’s 
motherly functions.
54
  These campaigns drew upon the work of educational theorists 
who believed that girls and boys should be educated differently in order to inculcate 
the values necessary for each to play her or his part in creating stable and fertile 
marriages.
55
  For boys, the traits that should be emphasized included “strength, 
activity, bravery, inventive and investigative behavior,” while the traits of “weakness, 
emotionalism, intuition and nurturant qualities” were emphasized for girls.
56
  As for 
women, Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick argue, “For the best part of a decade before the 
advent even of perestroika, women’s characters [in the media] were being habitually 
portrayed as inextricably bound up with their sexuality.”
57
   
By the 1980s, the discourse on inherent sex differences had become 
mainstream among both the public and Soviet officials.  Marina Malysheva of the 
Moscow Center for Gender Studies (MCGS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
remarked in 1991 that “the gulf between the sexes in the current generation is 
probably greater than at any time in Soviet history.”
58
  This Soviet legacy influenced 
the gendered impact of the transition to a market economy, when women’s and men’s 
“unique” qualities would be emphasized even more so than under socialism.  
Whereas men were seen to possess the qualities necessary to succeed in the business 
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world, such as competitiveness and entrepreneurship, women’s reproductive and 




4.2 History of Russian Women’s Movements post-1991 
4.2.1 Effects of the Post-Soviet Transition on Women 
The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ensuing period of economic, 
political, and cultural transition shook up the discourse on gender roles and directly 
impacted the daily lives of Russian women and men.  A wide range of socio-
economic indicators suggested that a disproportionate share of the costs of the 
transition fell on the shoulders of women.
60
  Many obstacles, including sex 
discrimination in hiring and firing practices, growing occupational segregation by 
gender, and the loss of child care services, contributed to female unemployment.
61
  
From the early to mid-1990s, women constituted around 70 percent of Russia’s 
unemployed.
62
   
However, women suffered from underemployment even more than from 
unemployment.  Large numbers of women with higher education who had worked as 
engineers, economists, or scientists lost their jobs, and most employment 
opportunities for women were for low-skilled positions such as secretaries, cleaners, 
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  The ideology of women’s family responsibilities led many women to 
accept any job available in order to support their families while their male partners 
embarked on lengthy searches for a respectable job.
64
  Although women’s pay 
averaged seventy percent of men’s pay in the late Soviet period, by 1994, women 
were making only forty percent of men’s salaries.
65
  While the pay differential 
between women and men increased, the workforce became increasingly stratified, 
with women concentrated in lower-paying fields at the same time that they were 
pushed out of traditionally “feminine” fields, such as banking and insurance, that had 
proven more profitable in the post-Soviet era.
66
   
In addition, so-called protectionist laws that banned women from working in 
certain occupations and granted women special rights that had to be paid for by their 
employers made women less desirable employees.  A labor code initiated in July 
1996 banned women from over 400 professions, arguably to protect the reproductive 
health of women.  As Wendy Rhein notes, “the Labor Code is most harmful for 
women who have worked in such professions for many years and now find 
themselves unemployed with no transferable or practical skills.  In many instances, 
their health is already damaged and they will not receive the extended benefits for 
which they have worked.”
67
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Working women in Russia were also legally entitled to extended paid 
maternity leave, vacation time when children are small, and sick child leave, the costs 
of which were to be paid by employers.
68
  As a result of these protectionist measures, 
many employers were reluctant to hire women and fired women first when cutting 
staff.  Analyzing the results of transition policies, Engel notes, “By the late 1990s, at 
least a quarter and perhaps as much as half of the Russian population qualified as 
poor or very poor and over two-thirds of those poor were female.”
69
 
 Women’s presence also declined in the political arena.  In the 1970s and 
1980s, women comprised approximately 35 percent of deputies to the Republic-level 
Supreme Soviets.  With the loss of quotas in 1990, women’s representation dropped 
to 5.4 percent in Russia.
 70
  In the first post-Soviet parliamentary elections in 1993, a 
women’s political party, Women of Russia (WOR), surpassed the five percent 
threshold on the party list vote for the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian 
parliament.  Receiving a total of 8.1 percent of the vote, WOR was able to send 21 
candidates from the party list to the Duma.  In total, 60 women served in the first 
Duma from 1993-1995, 13.5 percent of all representatives.
71
  In the 1995 elections, 
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however, WOR failed to clear the threshold, receiving only 4.6 percent of the vote, 
and it dissolved as a political faction.
72
   
Even with the loss of the WOR faction, women maintained a presence of 
about 10 percent of deputies to the Duma throughout the post-Soviet period.  
However, in 2007, women occupied only five percent of seats in the Federation 
Council, the upper house of parliament and 20 percent of the 126 seats in the Public 
Chamber, even with the Chamber representing the “feminized” sphere of civil 
society.
73
  In addition, there were only a handful of prominent female politicians 
widely recognizable to the public, with Valentina Matvienko, the governor of St. 
Petersburg from 2003-2011, being one of the few exceptions.   
In light of the reduced number of women in political positions during the 
democratic transition, Valentina Konstantinova of the Moscow Center for Gender 
Studies argues, “The important thing is that the introduction of democratic election 
procedures and the formation of democratic structures have improved the quality of 
women’s participation and representation, the token and marionette position being 
replaced by a more responsible one.”
74
  However, Mary Buckley points out that these 
changes were occurring as “automatic [Communist Party] lines on social protection 
for women and encouragement to be employed outside the home were coming under 
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  Thus, although the political positions that women held in newly democratic 
Russia might have been more meaningful, they constituted a small minority at a time 
when radical societal restructuring, with strong impacts on women’s lives, was taking 
place.   
 All of the gendered changes in the economic and political spheres meant that 
women, as a social category, became more vulnerable after the collapse of socialism.  
Studies found high rates of violence against women, including both domestic violence 
and rape.  Officials, advocates, and scholars estimated that between fourteen and 
fifteen thousand women were murdered every year by their spouses, although the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs put the number officially at three thousand.
76
  While 
police response to violence against women was lacking under the Soviet Union, 
women could turn to various collectives, such as trade unions, workplace Party 
committees, and zhensovety to help resolve problems in the home.
77
  However, as 
privatization of the domestic sphere occurred during the transition, public 
organizations lost their authority to intervene in family life and police became even 
more reluctant to respond to “private” matters.
78
  Thus, although data suggest that 
violence against women was increasing in the post-Soviet era, its importance among 
law enforcement and state officials was decreasing.
79
   
                                                 
75
 Buckley (1997), 162. 
 
76
 Weiler, 266-267. 
 
77
 Hemment (2007), 96. 
 
78
 Johnson (2009), 27-32. 
 
79




These changes accompanied another major development in the post-Soviet 
period: the growth of the sex industry.  Although Russian women found limited job 
openings in many high-skill fields, one field that did not lack for opportunities for 
women was the sex industry, which offered work in pornography, prostitution, erotic 
massage, strip tease shows, telephone sex, and other areas.
80
  After decades of strict 
censorship by the Soviet state, which largely prohibited sexual imagery, within 
months of Russia’s independence, “it had become commonplace for pornography to 
festoon virtually any public space where trading was taking place.”
81
  While 
photographs of naked or near-naked women were almost inescapable in public places 
in Russia in the early 1990s, prostitution also increased and was often described as 
“the only way for women to make a lot of money.”
82
  Large numbers of women did 
turn to prostitution, but Russian politicians, scholars, and media generally ignored this 
trend or used it as a reason to blame women for society’s “moral crisis.”   
An additional phenomenon that appeared after the end of the Soviet era was 
the trafficking of Russian women across national borders for the purpose of sex work.  
Every year, recruiters, many tied to criminal networks, promised well-paying jobs 
abroad to tens of thousands of Russian women, most from depressed towns and 
villages and living in desperate economic conditions.  Many of these women ended 
up in situations of sexual servitude, forced to engage in various types of sex work in 
exploitative and abusive conditions.
83
   
                                                 
80
 Attwood, 113. 
 
81
 Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 165. 
 
82
 Ibid., 174. 
 
83





4.2.2 The Emergence of the Post-Soviet Russian Women’s Movement 
While many socio-economic indicators suggested that women, as a group, lost out 
during the transition period, democratization made possible the emergence of an 
autonomous women’s movement to protest the social changes taking place.  After the 
passage of the 1990 law permitting organizations to operate independently of the 
Communist Party, the isolated pockets of women’s organizing that had emerged 
during perestroika grew into a stronger and more diverse movement.
84
   
Many women academics who had taken interest in women’s issues in the 
perestroika years began to formalize their activities.  Members of the LOTOS group 
(League for Emancipation from Sexual Stereotypes), which had been founded in 1989 
by researchers Anastasiia Posadskaia, Olga Voronina, Valentina Konstantinova, and 
Natalia Zakharova, set up the Moscow Center for Gender Studies (MCGS) under the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in 1990.  The Center would play a leading role in 
advocating for women’s rights in Russia when large-scale societal transformations 
were taking place.   
Alongside academic and feminist-oriented groups created by highly educated 
women, many grassroots women’s organizations also formed in response to the 
direction of political and economic reforms.  Numerous self-help groups and 
employment training organizations emerged, “trying to bridge the gap that the 
collapse of the centrally planned welfare state had left behind.”
85
  Many of these 
grassroots groups coalesced around women’s role as mothers and worked to protect 
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the rights of women and children as the economic crisis deepened.  The most well 
known of these organization was the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of 
Russia.
86
  In addition, in 1990, the Soviet Women’s Committee transformed into the 
Union of Women of Russia (UWR), now a voluntary union of zhensovety and NGOs, 
officially independent of the state.
87
  Despite its formal independence, the UWR 
largely maintained its Soviet-era hierarchy with a head office in Moscow and local 
divisions throughout Russia, most of the same leaders, governmental and 
international contacts, and free office space.  Thus, the UWR had an advantage over 
smaller organizations that were just beginning to form.
88
 
 The first attempt to connect and transform the newly emerging women’s 
organizations into a movement occurred in March 1990 when researchers-activists 
Olga Lipovskaia and Natalia Filippova convened a meeting of representatives of 
many small women’s groups, which together established the organization SAFO 
(abbreviation for the Free Association of Feminist Organizations) to provide support 
and psychological counseling for women.
89
  In July 1990, MCGS contributed to the 
formation of this movement by hosting a seminar on “Women in Politics and Policy 
for Women,” which attracted many women activists, including Olga Lipovskaia.  
Lipovskaia, along with other seminar attendees, then created a new organization 
called “NeZhDI,” an acronym standing for the Independent Women’s Democratic 
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Initiative and translating to “Don’t Wait” in Russian.
90
  Rosalind Marsh writes that 
this name reflected women’s impatience with the slow pace of reforms and their 
desire to take steps to change their situation for the better.
91
  As did researchers with 
the MCGS, NeZhDI produced reports refuting essentialized Soviet notions of natural 
differences between women and men and critiqued the path of reform.
92
 
 The largest and most notable effort to organize a women’s movement in these 
early years was the convening of two Independent Women’s Forums in 1991 and 
1992.  Both forums were held in Dubna, a small city outside of Moscow.  The first 
forum, organized by LOTOS, MCGS, SAFO, and NeZhDI, among other 
organizations, provided 172 women representing 48 groups across Russia the 
opportunity to become acquainted with one another, share information, and begin to 
form collaborative relationships.  Another aim of the forum, which took on the slogan 
“Democracy without Women Is No Democracy,” was to analyze the position of 
women in the course of political and economic reforms.  The final document drawn 
up by forum participants discussed the many forms of discrimination against women, 
both before and after perestroika.
93
  A final major goal of the forum was to 
demonstrate the independence of women’s organizing from the state.  As the first 
independent women’s conference in Russia since 1918, the forum stressed that 
organizations “were no longer being set up on orders from above, but were being 
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established on the initiative of women themselves.”
94
   Despite disruptions from city 
and law enforcement officials due to charges of “lesbianism,” the forum was 
successful in bringing together a diverse array of women activists, including both 




 The Second Independent Women’s Forum, held in Dubna a year later, 
benefitted from the information network set up at the first forum as organizers were 
able to advertise the event more widely and attracted over 500 participants.  More 
Western women were present than at the first forum, with attendees from the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia, and Australia.
96
  
In addition, the second forum was successful in winning some early financial support 
from the West.
97
  The forum program was also more ambitious.  Operating under the 
slogan “From Problems to Strategy,” the forum aimed to devise strategies to integrate 
women and women’s issues “into the economic and political systems developing in 
Russia and the former Soviet republics.”
98
  In her introductory speech to the forum, 
co-chair of the organizing committee Anastasiia Posadskaia called for resolutions that 
could change public consciousness “so that women’s problems will not be regarded 
as secondary problems which will automatically be solved after the situation as a 
                                                 
94
 Marsh (1996b), 290. 
 
95
 Sperling (1999), 106; Henderson (2003), 94. 
 
96
 Marsh (1996b), 290. 
 
97
 Henderson (2003), 95. 
 
98




whole has been transformed, but as an essential, integral and extremely important 
component of the general process of social reform.”
99
  
As did the first forum, the second forum stressed the “independence” of the 
Russian women’s movement.  In her introductory remarks, Posadskaia stated: 
After decades in which they were puppets, politically manipulated and totally 
integrated into the totalitarian state system, women have decided to organize 
themselves, to discuss problems that concern them…. At the same time, and 
this is particularly important, the independent women’s movement does not 
attempt to speak in the name of all women, does not abrogate to itself the 
authority of an all-Russian women’s organization, but presents an open forum 




Many women activists agreed with this sentiment.  In contrast to the vertical 
structures of power that characterized Soviet-era organizing, they emphasized the 
importance of horizontal networking to build an egalitarian women’s movement.
101
  
However, with the long legacy of state dependency, many Russian women found it 
difficult to view themselves as “independent” and to take initiative on social issues.
102
  
As a result, activists in the early years of the transition made one of their goals the 
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empowerment of women to “develop a sense of themselves as autonomous, self-
defining individuals.”
103
   
Analyzing the significance of this event, Marsh argues, “The Second Forum 
was a watershed in that it proved that a genuine and widespread ‘women’s 
movement’ now existed in Russia and the post-Soviet states, consisting of many 
different strands and representing a variety of viewpoints.”
104
  Although Posadskaia 
expressed hope that Independent Women’s Forums would continue to be organized 
on a yearly basis, no additional forums were held after 1992.
105
  Instead, organizers 
transformed the “Independent Women’s Forum” into a women’s NGO that advocated 
on women’s issues and critiqued the course of reforms.   
 As the Independent Women’s Forums took place in the early 1990s, the 
number of women’s organizations was growing.  In 1991, fifty women’s 
organizations had officially registered with the state; in 1992, two hundred were 
registered; and by 1993, over 300 organizations were registered.
106
  Many more 
groups were operating unofficially, not having filled out the considerable paperwork 
required to register.  Organizations represented a variety of ideological perspectives 
and carried out a range of activities, “from lobbying, holding conferences and 
seminars, publishing feminist magazines, and conducting research to conducting self-
help groups or providing social services for unemployed women, single mothers, and 
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  Johnson argues that, while some of these organizations “embraced 
feminism; most were de facto feminists in their challenge to the status of women, 
both in their actions and in simply organizing.”
108
  Groups also varied in size.  Some 
groups were smaller and operated only in one locale, while others were nation-wide 
and comprised several branches.
109
  Networks connecting women’s organizations also 
multiplied, which facilitated information-sharing and collaboration on issues of 
common concern.
110
    
 One of the biggest divides within the Russian women’s movement was 
between academic and feminist-oriented organizations, which often drew upon 
Western feminist theory in analyzing the position of women in Russian society, and 
grassroots and service-provision organizations, which usually took a more practical 
approach in addressing the immediate needs of their members and local communities.  
Henderson notes that the majority of women’s organizations had pragmatic goals: “to 
survive and to step in and provide services that the state could no longer secure for its 
population in this period of severe dislocation.”
111
  Such “pragmatic” organizations 
provided social services to vulnerable populations, such as single mothers, disabled 
children, or pensioners; formed support groups to offer moral and psychological 
assistance to members; and organized educational and re-training programs to help 
women improve their qualifications in the new market economy.  Some of the latter 
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groups were professional organizations that united women from various professions, 
such as law, business, journalism, and so forth, and aimed to help members increase 
their job opportunities.
112
   
A second broad category of women’s organizations were those that explicitly 
identified themselves as feminist or that organized for the specific purpose of 
advocating for women’s rights.  These organizations were smaller in number than 
those focused on support or service provision and were mainly located in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg.  They tended to have academic orientations, often taking the form of 
research centers, and produced materials on the status of women in Russian society.  
Despite their high level of activity, these organizations had little connection to the 
population at large.
113
   
There were, of course, overlaps between these two broad categories of 
organizations.  As the 1990s progressed, crisis centers for victims of family or gender 
violence became an increasingly popular form of women’s organizing.  In both 
raising awareness of the issue of gender violence and providing services to the public, 
crisis centers successfully united the “feminist” and the “pragmatic” branches of the 
women’s movement.   
 In the early 1990s, contact with Western feminists and with Western aid 
providers was also growing steadily among Russian women’s organizations.  
Hemment notes that, at the Dubna forums, Western feminists entered into dialogue 
with Russian women for the first time.
114
  She writes, “These connections led to 
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numerous intellectual and private exchanges and collaborations; activists began to 
think of themselves as belonging in a global movement.”
115
  After years of isolation 
from their Western counterparts, many Russian women were eager to make contact 
and gain access to Western feminist knowledge.  At the same time, large numbers of 
Western feminists arrived in Russia, excited to share their experience and help to 
build a women’s movement.
116
  The first offers of financial support to Russian 
women’s organizations were also made during this period, “mostly from private 
individuals and small feminist donor organizations.”
117
  Soon, aid that began as a 
“dribble” in the early 1990s became a “torrent” in the mid-1990s as “all the main 
agencies in Russia that promoted civil society development began to target women’s 
groups for a portion of this aid.”
118
  This new funding mandate reflected a shift in the 
agenda of global development agencies, as the concept of “gender” was 




4.2.3 Introducing “Gender” and the “Global Feminist Consensus” into the Agendas 
of International Funding Agencies 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, when international aid began to be provided to Russian 
civil society in significant amounts, a focus on gender issues had been increasingly 
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incorporated into the agendas of international funding agencies.  Many feminists 
lauded this as a major achievement of the international women’s movement, but over 
time, contradictions in funding practices towards NGOs became apparent.  Tied into 
the neoliberal restructuring process in Russia, aid to Russian women’s NGOs often 
carried the expectation that NGOs would become the new providers of social services 
that had been cut by the state during the restructuring process.  Additionally, although 
many women involved in Russia’s emerging women’s movement emphasized the 
principles of independence and horizontal organizing with other activists and 
women’s groups, those who sought to benefit from foreign aid found themselves in a 
position of dependency on donors and in competition with their follow activists for 
scarce funds.  Thus, the provision of foreign aid to support the development of a 
newly independent women’s movement entailed several contradictions that Russian 
women were left to unravel.   
Beginning in the 1970s, international feminists had lobbied development 
agencies and the UN system to devote more attention to women in their development 
programs.
120
  This lobbying eventually led to the organizing of the 1975 World 
Conference on Women in Mexico City and the launching of the UN Decade for 
Women from 1975 to 1985.
121
  As additional World Conferences on Women were 
held, in 1980 in Copenhagen and in 1985 in Nairobi, the development community 
increasingly incorporated the issues raised by women activists into their agendas.  By 
the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, “the notion of women’s rights [had] 
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moved from its rather peripheral location on the map of donor agencies to center 
stage.”
122
  Part of the reason that feminist efforts to prioritize women were so 
successful was that they appealed to the economic considerations of the New Policy 
Agenda (discussed in chapter 2).  Arguing that improving women’s status boosted a 
country’s economic performance, feminist policy researchers persuaded lending 
agencies such as the World Bank and grant-making agencies such as USAID to 
implement women-centered programs.
123
  Analyzing the success of this approach, 
Hemment writes: 
The status of women is now held to be an important indicator of development.  
International campaigns around women’s rights gained momentum in the 
1990s, culminating in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 
in 1995.  This event marked the enlargement and democratization of 
participation in international campaigns; the parallel NGO forum permitted 
thousands of women to attend who were not government officials but the 
representatives of independent, grassroots associations.  Indeed, Beijing 




As a gendered lens became the latest tool through which to measure the 
success of everything from poverty reduction and effective governance to the health 
of civil societies, the “global feminist consensus” on violence against women also 
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made its mark on the development community.
125
  Johnson notes that the issue of 
violence against women united activists from the Global North (industrialized 
democracies such as the United States, Canada, Western Europe) and the Global 
South (developing countries in South America, Africa, South and Southeast Asia) and 
helped them to overcome the divisions that had hampered international meetings of 
women since the 1970s.
126
  At the UN Conferences in Mexico City and Copenhagen, 




For many from the Global South, the universalistic agenda of Northern 
feminists erased important differences among women, veiled global 
inequality, and silenced their concerns.  For some, drawing from postcolonial 
critiques, feminism became a new kind of imperialism within a global context 
of increasing economic and political divides.
128
 
By the mid-1980s, women activists at the United Nations responded to such 
critiques by restructuring the conferences on women and the terms on which 
conversations were taking place.  Symbolizing an approach more sensitive to the 
differences and inequalities among women, the third conference was held in Africa 
and included more women from the developing world than from the industrialized 
world.
129
  The new “global feminism” that activists sought to construct revolved 
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around norms of inclusivity, “politics of solidarity,” and autonomous organizing.  
Utilizing this approach, women at the Nairobi Conference in 1985 found agreement 
on the issue of violence against women, a concept that linked women’s rights with 
human rights.
130
  This broad concept encompassed issues of concern to women in 
both regions, including rape, domestic violence, genital cutting, and human 
trafficking, and facilitated the creation of alliances between women on the basis of 
common interests, not on an imagined common identity.
131
   
A “politics of solidarity” permitted women to ally with each other on local or 
global levels in instances of strategic importance but also to organize separately 
according to wishes of each group.  This point is especially important for 
underrepresented groups who may feel that their concerns are misunderstood or 
minimized by the majority.  Thus, while feminists continued the difficult work of 
addressing inequalities and acknowledging differences in viewpoints on a variety of 
issues, violence against women served as a key issue on which feminists could unite 
their efforts.  On the basis of this new approach to global activism, women created 
transnational feminist networks comprised of organizations around the world, which 
would soon become a leading force in the fight for gender equality.
132
  Although 
women activists also coalesced around a concern with economic justice, the broad 
frame of “violence against women” struck a chord with the development and human 
rights communities and became the issue most identified with the burgeoning global 
women’s movement. 
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 The global feminist consensus on violence against women helped push the 
issue to a level of international prominence.  Hemment notes that, by linking 
women’s rights with human rights, campaigns against gendered violence garnered the 
support of diverse constituencies, including donors and politicians across the 
ideological spectrum.
133
  Feminists drew on this international support in multiple 
ways.  First, the global feminist consensus, outlined in international documents such 
as the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program for Action and the 1993 UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women, formalized new global norms against 
gender violence.
134
  As Johnson writes, “These norms can then be appropriated and 
translated by local activists, giving them some international cachet and perhaps new 
and powerful ways to articulate their demands locally.”
 135
  Additionally, by the late 
1980s, human rights activists began to accept the validity of the “women’s rights as 
human rights” frame and increasingly allied with feminists as they added monitoring 
of gender violence to their activities.
136
  Finally, the global feminist consensus led to 
partnerships with donors, who provided funds to women’s organizations across the 
world.  After the Beijing Conference in 1995, many major U.S. and European 
foundations made violence against women a funding priority.
137
  Summing up the 
impact of the feminist “consensus,” Johnson writes: 
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By the late 1990s, violence against women had been incorporated almost 
everywhere: by the leading intergovernmental agencies (e.g., the United 
Nations, the International Organization for Migration, and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe), by Western governments’ 
international development agencies, and by virtually all large foundations 
open to funding initiatives focused on women.
138
 
Despite the success of feminists in promoting “gender” and the issue of 
violence against women, several contradictions became apparent in the way that 
Western governments and funding agencies addressed these “hot topics.”  Hemment 
notes that in Russia, as in other former Soviet states, development programs 
advancing women’s rights and the growth of women’s NGOs were “part and parcel 
of the very economic restructuring processes that have undermined women’s status in 
the post-socialist period.”
139
  Hemment explains: 
In Russia, women’s rights and empowerment schemes were promoted at the 
same time that welfare systems were cut back.  Indeed, feminist schemes have 
been promoted by the very same agencies that have overseen this dismantling.  
During the same period they were promoting civil society development and 
women’s rights, international lending institutions such as the World Bank and 
foreign advisors put pressure on the new democratic government to follow 
policies of structural adjustment.
140
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As a result, women’s groups, even those founded with very different intentions, felt 
pushed “into a gendered division of labor where they are made responsible for 
providing services formerly guaranteed by the socialist state.”
141
   
The rise of the violence against women frame pushed women even further into 
service provision and away from analysis of the material forces that oppress women.  
Hemment argues: 
[G]ender mainstreaming marks less the triumph of radical social movements 
than their demobilization and cooptation…. The feminist conception of gender 
has been hitched to new, unsavory projects, displacing class and contributing 
to the “post-socialist condition” where it becomes increasingly difficult to 
speak of structural violence or economic issues.
142
 
Both Johnson and Hemment note that, in campaigns against trafficking in women, 
states have employed the language of global feminism to legitimate coercive 
measures to fortify national borders and penalize the women they claim to help.
143
   
A second contradiction of gender mainstreaming was the “bureaucratization 
of feminist knowledge” and the “disempowerment” of women activists who felt 
themselves dependent on the whims of donors.
144
  Hemment argues, “Gender 
mainstreaming and the new emphasis on ‘women’s issues’ operates as a mode of 
power that constitutes some women and some issues as deserving of support and 
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  Initially, feminists had seen the insertion of women’s concerns 
into the agendas of powerful agencies as an achievement of the women’s movement.  
Once this goal was achieved, however, the flow of influence was reversed.  
Development agencies took those feminist principles that most matched their agendas 
and created grant competitions that led activists to fight for the limited positions of 
agency affiliation and support.  The post-Soviet Russian women’s movement, 
founded in a spirit of independence and egalitarianism, found itself once again drawn 
into a set of competitive and hierarchical relationships.
146
     
 
4.2.4 Implementing “Gender” as a Funding Priority in Russia 
Gender mainstreaming and the rise of the violence against women paradigm saw 
concrete results in Russia.  Foreign funding soon became the leading source of 
financial support for the women’s movement.
147
  Several studies found that, by the 
late 1990s, approximately half of all women’s NGOs had received aid from a foreign 
source, a percentage significantly higher than other sectors of Russian civil society.
148
  
A large portion of this aid went specifically towards activism against gendered 
violence.  By 2006, more than $10 million had been awarded by U.S. donors, 
including USAID, the U.S. State Department, and the Ford Foundation, to 
organizations addressing violence against women.
149
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Early on, the Ford Foundation had become a leading supporter of women’s 
NGOs.  Between 1994 and 1999, it gave over $2 million in grants to help 
institutionalize the women’s movement.
150
  In 1998, the Ford Foundation turned its 
attention to the specific goal of developing crisis centers for women and, between 
1998 and 2005, gave over $1.6 million to crisis centers across Russia.
151
  USAID also 
joined in on the effort to establish a crisis center movement and granted nearly one 
million dollars to thirty-five crisis centers between 1999 and 2002.
152
  A third 
significant source of support for the crisis center movement was the Network for 
Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region (NCRB), representing Nordic 
countries, which had their own multilateral relations with Russia.  NCRB had 
received approximately $300,000 from the European Union and Nordic sources to 
support a network of organizations addressing gender violence in Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, and northwest Russia.
153
   
Other donors that have provided significant funds to the Russian women’s 
movement include foreign governments, such as the British, Canadian, and German 
governments and the European Union, and private foundations, such as the Open 
Society Institute, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Eurasia Foundation.
154
  In 
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addition, numerous donors, including charities and small feminist groups, have 
contributed smaller amounts of funding to women’s groups. 
 Many donors shared the belief that empowering women would lead to 
stronger civil societies and more representative democracies.
155
  In discussing the 
dynamics of foreign funding specifically to Russian women’s organizations, Richter 
notes that most donors geared their funds to three tasks, building NGO infrastructure, 
strengthening public advocacy, and promoting community outreach, in order to 
support the development of the Russian third sector.
156
  Richter argues that 
multidimensional grants geared towards building the infrastructures of a few 
organizations to act as “resource centers” or umbrella organizations had the strongest 
effect on the women’s movement.  Such long-term grants “pay for the salaries, office 
space, and other operational costs of a few select organizations that in turn are 
expected to provide a range of services to other organizations in the sector, including 
training, legal and financial consultations, facilitating and arranging seminars and 
conferences, and distributing information regarding the activities of other women’s 
organizations in Russia and around the world.”
157
  Such grants established several 
core women’s organizations that were designed to act as clearinghouses of 
information for other women’s groups throughout Russia.   
 In addition to multidimensional infrastructural grants, foreign donors also 
provided infrastructural grants in the following areas: minigrants to help small 
organizations become established; unidimensional grants awarded to organizations to 
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produce specific outcomes, many of which were focused on strengthening women’s 
networks, e.g., organizing training sessions and conferences, publishing brochures or 
newsletters, establishing internet connections, and so forth; individual grants to 
finance training programs to teach activists general principles of organizational 
administration; and travel grants and exchange programs to enable activists to attend 
conferences or visit other organizations within Russia or abroad.
158
 
 The second major goal of donors was to support the public advocacy function 
of women’s organizations.  Grants for public advocacy aimed to help activists better 
articulate their interests to governmental officials and to hold the government 
accountable for its policies on women.  Receiving such an advocacy grant, for 
example, the Moscow Center for Gender Studies undertook a “gender expertise” 
program that “analyzed upcoming legislation and its effects on women and organized 
seminars, press conferences, and publications to disseminate the findings.”
159
  
Another type of “public advocacy” grant, according to Richter’s schema, were those 
that funded the training of law enforcement officials on such issues as domestic 
violence and human trafficking.  Such trainings educated local police on the 
seriousness of the problem and taught methods of enforcement that had proven 
effective in other countries.
160
   
Finally, donors promoted the community outreach function of women’s 
organizations.  Although donors devoted relatively little attention to this goal in 
comparison to the others, the development of the Russian crisis center movement was 
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an example of a foreign-funded initiative that proved successful in helping women’s 
groups connect with average citizens and build their constituencies.
161
   
 The pervasiveness of foreign funding among women’s organizations had a 
strong impact on the development of the Russian women’s movement.  One of its 
biggest impacts was on the size of the movement.  Foreign funding made possible the 
very existence of numerous women’s organizations at a time when domestic support 
for women’s NGOs, and indeed civil society organizations as a whole, was lacking.  
Donors financed scores of projects geared to help women and increase knowledge on 
gender issues that most likely would have been impossible without these funds.  This 
support played a large role in expanding the scope of the Russian women’s 
movement, which had grown to approximately two thousand registered organizations 
by 1998.
162
   
The emphasis of many donors on connecting women’s NGOs across Russia 
led them to finance e-mail connections, national and regional conferences, 
networking projects, and newsletters and journals, which enabled activists throughout 
the country to communicate and collaborate as never before.  Additionally, foreign 
funding enhanced communication between Russian women and the international 
community of women’s rights activists.  By supporting the travel of Western 
feminists to Russia and the travel of Russian women abroad, donors facilitated an 
exchange of knowledge that many Russian women found beneficial to the growth of 
their organizations.
163
  Russian activists’ participation in international networks of 
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women broadened their opportunities to act on both national and international levels.  
Russian women often found that their international connections increased the 
legitimacy of their work in the eyes of local officials, and they drew upon global 
gender norms, such as those outlined in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 




 In spite of the many positive outcomes of foreign funding for the Russian 
women’s movement, this funding also presented challenges to the further 
development of the movement.  Similar to the consequences of aid to Russian civil 
society as a whole (discussed in the previous chapter), aid specifically to women’s 
groups contributed to the fragmentation of the movement and competition between 
groups; the establishment of a hierarchy of organizations with the “feminist elite” at 
the top; closed networks reluctant to share resources with outsiders; lack of ties 
between NGOs and the public; problems with organizational sustainability; and, 
overall, the “NGO-ization” of the Russian women’s movement.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of foreign funds at a time 
when domestic sources of support are scarce often leads organizations to compete 
with each other for limited funds and to fragment into ever smaller groups (or 
individuals) in order to qualify for more grants.  Thus, despite the emphasis of donors 
on encouraging cooperation and networking among women’s groups, the rules of 
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foreign funding have in fact discouraged women activists from collaborating too 
closely.  Sperling, Ferree, and Risman provide an example of this tendency in their 
case study of a series of three-day seminars for women activists held in seven cities 
throughout Russia in 1995-1996.  These seminars, funded by the Eurasia Foundation 
and MacArthur Foundation, were led by an American woman and a Russian woman 
and were organized around the purpose of developing “a ‘women’s agenda’ in each 
region that could be implemented by a coalition of women’s groups.”
165
  The 
techniques covered in the seminars included conducting media relations, lobbying 
elected officials, and building coalitions.  However, since the seminars represented a 
valuable opportunity for the Russian participants to make contact with Westerners, 
competition and controversy marked several of the occasions.  Sperling, Ferree, and 
Risman note, “There were recurrent, sometimes literally tearful, struggles over which 
local organization was more legitimate or deserving of Western funds as well as over 
which particular individual could be said to be the president or secretary or other 
formal representative of a specific group.”
166
  Based on their research, the scholars 
conclude that the logistics of aid complicate “the movement-building process, since it 
is clearly in the interest of groups to maintain an individual identity rather than 
collaborate with other groups and risk being absorbed.”
167
    
 Additionally, foreign funding contributed to the development of a hierarchy of 
women’s organizations and a “feminist elite” that commanded a disproportionate 
share of control and prestige within the movement.  As noted, many of the leaders of 
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the Russian women’s movement were academics who were familiar with Western 
feminist theory and literature.  Rebecca Kay writes: 
[T]hese women and their organizations quickly became associated with 
western activists and organizations working in Russia and began to be 
specifically identified in terms of this relationship…. Thus in addition to 
historical differences in status, power and access to resources, the 
development of increasingly close relations between certain Russian women’s 
organizations and western counterparts introduced a new, but equally 
powerful, factor to the formation of factions, elitism and competition, 
resentment and suspicion rather than solidarity between Russian women’s 
organizations.  What is more, the choice of academic women as the principal 
Russian partners and first points of contact for western bodies seeking to work 
in Russia reinforced a preexisting “class” difference between the Russian 
intelligentsia and other sections of Russian society.
168
   
As women with knowledge of Western feminism and the English language 
were the first to form relationships with foreign donors, they earned their trust, often 
leading to repeat funding and the opportunity to recommend new groups to funders.  
Those most closely associated with donors and with the Russian “feminist elite” were 
perceived to be at the top of the hierarchy of women’s activists, or the “big sisters” of 
Russian feminism.
169
  Kay illustrates this phenomenon through her discussion of the 
Independent Women’s Forum, an organization that grew out of the Dubna forums and 
that sought to improve communication and cooperation among women’s 
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organizations.  Donors sent grant announcements, application forms, and other 
information sources to the Forum with the understanding that such materials would be 
made available on an egalitarian basis to all of the Forum’s member organizations 
and other contact organizations.  In contrast to the official goal of the Forum, 
however, many women activists reported being left out of the information loop due to 
their low positions in the “pecking order” of the Forum.
170
  They felt they had 
purposely been denied access to information due to lack of ties or strained relations 
with movement leaders.  This problem was especially acute for women outside of 
Moscow, who largely relied on the main Moscow organizations to pass along 
information on funding opportunities.
171
   
 As the structure of the women’s movement grew increasingly hierarchical and 
many groups closed themselves off to outsiders, the flow of information was 
interrupted.  Instead of encouraging more women to join the ranks of movement 
participants, seminars and training sessions drew only the same small group of 
movement “regulars” who frequented such events.
172
  As Henderson notes, “[T]he 
effects of aid were often contained within the very circles to which it was distributed; 
the networking was insular rather than designed for outreach.  In addition, foreign aid 
did not encourage funded groups to radically extend their memberships.”
173
  
Henderson discusses the funding practices of the Ford Foundation in order to 
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illustrate how foreign aid contributed to the exclusivity that was growing within the 
women’s movement.  She writes: 
[T]he Ford Foundation’s philosophy of “building partnerships” and providing 
almost cradle-to-grave financial support to certain organizations also meant 
that a few organizations in an extremely large country were institutionalized 
often at the expense of a vast number of smaller, less-well-connected, but 
active organizations.  Thus, the Ford Foundation solidified a portion of the 
women’s movement and, in doing so, tended to privilege the groups that had 
managed to develop a relationship with the foundation early on and shut out 
other groups that also wanted to gain access to the foundation’s resources.
174
 
Hence, while both foreign donors and early leaders of the women’s movement 
emphasized the importance of horizontal networking and worked to expand the 
movement on an egalitarian basis, the consequences of foreign aid combined with the 
legacies of state socialism often produced the opposite outcome.  Many women’s 
groups, especially those seeking to obtain foreign grants, remained small, insular, and 
mistrustful of the intentions of outsiders.  This tendency left the women’s movement 
with a minimal base of support among the Russian population.   
 While the Russian women’s movement grew in size and scope, it faced the 
curious dilemma of being little understood or accepted at home.  As Hemment 
explains: 
Russian women’s groups do not have legitimacy among most Russian women.  
Most people are unaware of their activities, and many of those who are aware 
of them are suspicious of their goals.  For complex historical reasons there is 
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no commonly held perception of gender discrimination in Russia, and most 
people greet the notion of women organizing as women with suspicion…. 
Like other internationally supported nongovernmental organizations, these 
groups are considered to be far from most people’s concerns.
175
 
As mentioned, part of the Russian public’s resistance to feminism stemmed 
from the socialist ideology promoted during the Soviet era.  With women’s equality 
enshrined in the law but no means for women to legally advocate for their rights, 
Soviet women were left in a “blind alley.”
176
  The zhensovety enjoyed the benefits of 
closeness to the Communist Party but did little to actually improve the lives of Soviet 
women.  Therefore, most Soviet women viewed them as powerless to address the 
contradictions arising out of women’s “double burden.”  Sundstrom argues: 
There is thus an unfortunate convergence of societal rejection of past Soviet 
policies on women and basic acceptance of the Soviet view of feminism.  
Russian women tend to perceive feminist organizations as espousing an alien 
Western ideology unsuited to their conditions.  At the same time, they view 
nonfeminist women’s organizations that stem from the old zhensovet 




The negative connotations of the term “feminism” in Russia led even many 
leaders of the women’s movement to reject the label “feminist.”  Sundstrom notes 
that only three percent of women’s NGOs in a database of movement organizations 
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claimed to be “feminist” in orientation, even though many more asserted goals of 
fighting discrimination against women or improving women’s status in society.
178
  
She also found dismissive attitudes towards feminism among female staff members in 
the Russian offices of foreign donors to civil society.  Some argued that women’s 
organizations did not count as part of “civil society,” since they advocated only for 
one portion of the population.
179
  The general public, Sundstrom notes, tends to 




 While negative attitudes towards feminism and women’s organizing predated 
the arrival of foreign funding, donors did little to improve the public’s opinion of the 
women’s movement.  First, donors granted a large portion of their funding to groups 
that identified as “feminist” or that aimed to advocate for women’s rights at a societal 
level, in the belief that such groups could effect greater change in Russian society.   
Although this was a well-intentioned goal, these groups had much weaker 
connections to domestic constituencies and less overall support from the population 
than did groups focused on service provision.
181
   
Second, donors distributed few funds to outreach activities that would have 
encouraged their grant recipients to connect with average citizens.   Instead, funded 
organizations devoted most of their energy to producing quantifiable results that 
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could be reported back to funders, such as hosting conferences, publishing brochures 
and newsletters, and building databases of women’s NGOs, activities targeted 
towards a small group of women’s activists.
182
  In contrast, leading activities for 
organizations without foreign funding included listening to the concerns of members 
and providing practical assistance to help them solve immediate life problems.
183
  
Thus, while unfunded groups often had some base of support from average Russian 
citizens, funded groups usually did not.  Henderson argues that, although foreign 
funding helped women’s groups increase their level of “activity,” it was less 
successful in improving organizations’ “impact” on civil society development and on 
the public’s understanding of the women’s movement.
184
   
 The effects of dependency on foreign funding relate to what many scholars 
have called the “NGO-ization” of women’s movements.  As Hemment notes, foreign 
funding presented new opportunities to women’s organizations, but it also imposed 
constraints on their activities.
185
  While women had been able to organize somewhat 
informally during the early 1990s, for example, at the Dubna forums, the arrival of 
foreign donors led many women’s groups, especially those with academic and 
feminist orientations, to repackage themselves as NGOs in order to qualify for grants 
and conduct the “professional” activities that donor agencies required.  As 
organizations were “professionalized,” they grew closer to donors and states and 
further from their local constituencies.  In addition, their once radical aims were 
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“tamed” as they increasingly served the interests of their senior “partners.”
186
  
Hemment writes, “In the new marketplace of NGOs, gender and gender-based 
organizing have ironically become a specialized system of knowledge and a new 
basis for professional expertise.”
187
   
Studying how women’s movement activists perceived this process of NGO-
ization, Hemment finds that while some women quickly adapted to the career-
building mentality of the third sector, others were troubled by the contradictions in 
their work and struggled to balance their personal passions and sense of responsibility 
with the bureaucratic limitations of their jobs.
188
  However, Hemment argues that, 
unlike in Latin America and some other regions, NGO-ization of the Russian 
women’s movement was not a cooptation of an already existing grassroots 
movement.  Instead, with foundations arriving just as the Russian women’s 
movement was taking off, donors partnered with highly educated women and 
reinforced the notion of feminist organizing as an elite activity.
189
   
 While the arrival of foreign funding and the concomitant NGO-ization of the 
women’s movement provided women’s organizations with much-needed support on a 
grant-to-grant basis, it presented problems for the long-term sustainability of the 
movement.  As noted, several studies found that approximately half of all women’s 
organizations had received foreign funding.  Additionally, a study specifically on 
feminist and human rights NGOs found that these organizations overall received 90 
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percent of their funding from Western donors.
190
  With this degree of dependency, it 
is especially important that donors encourage grant recipients to establish other means 
of financing before they pull out.  However, given the lack of support for women’s 
organizing in Russia, women’s NGOs have had little success in attracting 
contributions from either the Russian public or Russian businesses.  
As an alternative to foreign funding, many organizations have found ways to 
utilize Russian state support to their best advantage.  At times this support has been 
in-kind, in the form of office space, telephone lines, or free advertising provided by 
local governments.  Other times, women’s NGOs have been able to survive by 
partnering with state-affiliated bodies in flex organizations or hybrids that blur the 
line between public and private.
191
  With no stable sources of support emerging in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, women’s organizations utilized their 
creativity in finding ways to survive.   
 
4.3 The Russian Crisis Center Movement 
4.3.1 Founding and Institutionalization of the Crisis Center Movement 
The development of the crisis center movement has been one of the most successful 
collaborations between foreign funders and Russian women’s organizations.  The 
seeds of this movement were first sown at the Dubna conferences in 1991 and 1992, 
when leading Russian feminists brought the “global feminist consensus” on violence 
against women to the attention of the larger Russian women’s movement.
192
  Inspired 
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by the transnational activism on these issues and the Western model of a “crisis 




 In 1993, ANNA (an acronym for the No to Violence Association) was 
founded in Moscow as a one-person hotline.  The organization, which would later 
become a leader in the crisis center movement, held a training for new hotline 
counselors in 1994, and officially registered with the Russian government in 1995.
194
  
A second Moscow crisis center, Syostri (Sisters), was founded around the same time, 
but while ANNA focused more on domestic violence, Syostri concentrated on sexual 
assault.
195
  A similar process occurred in St. Petersburg with the founding of the St. 
Petersburg Crisis Center.  The Center began offering some services in 1991, officially 
opened in 1994, and began operating a regular hotline in 1995.
196
  Soon after these 
early crisis centers opened in Moscow and St. Petersburg, similar organizations began 
appearing in the regions.  For example, in Saratov, a one-million-person city on the 
Volga, activists founded the Interregional Association of Women Lawyers in 1994 to 
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 In October 1994, ANNA activists established the Russian Association of 
Crisis Centers for Women (RACCW) to connect the newly emerging crisis centers 
across Russia and to facilitate collaborative projects to raise awareness and lobby for 
legislative reform.
198
  The founding members of RACCW were located in Moscow, 
the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Tagil, Ekaterinburg, and Kamchatka.  By 
this time, there were already seven to ten crisis centers, with varying degrees of 
activity, operating in Russia.
199
   
In these early years of the crisis center movement, Russian activists heavily 
borrowed from Western feminist theories on how to respond to violence against 
women.  Johnson notes that many Russian leaders of crisis centers met with Western 
feminists or traveled to North America or Western Europe to observe the operation of 
women’s shelters.
200
  In addition, the translation and publication of the Western 
feminist text How to Start a Crisis Center for Women
201
 allowed the crisis center 
model to reach even more Russian activists.
202
  Foreign donor funds supported the 
dissemination of five thousand copies of the text to women’s NGOs.
203
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Hemment observes that the methods and theoretical frameworks 
accompanying the crisis center model could be learned by activists and transferred 
even further.  Describing the methods promoted by this model, Hemment writes: 
These were techniques taken from Western European and U.S. crisis 
centers—nondirective active listening skills, crisis counseling—and were 
backed up by a broad feminist paradigm that offered an explanation for 
gendered violence: here, rape is seen not as a sexual act, but as an expressions 
[sic] of male dominance and power.  This conception offered a robust counter-
model both to old Soviet ideological explanations for interpersonal violence 




 While borrowing from foreign paradigms, Russian activists applied the crisis 
center model in ways that fit local conditions and needs.  In contrast to North 
American organizing against gender violence, which had started as a grassroots 
movement featuring sister-to-sister support, the Russian movement began as a more 
professionalized sphere in which many un- or underemployed psychologists, scholars, 
and lawyers offered their services to women.
205
  Johnson notes: 
The Russian version of the crisis center is an organization led by a few 
individuals (typically professionals receiving some compensation), a hotline 
staffed by volunteer counselors for several hours a day several days of the 
week, often some in-person counseling or support groups, and usually some 
sort of broader advocacy work.  Volunteers would listen to callers’ concerns 
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and try to help callers see new options.  Often, because of the virtual collapse 
of the welfare system and social conditions, there is very little that they can do 
except try to empower the victim to feel entitled to a better life.
206
  
Although the inexpensiveness of this model permitted its viability in a 
resource-poor environment, a lack of funds severely limited the aid that activists were 
able to offer clients.  While several crisis centers made attempts to establish shelters 
for women seeking to leave abusive relationships, these attempts were usually 
stymied by “financial realities and oppressive post-Soviet regulations.”
207
  
Nonetheless, by 1997, there were at least eight established and stably functioning 
crisis centers providing direct help to women and several additional organizations 
working on the theme of violence against women.  Johnson argues that the mid-1990s 
were a period of “institutionalization” of the crisis center, “which quickly replaced 




4.3.2 Proliferation of Crisis Centers 
By the late 1990s, foreign donors had begun to allocate significant funds to assist the 
growth of the Russian crisis center movement.  Funding activism against gender 
violence became a foreign aid priority of the United States government following the 
1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.
209
  After the Conference, then first-lady 
Hillary Clinton, who had led the U.S. delegation, pushed for increased attention to 
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gender issues from U.S. development aid providers.  Her efforts contributed to the 
development of the 1996 USAID Gender Plan of Action, which aimed to integrate 
gender concerns, including domestic violence, into all USAID activities.
210
  USAID 
and the U.S. State Department began to develop initiatives addressing domestic 
violence as part of their women in development, democracy assistance, and rule-of-
law programs.
211
  Then, while attending a Russia-United States conference on 
domestic violence in Moscow in 1998, Clinton promised U.S. assistance to Russian 
crisis centers.
212
  Subsequently, USAID granted almost one million dollars in aid 
between 1999 and 2002 to thirty-five crisis centers throughout Russia for start-up and 
expansion costs.
213
   
Another major U.S. donor was the Ford Foundation, which allocated more 
than half a million U.S. dollars to ANNA between 1998 and 2001.  The foundation 
dispersed another quarter of a million U.S. dollars to crisis centers in Irkutsk and St. 
Petersburg.
214
  A third important source of assistance for the growth of the movement 
was the Network for Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region, which 
provided financial and sister-to-sister support to crisis centers in northwest Russia.
215
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Other large donors to Russian crisis centers included the Open Society Institute, the 
British Know How Fund, and the EU’s TACIS program.
216
   
 Transnational feminists also provided a great deal of support to Russia’s crisis 
center movement, both in working with funders and in collaborating directly with 
Russian women’s organizations.  Following the achievement of the “global feminist 
consensus” on violence against women, feminists created transnational feminist 
networks (TFNs) to help promote their cause on both national and international 
levels.  Transnational feminist networks have been defined as “structures organized 
above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a 
common agenda, such as women’s human rights, reproductive health and rights, 
violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics.”
217
  
Valentine Moghadam argues that TFNs “ensure that women’s issues remain on the 
international agenda, and that local activists receive solidarity and support.”
218
   
Several TFNs had a strong presence in Russia and played significant roles in 
the development of the Russian crisis center movement.  For example, the Network of 
East-West Women (NEWW), founded in 1991, helped Russian women make contact 
with activists in other regions or countries and organized exchanges.  The Consortium 
of Women’s Nongovernmental Associations (formerly the NIS-US Women’s 
Consortium), which was founded to connect women’s organizations in the U.S. and 
in the post-Soviet states, provided nearly $100,000 in seed grants to women’s NGOs, 
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including Syostri and the St. Petersburg Crisis Center.
219
  In 1997, the Vienna-based 
Women against Violence Europe (WAVE) was formed to link “activists, 
policymakers, and others with an interest in reducing violence against women in 
nearly all European countries.”
220
  Noting the importance of WAVE in supporting the 
Russian crisis center movement, Johnson writes: 
[WAVE] serves as a discursive space for information exchange among 
professionals and activists, a library and archive, and a database of addresses, 
as well as a resource for women who are victims of domestic violence to find 
help within specific countries.  From the beginning Russian crisis centers, 
including Syostri and later ANNA as the Russian focal point, were involved, 




 In addition, transnational feminists aided the growth of the crisis center 
movement through alliances with donors.  In promoting the “global feminist 
consensus” on violence against women, feminists had encouraged many development 
agencies, human rights organizations, and large charitable foundations to support 
women’s activism in Russia.
222
  Several charitable foundations and international 
development agencies professed a commitment to global feminism and included 
global feminists in the process of designing and implementing aid.
223
  As a result of 
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this inclusion, many donors incorporated feminist principles by prioritizing the 
participation of local activists in the aid process, giving grant recipients more control 
over projects, and using feminist “best practices” to combat violence against women 
in Russia.
224
   
Johnson argues that this approach to funding helped crisis centers to overcome 
many of the challenges that hindered other foreign-funded women’s NGOs in Russia 
and to become one of the most successful sectors of Russian civil society.
225
  She 
points out that, while crisis centers were “NGO-ized and somewhat fragmented,” they 
maintained relatively strong networks, demonstrated closer ties to local communities, 
and actively worked for social and political change.
226
  In addition, by providing 
support to the crisis center movement over a number of years, foreign donors helped 
the movement survive a difficult time in Russia’s economy.
227
  Finally, the 
relationship between crisis centers and their funders was successful in that activists 




 Despite the success of the crisis center movement, some scholars pointed out 
problems that arose when transnational feminists and foreign donors attempted to 
push the Western crisis center model too rigidly onto Russian groups without taking 
the time to understand the local context.  In her study of women’s NGOs and crisis 
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centers throughout Russia in 1997 and 1998, Hemment found that, when the crisis 
center model was first introduced, many women activists were confused by or even 
objected to the need to address gender violence.  In a period of economic dislocation, 
many activists were focused on resolving issues such as unemployment, lack of living 
space, alcoholism, and military service.
229
  However, with foreign donors promoting 
the issue of gender violence, activists felt compelled to address this topic.  Of the 
mismatch between the aims of transnational donors and of Russian activists, 
Hemment writes: 
Privately, many Russian activists involved in the campaigns admitted that 
they did not think gendered violence was the most pressing issue facing 
Russian women.  In the light of major socioeconomic upheavals such as the 
decay of the free healthcare system, the erosion of state-sponsored day care, 
and a sharp decline in living standards, they were concerned that the issue had 
such high priority and that so many resources were put into it.  I was struck 
that many of those engaged in the ideological work of the antiviolence 
campaign (organizing the conferences, publishing materials) even objected to 
them.  One of my friends, Irina, who worked for an organization that 
supported antiviolence campaigns, rolled her eyes upon learning that I was 
working with a group to set up a crisis center.  “Crisis centers, crisis centers!  
That’s all you can think about.  But let me tell you, there are good Russian 
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families, you know.  I know there is really a serious problem in America, but 
in Russia it is different.”
230
 
Hemment notes that she began to see transnational campaigns against gender 
violence as a form of cultural imperialism in Russia.  The imported framework of 
“violence against women” was based on Western assumptions of the form of 
interpersonal and economic relations between women and men; transnational activists 
and donors failed to take into account the specificity of the Russian context and 
history.  Although violence, of course, existed in the private realm, Hemment argues 
that neither women nor men saw it as a “gender” problem.
231
  As it was commonplace 
in post-Soviet Russia for multiple generations of families, or even multiple families, 
to live together in communal apartments, “domestic conflict most commonly 




When Russian activists tried to express their concerns to foreign donors, they 
felt “unheard.”  Hemment writes: 
[The framing of violence against women] not only screened out local 
constructions of events but deflected attention from other issues of social 
justice also, notably the material forces that oppress women.  During 
conferences and seminars, I noted that when Russian activists attempted to 
expand discussion of “violence” to encompass other issues, such as economic 
or structural violence, agency representatives seemed to reject these out of 
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hand.  I found that many North American or Western European feminists 
dismissed discussions of economic factors… as either Communist holdovers 
or as rationalizations for male perpetrated violence….  Within the campaigns, 
economic issues and structural violence became unnarratable.  In this way, I 
saw that the campaigns contributed to the neoliberal restructuring process.
233
 
 Given the gulf in understanding between the Western leaders of the campaign 
against gender violence and Russian women activists, activists responded by adapting 
the Western model to fit their local contexts.
234
  Although formally existing as “crisis 
centers for women victims of gender violence,” many crisis centers welcomed clients, 
both women and men, from multiple demographic groups experiencing various forms 
of “crises” in their lives.
235
  Visiting several crisis centers, Hemment found that 
clients called crisis center hotlines to discuss issues such as “unemployment, unpaid 
wages, loneliness, alcoholism, loss of children to the military service, as well as 
domestic or sexual violence.”
236
  Since violence against women was a new topic for 
Russia, few clients called to discuss it.
237
  When women did call to discuss violence, 
they often spoke about it in relation to economic problems.  Counselors responded by 
placing a high priority on clients’ material problems, concluding that “it made no 
                                                 
233
 Ibid., 99-100. 
 
234
 Ibid., 98, 101-102. 
 
235
 Ibid., 101. 
 
236
 Ibid., 101. 
 
237




sense to specialize too narrowly.”
238
  In the end, Hemment finds, the work of crisis 
centers “both embraced and exceeded the gendered violence narrative.”
239
 
 Despite the early bumps in the road, the development of the crisis center 
movement brought several benefits to Russian women and the communities they 
served.  First, the funding activists received permitted them to do the work they saw 
as necessary and to offer important services to the local population.
240
  Activists were 
able to use the funding creatively, often to support already existing projects.  Second, 
crisis centers provided local women with jobs and the opportunity to volunteer and 
gain valuable work experience.
241
  Third, the centers frequently promoted a sense of 
community and acted as a support center for local women.
242
  Finally, they allowed 
Russian women to act as active participants in the transnational movement against 
gender violence, albeit on their own terms.   
 Support from transnational feminists and donors, along with strategies women 
activists developed to make such support work in Russia, enabled the crisis center 
movement to advance from its “institutionalization” phase to its “proliferation” phase.  
Between 1998 and 2001, new crisis centers for women were established at a rapid 
pace, and already existing centers expanded their activities.
243
  In 1998, ANNA was a 
bustling crisis center with twelve staff members and dozens of volunteers running a 
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hotline and providing group consultations, serving over two hundred women a 
month.
244
  By 2001, ANNA activists were national leaders in the crisis center 
movement and were participating regularly in American Bar Association Central 
European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI) conferences.
245
  These 
conferences brought together social service professionals (psychologists, healthcare 
providers, social workers), law enforcement personnel, and women activists.
246
  In 
addition, ANNA was conducting two large national media and public awareness 
campaigns.
247
  At the same time, the number of crisis centers across Russia was 
increasing.  By the summer of 2002, RACCW had grown to forty members, and 
numerous other crisis centers were operating outside of this network.  A RACCW 
leader estimated that there were a total of 120 organizations in Russia working on the 
topic of gender violence.
248
   
 To illustrate the phenomenon of crisis center proliferation, in Barnaul, a 
southwestern Siberian city of 780,000 residents, three centers were established during 
this period.  One, the Women’s Alliance (Zhenskii Al’ians), grew out of a women’s 
organization originally formed in 1993.
249
  As with many other crisis centers, the 
main activity of the Women’s Alliance was operating a hotline, but the crisis center 
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also carried out other activities, such as on-site counseling and support groups.
250
  
Between 1998 and 2002, the Women’s Alliance assisted “6,500 victims—most of 
them female victims of violence.”
251
  The other two crisis centers that emerged in 
Barnaul during this period were Response (Otklik), a project run out of the local 
university’s sociology department, and the Altai Crisis Center for Men, a state social 
service organization that was restructured to take on the issue of domestic violence.
252
  
The latter drew notice as the first Russian crisis center designed specifically for men, 
and included programs on prevention of violence among male offenders, as well as 




 Another area that saw significant growth in crisis centers during this period 
was northwestern Russia.  By 2001, there were at least ten women’s crisis centers in 
the Barents region of Karelia, Murmansk, and Arkhangelsk.
254
  In 1998, following 
years of activism against gender violence by women’s NGOs, the Republic of Karelia 
founded its own, state-supported shelter for women with children who had been in 
situations of domestic violence.  Formal collaboration between the state and the NGO 
sector on gender violence in Karelia began in 1999, following a multidisciplinary 
seminar on domestic violence organized by the director of the Karelian Center for 
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  The next year, a seminar conducted by an independent women’s 
crisis center in the area produced a protocol of cooperation between NGOs, the 
Karelian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Center of Family Planning, and the juridical 
clinic of the Petrozavodsk state university.
256
  This protocol improved procedures for 
responding to instances of domestic violence in the republic.  For example, the 
protocol prescribes that, when a woman enters a shelter, a female police officer meets 
with her to explain her legal options and to support her decisions.  In addition, the 
Karelian Ministry of Internal Affairs began to train public safety officers on “violence 
against women in the family.”
257
   
These changes in the domestic violence response system were assisted by 
international organizations and networks.  U.S.-based Project Harmony supported the 
development of the protocol on cooperation, and the Nordic Network for Crisis 
Centers for Women in the Barents Region brought Nordic activists and public 
officials to Karelia to share their experiences with multidisciplinary collaboration.
258
  
This exposure to international methods, and even the opportunity to visit Nordic 
countries to observe their response systems, led one police officer to report that such 
experiences “had shown him and his colleagues that with a different approach to 
violence and more preventative work, more serious crimes could be averted.”
259
  
Overall, the director of the Karelian Center for Gender Studies believes that these 
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initiatives drew increased attention to the problem of violence in the family from 
multiple ministries and organizations in the republic and led such violence to be seen 




 In 2000, scholars affiliated with the crisis centers in northwestern Russia 
carried out a survey of the crisis centers in their region and two in St. Petersburg to 
provide a snapshot of the crisis center movement.
261
  Of the crisis centers included in 
the survey, all had hotlines and provided psychological counseling, and ten out of 
twelve also offered legal counseling and self-help groups.  Like most Russian crisis 
centers, these centers took a professionalized approach in treating women victims as 
clients and “were not particularly concerned about overriding the wishes of the client 
in some circumstances.”
262
  Although focused on domestic violence, most centers 
also addressed sexual abuse, rape, incest, and, in some instances, sexual 
harassment.
263
   
The survey found significant differences between government and 
independent crisis centers.  The independent centers were more activist-oriented: they 
were slightly more likely to identify as feminist and much more likely to have links to 
the international women’s movement.
264
  They were somewhat less hierarchical than 
government centers, and their viability largely depended on the management and 
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fundraising skills of the director.
265
  By contrast, government crisis centers could rely 
on more stable, even though limited, funding.  However, they were strictly regulated 
by the authorities and highly vulnerable to shifts in the local political environment. 
The authors of the survey also concluded that workers at government centers were 
less competent, perhaps stemming from the fact that they had received no education 
on gender violence prior to beginning work at the center.
266
  In regards to funding, the 
government centers had received no foreign grants, and, in turn, only one independent 
center had received a small amount of municipal funding.  One crisis center relied 
completely on the work of volunteers.
267
 
 Additionally, there were a growing number of hybrid organizations that 
blurred the lines between the state and civic sectors.  Such organizations received 
state funding while presenting themselves to donors as NGOs.  By 2004, one-third of 
organizations affiliated with RACCW, which had initially resisted the incorporation 
of state centers, were hybrids.
268
  However, hybrid organizations have been criticized 
by scholars of Russian civil society for lacking transparency, furthering networks 
based on patronage, and extending state control over civil society.
269
  Despite these 
criticisms, Johnson argues that in the case of crisis centers, hybrids served a positive 
function in expanding activism against gender violence.  While feminists lamented 
the state’s decreasing responsibilities for social service provision and protection of 
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the population in the post-Soviet era, hybrid organizations represented a new way for 
the state to take responsibility for violence against women.
270
  In addition, hybrids 
increased the number of individuals working against gender violence by drawing in 
state workers previously unaffiliated with the crisis center movement.
271
  By 
attracting state resources but ensuring that they had a role to play in the deployment 
of these resources, women activists used the hybrid model to its best advantage.  In 
addition, these affiliations with governmental structures gave women’s activists 
increased visibility and legitimacy in the state sector. 
With the crisis center movement flourishing across Russia by 2001, the 
movement was increasingly drawing upon maternalist and neotraditional frames, 
which emphasized women’s role as mothers, to advance its work domestically.  
Johnson writes that the strategy of new leaders of the movement was to “balance 
maternalism and global feminism.”
272
  Crisis centers activists more frequently used 
the concept of “violence in the family” instead of “violence against women” in order 
to connect with the Russian public and state officials.  As one leader of the movement 
explained, using maternalism was the best way to bring attention to domestic violence 
because “women [as a category of rights-bearing citizens] are not heard in Russia.”
273
  
This framing of gender violence also helped activists to find common ground with the 
many maternalist women’s groups that had emerged in Russia.  However, while 
appealing to traditional values, crisis center activists still insisted on holding batterers 
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accountable for their actions and not reverting to the tendency to blame women for 
violence in the household.  Johnson writes, “the movement adjusted the global 
concept of domestic violence to fit the Russian context even while continuing to 
challenge the gender order.”
274
  She argues that the feminist-inspired approach of 
donors to the crisis centers allowed this “successful transplantation” to occur, as 





4.3.3 Transformation of the Crisis Center Movement 
By the start of 2002, there were over one hundred autonomous, state-funded, and 
hybrid crisis centers operating actively throughout Russia.  However, Johnson writes, 
“Just as the movement was set to take off, international donors began to shift 
gears.”
276
  Starting in 2002, she argues, crisis centers entered the phase of “de-
funding” and “transformation.”
277
  After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the 
United States, many donors transferred their attention to new hotspots.
278
  In 2002, 
USAID, one of the major funders of crisis centers, suddenly stopped providing aid for 
activism against domestic violence.
279
  Other donors, ready to wean Russian grant 
recipients after a decade of funding, shifted their focus to teaching skills of self-
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sufficiency, such as fundraising.  By 2003, Johnson contends, donors had lost much 
of their interest in funding women’s organizations.
280
   
As numerous aid providers ended their commitment to Russia’s crisis centers, 
two main sources of support were left.  The first comprised projects supported by the 
EU, such as AIDOS-Focus and the Nordic NCRB for northwestern Russia.  However, 
these projects required Russian organizations to have European partners, who often 
took a large portion of the grants, and most of the projects were geared to the Eastern 
and Central European countries that sought to become EU members.  The second 
major funder was the Ford Foundation, but it provided funds only to the ANNA crisis 
center. 
281
  Other crisis centers were left to search for new sources of support.  
Johnson comments, “The global alliance between transnational feminists and 




 As democracy assistance for domestic violence crisis centers ended, funding 
opportunities began to appear for activism against human trafficking.  In the earlier 
phases of the crisis center movement, with little funding geared towards counter-
trafficking work, only a handful of centers had taken up this topic.  Few Russian 
women activists saw human trafficking as a priority issue within their communities or 
had expressed interest in working on the issue.
283
  However, similar to the situation 
when domestic violence was introduced as a priority of international funders, some 
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crisis centers began to take on the issue of trafficking as funds became available and 
activists adapted the new funding “fad” to fit the reality of their local context.
284   
 
The passage of the UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, and of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
(TVPA) in 2000 raised the issue to a level of international prominence and led to 
increasing amounts of funds becoming available for counter-trafficking projects.  At 
the time, it was estimated that at least 700,000 persons were trafficked every year 
across national borders for the purpose of labor or sexual exploitation.
285
  The United 
States offered more than $300 million in aid for counter-trafficking initiatives, 
including support for NGOs, training for journalists, and projects led by U.S. 
embassies to revise other countries’ legislation.
286
  Along with these funds, the TVPA 
gave the U.S. administration authority to evaluate other countries’ counter-trafficking 
efforts according to its own grading system and to apply sanctions to those not 
making the grade.  Johnson writes: 
Those countries not meeting minimal standards, nor making any significant 
efforts, would then be subject to the termination of non-humanitarian and non-
trade-related foreign assistance, not just from the United States, but from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the leading international 
lending institutions, upon which the United States has great impact…. For the 
first time on behalf of women, the United States explicitly legislated itself as 
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However, Johnson points out that, unlike for interventions targeted at 
domestic violence, the United States did not include feminists in the implementation 
of these initiatives to “help women.”  She contends, “This has led to an intervention 
that is, at best, a pseudofeminist policy, that is, a concerted response to problems 
women tend to face couched in language that appears feminist, but with no opposition 
to the sex/gender hierarchy.”
288
  For example, although the TVPA included 
provisions on trafficking prevention, it prioritized the prosecution of traffickers both 
domestically and in its evaluation of other countries’ counter-trafficking efforts.  Such 
a priority reflects the desire of states to police their borders and combat organized 
crime over their desire to empower women and fight gender discrimination.  In order 
to receive the services offered for those who had been trafficked, women must act in 
the role of “victim,” and, in many states, they must also cooperate with law 
enforcement in prosecuting their traffickers.
289
  Thus, instead of a “woman-centered” 
policy, these so-called “gendered interventions” actually reflect mainly the interests 
of states and intergovernmental organizations.   
 As counter-trafficking activism expanded across Russia, crisis centers in 
Moscow, Petrozavodsk, Yekaterinburg, and Krasnodar received a grant from USAID 
for “trafficking prevention and information dissemination.”
290
  Centers in Barnaul and 
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Saratov received funding from USAID for public awareness campaigns and the 
implementation of crisis intervention services.
291
  Thirteen women’s organizations in 
the Russian Far East and Siberia won a similar grant to carry out informational 
campaigns, but also to provide training in job skills and small business development 
and to offer consultations to women at high risk for trafficking.
292
  A crisis center in 
Novgorod received a smaller grant to compile a trainer’s portfolio on trafficking.  
Additional funds were dispersed to individuals as part of an “International Visitor 
Exchange Program on Trafficking of Women and Children” that sponsored the visits 
of Russian experts to Washington, D.C., to learn about U.S. programs.
293
  Johnson 
notes that these grants were generally modeled on earlier gender violence grants in 
Russia and were distributed through traditional development channels.
294
 
 However, Johnson notes, the new type of funding offered by the U.S. State 
Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) 
went to the MiraMed Institute and the Angel Coalition (AC), new participants in the 
Russian movement against gender violence.
295
  MiraMed had been founded in 1991 
by American doctor Juliette Engel and was registered both as an American nonprofit 
and a Russian NGO.
296
  Originally founded with a focus on improving Russian 
birthing centers and orphanages, MiraMed began to organize programs on human 
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trafficking in the late 1990s, as Engel became aware of girls being trafficked out of 
orphanages for the purpose of sexual exploitation.  In collaboration with twenty 
Russian NGOs, MiraMed founded the Angel Coalition in 1999 to coordinate the 
efforts of organizations working specifically to combat human trafficking.  By the 
beginning of 2003, the AC had thirty-three member organizations across Russia, and 
more in other post-Soviet republics.  Seven of these NGOs collaborated to operate 




 Although most member organizations of the Angel Coalition were unaffiliated 
with the crisis center movement, there was some overlap.  Six were members of 
RACCW, and several more were part of the broader Russian women’s movement.
298
  
For example, the Psychological Crisis Center in St. Petersburg was under the 
direction of Natalia Khodyreva, an early leader in the crisis center movement and 
official president of the Angel Coalition.
299
  In 2003, the Psychological Crisis Center 
was operating a hotline to offer consultations to people considering work abroad and 
managing a nine-woman shelter that provided psychological counseling, medical 
assistance, and education and job training to victims of trafficking.
300
  In contrast, the 
affiliate of the AC in Kazan, the capital of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, 
operated on a much smaller scale.  Originally a micro-financing women’s 
organization, the organization managed to obtain a rented apartment to use as a 
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safehouse, where it hosted one woman who had been deported back to Russia in the 
summer of 2004.
301
   
 Johnson contends that the availability of counter-trafficking funds, and 
specifically the politics behind the distribution of these funds, deepened divisions 
within the Russian crisis center and women’s movements.  During the 1990s, as the 
transnational movement against human trafficking was gaining momentum, feminists 
around the world found themselves drawn to different sides of the debate on 
prostitution and its connection to trafficking.  Some feminists, often referred to as 
abolitionist feminists or radical feminists, saw the practice of prostitution as 
inherently exploitative towards women, a means through which men demonstrate 
their power over women and their right to use women for sex according to their 
whims.  Thus, abolitionist feminists saw little need to distinguish between trafficking 
and prostitution and advocated for the criminalization of both, while also urging 
states and organizations to protect women from such violence.   
Other feminists, known as sex workers’ rights feminists or human rights 
feminists, drew a distinction between forced prostitution, in which women are 
compelled to work in the sex industry through the use of violence, threats, debt 
bondage, or other forms of coercion, and voluntary prostitution, in which women 
themselves choose to engage in such work.  Sex workers’ rights activists supported 
the freedom of women to choose to work as prostitutes, and they advocated for 
worker and migrant rights to improve prostitutes’ autonomy and working conditions.  
Since they saw prostitution as an acceptable form of work, they argued that counter-
                                                 
301




trafficking efforts should be focused on combating the exploitation or forced 
movement of workers in any field, not on abolishing the practice of prostitution.   
There are, of course, varying versions of these perspectives, along with other 
approaches to human trafficking, which will be reviewed in more depth in the next 
chapter.  For the purpose of understanding how these debates affected the distribution 
of funds to the Russian counter-trafficking movement, however, here I will focus on 
these two leading perspectives on trafficking.   
 As U.S. funding was distributed to NGOs in other countries, U.S. counter-
trafficking activists monitored the use of these funds and the organizations to which 
they were given. A strong coalition of radical feminists and political conservatives in 
the United States that had supported the passage of the TVPA continued to emphasize 
the severity of the trafficking of women and children for prostitution and pressed the 
U.S. government to take an abolitionist stance in its counter-trafficking efforts 
abroad.  One of the leading monitors of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia 
was Donna Hughes, a professor of women’s studies at the University of Rhode Island 
and later a board member of the MiraMed Institute, who has published widely on the 
topic of human trafficking, including in the Russian context.   
In fall 2002, Hughes wrote an article in the National Review claiming that the 
Angel Coalition, which had received U.S. funding during its first years of operation, 
subsequently had all of its grant applications rejected by the U.S. due to the 
Coalition’s abolitionist views.  Hughes accused the U.S., because of its support 






  She writes that a “pro-prostitution mafia” consisting of the U.S. State 
Department, U.S.- and Dutch-funded NGOs, and the Union of Right Forces, a 
Russian political party, were conspiring to “muscle out the Angel Coalition and 
install their own NGOs.”
303
  Hughes argues that, since the Angel Coalition refused to 
go along with a plan to legalize prostitution in Russia, other NGOs refused to 
associate with it, representatives of the U.S. embassy in Moscow turned “hostile and 
accusatory,” and a “disinformation campaign was initiated against the work and 
reputation of the Angel Coalition.”
304
   
As a result of its alleged prejudice against the Angel Coalition, Hughes 
contends, the U.S. government rejected or cancelled all MiraMed proposals for 
funding in Spring 2001, and instead gave a $2 million grant to a “pro-prostitution” 
organization.  Hughes’s critique was supported by an international coalition that 
condemned the distribution of funds to Russian organizations that did not claim an 
“abolitionist” perspective.  A coalition of “human-rights and women’s-rights policy 
organizations, churches, and faith-based groups” wrote to President Putin exhorting 
him to take a stand against U.S. prostitution supporters.
305
  In addition, Johnson 
writes, many abolitionists in the United States sent letters to U.S. Congress members, 
and the U.S. embassy in Moscow was repeatedly called upon to explain itself.
306
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While Hughes provided no evidence supporting her claims of a “pro-
prostitution mafia” existing among U.S. officials, Johnson argues that there was also 
no evidence that any of the women’s NGOs supported the legalization of prostitution 
in Russia.
307
  At the same time, they were not clearly “abolitionist” organizations.  In 
the Russian context, many women activists felt that they could not simply “import” 
foreign stances on the issue, and instead were developing their own views on the 
legalization of prostitution.  Some remained open to discussing the matter, but none 
of the organizations Johnson studied had come out in support of legalization.  In 
contrast to organizations that had not yet declared a position on the prostitution 
debate, the Angel Coalition and MiraMed professed a strict abolitionist viewpoint, 
which coincided with the views of the administration of George W. Bush, who was 
president of the United States at the time.   
 While the U.S. embassy and Russian women’s organizations defended 
themselves against Hughes’s charges, Johnson argues that the abolitionist campaign 
supported by Hughes and the TIP Office had more influence with the Bush 
administration.
308
  As part of the reauthorization of the TVPA legislation in 2003, the 
administration announced that the United States would stop funding groups perceived 
as encouraging sex work.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2003 mandated that an organization pledge “in either a grant application, a grant 
agreement, or both, that it does not promote, support, or advocate the legalization or 
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practice of prostitution” in order to be eligible for U.S. funding.
309
  This required oath 
became known as the “anti-prostitution pledge.”  The requirement was also included 
in the Global AIDS Act of 2003, which prohibited “international agencies from 
receiving funds unless they explicitly sign an oath that they do not support or condone 
prostitution in its many manifestations.”
310
  In line with this new policy, the Bush 




 Johnson argues that the controversy surrounding counter-trafficking 
organizations in Russia created a rift between many women’s crisis center leaders and 
the MiraMed/Angel Coalition.
312
  In the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking 
funding following this controversy, in 2004, the Angel Coalition won a grant of 
nearly half a million dollars to coordinate more shelters, while only one women’s 
crisis center affiliated with RACCW received a small grant, for $6,060.
313
  Johnson 
contends that, “Because of the lines that were drawn, the conflict led to the closing-
off of most long-term, feminist women’s crisis centers from U.S. funds.”
314
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In light of the limited sources of funding for the crisis center movement 
following the shift away from a focus on domestic violence and towards human 
trafficking, crisis centers searched for new ways to support themselves.  By 2005, the 
Russian government was supporting twenty-two state-run centers, but independent 
crisis centers had few options.  By the end of the year, eighteen crisis centers had 
closed.
315
  Remaining crisis centers turned to new tactics in an attempt to survive.  To 
illustrate this trend, Johnson describes the tactics employed by RACCW. 
 Until 2001, the crisis center network of RACCW and the crisis center ANNA 
had been intermingled, with overlapping leadership and shared resources.
316
  
However, USAID, which encourages clear accountability structures, criticized this 
arrangement and the organizations’ structures were split.  RACCW lost access to the 
funding that the Ford Foundation had granted to ANNA, and it could no longer rely 
on the effective fundraising skills of ANNA leader Marina Pisklakova.  In addition, 
Johnson writes that the prostitution controversy had closed off the possibility of 
receiving funds from USAID.
317
   
Fortunately, RACCW was able to find a new feminist partner, Women’s Aid, 
a British network of organizations against domestic violence, which received British 
and EU funding.  In 2003, they, in collaboration with several other crisis centers, 
initiated a multi-year project targeting ethnic minorities and migrant communities in 
Russia.
318
  However, the project struggled.  With open discussion of gender violence 
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still a new phenomenon in Russia and racism widespread even among the country’s 
leaders, few ethnic minorities were willing to turn to NGOs or the Russian state for 
help, or even to admit that domestic violence existed in their communities.
319
  
Johnson writes, “In Russia, such an admission would legitimate common Russian 
assertions that ethnic minorities are to blame for society’s ills, especially for 
violence.”  Johnson argues that the project’s approach “threatened to foster racist 
arguments that domestic violence was a problem only for ethnic groups.”
320
  When 
the project came up for renewal, the EU concluded that RACCW had failed to meet 
its goals and terminated the grant.  As a result, RACCW was left without any support.  
In 2005, it existed only on the unpaid work and small donations of its two leaders.  In 
2006, it lost its Moscow office.  Likewise, independent crisis centers with whom 
RACCW had collaborated in Saratov, Kazan, Nizhny Tagil, Voronezh, and Barnaul 
lost their primary funding sources.  As Johnson comments, “It was the end of the era 
of autonomous feminist mobilization against gender violence.”
321
 
 One of the crisis centers with which RAACW had collaborated on the ethnic 
minorities project was Fatima. Fatima was located in Kazan, the capital of the 
Republic of Tatarstan, an ethnic homeland of approximately 48 percent mostly 
Muslim Tatars and 43 percent ethnic Russians.
322
  Although the crisis center 
movement had initially been dominated by those of Russian ethnicity, by 2004, 
centers had begun appearing in communities with large populations of ethnic 
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minorities.  Since Kazan was recognized as a gateway for trafficking to Turkey, 
Fatima tried to obtain counter-trafficking funds, but only received small grants 
through RACCW.  Fatima activists also collaborated with the Angel Coalition 
affiliate in Kazan.  For example, for the one deported women who was staying at the 
AC-network safehouse, Fatima activists were providing psychological support and 
helped her search for employment and permanent housing.
323
  However, while the AC 
affiliate received foreign funds, Fatima activists worked for free.  The small grants 
Fatima received through RACCW gave the organization some base of support, but 
once RACCW’s EU grant was terminated, Fatima was left with no financial support 
and its founders left the organization.
324
 
Some crisis centers turned to the Russian state for support.  The feminist 
organization Women’s Alliance in Barnaul, which had been the only independent 
crisis center in a city with several hybrid centers, was also left with virtually no 
funding once RACCW’s EU grant ended.
325
  Their financial difficulties existed even 
as the organization was recognized by the U.S. edition of the women’s magazine 
Marie Claire, which, in 2004, declared staff member Elena Shitova one of the top ten 
women in the world.
326
  As the organization’s director Natalia Sereda searched for 
support, the regional administration made plans to open a government crisis center for 
women, and invited Sereda to become the center’s director.  Sereda accepted the 
position, but on the condition that she be allowed to maintain her connection with the 
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independent women’s movement, believing that the position would aid her in 
continuing to pursue her activist goals.  Soon, however, Sereda became frustrated 
with the government center’s sole focus on social service provision, and she returned 
to the Women’s Alliance.
327
  As foreign funding became more difficult to obtain, 
many crisis centers followed this route of turning to the state for support or entering 
into “hybrid” partnerships that allowed them to draw upon state resources.  Although 
this approach carries some benefits, activists must be cautious of shifts in the political 
environment that can affect the viability of government crisis centers and must remain 
mindful of their own goals to prevent being coopted into the government’s agenda.
328
 
Another route that women’s crisis centers took to remain operational was to 
align themselves with public universities.  As many of the leaders of the Russian 
women’s movement had emerged from academia, Russian feminism has always had a 
strong connection to the academy.  Some crisis centers, such as Moscow-based 
Yaroslavna, had been formed within universities, while others developed university 
ties later.
329
  Since these crisis centers received state-subsidized space and faculty 
time, they could survive with little external funding.   
In 2005, one remaining crisis center within a university was Bridges of Mercy 
in the city of Arkhangelsk.  Established in 1999 on the basis of a borrowed telephone 
line, the organization was officially registered when a senior professor at the 
university secured an office for the organization.
330
  With this stable operational base, 
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the organization was able to obtain some funding from USAID, NCRB, and other 
Nordic sources.  In 2005, this external funding ended, and Bridges of Mercy was left 
with no financial resources.
331
  However, the organization survived due to the support 
of three professors who led the crisis center and university-provided office space.  To 
give back to the university, Bridges of Mercy offered work experience to social work 
and psychology students.
332
  Although university affiliation may be the best option 
for long-term crisis center survival, Johnson argues that this route “represents a 
scaled-down feminist mobilization.”
333
  She writes that Bridges of Mercy’s feminist 
leaders were exhausted and most of its volunteers saw their work as a practical step to 
acquiring job experience.
334
  Without a feminist consciousness, Johnson argues, crisis 
center workers may simply reinforce neotraditional gender roles that assign women 
responsibility for peace in the family.
335
 
Employing creative tactics in their search for support enabled many crisis 
centers to survive into the first decade of the twenty-first century.  In fact, the number 
of organizations even grew in the first half of the decade.  By 2004, RACCW had 
grown to 47 organizations as more NGOs and state hybrids applied for 
membership.
336
  By 2004, ANNA had also developed its own, overlapping, network 
of 121 organizations in Russia with which they had collaborated.  Altogether in 2004, 
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there were 229 organizations in Russia that identified a focus on combating violence 
against women and/or trafficking in women, which Johnson writes may be the high 
point of the movement in terms of the number of organizations.
337
  She argues, 
however, that the large number of organizations may not paint an accurate portrait of 
the strength of the crisis center movement.  Given the difficulty organizations had in 
finding support, most crisis centers could offer only limited services and their period 
of operation was short.   Of the 229 organizations Johnson counted, only thirty-eight 
“had proven longevity by lasting more than a couple of years.”
338
  In addition, the 
quality of their services suffered, as organizations could not afford to pay high 
salaries, or sometimes any salaries at all.  As a result, crisis centers had a high rate of 
turnovers and many were run completely by volunteers.
339
  In 2007, movement 
leaders counted only nineteen functioning women’s crisis centers remaining.
340
 
In her study of the crisis center movement, Johnson examined the success of 
centers in addressing different issues, namely, sexual assault, domestic violence, and 
human trafficking.  She found that crisis centers were most effective at raising 
awareness and influencing changes in practices and policies on the issue of domestic 
violence, because the distribution of funds towards activism on this topic reflected the 
input of transnational feminists and was substantial enough to support sizeable 
initiatives.
341
  Activism against sexual assault was less successful because, while 
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transnational activists provided a great deal of networking and informational support 
in attempting to “blame and shame” the Russian government, donors did not back this 
up with funding.
342
  Meanwhile, activism against human trafficking was less effective 
because the international interventions were too aggressive and did not center 
women’s concerns.
343
  The Russian state made some nominal changes in its laws and 
practices to avoid international censure, but the heavy-handed approach of the U.S.-
led campaign did not win Russia’s sympathies or encourage in-depth reform.   
Johnson argues that a major reason for the differential outcomes in the 
campaigns against domestic violence and against human trafficking was that 
feminists did not come to a consensus on the issue of trafficking.  The transnational 
feminist consensus on the issue of gender violence, by contrast, produced a neatly 
packaged cause that feminists could lobby to be included in the programs of 
international development agencies.  When development agencies agreed to take on 
the issue of gender violence, many also welcomed the input of feminists in designing 
grant programs around the issue.  As a result, these programs were designed to, and 
many times did, produce transformative and long-term improvements in how 
domestic violence was addressed by a wide array of institutions in Russian society.  
In centering women’s interests, these programs also sought to promote women’s right 
to self-determination.    
On the issue of human trafficking, however, feminists devoted a great deal of 
energy to debating the legality of prostitution and did not present a unified front to 
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states or to the United Nations when they were passing initiatives on the topic.
344
  
With little feminist influence in the U.S. camp, the legislation that the U.S. 
encouraged Russia to pass may even have made the situation worse “because of the 
punitive nature of the law, leaving trafficked women even more likely to be arrested 
and prosecuted.”
345
  Johnson argues that feminists should seek a role in designing and 
implementing U.S. counter-trafficking initiatives and, while acknowledging their 
differences in perspective on the issue of prostitution, should present a united front in 
pressing for programs that center women’s rights.
346
   
Another important argument that Johnson makes is in response to critics of the 
neoliberal democratization programs.  These critics maintained that the drive to 
develop civil societies in post-Soviet countries legitimated the loss of welfare 
entitlements and the retreat of the state from its duty to protect its citizens, while 
placing the burden on NGOs to pick up the slack.
347
   In response to such concerns, 
Johnson contends: 
The activism and impact of the women’s crisis centers in postcommunist 
Russia demonstrates how foreign-funded NGOs can become much more than 
instruments of neoliberalism…. Most activists were not ready to absolve the 
state of responsibility to address gender violence; instead, they were making 
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powerful arguments for the resumption of some previous state responsibility 
and the addition of new responsibilities.
348
   
Johnson emphasizes that, through their work in crisis centers, women activists 
were not just service providers, but were also advocates for change in Russian 
society.  Russian state officials responded to the advocacy of these women by 
mimicking autonomous women’s crisis centers in the establishment of local and 
regional governmental crisis centers for women based on their model.
349
  This was 
true, Johnson notes, especially on the issue of domestic violence, for which foreign 
donors gave funding substantial enough to support the growth of the movement.  It 
was less true, however, on the issue of sexual assault, for which crisis centers became 
“excuses for the police to do nothing” in response to charges of rape.
350
  Thus, 
Johnson concludes, substantial, long-term funding by donors distributed in ways that 
respect local cultures and privilege women’s concerns can lead to noticeable 





4.4 Partnerships between Women’s Organizations and the Russian State: The 
Importance of Domestic Connections 
While Russian women were active participants in transnational feminist networks, 
ultimately, the main goal of most was to improve the social, economic, and political 
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situations of women living in Russia.  As a result, in addition to feminist networking, 
Russian activists devoted a great deal of energy to working with Russian state 
officials on local, regional, and national levels.  Although women’s organizations 
received little funding and little respect from the state in the early years of the post-
Soviet period, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, many had succeeded in 
forming productive relations with governmental officials.   These relations enabled 
women activists to provide services to greater numbers of individuals, exert influence 
on policymaking, and to receive state support for their activities.  Working in 
cooperation with the state in hybrid organizations and coordinated community 
response systems, women activists helped to develop comprehensive models of 
support for victims of violence.   
 As noted, funding from the Russian state to women’s organizations was 
minimal, especially in comparison to the amounts offered by foreign donors.
352
  
However, throughout the course of the post-Soviet period, many governmental bodies 
began to provide support to women’s NGOs.  In her study of over 150 women’s 
organizations in 1998-1999, Henderson found that 22 percent of organizations had 
received support from local administrations, compared to 36 percent who had support 
from foreign donors and 32 percent who had support from local businesses.
353
  While 
foreign donors favored women’s groups that were seen as promoting “democracy” in 
Russia, local governments tended to give to “Soviet-era organizations such as groups 
uniting youth or the disabled.”
354
  In addition, whereas foreign funders often provided 
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grants of sizable amounts to women’s groups, state bodies were more likely to offer 
in-kind support in the form of free office space or telephone lines.   
However, some local governments did sponsor grant competitions.
355
  For 
example, the Moscow regional government started an annual grant competition in 
1996 to grant funds for “socially meaningful” projects, mainly defined as projects 
providing social services to the population.
356
  In Yekaterinburg, a municipal grant 
competition was organized in 2000 with the input of NGO representatives and was 
designed to focus on two or three different issue areas each year.
357
  Some NGO 
activists complained, however, that local grant competitions were politically biased in 
favoring organizations with ties to the municipal administration.
358
   
 Particularly on the issue of violence against women, local governments often 
supported the growth of the women’s movement by establishing their own crisis 
centers or creating centers in cooperation with independent women’s groups (hybrid 
crisis centers).  In St. Petersburg, for instance, lobbying by women activists led the 
city to open a shelter to provide assistance to “women in danger.”
359
  Although 
activists were involved in running the shelter, they found that cooperating with the 
city required several compromises on feminist principles.   For example, the city was 
interested in helping only women of childbearing age, which led to age limits and 
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eventually a requirement that sheltered women have children.
360
  Despite 
disagreements on such policies, the shelter was seen as a success in that it lasted over 
ten years on the government’s budget and fostered a new understanding of domestic 
violence among the city’s police.
361
  Likewise, in Izhevsk, the city administration 
founded a municipal shelter for women and children in collaboration with local 
activists.  It also worked with activists to organize seminars and conferences on 
family violence, along with other themes.
362
  By 2005, there were 22 state-supported 
crisis centers for women throughout Russia, which Johnson argues demonstrates 
Russia’s “new commitment to women living in violent relationships.”
363
 
In many regions, the administration partnered with women’s organizations to 
develop coordinated community response systems to assist women victims of 
violence.  The coordinated community response model, advocated by prominent 
TFNs and supported by a number of Western donors, calls on state criminal justice 
and human service agencies to work with women’s NGOs in developing 
comprehensive response systems for victims, which often involves training police, 
psychologists, and social workers on the issue of domestic violence.
364
  As 
mentioned, in Karelia, the protocol on cooperation between women’s NGOs and state 
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institutions improved the coordination of services for women experiencing domestic 
violence and increased public awareness of the issue.
365
   
In addition, foreign aid supported the development of coordinated community 
approaches to domestic violence in several other cities throughout Russia.  These 
programs have seen concrete results as services to victims of violence have expanded.  
In Tomsk, for example, a coalition of Russian psychologists, physicians, journalists, 
law faculty, state social services, and gender experts with Amnesty International and 
Project Harmony developed a program in which the local legal clinic, state youth 
center, and gender center provided coordinated services for battered women.
366
  
Additionally, Johnson highlights the creation of a working group in Barnaul that 
consisted of crisis center activists, social workers, administrative officials, health 
officials, educators, the head doctor of a private hospital, and others that established 
new patterns of collaboration between state and civic actors and the police in 
responding to domestic violence.  The working group organized a number of 
roundtables on “Safety in the Family” that attracted widespread attention from both 
civic leaders and state officials.  Following the roundtables, police began collecting 
statistics on domestic violence and a local journalist reported that domestic violence 
had become an issue of public concern in the city.
367
   
Initiatives on the issue of violence against women were also introduced at the 
federal level.  Following the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, the Russian 
government implemented policies to comply with commitments they made to the 
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international community; however, most of these policies were declaratory and 
carried no resources for implementation.
368
  For example, the National Action Plan on 
Improving the Status of Women in the Russian Federation and Promoting their Role 
in Society was approved in 1996, but no funds were allocated to implement the 
plan.
369
  Nonetheless, Russian activists reported that Russia’s participation in the 
Conference legitimated their claims on the state.  Olga Samarina of the Department 
for Family, Women, and Children within the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social 
Development commented: 
[The Conference allowed us to] have all of this passed as government policy, 
and in general to prove to the male majority located in all areas of power that 
it’s not nonsense coming from some separate department or a handful of 




Moreover, the contributions of Russian women’s organizations during preparations 
for and throughout the course of the Beijing Conference gained them the respect of 
state officials and facilitated further collaborative work.
371
   
In addition, connections made in Beijing led to the 1998 U.S.-Russian 
conference on domestic violence in Moscow attended by Hillary Clinton.  This 
conference brought together governmental officials from all branches and thirty-two 
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of Russia’s regions, leaders of the crisis center movement, and American feminists.
372
  
The conference resolution declared that the government of the Russian Federation 
“recognizes the problem of violence against women, including domestic violence, as 
one of top priority, which is of special concern in Russia.”
373
   
In 2001, and again in 2005, the National Action Plan on women underwent 
revisions that called for more active cooperation on matters of violence in the family 
between the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and the General Prosecutor’s Office.  The revised plan also called for the 
establishment of state-supported shelters and crisis centers.
374
  These elements of the 
latter plans would bring about governmental action, in part reflecting the growing 
influence of the Russian women’s movement and crisis center movement. 
 As gender violence was increasingly accepted as an important issue in 
Russian society, crisis center leaders began to work with state officials on the federal 
level.  For example, ANNA started to work with the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Development, carrying out joint research, training social workers, and establishing a 
governmental crisis center in Moscow.
375
  By 2004, the successor ministry, the 
Ministry of Health and Social Development, was collaborating with the RACCW, 
hosting a conference on coordination between crisis centers and social services in 
preventing violence in the family.  ANNA, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
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also led police trainings.
376
  In addition, the parliamentary Committee on Women, 
Family, and Children conducted roundtables with relevant ministries and the leading 
Moscow crisis centers on the issue of domestic violence.
377
   
These are just some of the civil society-state partnerships established around 
gender violence on the federal level.  Such efforts helped to push forward some 
reforms, although much work remained to be done.  One sign of progress was that the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversees law enforcement, began to collect 
statistics on the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of a crime, which 
would make it possible to identify instances of domestic violence.
378
  However, there 
has been much criticism of police response to domestic violence from human rights 
groups.  Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have 
documented police inaction to charges of domestic violence, including refusals to 
accept complaints from women; a lack of mechanisms, such as protection orders, for 
immediate defense of victims; the rarity of prosecution and conviction in domestic 
violence crimes; and a lack of shelter space.
379
  In addition, despite the increased 
attention of state officials to the issue of violence against women, the state failed to 
pass a law to formalize their commitment to addressing domestic violence.  Johnson 
puts Russia’s reforms into perspective: 
Although there is no new domestic violence law—nor any substantial national 
reforms of criminal law—domestic violence is on the agenda of the Ministry 
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of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, and 
several regional governments have passed regional laws or implemented new 
procedures to respond to domestic violence.  Even though less than global 
feminists might hope, these changes have the potential for transforming the 
sex/gender hierarchy.  Global experience suggests that gender revolutions 




4.5 Summing Up: The Neoliberal Restructuring Process, Transnational Feminism, 
and Russian Women Activists 
Global feminists, human rights activists, and like-minded academics have directed a 
great deal of criticism towards Western governments and intergovernmental 
institutions for pressing a neoliberal model of societal organization onto Russia that 
called for the retrenchment of the welfare state and the development of a civil society 
to take over the state’s former responsibilities.  These neoliberal policies, critics point 
out, led to a decline of the living standards of most women and made them more 
vulnerable to poverty, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence.   
As the division between the public and the private spheres was widening, 
women were increasingly pushed out of the “public” sectors of business and politics 
and encouraged to return to the more feminine “private” sphere to care for their 
families and communities, either through housework or involvement in civil society 
organizations.
381
  The growing concentration of women in the civic sector reflected 
the understanding of civic activism as the “housework” of politics, where women’s 
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issues, not important enough to merit the attention of male politicians, are 
addressed.
382
   
In addition, the strategy of foreign donors to encourage women activists to 
focus on the issue of gender violence instead of addressing the underlying economic 
problems further deflected attention from the structural processes subverting 
women’s status.
383
  As women were “empowered” to take on new responsibilities, 
questions on how Russia’s social and political system could be reformed to respond 
to women’s needs were neglected.  The burden fell on women as individuals, or as 
“civic activists,” to solve the problem.
384
   
 Moving beyond this critique, however, feminist scholars point out that 
Russian women activists were not just victims of the restructuring process.  Instead, 
they were active agents constructing solutions to the challenges presented to them and 
negotiating with multiple parties to advance their causes.  As scholars have noted, 
activists in all societies are faced with the task of navigating the obstacles and the 
opportunities in the political process as they work to achieve their goals.  In the case 
of the Russian women’s movement, activists negotiated with both Russian state 
officials and foreign partners to bring about results they saw as most beneficial for 
their communities.  When foreign resources became available for projects against 
gender violence, even though many activists did not see this as the most pressing 
issue, they took advantage of the funding and used it in ways that made sense in their 
local context.  They drew upon international norms against gender violence and 
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transnational feminist networks to lobby Russian governmental officials to devote 
more attention to the issue, which eventually led to the establishment of a successful 
crisis center movement supported by both international agencies and the Russian 
state.  When foreign funding for projects against domestic violence declined, activists 
employed creative means to continue work on this topic, creating hybrid 
organizations with state bodies or assisting in the development of governmental crisis 
centers.   
As with most forms of social or political activism, these state-society 
partnerships required compromises, which Russian women skillfully managed in 
order to make progress on issues important to them.  While the neoliberal 
restructuring process may have pushed the state’s former responsibilities onto women 
activists, these same activists pushed some of these responsibilities back onto the 
state, this time with women’s concerns more central in their community response 
model.  In some ways, then, the response of the Russian state to gender violence 
improved over the course of the post-Soviet era.  Although responsibility for 
addressing violence against women is now shared between the state and the civic 
realm, Russian women activists have a larger influence in constructing the response 




Chapter 5:  Transnational Movements against Human Trafficking,  
1800s to 2008 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the issue of human trafficking was a “hot 
button” issue for activists, lawmakers, and the general public alike.  The most 
common estimates at the time held that between 600,000 to 800,000 persons were 
trafficked across international borders each year, with millions more trafficked within 
national borders.
1
  These estimates also claimed that the majority of trafficking 
victims (approximately 80 percent) were women and girls.  Some estimates were 
even higher, approximating that over a million persons were trafficked across 
international borders each year.
2
  However, it is widely acknowledged that it is 
impossible to provide an accurate count of trafficking victims due to the clandestine 
nature of the problem.  Therefore, these numbers are only a guess at the actual 
number of people affected by human trafficking.  Despite the lack of significant and 
concrete knowledge on the problem, there was wide agreement that human trafficking 
was an atrocious crime that needed to be immediately attacked through the efforts of 
law enforcement, state legislators, migration officials, anti-trafficking NGOs, and 
international cooperation.  However, as movements against human trafficking 
developed into the first decade of the twenty-first century, activists and officials 
gained experience and knowledge in fighting this crime and assisting its victims.   
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In this chapter, I review the development of the modern-day movement 
against human trafficking.  I discuss the historical precedent of this movement in the 
campaigns against “white slavery” at the turn of the twentieth century, the decline in 
international attention to the issue in the middle decades of the century, and the 
emergence of an active counter-trafficking movement in the last decades of the 
twentieth century.  As the global movement grew in strength in the 1990s, Russian 
activists and officials became aware of the problem occurring across their newly 
opened borders and made tentative efforts to address the issue.  I examine the 
development of the Russian counter-trafficking movement between 1998 and 2008 
and the relationship of this movement both to international networks against human 
trafficking and to Western programs promoting democracy and civil society in 
Russia.   
Human trafficking is a complex issue connected to many other social 
problems such as global inequality, economic restructuring, organized crime, and 
gender discrimination, and as such has required a multidisciplinary response from 
practitioners and scholars.  Experts have variously analyzed human trafficking as an 
issue of migration, national security, crime control, labor markets, human rights, 
women’s rights, or sexual morality, among other approaches.  In this dissertation, 
with my focus on civil society organizations and women’s movements that advocate 
for the human rights of their constituents, I employ a feminist lens that attempts to 
center the perspectives and needs of trafficked persons, as counter-trafficking NGOs 
set out to do.  Unfortunately, the voices of trafficking “victims” are under-represented 




their clients.  However, as counter-trafficking NGOs seek to represent the interests of 
trafficked persons, as opposed to the interests of governments, transnational 
corporations, or law enforcement, my approach also seeks to better understand the 
situations of trafficked persons.   
Thus far, the trafficking of women and children, especially for work in the sex 
industry, has received greater attention among activists and scholars than the 
trafficking of men.  As a result, in reviewing the literature and outlining international 
efforts against human trafficking, this chapter will reflect the greater focus on the 
trafficking of women and children.  However, it is unknown whether women and 
children are in fact trafficked in greater numbers than men.  Hence, wherever 
possible, I include attention to the trafficking of men as well.   
 
5.1 History of Activism against Human Trafficking and the “White Slave Trade”: 
1800s-1970s 
The practices of forcibly extracting labor from individuals and of forcibly 
transporting individuals from one geographical location to another date back to the 
beginning of the historical record.
3
  Likewise, movements condemning these practices 
also have a long history.  The historical precedent of the modern movement against 
human trafficking was the movement against “white slavery” that emerged at the turn 
of the twentieth century.  This movement, which flourished across North America and 
Europe, was organized to combat what was perceived to be the widespread abduction 
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and transport of white women for prostitution.
4
  As industrialization, urbanization, 
and unequal distribution of wealth fueled increased migration of both women and 
men in the late nineteenth century, the growing number of women traveling abroad 
for work, including sex work, caused great anxiety among the middle-classes and 
elites and set off a racialized panic over the “White Slave Trade.”
5
  Similar to the 
contemporary movement against human trafficking, the movement against white 
slavery captured popular imaginations and garnered international attention.  
Describing the scope of the movement against white slavery, Jo Doezema writes, 
“There were organizations world-wide devoted to its eradication; it received 
extensive coverage in the world’s media; was the subject of numerous novels, plays, 
and films; and led to a number of international conferences, new national laws, and a 
series of international agreements.”
6
 
The panic over white slavery at the turn of the twentieth century was rooted in 
North American and European nineteenth-century discourses on prostitution and on 
gendered international migration.
7
  Over the course of the nineteenth century, a 
category of persons known as “prostitutes” was constructed in both the United States 
and Europe and was perceived to require management by the middle class.  Prior to 
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the nineteenth century, prostitution was more often treated as just one of many 
criminal offenses, and prostitutes were not seen to comprise a separate, morally 
deviant group.
8
  Many women engaged in commercial sex work on a transitory and 
fairly casual basis.
9
  For example, before the 1860s in Great Britain, “Prostitutes were 
not particularly identified as a special class and were thus allowed some opportunity 
for mobility out of prostitution.  They were part of the community in which they grew 
up.”
10
  Our contemporary understanding of prostitutes as a class of women standing 
outside of moral society and in need of special attention and help thus began to form 
out of these nineteenth-century discourses.  
In Britain, the passage of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866, and 
1869, which mandated “the medical examination of ‘prostitutes’ in England’s 
garrison and port towns, to protect the armed forces,” was the first legal regulation of 
a category of “prostitutes.”
11
  Activist Josephine Butler, who organized the Ladies 
National Association in Britain to campaign for the repeal of the Acts, saw the Acts 
as sanctioning prostitution in order to serve the interests of men.  The access of men 
to prostitutes was ensured and their health protected, but the Acts did nothing to 
uphold the rights of prostitutes or improve their safety in brothels.  Instead of viewing 
prostitutes as criminals who should be policed and punished, Butler saw them as 
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victims who needed to be rescued and rehabilitated.
12
  Butler noted that not only 
women working as prostitutes, but all women living in areas covered by the Acts 
were subject to their provisions.
13
  A statement issued by the Ladies National 
Association read: 
Unlike all other laws for the repression of contagious diseases, to which both 
men and women are liable, these two [Acts] apply to women only, men being 
wholly exempt from their penalties.  The law is ostensibly framed for a certain 
class of women, but in order to reach these, all women residing within the 
district where it is in force are brought under the provisions of the Acts.  Any 




Historian Judith Walkowitz argued that the Acts “were designed to force 
prostitutes to accept their status as public women by destroying their private identities 
and associations with the poor working-class community.”
15
  Once identified, 
prostitutes could be either regulated by the state or “saved” by middle-class women 
and religious groups.  In England, as in other countries such as France, Australia, and 
Russia, responses to prostitution were based on the “principle of incarceration: 
brothel, hospital, ‘home’ and prison were all institutions to which women were to be 
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confined, providing a structure for women believed to lack one.”
16
  Social reformers 
and philanthropists, including many middle-class women, set up penitentiaries to 
offer shelter and rehabilitation to “fallen women.”   
 The movement for female liberation from “sexual slavery” spearheaded by 
Butler played a major role in bringing about the repeal of the Contagious Disease 
Acts in 1886.  However, by this time, the conditions for prostitutes had worsened and 
their status as a “special class” of public women had been solidified.  As Barry writes: 
Separated from their neighborhoods into distinct red-light districts and 
brothels made identification of the women as prostitutes more specific and 
therefore their ability to leave prostitution much more difficult.  In the early 
years of the Acts, most prostitutes were young and single; by the late 
nineteenth century the rigidifying of this social role resulted in women’s 




While efforts to regulate prostitution through the Acts were a leading force behind the 
creation of this special class of women, both Barry and Agustin suggest that the 
movement against regulation also played a role.  Barry notes that, although Butler 
initiated the movement against the regulation of prostitution, the movement was later 
taken over by purity crusaders more interested in “protecting women’s virtue and 
preserving the family” than safeguarding women’s rights.
18
  While Butler had worked 
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to effect change in state structures and destroy sexist double standards, purity 
crusaders focused on the need to purify women and keep them within the confines of 
Victorian morality.  In the judgment of purity crusaders, women who did not meet 
their standards of morality had to be identifiable and separated from virtuous middle-
class society.
19
   
 In addition to campaigning against the regulation of prostitution in England, 
the coalition of women’s liberation activists and religious moralists also condemned 
the traffic of English women and girls to Continental Europe, a phenomenon that 
came to their attention around 1880.
20
  As the purity crusaders increasingly 
dominated the movement, they applied their moral standards to the “victims” of 
international trafficking as well.  With a paternalistic approach, the purity crusaders 
constructed the “madonna-whore standard, condemning all prostitutes except the 
innocent and pure victims.”
21
  Barry argues that the influence of the religious 
moralists also led to an increase in sensationalist accounts of trafficking, which 
described “sweet, innocent young things being chloroformed and dragged off to 
foreign brothels.”
22
  These sensationalized, and likely often fictionalized, accounts 
cast doubt among many as to the actual occurrence of trafficking in women.  
However, historians have documented the migration of significant numbers of British 
women for prostitution as far back as the 1860s.
23
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 Thus, along with discourses on prostitution, discourses on gendered 
international migration also helped to shape the emerging international movement 
against white slavery.  The wave of large-scale international migration that took off in 
the mid-nineteenth century included women who were migrating for sex work of 
various kinds.  Eileen Scully argues that the demand for sex workers was augmented 
by the migration of large numbers of single males.
24
  As Kamala Kempadoo explains: 
Predominately poor and working-class men and women crossed borders, 
clandestinely or not, to find new futures, enduring systems of bonded labor 
and indentured servitude that positioned and maintained them as cheap, 
disposable labor forces.  Women sought to independently move or were 
moved through organized channels—commonly as sexual and domestic 
partners—servicing and reproducing the migrant workforce, sometimes 




By the mid-1890s, established routes for women seeking to travel for sex work 
existed throughout Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas.
26
  While some 
women migrated and engaged in prostitution voluntarily, others faced various forms 
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of coercion.  Often coercive procurement of women increased as trafficking routes 
increased in scope and profitability.
27
   
 As activists and government officials in North America and Western Europe 
became increasingly aware of women’s migration for sex work in the 1890s and 
early-twentieth century, the concepts of prostitution and trafficking became linked 
and inspired a series of international meetings and conventions.  The term “white 
slavery,” which had previously been used by activists to refer to the regional traffic of 
English women to Belgium and France, was internationalized and used to describe 
the entire phenomenon of travel for sex work across national borders.
28
  Barry writes: 
While the term was initially meant to distinguish the practice from nineteenth-
century black slavery, it had immediate appeal to racists who could and did 
conclude that the efforts were against an international traffic in white women.  
So in addition to being sweet, innocent, and young, victims were also coming 
to be seen only as white, despite the evidence that the traffic included black, 
brown, and yellow women.  The term eventually embodied all the sexist, 
classist, and racist bigotry that was ultimately incorporated within the 
movement dominated by religious morality.
29
 
As the furor over “white slavery” increased, the first international conference 
on trafficking was organized in Paris in 1895.
30
  In 1899, another international 
conference was held in London, the hotbed of the growing panic over white slavery.  
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Scully argues that it was at the London conference that the campaign against white 
slavery “burst into public discourse, as conferees learned of a European-wide network 
of procurers and brothels and established an international bureau to coordinate among 
national committees and disseminate propaganda.”
31
   
The first international convention against white slavery was drafted in Paris in 
1902 at a conference arranged by the French government.
32
  This convention, the 
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, was passed 
at a meeting of representatives of sixteen, mostly European, states in Paris in 1904; 
soon afterwards, it was signed by a number of these states.
33
  The convention 
established white slavery as a juridical concept in international law and required 
states to collect and exchange information on “the procuring of women or girls for 
immoral purposes abroad,” to identify victims, to supervise employment agencies, 
and to oversee railway stations, ports of embarkation, and travel routes.
34
  However, it 
contained no provisions on the punishment of traffickers, which limited the 
application of the convention. 
 Recognizing the weakness of the 1904 Convention, many of the signatory 
states met again in Paris in 1910 to draft the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic.  The 1910 Convention took a stronger stance 
in urging states to punish traffickers and expanded the definition of trafficking.  
                                                 
31
 Scully, 84. 
 
32
 Ibid., 96; Doezema (2002), 23. 
 
33
 Scully, 96; Long, 20; Barry (1979), 32-33. 
 
34
 International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904.  Available 
on-line at: http://wfrt.info/humanrts/instree/whiteslavetraffic1904.html (accessed December 6, 2011); 




Whereas the 1904 Convention focused on protecting women who had “suffered abuse 
or compulsion” in their recruitment into prostitution,
35
 the 1910 Convention made 
trafficking punishable regardless of a women’s consent.  Article 1 of the 1910 
Convention reads: 
Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has procured, 
enticed, or led away, even with her consent, a woman or girl under age, for 
immoral purposes, shall be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts 
constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries.
36
 
Signatory states were urged to pass new laws or amend existing legislation to 
facilitate the punishment of traffickers.   
One perspective on this convention holds that, with the addition of the phrase 
“even with her consent,” the 1910 Convention marks the beginning of the abolitionist 
tradition in international law.  Prostitution was held to be inherently immoral and thus 
all migrant prostitutes were seen to be victims of traffickers.  However, another 
perspective argues against viewing the 1910 Convention as an abolitionist document 
as it did not address the keeping of brothels or domestic prostitution.
37
  Prostitution 
occurring within national borders continued to be subject to domestic, not 
international, law; the Convention did not address cases in which women were held 
against their will in brothels, or for the matter, the larger issue of the legality of 
prostitution.   
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 In the United States, the issue of “white slavery” had not captured the same 
degree of interest as it had in Europe; thus, the United States government was slower 
to take action and was hesitant to sign the European conventions.  American delegates 
attended the 1899 London conference but “opted not to bring home with them the 
‘white slave trade’ phenomenon.”
38
  The United States did not accede to the 1904 
convention until 1908.  Until 1909-1910, migratory prostitution received only minor 
attention in the United States, addressed mainly as an issue of law and order by the 
government.  However, the increasing influence of purity campaigners and social 
activists throughout the decade put pressure on the United States to sign the expanded 
1910 Convention.  Ultimately, the United States declined to sign the convention due 
to concerns over its constitutionality and issues of federal-state separation.
39
  Instead, 
acting in compliance with the 1904 Convention, the United States passed the 1910 
Mann Act, which made it a felony to knowingly transport a girl or woman across state 
lines or abroad for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or other immoral 
purpose.
40
   
Noting the ambiguity of the term “immoral purpose,” Barry argues that the 
Mann Act demonstrates the extent to which the purity movement had succeeded in 
becoming guardians of “women’s virtue.”  She writes that “’immoral purposes’ could 
and would eventually be defined by the courts according to prevailing male 
definitions of morality.”
41
  Scholars find that the Act in fact penalized the behavior of 
                                                 
38
 Scully, 85.   
 
39
 Ibid., 86. 
 
40
 Ibid., 86; Barry (1979), 33. 
 
41




prostitutes more so than the actions of procurers.
 42
  Women arrested as prostitutes 
were commonly detained in harsh conditions, uninformed of their rights, and women 
with illegal immigration status were deported.  Thus, in many cases, there was no 
“victim” available to testify against procurers.
43
  Additionally, the ambiguity of the 
law allowed it to be used for political purposes to prosecute unpopular persons.  
Doezema notes that “prostitutes’ husbands and boyfriends were targeted as pimps, 
especially if they were black or ‘foreign.’”
44
  Thus, instead of curtailing prostitution 
or protecting sex workers from the “white slavers” who were said to control them, the 
Mann Act penalized the very individuals it claimed to defend.  Doezema points out 
the irony that “The original, emancipatory thrust of the abolitionist movement, 
dedicated as it was to decreasing state control over poor women, ironically evolved to 
support a ‘social purity’ agenda that would give the state new repressive powers over 
women and subaltern men.”
45
 
 By 1910, the white slavery panic incited by London purity groups had taken 
“full hold of the American imagination.”
46
  Scully writes: “Lurid stories of sullied 
white womanhood and organized syndicates linking major cities helped bring on 
board southerners who otherwise would have argued states’ rights in the face of a 
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broad expansion of federal police powers.”
47
  In both North America and Europe, an 
essential part of the campaign against white slavery was the need to create sympathy 
for its victims.
48
  Doezema explains: 
The “innocence” of the victim was established through a variety of rhetorical 
devices: by stressing her youth/virginity; her whiteness; and her unwillingness 
to be a prostitute.  The “innocence” of the victim also served as a perfect foil 
for the “evil trafficker”; simplifying the reality of prostitution and female 
migration to a melodramatic formula of victim and villain.
49
 
Doezema argues that while the impetus for the white slavery movement was the mass 
migration of thousands of women from Europe, including Russia, between 1860 and 
1914, the success of the movement lie in organizers’ ability to rouse the public’s 
emotions to a fever pitch.
50
  The sordid images and sensationalized stories generated 
by the “white slavery myth” gained more support for the movement against white 
slavery than abolitionism ever could.
51
 
 Although rooted in an actual social phenomenon, the sensationalism of the 
campaigns against white slavery obscured the dynamics of the issue and the true 
interests behind the campaigns.  While the movement against white slavery was 
ostensibly about the protection of women, Doezema argues that “to a large extent, the 
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welfare of the ‘white slaves’ was peripheral to the discourse.”
52
  Instead, the 
movement was rooted in deeper fears over “women’s growing independence, the 
breakdown of the family, and loss of national identity through the influx of 
immigrants.”
53
  The movement also reflected racial anxieties, casting white women as 
the victims of dark-skinned foreign men, a category that at the time included Jews.
54
  
In contrast to this imagined narrative, Scully maintains that the majority of trafficking 
victims were women of color from various regions of the world, but mostly from 
colonial areas.
55
  Additionally, the extreme tactics described in published reports of 
traffickers deceiving women and trapping them in a life of forced prostitution made it 
difficult for the public to recognize elements of trafficking in less extreme cases.
56
  
Ultimately, the white slave panic reinforced the madonna/whore standard that 
required victims to be white and pure, while women who exercised some agency in 
becoming prostitutes were seen as social deviants or criminals.   
 Abolitionist feminists had been key in jumpstarting the movement against 
white slavery, both in the United States and Western Europe, but lost control over the 
movement as religious and social purity organizations gained influence.
57
  While 
Butler and some fellow feminists condemned the repressive tactics of the social 
purists, who viewed all (free) prostitutes as immoral women, other feminists joined 
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the purity campaigners in upholding an idealist standard of feminine morality.  In her 
1912 book, A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil, Jane Addams demonstrates the 
ambiguity of the abolitionist feminist perspective toward prostitution.  Addams 
argues forcefully against police harassment of prostitutes, but portrays prostitutes as 
deserving a share of the blame for their fate.  She writes:     
Although economic pressure as a reason for entering an illicit life has thus 
been brought out in court by the evidence in a surprising number of cases, 
there is no doubt that it is often exaggerated; a girl always prefers to think that 
economic pressure is the reason for her downfall, even when the immediate 
causes have been her love of pleasure, her desire for finery, or the influence of 
evil companions.
58
   
Writings such as these illustrate the uncertainty of the feminist position 
toward prostitution.  Many feminists refrained from criticizing prostitutes, but at the 
same time expressed a “moralistic, middle-class urge” to protect the virtue of young, 
innocent women from the evils of this line of work.
59
  In contrast to those who 
focused on the sexual immorality of prostitutes, however, were feminists such as 
Butler, Christabel Pankhurst, and Emma Goldman, who focused on the economic and 
political conditions that fueled the prostitution industry.
60
   
 The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 slowed the momentum of the 
international movement against white slavery, as the world’s attention shifted onto 
other issues and migration across national borders decreased.  After the war, however, 
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anti-white slavery groups coalesced once again and pushed for further measures to 
combat the trafficking of women.  Although European emigration declined 
significantly following the war, regional and local prostitution expanded due to the 
continued military presence in much of Europe.  Additionally, while some trafficking 
routes dating to the pre-war period were less traveled, “the postwar reopening of 
commerce and frontiers provided fertile ground for a dramatic increase in the volume 
and intensity of the traffic in women and children.”
61
   
In 1920, the newly established League of Nations took on the responsibility of 
combating traffic in persons.
62
  By this time, the term “white slavery” had fallen out 
of favor due to its racial connotations and “traffic in women and children” became the 
preferred term that would be used in League of Nations, and later United Nations, 
reports and conventions.
63
  In 1921, the International Conference on Traffic in 
Women and Children was held in Geneva, which led to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children.
64
  This Convention expanded upon 
previous international conventions to include trafficking in boys and prescribed three 
approaches to combat trafficking: prosecuting persons who traffic children; licensing 
and supervising employment agencies; and protecting migrant women and children.
65
 
Scully writes that “optimism and expansiveness” characterized early League 
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proclamations on the subject.
66
  Delegates to the 1921 conference envisioned “a 
comprehensive, multilateral attack on public and private fronts, to ‘vanquish this 
powerful evil.’”
67
   
Despite such optimism, the League of Nations did not have the authority to 
force compliance with its conventions.  In its efforts to fight trafficking, the League 
relied on self-reporting by signatories, annual conferences, and travelling 
commissions to investigate reports of trafficking.
68
  The United States, which had 
become a leader in the movement against trafficking in the years prior to World War 
I, deferred to the League of Nations after the war as immigration declined and human 
trafficking was seen as a “foreign” problem.
69
 
 Scully contends that the modern-day dismissal of early twentieth-century 
counter-trafficking campaigns as “paternalist, elitist, [and] racist” overlooks the wide 
diversity of approaches to fighting trafficking that existed in the period between the 
two World Wars.
70
  Then, as is true today, some campaigners focused their efforts on 
long-term solutions and structural transformations to improve women’s status and job 
opportunities, while others attended to the more immediate problems of tightening 
immigration controls, punishing traffickers, and protecting victims.  In an attempt to 
protect women, delegates to the 1921 conference proposed such measures as “special 
passport requirements for women; bans on women traveling alone; registration with 
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local police when working abroad; [and] forced repatriation and retraining of 
prostitutes.”
71
  However, women’s groups throughout Europe opposed measures that 
sought to “protect” women by restricting their freedoms.  Instead, they called for 
tactics targeting procurers.   
The League of Nations sponsored a second convention, The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women, which was adopted in 1933.  
This convention built upon the conventions of 1910 and 1921 and required signatory 
states to punish any person who, “in order to gratify the passions of another person, 
has procured, enticed or led away even with her consent, a woman or girl of full age 
for immoral purposes to be carried out in another country.”
72
  As with the previous 
treaties, the 1933 Convention focused on the trafficking of women across national 
boundaries and neglected trafficking and prostitution occurring domestically.  Tom 
Obokata argues that both conventions sponsored by the League of Nations were 
ineffective “mainly because they continued to treat prostitution as a matter of 
domestic concern, and therefore did not oblige States to abolish the practice.”
73
  
Recognizing that the existence of brothels was one factor fueling international 
trafficking, the League of Nations prepared a draft convention in 1937 that promoted 
the international abolishment of brothels and called for the punishment of brothel 
owners and managers.
74
  This draft convention was to be concluded in 1940, but the 
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outbreak of World War II interrupted these plans and work on the convention was 
abandoned.   
In the final analysis, Obokata and Scully both argue that pre-World War II 
efforts to combat human trafficking achieved few of their objectives.  Although 
evidence suggests that international trafficking did decrease, this was due to reduced 
migration and other socio-economic factors, rather than the influence of anti-
trafficking campaigns.  In locations where the number of foreign prostitutes 
decreased, local women simply took their place.
75
  A reason for the ineffectiveness of 
anti-trafficking campaigns, Scully maintains, was the lack of a “global prohibition 
regime.”
76
  Unlike the movement against the African slave trade, which achieved a 
consensus as to the evil and illegality of this trade, campaigns against trafficking in 
women for the purpose of prostitution achieved no such consensus.  Although the 
abolitionist position had a clear influence on international law, the legality of 
prostitution remained an issue of debate in many states and among anti-trafficking 
campaigners.  Even feminists did not voice a common perspective as to the meaning 
and morality of prostitution.  Scully argues that a lack of consensus on the issue, 
combined with the ease of concealing trafficked women and the durability of demand, 
prevented campaigners from effectively halting the international procurement of 
women for prostitution and the practice continued for years to come.
77
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Following the onset of World War II in 1939, troop deployment hampered 
international efforts to control prostitution.
78
  However, most women migrating for 
work in prostitution remained in local or regional areas.  After the war, the newly 
formed United Nations assumed responsibility for international efforts against human 
trafficking and took over the reporting functions previously performed by the League 
of Nations.
79
  Figures collected in 1948-1950 show that most routes travelled by 
women were relatively short in distance, “for example, back and forth from Syria and 
Lebanon to Palestine/Israel; between Vietnam and Cambodia; Costa Rica and 
Panama; Somaliland and Aden; France and Poland; between and among Bulgaria, 
Turkey, Iran, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia; and the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico.”
80




In 1949, in its first major action in the fight against human trafficking, the 
United Nations sponsored the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which would serve as 
the primary international instrument on human trafficking for the next fifty years.  
The 1949 Convention built upon the 1937 draft convention and consolidated and 
superseded the previous international agreements of 1904, 1910, 1921, and 1933.  
The Convention’s preamble lays out the premises upon which it was written, stating 
that: 
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[P]rostitution and the accompanying evil of the traffic in persons for the 
purpose of prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the 




Borrowing much of the language used in previous international treaties, Article 1 of 
the 1949 Convention reads: 
The Parties to the present Convention agree to punish any person who, to 
gratify the passions of another: 1) Procures, entices or leads away, for 
purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person; 




While sharing some similarities to previous conventions, the 1949 Convention 
broke new ground by using the gender-neutral “persons” in place of “women and 
children” and by explicitly linking trafficking and prostitution, as seen in the title.
84
  It 
no longer defined trafficking as occurring solely across national borders, which made 
local and regional trafficking punishable under the standards of the Convention.  In 
addition, the 1949 Convention also called upon states to punish persons involved in 
the running of brothels within their borders.  Thus, while previous conventions had 
taken care not to step into domains governed by domestic law, the provision against 
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brothel owners demonstrates that international law was moving closer to a standard of 
abolitionism.  However, the Convention did not go so far as to require states to 
outlaw prostitution altogether.  Obokata writes that this omission was due, in part, to 
a fear that laws prohibiting prostitution would only drive prostitution further 
underground and would be used to penalize prostitutes rather than clients.
85
 
 Along with calling for the punishment of procurers and brothel owners, the 
1949 Convention also encouraged states to take measures to prevent trafficking, 
rehabilitate trafficking victims, and ensure oversight of points of entry into the 
country and transportation routes to identify possible victims.  In addition, it 
requested that states establish centers to coordinate investigations on trafficking and 
develop mechanisms of communication with other states in order to exchange 
information on trafficking cases.  Despite the scope of the Convention and the high 
moral ground it claimed, it carried only weak enforcement mechanisms and relied on 
signatory states to submit reports on domestic developments.
86
  Malka Marcovich 
argues that many states that signed the Convention did not adhere to its provisions 
and some even passed laws that contradicted the standards of the Convention.
87
  At 
the same time, as the leading international instrument on human trafficking for fifty 
years, the 1949 Convention served as a model for many domestic laws against 
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  As of 2012, 82 states were parties to the Convention; the United States 
was not among them.
89
   
 After the adoption of the 1949 Convention, the issue of human trafficking 
faded from public attention for the next several decades and did not appear again on 
the international agenda until the 1970s and 1980s.  During the height of the Cold 
War following World War II, labor and migration were largely regulated by state 
governments.
90
  As Barry pointed out in 1984, “Since [1949], except for a few efforts 
from some individuals and a few non-governmental organizations, the United Nations 
has virtually abandoned the problem, allowing the traffic in women to become 
invisible once again.”
91
  Despite the lack of attention to the issue mid-century, human 
trafficking and migration for sex work continued.
92
  In an international survey 
presented to the United Nations in 1966, Dr. Mohamed Awad, U.N. Special 
Rapporteur, reported that slavery was still a major world problem and proposed that 
the United Nations establish a committee to address this problem.
93
  His proposal 
found little support, however, and the issue again disappeared from the international 
agenda.   
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Barry notes that the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
was also aware of trafficking in women during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century and produced reports on the topic for the United Nations; however, these 
reports were not made available to the public.
94
  After considerable effort, Barry was 
able to obtain a copy of a report produced by INTERPOL in 1974, which described 
routes that women travelled, voluntarily or involuntarily, for sex work.  These routes 
included South American, primarily Argentine, women, traveling to Puerto Rico, the 
European Mediterranean countries, or the Middle East; French women and South 
American women traveling to European countries such as Luxembourg and Germany; 
women from Europe traveling to African countries such as the Ivory Coast and 
Senegal; and women from Thailand and the Philippines traveling to other countries.
95
   
The INTERPOL report, which was based on a survey of 69 countries, 
acknowledged that data on human trafficking was incomplete and therefore its 
findings should be treated with caution, but concluded that: 
There are hardly any cases of traffic in women in which the victims have been 
forcibly kidnapped in one country and taken to work as prostitutes in another 
country.  Nearly always the women concerned are apparently consenting—
most of them have already worked as prostitutes in the country in which they 
are recruited…. However,…there are a certain number of naïve women who 
are attracted by the promises made to them by some employment agencies or 
by organizers of artistic tours, etc., and who eventually find themselves in a 
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situation where they are forced into prostitution and may finally think that this 
is the only way they can earn their living.
96
 
Indeed, Barry argues that the reason that human trafficking was abandoned as an 
international issue mid-century is that the United Nations, INTERPOL, and many 
international human rights organizations “came to accept the popular misconception 
that most prostitution is voluntary work and therefore does not constitute a 
fundamental violation of women’s human rights.”
97
  Thus, the abolitionist position 
had begun to lose its hold in the international arena.  However, in 1974, the year this 
INTERPOL report was submitted, the United Nations formed a Working Group on 
Slavery, which constituted one of the first actions taken in the revival of the 
international movement against human trafficking in the final decades of the 
twentieth century.   
 
5.2 The International Movement against Human Trafficking: 1970s to 2000 
Beginning in the 1970s, several factors contributed to the reemergence of interest in 
the issue of human trafficking.  At first the issue garnered the attention of only small 
groups of activists and officials; eventually, however, campaigns against human 
trafficking grew to comprise one of the largest international movements of the early 
twenty-first century.  In this section, I chart the development of the modern-day 
movement against human trafficking, from the seeds planted in the 1970s to the 
popularization and diversification of the movement at the turn of the twenty-first 
century.   
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 In the 1970s, economic globalization policies, an increase in international 
tourism and migration, the expansion of the sex industry, and the growth of women’s 
movements all contributed to a rekindling of interest in the trafficking of women.  
The effects of economic globalization policies on national economies and on 
changing gender roles in developing countries led many women to migrate in search 
of work.
98
  While overall labor migration was increasing, the percentage of women 
among labor migrants also grew, and scholars began to refer to the “feminization” of 
migration.
99
  In a globalizing world characterized by the growth of the service sector 
in industrialized countries and the move of manufacturing jobs to developing 
countries, women came to be seen as the “ideal worker,” flexible and compliant 
enough to fulfill jobs in both sectors.
100
 
 As globalization was restructuring economic relations between nations and 
stimulating an increase in migration, the sex industry was also expanding.
101
  Arguing 
that prostitution was “industrialized” beginning in the 1970s, Barry writes: 
Prostitution has overtaken populations of women, especially in newly 
industrializing economies…. The industrialization of sex has produced a 
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multibillion-dollar global market in women, at home and abroad, in highly 
organized trafficking and in the most diffused, informal arrangements.
102
   
The “industrialization” of prostitution, Barry contends, was the result of the 
recruitment of women for military prostitution, the development of tourist industries 
in developing countries, and export-oriented economic development policies.  The 
first cases of “trafficking in women” to receive attention in the 1970s concerned 
women working in military camps or in the tourist industry in Southeast Asia.  
Troops stationed in Southeast Asia during World War II, the Korean War, and the 
Vietnam War supported the growth of an extensive sex industry in the region.  In 
particular, U.S. troops fighting in the Vietnam War helped to fuel the beginning of 
sex tourism in Thailand and the Philippines as they took their “rest and recreation” 
breaks in these locations.
103
  As troops withdrew from the region following the end of 
the Vietnam War, the sex tourism industry grew to attract a steady stream of clients 
for sex businesses.
104
  At the same time, practices of military prostitution also 
continued as significant numbers of troops remained in the area.   
James Petras and Tienchai Wongchaisuwan describe how the convergence of 
economic globalization policies and military interests spurred the growth of the sex 
industry in Thailand: 
                                                 
102
 Barry (1995), 122.  
 
103
 Ibid., 132. 
 
104
 Kathleen Barry, “The Network Defines Its Issues: Theory, Evidence, and Analysis of Female 
Sexual Slavery,” in International Feminism: Networking against Female Sexual Slavery: Report of the 
Global Feminist Workshop to Organize Against Traffic in Women, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, April 
6-15, 1983, ed. Kathleen Barry, Charlotte Bunch, and Shirley Castley (New York: International 




The “success” of the sex industry is based on a “special relation” of shared 
interests among a complex network of military leaders, police officials, 
business tourist promoters, godfathers and pimps.  At the international level, 
airline and hotel chains have worked closely with the local business-military 
elite to promote the sex-tourist industry.  The World Bank’s support for the 




Kempadoo asserts that concern “with the social impacts of the reconstruction 
and development of the Southeast Asian region in the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
and the continued stationing and servicing of U.S. military troops in the region” was 
the spark that first led feminists to “rediscover” the issue of trafficking in women.
106
  
Around the same time, feminists also became aware of forced prostitution in other 
areas of world, and the issue of trafficking gradually made its way onto the agenda of 
the second-wave feminist movement.   
 A major publication that helped to reignite the Western feminist movement 
against trafficking in women was Kathleen Barry’s 1979 book Female Sexual 
Slavery.  Writing from a radical feminist perspective, Barry cites practices of rape, 
pornography, prostitution, and the trafficking of women around the world as just 
some examples of the ways that men have sexually “colonized” women.  As one of 
the first publications to address trafficking in women from a feminist perspective in 
many years, she documents that the practice of trafficking in women continued 
throughout the twentieth century and addresses reasons for the invisibility of the issue 
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at the time of her writing.  Namely, Barry discusses the prevailing belief among 
authorities mid-century that prostitution is non-exploitative and that women enter the 
profession by choice, and the ensuing conclusion that such women are not deserving 
of the same protections as “moral” women.  She writes that such beliefs served the 
interests of authorities, whether it be those who profited directly from the prostitution 
industry or those who resisted change to the status quo.
107
    
Barry credits two developments with helping to put prostitution and 
trafficking in women back onto the U.S. feminist agenda: the growth of the 
movement against wife battery in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
which provided a model for understanding the victimization of women, and the 
proliferation of pornography in the 1970s, which brought illustration of the 
victimization of women into the lives of average Americans.
108
  The publication of 
Female Sexual Slavery, along with Barry’s activism against trafficking in women, 
inspired increased attention to the issue among Western feminists, and Barry became 
a leader in a burgeoning international movement against trafficking. 
 Feminist interest in the issue of trafficking in women grew alongside, and 
sometimes as part of, campaigns against violence against women as a whole.  In the 
1980s, violence against women would become a leading international feminist issue.  
However, in the 1970s, campaigns against the various forms of bodily injury to 
women remained local phenomena, and the issues were not prominent in international 
meetings of women.  Before the concept of “violence against women” came into 
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being, these disparate issues were not seen as connected.  Political scientists Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink write: 
What existed first was not the general category “violence against women” but 
separate activist campaigns on specific practices—against rape and domestic 
battery in the United States and Europe, female genital mutilation in Africa, 
female sexual slavery in Europe and Asia, dowry death in India, and torture 
and rape of political prisoners in Latin America.  It was neither obvious nor 
natural that one should think of female genital mutilation and domestic abuse 
as part of the same category.  The category “violence against women” had to 
be constructed and popularized before people could think of these practices as 
the “same” in some basic way.
109
 
The composite concept of “violence against women” as a unifying theme for 
international feminists would grow out of the UN Conferences on Women in the 
1980s.  Prior to the first UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, 
“discrimination” and “equality,” not “violence against women,” had served as the 
master frames for understanding women’s issues both for Western feminists and in 
the UN system.  Violence against women was not a major topic at the 1975 
conference, and indeed scholars note that this conference “disintegrated into a heated 
debate among feminists from Western countries who stressed discrimination, and 
women from the developing world who stressed what they considered the more 
pressing issues of development and social justice that affected both men and 
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  In the document adopted at the conference, the Declaration of Mexico on 
the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace of 1975, 
only one out of thirty principles directly addresses violence against women.  Principle 
28 states: 
Women all over the world should unite to eliminate violations of human rights 
committed against women and girls such as: rape, prostitution, physical 




  In 1979, the United Nations made another notable effort to promote women’s 
rights when it adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  This document would come to serve as 
the main normative legal code on women’s rights.
112
  However, like the 1975 Mexico 
Declaration, CEDAW does not prioritize the issue of violence against women.  The 
one exception was article six, which addressed trafficking in women and reads, 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress 
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”
113
   
 At the next UN Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, neither 
violence against women nor human trafficking were prominent issues.  Attendees 
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spent much of the conference trying to overcome the so-called North-South split that 
had emerged at the Mexico City Conference.
114
  Barry notes that, despite considerable 
effort by feminists to get the issue of trafficking in women added to the conference 
agenda, the planning commission for the official governmental conference failed to 
do so.  Only at the last minute did the planning commission for the informal NGO 
forum agree to add the issue to their agenda.
115
  Indeed, it was at this forum that 
“seeds of an international network on violence against women were planted.”
116
  
Charlotte Bunch, a U.S. feminist leader in the international women’s movement, had 
organized a series of panels on international feminist networking at the NGO forum, 
which ran parallel to the official conference.  Bunch states: 
We observed in that two weeks of the forum that the workshops on issues 
related to violence against women were the most successful….They were the 
workshops where women did not divide along north-south lines, that women 
felt a sense of commonality and energy in the room, that there was a sense that 
we could do something to help each other…. It was so visible to me that this 
issue had the potential to bring women together in a different way, and that it 
had the potential to do that without erasing difference.
117
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Several of these sessions were on the topic of “female sexual slavery.”  Barry writes 
that feminist momentum built in these sessions and resulted in an advisory committee 
and a plan to develop an international network against trafficking in women.
118
 
 Building on the momentum initiated at the sessions on trafficking in women in 
Copenhagen, activists began planning an international conference specifically on the 
issues of trafficking and prostitution.  Barry and Bunch, both U.S. feminists, and 
Shirley Castley, an Australian feminist, spearheaded the organizing efforts and 
ultimately brought together thirty-four women activists from twenty-four countries, 
half from the developing world, at the Global Feminist Workshop to Organize 
Against Trafficking in Women in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in April 1983.
119
  The 
goal of the workshop was to develop a network of activists from around the world to 
take action against trafficking and related forms of violence against women, such as 
forced prostitution and sex tourism.   
An early effort at international feminist organizing, the planners of the 
workshop took seriously the need to be inclusive of participants from a wide variety 
of backgrounds and to develop a network that represented the interests of all 
participants.  In her opening paper to the conference, Barry argued against the 
tendency to view exploited groups as “special” or as “other” and against “one-way 
benevolence,” which she sees as “antithetical to feminist work.”
120
  She writes: 
What this means is that Western women must be as concerned with the 
exploitation and enslavement of women in their own countries and cultures as 
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they are with that of women in other parts of the world.  It is only in this 
context that feminists can begin to work with a full definition of woman’s 
human rights by beginning with the self, the subject and therefore extending 
into international work not through concern for the objectified other but as 
woman to woman, subject to subject.  It is there that the authenticity of 
international feminist work is established.
121
  
In order to avoid centering the network in the West, workshop participants decided to 
develop regional organizational structures that would allow information to circulate 
and connections to be made from region to region and internationally.
122
   
However, despite the success of the workshop in stimulating meaningful 
discussion among participants and devising a common plan for action, the envisioned 
international network failed to materialize.  As Keck and Sikkink explain, one reason 
was that “third world women did not want the network to be based in the north, but 
no organizations in the south could shoulder the financial and infrastructural burden 
of coordinating it.”
123
  And second, there was disagreement between activists who 
advocated the abolishment of prostitution and those who argued that prostitution 
could be a choice.  Although the workshop did not produce a long-standing network, 
it was important historically because it “explicitly argued that the issue of sexual 
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slavery needed to be situated in a broader debate about women’s human rights.”
124
 
Finally, and significantly, the workshop marked the beginning of the contemporary 
international movement against human trafficking.
125
 
 Two years later, at the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi, the frames 
of “violence against women” and “women’s rights as human rights” became even 
more prominent as women from the North and from the South found consensus on 
these issues.  While previous attempts to find common ground on such issues as 
discrimination or imperialism had often led to divisions between women of different 
cultural backgrounds, women from around the world found they could relate to the 
issue of violence and this frame helped participants to overcome the “north-south 
split.”
126
  As mentioned above, the frame of “violence against women” encompassed 
a range of practices that impinged upon the bodily integrity of women “from 
household brutality to the violence of state security forces,” and thus became a widely 
recognized concept that could unite women and inspire activism.  In social movement 
theory, Keck and Sikkink argue that “violence against women” can be seen as a 
“condensation symbol,” which “evoke[s] the emotions associated with the situation” 
and “provokes mass responses because it condenses threats or reassurances into one 
symbolic moment.”
127
  They note that “Nairobi was the first step in securing agenda 
attention to the issue, for initiating the change in discursive positions of governments, 
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and for strengthening linkages among women’s groups working on the issue.”
128
  The 
report of the Nairobi conference was the first to make substantial recommendations 
on the issue of violence against women.
129
 
 Following the Nairobi conference, networks and campaigns around “violence 
in women” continued to grow.   As before, the development of feminist networks 
against gendered violence remained intertwined with UN activities.  Keck and 
Sikkink write: 
By 1987 sufficient interest and pressure had built, that the UN organized a 
meeting on violence in the family and commissioned a study, Violence against 
Women in the Family, the first comprehensive survey of research on the 
subject.  From this point on there was growing attention to the issue, with an 
“explosion of organizing” in NGOs.
130
   
Women activists increasingly moved away from the “discrimination” frame as they 
took on “violence against women” and the associated frame of “women’s rights as 
human rights.”  Since the violence against women frame dealt with bodily injury to 
women, activists could connect it to the human rights frame, which was already well 
embedded in the UN system.  However, the human rights frame largely addressed the 
violation of human rights by state actors, covering such issues as state-sanctioned 
slavery and the torture of political prisoners, not by private actors, which was the case 
for most issues associated with violence against women.   Hence, feminists criticized 
the “public-private” divide that kept states from protecting women from violence in 
                                                 
128
 Ibid., 179. 
 
129
 Ibid., 170. 
 
130




the household and lobbied to have violations by private actors covered by human 
rights treaties.
131
   
 As women’s NGOs and networks combating violence against women 
proliferated, new organizations and networks specifically addressing prostitution and 
trafficking in women also emerged.  In the United States, the organization Women 
Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt (WHISPER) and the Council for 
Prostitution Alternatives were both founded in the mid-1980s.
132
  In Europe, the 
Foundation Against Trafficking in Women (STV) was founded in the Netherlands in 
1987.
133
  In Asia, activism on the issue of trafficking in women was particularly 
strong.  Much of the region’s activism was centered in Thailand, where Siriporn 
Skrobanek, an early leader in the movement, helped to organize the Foundation For 
Women (FFW), which focused on “issues of women’s labor, prostitution, and 
violence against women.”
134
  STV and FFW collaborated on campaigns against sex 
tourism and against the trafficking of Asian women to Europe.
135
   
 While feminist networks against trafficking in women were developing on the 
global level, prostitutes’ rights organizations had been operating quietly for years, 
often with little recognition from the global movement.  With the emergence of 
second wave feminism in the 1970s, prostitutes had begun to articulate a public voice 
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and organize for their rights on a larger scale than ever before.
136
  Prostitutes’ rights 
groups were active in many regions of the world, but those most documented in the 
literature and integrated into international networks tended to be located in North 
America and Western Europe, with Third World sex workers underrepresented both 
in the literature and at international sex workers’ conferences.
137
  Kempadoo notes: 
Prostitutes and other sex workers were fighting to keep brothels open, 
challenging the various stigmas about prostitution, and exposing corruption 
within sex industries in many different countries—yet very few people had 
heard about these courageous steps.
138
 
Despite the many successes of sex workers’ groups in influencing legislation that 
affected their rights, there was minimal collaboration between prostitutes’ rights 
movements and movements against human trafficking.  However, many feminists 
have argued for the importance of including the perspectives of sex workers in anti-
trafficking campaigns.
139
   
 By the late 1980s, two distinct international feminist networks against human 
trafficking, each with a different perspective on the legitimacy of sex work, had 
begun to develop.  In 1988, Kathleen Barry and Dorchen Leidholdt founded the 
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), which would become the leading 
representative of the abolitionist perspective, which views prostitution as inherently 
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  CATW was the first international NGO to focus on 
human trafficking, and it obtained Consultative Status with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council in 1989.
141
  It unites national coalitions in various 
regions of the world, but is headquartered in the United States.  In viewing 
prostitution as an inherent violation of women’s human rights, CATW does not 
distinguish between trafficking and prostitution and advocates for the criminalization 
of both, while also calling upon states to protect women from sexual violence.  
 Another strand of the international feminist movement against human 
trafficking, the sex workers’ rights perspective, also referred to as the “human rights,” 
perspective, is most prominently represented by the Global Alliance Against Traffic 
in Women (GAATW).  GAATW was officially founded in 1994 in Thailand, but 
grew out of several years of activism and networking against trafficking in the Asian 
region.
142
  As FFW, under the leadership of Siriporn Skrobanek, became the center of 
anti-trafficking activities in Asia, the organization became the “host” of GAATW 
when it was launched at an International Workshop on Migration and Traffic in 
Women at Chiangmai University, Thailand, in October 1994.
143
  GAATW would 
grow to unite NGOs in countries around the world, but remained based in Bangkok, 
Thailand.  Like CATW, GAATW has Consultative Status with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council.  GAATW’s member organizations include “migrant 
rights organizations; anti-trafficking organizations; self-organized groups of migrant 
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workers, domestic workers, survivors of trafficking and sex workers; human rights 
and women's rights organizations; and direct service providers.”
144
  GAATW’s 
perspective on trafficking is broader than CATW’s focus on prostitution as inherently 
exploitative.  GAATW seeks to combat exploitative working conditions or forced 
movement in any field of labor, instead of focusing solely on sex work.  Therefore, 
GAATW distinguishes between prostitution and trafficking.  It opposes forced 
prostitution and trafficking, but accepts the right of individuals to choose to work as 
prostitutes and supports these individuals by working for migrant rights and improved 
labor conditions.   
 Thus, just as feminists developed transnational feminist networks on the 
broader issue of violence against women, feminists and other activists created 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) specifically to combat human trafficking by 
working to persuade states and international organizations to take on the issue, to 
influence them to enact policies in line with activists’ own perspectives on human 
trafficking, and to hold states and international organizations accountable for 
enforcing the policies they put into place.  The influence of counter-trafficking TANs 
can be seen through an examination of their participation in UN conferences and 
other international meetings, in policy debates surrounding anti-trafficking laws 
within states, and in the discussions toward the creation of UN instruments and 
conventions.   
In the early 1990s, there were a series of international meetings and 
conferences addressing the newly popular concept of “violence against women.”  At 
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these meetings, counter-trafficking activists worked to ensure that attention was paid 
to the specific issue of trafficking in women.  At the same time, UN conferences and 
other international meetings played a large role in supporting the formation of TANs 
on the issue of human trafficking.  Thus, through the early 1990s, the relationship 
between the UN system and the developing movement against human trafficking was 
largely symbiotic, as early activists pressured the United Nations to take on the issue, 
and UN meetings and conferences provided an arena for activists to make 
connections and expand their networks.   
 One of the first opportunities for TANs on the issues of violence against 
women and human trafficking to influence international policy came during the 
preparations for the UN-sponsored 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna.  Keck and Sikkink note that, originally, discussion of women’s rights was not 
on the conference agenda.
145
  This omission gave women’s rights activists a target 
around which to rally their organizing efforts, and groups employed a variety of 
techniques to get discussion of women’s rights onto the agenda.  In February 1993, 
four months before the conference, the Center for Women’s Global Leadership 
(CWGL) at Rutgers University held the International Women’s Strategic Planning 
Meeting to bring together women from around the world to prepare for the 
conference.
146
  CWGL coordinated with the International Women’s Tribunal Center 
and the International YMCA in circulating a worldwide petition “calling on the 1993 
Conference to comprehensively address women’s human rights at every level of the 
proceedings and demanding that gender violence be recognized as a violation of 
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human rights requiring immediate action.”
147
  The petition drive collected over 
300,000 signatures in 123 countries and twenty languages; more than 800 groups 
became co-sponsors of the petition.
148
  Other feminist efforts to prepare for the 
conference included NOVIB, the Dutch cofinancing agency, convening a “reference 
group” of regional networks of women’s groups from Asia, Latin America, Africa, 
Europe, and North America to discuss strategies for the conference, and the 
International Women’s Rights Action Watch advising its members on how to 
participate in the conference in both direct and indirect ways.
149
 
The feminist strategy that received the most attention was the organization of 
a Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights in Vienna, which ran parallel to the 
conference proceedings.  The idea for the tribunal originated at CWGL’s strategic 
planning meeting, and it was carried out by an international coordinating committee.  
At the Tribunal: 
Thirty-three women from twenty-five countries testified before three judges 
and an audience about their own experiences with violence or as advocates for 
others.  The Tribunal heard specific stories of what violence means for 
women’s lives and how human rights instruments could begin to address it.  
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The efforts of feminist activists proved successful when discussion of 
women’s rights was added to the agenda of the Vienna Conference.  Many feminist 
activists agree that a major breakthrough of the conference was integrating concern 
over women’s rights into the broader “human rights” agenda.
151
  In addition, the 
conference strengthened connections between feminist networks and human rights 
networks.  Keck and Sikkink note, “The result was the application of the ‘human 
rights methodology’ to the cause of women’s rights, and a fuller appreciation within 
mainstream human rights organizations of the problems with the public-private divide 
that had characterized their work.”
152
   
The final document of the conference, the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action, explicitly recognized “gender-based violence,” including rape, sexual 
harassment and exploitation, and trafficking in women as human rights violations.
153
  
The Vienna Declaration also called upon the United Nations to adopt a (at that time 
draft) declaration on violence against women and urged states to “combat violence 
against women in accordance with its provisions.”
154
  In addition, the Declaration 
supported the decision of the Commission on Human Rights to consider appointing a 
special rapporteur on violence against women.
155
  However, not all feminists were 
satisfied with the conference results.  At the conference, Kathleen Barry of CATW 
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had attempted to present a proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation, which 
would define all prostitution as sexual exploitation, but this agenda item was 
rejected.
156
  Barry argues that the Vienna Declaration did not do enough to protect 
women’s rights and that the new rhetoric of “women’s rights as human rights” was 
accompanied only by unfunded educational campaigns, not programmatic change.
157
  
Despite its limitations, the Vienna Conference represented a big step forward in 
promoting the importance of women’s rights in the international community and in 
forging connections with other activist networks.   
The success of feminist activists in getting the issues of violence against 
women and human trafficking on the agenda at the Vienna Conference demonstrates 
the ability of TANs to draw attention to issues and influence the positions of states 
and international organizations.
158
  At the same time, it fueled the continuing efforts 
of TANs as they prepared to advocate their positions in upcoming international 
meetings, including the planned 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.   
In the two years before the Beijing Conference, several international events 
occurred that further demonstrated the influence of the TANs and presented them 
with opportunities to expand their networks.  In December 1993, the United Nations 
passed the (non-binding) Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 
which elaborated the definition of “violence against women” as including rape, sexual 
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abuse, sexual harassment, and “trafficking in women and forced prostitution.”
159
  
Feminist scholars note that the Declaration signaled the international community’s 
move away from abolitionism as it condemns only trafficking and “forced 
prostitution,” not all prostitution.
160
  In 1994, the United Nations appointed Radhika 
Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka as Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, a 
position endorsed by the Vienna Declaration and mandated by the Commission on 
Human Rights.
161
  The rapporteur is charged with traveling to specific countries to 
investigate claims of human rights violations and with presenting reports on violence 
against women to the United Nations.  The issues of “forced prostitution” and 
“trafficking” were included in the original mandate of the special rapporteur on 
violence against women as types of violence she should investigate.
162
  
Two important conferences specifically on the issue of human trafficking also 
took place in 1994.  As mentioned, the International Workshop on Migration and 
Traffic in Women at Chiangmai University, Thailand, out of which GAATW was 
launched, was held in October 1994.  In addition, in November 1994, the 
International Conference on Traffic in Persons, organized by several Dutch Human 
Rights Institutes, took place in Utrecht, the Netherlands.
163
  The conference brought 
together experts on human trafficking from around the world, who discussed issues 
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contributing to human trafficking and made recommendations to combat the problem.  
Like the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the Report of 
the Utrecht Conference moved away from the abolitionist approach to trafficking, as 
it condemned only forced prostitution and acknowledged that prostitution could be a 
freely chosen occupation.  It called for prostitution and other activities in the informal 
sphere to be recognized as legitimate forms of work in order to improve the labor 
conditions of these workers.  Furthermore, the report recognized that trafficking in 
persons can involve various forms of work, not only prostitution.   Thus, the report 
largely aligns with the human rights approach to human trafficking, as it emphasizes 
the use of force, rather than the nature of work to be performed, in its definition of 
trafficking.
164
   
Following these conferences, in December 1994, the United Nations adopted a 
Resolution on Traffic in Women and Girls, which expressed “its grave concern over 
the worsening problem of trafficking, particularly the increasing syndication of the 
sex trade and the internationalization of the traffic in women and girl children.”
165
  In 
addition, the resolution urged governments to take action to address the problem of 
trafficking and ensure that victims are provided with the necessary assistance, and 
invited governments and organizations to promote increased public awareness of the 
issue, among other recommendations.  The resolution followed the trend away from 
abolitionism by condemning only “trafficking,” not all prostitution, and by 
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recognizing that trafficking can involve various forms of work.  However, the 
resolution was limited in that it covered only the trafficking of women and children, 
not men, and focused mainly on sexual exploitation.   
By 1995, feminist networks on violence against women and human trafficking 
had grown in size and strength as they prepared for the strategically important UN 
Conference on Women in Beijing.  Years of advocacy on the violence against women 
frame would culminate in Beijing, where the frame would be solidified as a leading 
and enduring symbol for feminist activism.   However, despite general agreement on 
the centrality of the violence against women frame for the women’s movement, 
disagreements over specific issues characterized conference proceedings.
166
   
The issue of human trafficking was one that divided conference participants, 
with at least three different perspectives represented in conference discussions.  One 
lobby group, the NGO Coalition Against Exploitation in Women, was supported by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and 
led by CATW.  After failing to get their proposed Convention Against Sexual 
Exploitation onto the agenda at the 1993 Vienna Conference, CATW joined forces 
with other anti-trafficking NGOs to present a petition at the Beijing Conference for 
their proposed convention to replace the 1949 UN Convention on the Suppression of 
Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.
167
  As noted 
above, the proposed convention would define all prostitution, even consensual, as 
                                                 
166
 Keck and Sikkink, 188. 
 
167




sexual exploitation and would require signatory states to punish procurers and clients 
of prostitutes while providing assistance to “victims,” i.e., prostitutes.
168
   
A second lobby group at the Beijing Conference was led by GAATW, which 
differentiated itself from CATW by opposing the abolitionist perspective and 
acknowledging sex work as a legitimate occupation that could be freely chosen.  
GAATW collaborated with sex workers’ groups at the conference to contest the 
proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation.  However, Alison Murray, a 
researcher in human geography and sex workers’ rights advocate, argues that 
GAATW’s collaboration with sex workers’ groups did not go far enough.
169
  While 
GAATW recognized the legitimacy of sex work, it devoted most of its energy to 
combating forced prostitution instead of supporting the rights of sex workers or 
denouncing the moral and cultural attitudes that paint prostitution as unacceptable.  




Finally, the third lobby group on the issue of human trafficking was the 
Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), which coordinated a “small, but staunch” 
sex worker presence at the conference.
171
  The sex workers’ perspective dismisses the 
“free/forced” dichotomy commonly found in debates on trafficking in women and 
holds that an emphasis only on “forced prostitution” marginalizes those who have 
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freely chosen the profession.
172
  While the dichotomy implies that “forced” prostitutes 
are “victims” in needs of services and support, it suggests that the “others” are 
immoral or sexually depraved.  Instead of focusing on the issue of “consent” as do 
many anti-trafficking organizations, sex workers’ groups support measures that 
enhance their human rights, improve their working conditions, ease travel restrictions, 
and address what they view as the true causes of trafficking situations, namely, 
economic, political, and gender inequalities, not the nature of the sex industry.  
Murray contends that, although small, the sex worker presence in Beijing made a 
significant impact at both the official UN Conference and the parallel NGO Forum.  
Working in collaboration with GAATW and other anti-trafficking groups, NSWP 
helped to defeat Section 230(o) of the Draft Platform for Action, which would have 




Despite disagreements among conference participants on specific topics, 
overall the Beijing Conference proved to be a great success for TANs on the broad 
issue of violence against women.  The frame of “women’s right as human rights” was 
further validated as a global norm and “violence against women” was featured in the 
final conference document, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as one of 
twelve “critical areas of concern.”  In the Declaration, “violence against women” was 
defined as including physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the 
family; physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community; and physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned 
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  “Trafficking in women and forced prostitution” is included in the 
category of physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community.
175
  In using the phrasing “trafficking in women and forced prostitution” 
instead of “all prostitution” as desired by CATW and its allies, the Declaration further 
moved away from the old international standard of abolitionism and endorsed the 
“free/forced” dichotomy that was now popular in discussions of human trafficking 
within the international community.  In addition, the Declaration broadened the 
traditional understanding of “trafficking in women” by recognizing “forced labor” as 
one objective of trafficking, in addition to forced prostitution.
176
   
Much of the final document was shaped by the discussions that occurred 
among activists and officials at the conference, and some language was even provided 
directly by NGOs.
177
  On the issue of human trafficking, the lobbying groups of 
NSWP and of GAATW and its allies proved most effective at promoting their 
perspectives on the issue in conference discussions and at influencing the language 
used in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.   
GAATW and sex workers’ groups also found support in the views of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy, who 
recognized the wide variety of situations of sex workers, including those who are 
trafficked and those who have freely chosen the occupation and work in good 
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  In a report on the topic in 1997, however, Coomaraswamy lamented 
the lack of effective action against trafficking networks and the absence of a 
consensus on the definition of “human trafficking.”
179
  She writes, “Unfortunately, 
the women’s movement is deeply divided over this debate, preventing a concerted 
international effort to bring about necessary and important changes with regard to 
international standards.”
180
  Coomaraswamy called upon “different camps of activists 
and Governments which have fought so valiantly for the human rights of trafficked 
women over the years [to] engage in a constructive dialogue with a view to 
collectively evolving international standards and mechanisms to provide redress for 
women victims.”
181
  Indeed, within a few years time this call would be answered, as 
states and activists with a variety of views on prostitution and trafficking would 
engage in tense negotiations over a new UN Convention to combat human trafficking.   
 
 
                                                 
178
 United Nations, Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission 
on Human Rights resolution 1994/45 (November 22, 1994), Paragraph 205.  Available on-line at: 




 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, to the Commission on Human Rights (February 12, 
1997), Paragraphs 73 & 74.  Available on-line at: 




 Ibid., Paragraph 75. 
 
181





5.3 The Development and Implementation of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000 and the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children of 2000 
During the course of the 1990s, as awareness of and activism against human 
trafficking grew on the international level, the increasing visibility of human 
trafficking cases and expanding media coverage of the issue brought the problem to 
the attention of state officials and the general public in many countries.  In the United 
States, several cases involving the forced labor of migrants raised the awareness of 
the American public of the issue of human trafficking.  One case involved the 
discovery in 1995 of 72 Thai immigrants locked up in a sweatshop in El Monte, 
California, many of whom had been held for years behind razor wire and forced to 
work in horrendous conditions.
182
  Then, in 1997, two additional cases came to light.  
One was the “Cadena case,” in which Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents 
discovered a string of brothels in the Miami area run by members of the Cadena 
family in which Mexican women immigrants were forced to engage in sex work in 
exploitative conditions.  Since the crime of “human trafficking” did not yet exist in 
the U.S. legal code at this time, the members of the Cadena trafficking ring were 
charged with conspiracy, alien smuggling, organizing prostitution, and violating the 
women’s civil rights.
183
  Another case, which came to light around the same time as 
the Cadena case, involved the discovery of over forty deaf Mexican immigrants in 
New York City forced to sell trinkets on the subway system while being housed in 
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cramped apartments and subject to sexual assault and torture.  The ringleaders of the 
trafficking operation were indicted on various charges ranging from alien smuggling 
to slavery.
184
  These cases drew attention to the various circumstances in which 
smuggling and forced labor could take place and the various forms of labor that 
migrants were coerced to perform.  They also illustrated the need for a broader 
concept that could encompass the complexity of this newly visible type of crime.   
Meanwhile, in Western Europe, it was the influx of women from former 
communist countries working in the sex industry that drew increased attention to 
human trafficking.  Since the late 1980s, women’s groups had led efforts to combat 
trafficking of women into countries of the European Union (EU), but as public 
awareness of the problem grew in the 1990s, these efforts expanded to include other 
activists and groups.
185
  Sally Stoecker and Louise Shelley write, “As a result of 
citizen activism—especially their publicizing of the enslavement and abuse of women 
in…brothels—parliamentary hearings were held, government reports were produced, 
and the European Union began to focus seriously on the issue of human 
trafficking.”
186
  To illustrate the scope of the problem, Akee et al. report that “in the 
mid- to late 1990s, an estimated 175,000 women were trafficked [annually] out of 
Russia and the Eastern European counties—70% of them into Western Europe, 
especially Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece, Austria and 
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England, while 3% or 5,000 women were trafficked into the United States and 
Canada.”
187
   
As governments in North America and Western Europe devised policies to 
respond to the problem of human trafficking, the United States emerged as a global 
leader on the issue.  One of the first legislators to take action against human 
trafficking was Senator Paul Wellstone, a Democrat from Wisconsin.  His attention 
was drawn to the issue in 1997 after police raided a brothel in Bethesda, Maryland, a 
suburb of Washington, D.C., and discovered that a number of Russian and Ukrainian 
women had been trafficked into the establishment and had been beaten and 
traumatized by the brothel’s owners.
188
  Encouraged by his wife, Sheila Wellstone, 
also a human rights advocate, Senator Wellstone introduced a Senate resolution 
denouncing human trafficking on March 10, 1998.
189
  Using as visual aids maps of 
routes taken by emigrants from the former Soviet Union, he decried that the 
international community had ignored the problem and argued that the proposed 
resolution would put the U.S. Congress on record “as opposing trafficking for forced 
prostitution and domestic servitude, and acting to check it before the lives of more 
women and girls are shattered.”
190
  Wellstone recounted what by then had become the 
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common narrative of the trafficking scenario: “unsuspecting women and girls [lured] 
into lives of prostitution with promises of lucrative jobs.”
191
   
Although Wellstone acknowledged that women were also trafficked into 
domestic labor, his presentation focused on trafficking for the purpose of sex work.  
This focus on sex trafficking, and on the oft-repeated narrative of the “duped victim,” 
would dominate U.S. policy and U.S. popular discourse on human trafficking for 
years to come.  In the end, Wellstone’s proposed resolution was passed by the Senate, 
and a companion measure introduced by Representative Louise McIntosh Slaughter 
was passed by the House of Representatives.  The resolutions asked the U.S. 
government to report on the issue to Congress, with a focus on legal barriers that 
prevented effective governmental responses and methods to help victims.  It also 




Almost simultaneously in March 1998, President Clinton announced an 
Executive Order on Trafficking in Women and Children, which outlined a 
comprehensive and integrated policy framework to guide the United State’s anti-
trafficking efforts both domestically and abroad.  The order introduced the policy 
framework that would later become widely known as the “three P’s,” which consisted 
of a focus on (1) prevention, (2) protection and assistance for victims, and (3) 
prosecution of and enforcement against traffickers.
193
  The Clinton administration 
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began establishing bilateral working relationships and joint counter-trafficking 
initiatives with numerous countries, and also spearheaded the development of a new 
UN instrument on human trafficking.   
Thus, as the U.S. Congress worked toward the creation of a domestic anti-
trafficking law, the Clinton administration was focused on developing an 
international protocol to combat human trafficking.  Journalist Anthony DeStefano 
notes: “[I]t was fortuitous that the United States had started to focus on human 
trafficking just as the United Nations awoke to the problem; as a consequence, U.S. 
interest served as a catalyst for much of what happened in the international 
agreements.”
194
   
By the end of 1998, U.S. officials had outlined a draft protocol on human 
trafficking to guide UN deliberations.
195
  However, Argentina had developed a draft 
protocol of its own.  The United States and Argentina worked to combine their 
proposals into the “Revised Draft Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish 
Trafficking in Women and Children,” which they presented at the first session of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of the Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime in Vienna, Austria in March 1999.
196
   
One of the main differences between the original proposals had been the more 
specific emphasis of Argentina on trafficking in women and children as compared to 
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the broader emphasis of the United States on trafficking in persons.  Therefore, the 
combined draft alternated between the terms “trafficking in women and children” and 
“trafficking in persons,” leaving the committee to decide which term to incorporate 
into the final document.  Another difference between the proposals was the United 
State’s emphasis on the use of force or coercion in defining trafficking situations, 
except for situations involving children in which consent was irrelevant, while 
Argentina’s definition of “trafficking in women” implied that trafficking situations 
could occur even with a woman’s consent.
197
  The draft “proposed promotion and 
facilitation of cooperation among nations to prevent, investigate, and punish 
trafficking for sexual exploitation or forced labor.”
198
   
The overarching purpose of the protocol was to bring about consensus among 
nations on the criminalization of human trafficking—in other words, to make 
trafficking a crime.
199
  Although awareness of human trafficking was growing around 
the world, not all countries had criminal laws that addressed trafficking.  A major step 
toward this goal was to achieve agreement on the definition of “human trafficking.”  
The ad-hoc committee spent nearly two years in negotiations revising the document 
and debating the definition of “human trafficking” before reaching a hard-wrought 
consensus among participants.  The negotiation process for the trafficking protocol, 
which took place in Vienna and is often referred to as the “Vienna process,” was 
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unusual in that it involved more than 120 states, an unprecedented number of NGOs, 
and an informal group of intergovernmental agencies that sought to ensure that the 
final document would represent “a net advance for the human rights” of women, 
children, migrants, and other affected persons.
200
  Throughout the process, however, 
the United States maintained a large presence, with a strong team of governmental 
representatives led by the State Department providing recommendations on the 
protocol and with U.S.-based NGOs dominating the lobbying factions that sought to 
shape the final document according to their views on human trafficking.
201
  
Meanwhile, in the United States, Congress continued to work toward a 
domestic counter-trafficking law.  Hearings were held to educate Congress about the 
issue, and several U.S.-based NGOs were invited to testify on the scope of the 
problem.
202
  In March 1999, Representative Chris Smith, a Republican from New 
Jersey, introduced the “Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999” in the House, 
while Wellstone introduced the “International Trafficking of Women and Children 
Victim Protection Act of 1999” in the Senate and Slaughter introduced the same bill 
in the House.
203
  As suggested by the titles of these bills, they were focused more on 
sex trafficking and on the protection of women and children than on the broader issue 
of human trafficking for any type of forced labor.    
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 On June 28, 1999, Smith called a hearing entitled “The Sex Trade: Trafficking 
in Women and Children in Europe and the United States” before the U.S. 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and invited NGO 
representatives and other trafficking experts to speak about the problem.  One expert 
present at the hearing was Steven Galster, Executive Director of the Global Survival 
Network, which had produced the film “Bought & Sold” documenting underground 
trafficking networks in Russia that recruited women into prostitution.  Galster 
testified on the extent of the trafficking of women into the United States and 
Europe.
204
  As with prior hearings and presentations on human trafficking before 
Congress, this hearing continued the theme of focusing on the sex trafficking of 
women and children.   
Kimberly Williams notes that, including this hearing before the CSCE, there 
were a total of three Congressional hearings and one public legislative markup 
session held between June 1999 and April 2000 to hear expert testimony on what 
lawmakers of both houses referred to interchangeably as “trafficking” or “sex 
trafficking.”
205
  The bulk of the testimony came from 13 NGO researchers and 
activists, including five survivors of sex trafficking, who were involved with 
campaigns targeted directly at combating sex trafficking.
206
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 In addition to focusing on sex trafficking, many of these hearings focused on 
Russia and other former communist nations as source countries for the problem.  At 
the June 28, 1999 hearing on “The Sex Trade,” Smith stated: 
Although trafficking has been a problem for many years in Asian countries, it 
was not until the end of communism in East-Central Europe and the break up 
of the Soviet Union that a sex trade in the OSCE [Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] region began to develop. This appalling trade has 
grown exponentially over the ensuing decade. Trafficking is induced by 
poverty, lack of economic opportunities for women, the low status of women 
in many cultures, and the rapid growth of sophisticated and ruthless 
international organized crime syndicates.
207
 
Indeed, both Williams and Andrea Bertone argue that the identity of sex trafficking 
victims as Russian or Eastern European contributed to Congress’s willingness to take 
action on the issue.
208
  Members of the U.S. Congress, who were predominately white 
and male, could better relate to the “racially white” Russian and East European 
women who were being trafficked, than they could to Asian victims of trafficking.
209
  
Members of Congress were called upon to think of their “daughters” in supporting 
legislation to protect victims of sex trafficking.
210
  Hence, a desire to safeguard “those 
of their own kind” influenced lawmakers to support the legislation.   
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 Another strategy used to gain support for the legislation during the 
Congressional hearings was to liken human trafficking to the African slave trade.  
Laura Lederer, an invited expert from the counter-trafficking organization The 
Protection Project, predicted that the number of women trafficked for work in the 
global sex industry would soon equal the number of Africans enslaved during the 
transatlantic African slave trade in the eighteenth century.
211
  Following Lederer’s 
introduction of this analogy, other witnesses employed it in their own testimonies.   
Wendy Young of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 
referred to sex trafficking as “an increasingly prevalent phenomenon” equivalent to 
“modern day slavery,” and Theresa Loar of the President’s Interagency Council on 
Women called sex trafficking “one of the most egregious violations of our time” and 
a “modern form of slavery.”
212
  Additionally, Department of Justice civil rights 
attorney William R. Yeomans referred to trafficking as “slavery in its modern 
manifestations.”
213
  The use of this analogy appealed to Congress’s view of the 
United States as the “global human-rights leader” and also its desire to assuage its 
guilt over the United State’s role in the African slave trade.
214
   
 An additional influence that served to build support for counter-trafficking 
legislation was Amy O’Neill Richard’s April 2000 report for the U.S. Department of 
State, “International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary 
Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime,” which received wide publicity 
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throughout the United States.
215
  Although instances of trafficking were known to the 
public and to legislators, the report drove home the magnitude of the problem.  
Richard wrote that “trafficking in persons, particularly in women and children, was 
significant on nearly every continent; and the United States had become a destination 
for trafficked persons working in the sex, agricultural, and garment industries as well 
as in domestic settings.”
216
  While acknowledging that it was impossible to accurately 
count the number of trafficking victims, Richard repeated government and NGO 
estimates claiming that between 700,000 and 2 million women and children were 
trafficked around the world each year, with 45,000 to 50,000 trafficked to the United 
States.
217
  This estimate would later be found to be too high; nonetheless, her report 
provided a sense of the pervasiveness of human trafficking and fueled the public 
outcry against the practice.
218
 
 As support for legislation against human trafficking grew, debates turned to 
specific provisions of the law and to the definition of “human trafficking.”  One 
debate concerned the degree to which the law would emphasize sex trafficking over 
trafficking for any purpose.  Wellstone and Smith continued to serve as leaders in 
developing the legislation, but their proposed bills had different thrusts.  On October 
27, 1999, Wellstone had submitted a bill entitled “Comprehensive Anti-Trafficking in 
Persons Act of 1999” to the Senate, while Representative Sam Gejdenson submitted 
the same bill to the House.  On November 8, 1999, Smith, along with eight co-
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sponsors, including Gejdenson, had submitted the “Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 1999” to the House.
219
  Wellstone’s bill focused on all forms of human 
trafficking, but Smith’s bill placed a special emphasis on trafficking for the purpose 
of sexual exploitation.  Both Wellstone and Smith proposed the establishment of an 
interagency task force to monitor and combat trafficking, but Smith wanted the task 
force to pay special attention to sex trafficking and to study the phenomenon of 
international sex tourism.
220
  Smith’s bill also included separate provision to address 
the sex trafficking of children, including revising the U.S. criminal code to require 
harsh punishments for these offenses and developing a list of countries that serve as 
origin, transit, or destination points for child trafficking.
221
   
As noted, most of the invited experts on human trafficking at the 
Congressional hearings had focused on sex trafficking; some had also used the 
platform to push an abolitionist agenda.  For example, Laura Lederer had presumed to 
“safely speak for many women’s organizations” when she praised Smith’s efforts to 
pass anti-sex trafficking legislation, maintaining that “sex and labor aren’t the same 
and can’t be equated.”
222
  Lederer declared that the “commercial sexual exploitation 
of women and children is one of the last…of the issues, but definitely not the least to 
be examined by our society” and suggested that legislators had the opportunity to 
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advance women’s rights by protecting vulnerable women and children from 
traffickers.
223
   
  A second debate impacting the development of counter-trafficking legislation 
concerned the proposed use of U.S. sanctions to encourage other states to fight human 
trafficking.  Wellstone’s bill proposed a “carrot-and-stick sanction approach,” 
through which the president would be authorized to withhold law enforcement 
support, foreign aid, and other assistance to countries making little progress in 
counter-trafficking efforts.  Smith’s bill proposed a stricter sanctions regime that 
would set minimum standards that foreign countries must meet in combating human 
trafficking in order to avoid U.S. sanctions, including the withholding of non-
humanitarian aid and U.S. pressure on institutions such as the World Bank to deny 
loans or other funds.
224
  However, the Clinton administration opposed the use of 
sanctions, especially Smith’s harsher approach, in favor of engaging in cooperative 
efforts with other countries to encourage counter-trafficking measures.
225
  Because 
many countries’ efforts to fight trafficking were still “in the early stages,” the Clinton 
administration believed that unilateral sanctions would be counterproductive and that 




 On May 9, 2000, Smith’s bill, the “Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
1999” was passed by a voice vote in the House.  After its passage in the House, 
                                                 
223
 Ibid., 141. 
 
224
 DeStefano, 36-37. 
 
225
 Ibid., 37; Chuang, 449. 
 
226




Wellstone and Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas, worked to revise 
the bill into the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,” which 
unanimously passed in the Senate on July 27, 2000. The House and Senate versions 
of the Act were then negotiated into one bill. On October 6, the reconciled bill was 
passed by the House, and on October 11, it was passed by the Senate.
227
  It was then 
sent to the White House, and on October 28, President Clinton signed into law the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, which would often be 
referred to in shortened form as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).
228
  
Modeled on the Clinton administration’s “three P’s” framework, the legislation 
included innovative measures aimed at prosecuting traffickers, preventing trafficking, 
and protecting trafficked persons.
229
  The focus on the victims of trafficking during 
the Senate hearings helped to influence lawmakers to include significant human rights 
protections in the final law. 
 The provisions of the TVPA included some compromises on key issues.  
Regarding the debate over whether or not to prioritize sex trafficking, proponents of a 
more comprehensive focus on all forms of human trafficking were satisfied that the 
law criminalized trafficking of persons into any type of work.  At the same time, the 
law also satisfied some activists who wanted the law to focus on trafficking for sexual 
exploitation by including a definition of “sex trafficking” that did not require a 
“trafficking victim” to be coerced into the situation.  In not requiring evidence of 
coercion, the TVPA gave some support to the abolitionist stance that all sex work is 
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exploitative of women and should be prohibited.  However, while offering a 
definition of “sex trafficking,” most of the provisions of the TVPA apply only to 
“severe forms of trafficking in persons,” which do require evidence that coercion had 
taken place.  Specifically, “severe forms of trafficking in persons” is defined as:  
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, 
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not 
attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of 
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
230
   
In addition to criminalizing trafficking in persons and related offences, the 
TVPA increased penalties for such crimes; required convicted traffickers to make 
restitution to their victims; made victims of trafficking in the United States eligible 
for certain immigration benefits, such as the T-visa, which allows victims to remain 
in the country on the conditions that they would suffer extreme hardship if deported 
and that they assist law enforcement in prosecuting their traffickers; and made victims 
eligible for health care, legal aid, and other services offered through federal 
agencies.
231
  Recognizing that efforts to combat human trafficking into the United 
States requires strong prevention measures abroad, the TVPA also established 
programs, including funding programs for NGOs, to strengthen other countries’ 
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domestic legal responses, to provide economic alternatives to victims, and to conduct 
public awareness campaigns.
232
   
 The law also specifies that any foreign government not complying with U.S. 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and not “making significant 
efforts to bring itself into compliance” will be denied “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-
related foreign assistance.”
233
  Sanctioned governments also face U.S. opposition to 
non-humanitarian, non-trade-related assistance from international financial 
institutions and multilateral development banks, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.
234
   
The TVPA established the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons under the State Department, which was charged with producing an annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) to analyze the counter-trafficking efforts 
of other countries.
235
  Based on the assessments, the TIP Report ranks countries 
according to whether they (1) comply with the minimum standards (Tier 1); (2) do 
not yet fully comply but are making significant efforts to do so (Tier 2); or (3) are not 
making significant efforts to comply (Tier 3).
236
  In addition, there is also a “Tier 2 
Watch List” of countries that require special attention in the following year due to 
increasing numbers of trafficking victims or a ranking that is based on the promise to 
carry out additional measures over the course of the year.  Countries that the State 
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Department puts into Tier 3 may be subject to sanctions if they do not bring 
themselves into compliance within 90 days.  During this grace period, the State 
Department works closely with the governments to develop plans of action.  
Countries that make a significant effort to comply during this period will not be 
sanctioned.  The president may also waive sanctions if (1) continued financial 
assistance would help support TVPA’s goals or is otherwise in the national interest of 
the United States, or (2) withdrawing assistance would negatively impact vulnerable 
populations, including women and children.
237
 
 While the TVPA was being developed in the United States, negotiations 
continued in Vienna toward the development of a UN Protocol on Human 
Trafficking.  The protocol would supplement a new Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, which was drafted under the auspices of the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UN Crime Commission).  
The purpose of the convention is to “promote international cooperation in order to 
combat transnational organized crime more effectively,” and it includes protocols 
addressing the specific transnational crimes of human trafficking, migrant smuggling, 
and trafficking in firearms.
238
  States must ratify the convention before ratifying any 
of its protocols.   
There was disappointment among human rights advocates that the convention 
was being drafted by the UN Crime Commission rather than the UN Commission on 
Human Rights.  They feared that, as a convention focused on crime control, it would 
downplay human rights protections for trafficking victims and would legitimize 
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stricter border controls and migration requirements as a means of fighting human 
trafficking.
239
  They believed that restrictive immigration policies would drive labor 
migration further underground and would actually lead to an increase in trafficking.  
Thus, a major topic of debate during the negotiations on the counter-trafficking 
protocol was the extent to which human rights protections would be included in this 
crime control instrument.  A second major topic of debate, similar to the debate 
during negotiations on the TVPA, concerned whether the protocol should focus on 
the sex trafficking of women and children as inherently exploitative and therefore aim 
to abolish prostitution, or whether the protocol should include sex trafficking as only 
one form of trafficking among others and emphasize the need to combat forced or 
coerced labor in any field.     
In the debate concerning the protocol’s position on prostitution, most states 
and NGOs were polarized into two camps.  One group of states, supported by a 
coalition of NGOs called the Human Rights Network (the Network), took an 
abolitionist perspective and viewed any distinction between forced and voluntary 
prostitution as morally unacceptable.
240
  This camp opposed any definition of human 
trafficking that included a coercion requirement and argued that all migration for sex 
work should be criminalized.  Another group of states, including the United States 
and supported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and a group of NGOs 
known as the Human Rights Caucus (the Caucus), took the position that including 
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non-coerced migration for sex work would blur the distinction between trafficking 
and migrant smuggling and would divert resources away from the real problem.
241
 
 The final version of the Protocol, entitled the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,” reflected a 
compromise between the two opposing camps on the prostitution issue.  This 
compromise can be seen in the title of the protocol.  The title pleased the Caucus and 
its supporters in that it covered trafficking of all persons.  At the same time, it sought 
to appease the Network and its supporters by including the phrase “Especially 
Women and Children.”  The compromise can also be seen in the definition of 
“trafficking in persons” in the protocol, which is as follows: 
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse 
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of 
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;  
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant 
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;  
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(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for 
the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if 
this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 
article;  
 (d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
242
 
Both camps also claimed victory in regards to the definition.  The Caucus and 
its allies were satisfied that the definition included trafficking for various forms of 
work, not just prostitution; that it defined trafficking as a crime of coercion, fraud, 
etc., meaning that voluntary migration for sex work was not criminalized; and that the 
definition included trafficking in men in addition to trafficking in women and 
children.  This definition marked an advance from the previous international 
convention against human trafficking, the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which 
criminalized only trafficking for the purpose of prostitution and did not require 
evidence of “coercion,” thereby promoting an abolitionist approach.  On the other 
hand, the Network and its allies also claimed victory in that the definition of 
“exploitation” explicitly mentioned “the exploitation of the prostitution of others,” 
and that the definition of “trafficking in persons” included the clause, “The consent of 
a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation … shall be irrelevant” 
when coercion, fraud, etc., are involved.  The Network interpreted these provisions to 
mean “that any migration that involves sex work now falls under trafficking and that 
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all migrating sex workers can be treated as victims of trafficking.”
243
  However, the 
Caucus holds that the protocol intentionally did not define “the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others” in order to permit states to regulate domestic sex industries on 
their own.   
Thus, the achievement of this internationally recognized definition of human 
trafficking did not end debates on the relationship between trafficking and 
prostitution.  Each camp interpreted the definition in line with its own ideology.  
However, legal experts largely support the Caucus’s interpretation that the protocol 
does not criminalize prostitution, but leaves the regulation of prostitution to 
individual states.
244
  In addition, excluding consensual migration for prostitution from 
the trafficking definition allowed states to treat human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling as two separate offenses.
245
 
 While the Caucus’s lobbying faction at the negotiations included sex workers’ 
groups, many sex workers were not pleased with the compromises in the protocol.
246
  
The amount of time spent debating the definition of human trafficking left little time 
for the Caucus to lobby for human rights protections for trafficking victims and 
migrant sex workers.  Doezema points out that the protocol “in no way prevents 
governments from persecuting, criminalizing, and denying equal protection of the law 
to sex workers in the name of fighting ‘trafficking.’”
247
  Sex workers’ groups argue 
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for a new frame to replace the “forced/chosen” dichotomy that has characterized 
international discussions on human trafficking.  They note that simply excluding 
voluntary prostitution from the definition of “human trafficking” does not advance 
sex workers’ rights and that, without labor protections, more prostitutes are likely to 
suffer abuses.  Doezema proposes that a new framework to replace “trafficking” 
would “incorporate elements of labor rights, insisting that sex workers be treated as 
legitimate workers, rather than as moral reprobates.”
248
 
 A second major debate that divided delegates in Vienna was whether the 
protocol should address human trafficking as primarily a crime and border control 
issue or as a human rights issue.  During negotiations, human rights advocates argued 
that “successful prosecutions depend on trafficked persons’ meaningful cooperation, 
which in turn requires assurances that their human rights will be protected.”
 249
  
Human rights advocates also lobbied for the protocol to address the root causes of 
trafficking by offering broader rights protections to women and other vulnerable 
groups, e.g., by promoting the rights of equal access to education, economic 
opportunities, and bodily integrity.   
In the end, however, human rights protections received relatively little 
attention during negotiations, and human rights advocates were unable to convince 
states to include important trafficking-specific human rights protections.
250
  For 
example, states refused to include a provision granting trafficked persons protections 
against prosecution for offenses such as illegal migration, undocumented work, and 
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  While the protocol does call on states to provide assistance and 
protection to trafficked persons, it is “mostly couched in aspirational terms rather than 
as a matter of hard obligation.”
252
  On the positive side, the protocol granted more 
attention to human rights than would be expected in a crime and border control 
instrument.  Although the protocol does not “break new ground or grant new rights,” 
“[e]xisting rights have been confirmed and there is little in the final texts to suggest a 
significant dilution of the responsibility which states owe to trafficked persons.”
253
 
 After a hard-wrought consensus had been achieved on these issues after nearly 
two years of negotiations, the protocol was complete.  On November 15, 2000, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and two of its protocols, the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea.
254
  A conference 
was convened for the signing of the convention and its two accompanying protocols 
in Palermo, Italy, on December 12-15, 2000.  By the last day of the conference, the 
convention had been signed by 121 nations and the protocol on human trafficking had 
been signed by 81 nations; the United States was a signatory to both.  However, for 
the convention or a protocol to come into force, it had to be ratified domestically by 
at least forty countries.  After meeting this threshold, the convention came into force 
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 While the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking represented a remarkable 
achievement in establishing an internationally recognized definition of human 
trafficking and broke new ground in criminalizing all forms of human trafficking, it 
included only weak enforcement mechanisms, which prevented the United Nations 
from assuming a leadership role in the fight against human trafficking.  Bertone 
argues that “the United States took advantage of the global leadership vacuum on 
enforcement of anti-trafficking norms.”
 256
  A few months after the TVPA was signed 
into law by Democratic President Clinton, Republican President George W. Bush, 
and his more conservative administration, took over the White House.  While the 
Clinton administration had concerns about the sanctions component of the TVPA, the 
Bush administration quickly put the sanctions regime into place and implemented the 
provisions of the TVPA with the support of conservative activists and officials.  
Bertone notes: 
Between 2001 and 2006 feminist abolitionists and conservatives in the United 
States were fully empowered to pursue their anti-prostitution agenda because 
of the control of a Republican White House and a Republican Congress…. 
Democratic support of the trafficking issue almost disappeared; there were no 
Democratic champions of the trafficking issue left in Congress.”
257
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 In implementing the TVPA’s tier-ranking system and sanctions regime, 
Chuang contends that “the United States has proclaimed itself global sheriff on 
trafficking.”
258
  She argues that this “raises grave concerns both as a matter of 
international law and as a matter of global anti-trafficking strategy.”
259
  Outlining her 
argument, Chuang states: 
By injecting U.S. norms into the international arena, the sanctions regime 
risks undermining the fragile international cooperation framework created by 
the Palermo Protocol.  The sanctions threat arguably elevates U.S. norms over 
international norms by giving the former the teeth the latter so often lack.  In 
doing so, the sanctions regime presents a ready opportunity for the United 
States to impose—by the threat of sanctions—its own anti-trafficking 
paradigm onto other states.
260
 
One of the biggest concerns regarding the U.S. ranking system is the 
inconsistency of its standards with international norms set by the protocol on human 
trafficking.  Chuang notes that “the legal norms the United States encourages other 
governments to adopt employ selective (and sometimes misleading) references to the 
Palermo Protocol norms.”
261
  Critics charge that the United States has substituted “its 
own domestic standards in place of those to which the international community has 
already agreed.”
262
  For example, in the document entitled “Legal Building Blocks to 
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Combat Trafficking in Persons” that the State Department provided to governments 
to help them bring their domestic anti-trafficking efforts up to U.S. minimal 
standards, the definition of trafficking in persons cites the UN Protocol on Human 
Trafficking as a reference, implying that its definition is derived from the protocol.  
However, the definitions are different in that the U.S. “Legal Building Blocks” 
defines “exploitation” as including “pimping, pandering, procuring, profiting from 
prostitution.”
263
  In contrast, the protocol had left “exploitation of the prostitution of 
others” purposely undefined in order to allow states to make their own determinations 
as to the legality of prostitution within their borders.  Therefore, as the Bush 
administration increasingly promoted an abolitionist agenda, it also imposed these 
standards on the countries it was assessing.  Chuang argues, “While governments 
technically are not required to incorporate the Legal Building Blocks into their 
domestic legislation, the threat of sanctions nonetheless pressures governments to 
conform to U.S. preferences.”
264
 
 One of the TPVA’s provisions was to grant funding to NGOs in order to 
provide assistance to victims, conduct public awareness campaigns, and carry out 
other activities to aid the fight against human trafficking.  In the first several years 
after the TVPA was implemented, the U.S. Congress made available hundreds of 
millions of dollars for these purposes through international development aid 
mechanisms, namely, USAID, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department 
of Labor.
265
  The lobbying groups that had been involved in the creation of the TVPA 
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and in the negotiation process for the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking remained 
active and attempted to influence how the funds would be distributed.  With the 
United States under the conservative Bush administration from 2000-2008, 
abolitionists and other conservative groups gained influence over such decisions.  
Bertone points out that “Conservative and Christian faith-based organizations enjoyed 
increased access to funding to combat human trafficking both domestically and 
internationally, regardless of whether their project proposals or implementation 
models were sound or effective.”
266
  In contrast to the support given to conservative-
leaning groups, Bertone states that “In the early years of the TVPA implementation, 
more liberal-minded, human rights activists began to be silenced and essentially 
‘went underground’ for a number of years.”
267
 
 Conservative lobbyists’ views were supported by some changes made to the 
TVPA when it was renewed in 2003 through the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).  The TVPRA increased the amount appropriated to 
finance the provisions of the law to $106 million a year, with about $61 million 
earmarked for “overseas assistance to protect trafficking victims and help foreign 
states meet the minimum standards of activity and policy as monitored by the state 
department’s yearly country reports.”
268
  Significantly, the law limited organizations 
eligible to receive U.S. funding to those that pledged not to “promote, support, or 
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advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution.”
269
  This required oath, which 
came to be known as the “anti-prostitution pledge,” caused particular consternation 
among liberals.  As Chuang argues:  
The requirement that NGOs take an “anti-prostitution pledge” or else be 
disqualified from U.S. financial assistance will continue to alienate service 
providers whose contribution to anti-trafficking norm development is vital.  
These include a number of NGOs with some of the most extensive experience 
working with trafficked persons.  Not only do NGOs have valuable access to 
victim populations, but they have rare firsthand exposure and insight into the 
long-term impact of trafficking on survivors that is crucial to informed anti-
trafficking norm development…. In a field as new and complex as trafficking, 
and in such need for input from all sectors of civil society, this dynamic 
severely undermines the transnational interactive process.
270
 
Overall, the U.S. minimum standards and sanctions regime have seen positive 
results in that they have led governments around the world to enact counter-
trafficking legislation and develop domestic infrastructure to combat the problem.  
However, Chuang questions whether these actions have resulted from a genuine 
commitment from governments to fight trafficking or whether governments have 
simply complied with U.S. standards in order to avoid sanctions.  She contends that 
international leadership on the issue of human trafficking should be focused not only 
on quantitative goals, i.e., increasing the number of states with counter-trafficking 
laws, but also on qualitative goals, i.e., promoting cooperation among states on 
                                                 
269
 Bertone, 184-185. 
 
270




human trafficking and encouraging states to internalize international counter-
trafficking norms.  On these qualitative measures, she argues that the U.S. sanctions 
regime has failed to uphold the international consensus forged in Vienna.
271
  Chuang 
maintains that, in order for the United States to strengthen the effectiveness of its 
sanctions regime and continue in an international leadership role in counter-
trafficking efforts, it should show deference to the UN Protocol on Human 
Trafficking when working with foreign governments.   
Since the adoption of the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and the passing 
of the TVPA in 2000, the international community has continued to develop methods 
of combating human trafficking and to improve international cooperation.  Both the 
United Nations and the United States remain leaders in the international fight against 
trafficking.  In 2004, the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights 
appointed a special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children, who reports on human trafficking and makes recommendations on how to 
protect the human rights of trafficking victims.  In the United States, the TVPA was 
reauthorized again in 2005, 2008, and 2013 with improved provisions on combating 
trafficking and protecting victims based on the experience gained since the passing of 
the original law.   
As demonstrated in this section, advocacy networks have exerted a strong 
influence on the development of both national and international instruments against 
human trafficking.  In the United States, testimonies by experts on sex trafficking 
demonstrated the seriousness of the issue to lawmakers and helped win their support 
for a comprehensive counter-trafficking law that would deploy U.S. resources to 
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other countries in order to fight the problem.  In addition, activists’ focus on the 
victims of trafficking, rather than its impact on, e.g., the national economy or crime 
control efforts, influenced lawmakers to include pioneering human rights protections 
for victims in the TVPA.   
Through the Vienna process leading up to the adoption of the UN Protocol on 
Human Trafficking, networks of NGOs with opposing views on prostitution and 
trafficking lobbied for the title and text of the protocol to reflect their network’s 
perspective on how to best combat human trafficking.  As noted, TANs on both sides 
of the debate claimed some victories in regards to the language of the final document.  
Additionally, the lobbying efforts of both camps, focused as they were on the victims 
of trafficking rather than on crime control, influenced the decision of states to include 
the following in the final version of the protocol: 1) specific references to 
international law, including human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law; 2) 
an anti-discrimination clause; and 3) the protection of human rights as a principal 
objective.
272
  The Vienna process represented the achievement of a “fragile 
consensus” between states and TANs with markedly different perspectives on the 
connection between prostitution and trafficking.
273
  Through this process, the 
interdependency of states and TANs grew stronger, as states came to increasingly rely 
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5.4 The Development of the Russian Movement against Human Trafficking 
In this section, I provide a brief history of the development of the modern Russian 
movement against human trafficking before turning to a case study of the leading 
counter-trafficking NGO in Russia, the Angel Coalition, in the next chapter.   
 As noted previously, in the modern era, human trafficking from and into 
Russia was first recognized as a problem following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.
274
  The economic and political chaos that accompanied the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the transition to a market economy in the early to mid-
1990s produced conditions that contributed to a rise in human trafficking.  The 
demise of a state-controlled economy meant that the state no longer guaranteed the 
economic security of its citizens; this resulted in economic dislocations for many.
275
  
At the same time, instability in the political system during the transition period 
contributed to the growth of organized crime and corruption among governmental 
officials, both of which facilitated human trafficking.  While job prospects declined in 
the Russian Federation, a globalizing economy produced demand for low-skill, low-
wage workers in many parts of the world.  After Russia relaxed border controls and 
travel restrictions in the early 1990s, many Russians were able to travel abroad to 
seek their fortunes elsewhere.   
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 Although the transition to a market economy created difficulties for both 
women and men, many scholars have noted the especially harsh effects it had on 
women, as women suffered more from underemployment and from cutbacks in social 
welfare benefits.  As a result, significant numbers of Russian women sought 
opportunities abroad for education, employment, or marriage.  Women found job 
opportunities through advertisements in the media, recruitment agencies, direct 
contact with companies abroad, friends and family members, and other sources.  
Although some of these opportunities were legal, some recruiters operated illegally, 
and some even blatantly misled women as to the location or the nature of the 
promised job.  To reach their destinations, some women travelled with the required 
documents, while many trafficking victims had falsified documents or traveled with 
only tourist visas that would expire after a short period of time.  Thus, there was a 
wide range of scenarios that accounted for women’s labor migration out of Russia.   
 The first form of human trafficking from the Russian region to receive 
attention was the trafficking of women from Russia and other former communist 
countries for the purpose of sex work.  As noted in the previous section, the 
trafficking of women from former communist states received a great deal of attention 
in both the United States and Western Europe and even served as a catalyst to the 
development of counter-trafficking legislation in several countries.  In the 1990s, 
according to estimates, Russian women and women from other Slavic states of the 
former Soviet Union came to constitute one of the largest groups of foreign sex 
workers trafficked to Western Europe.
276
  Sally Stoecker states that Slavic and Baltic 
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women from the former Soviet states were seen as “exotic and desirable in the 
‘developed’ industrial countries of Europe, North America, Asia, and the Middle 
East.”
277
  By the late 1990s, it was estimated that tens of thousands of Russian women 
and girls were being “trafficked” across Russia’s borders each year to Central and 
Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and North America for the 
purpose of sex work.
278
  While many of these women were aware of the nature of the 
work they were to perform, others were not, and some were forcibly coerced to 
engage in prostitution.
279
  Media stories and anti-trafficking campaigns focused on the 
latter category of “victims,” and stories of Russian women tricked into lives of sexual 
slavery were sensationalized and produced the new “narrative” of the Russian 
trafficking victim.   
In addition, the tale of the Russian “mail order bride” also became notorious 
throughout the West.  Many women left Russia not for employment in the paid sector, 
but for marriage.  Marriage agencies sprung up to connect Russian women with 
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desiring men, primarily from North America and Western Europe, but also some from 
Asia.  It is believed that thousands of marriages resulted from the services of marriage 
agencies, but the cases that received the most attention in the West were those in 
which the woman ended up being abused or exploited by her husband.  While it is 
important to document cases in which women are abused in either sex work or 
marriage, there were also many cases in which women entered into these 
arrangements freely and experienced no exploitation.  Sensationalizing the issue 
served to attract the attention of many people, but also obscured the true dynamics of 
the phenomenon.  Additionally, although fewer in number, there were also cases of 
Russian women being trafficked for other forms of labor, such as domestic work.   
A particularly challenging problem in post-Soviet Russia was the trafficking 
of children.  The loss of state-sponsored social protections meant that many families 
could no longer afford to properly care for their children.
280
  This resulted in the 
problem of “artificial orphans,” which A. V. Orlova describes as “children abandoned 
by their families because of economic difficulties and raised in state institutions, in 
the best case scenario, or on the streets in the worst.”
281
  The number of state 
institutions that cared for children was reduced due to lack of funds and the remaining 
facilities were overcrowded, especially those that cared for children with special 
needs.  Neglect and abuse in these institutions often led children to run away, 
resulting in an increase in the number of street kids in Russian cities.  Those who 
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remained in the institutions received inadequate education and preparation for life 
after their graduation out of orphanages, usually around age seventeen.  Thus, street 
children and graduates of orphanages were especially vulnerable to recruitment by 
traffickers, many of whom specifically targeted this population.
282
  Some of these 
children, particularly girls, were trafficked outside of Russia for the purpose of sex 
work, while others faced exploitation within Russia’s borders in both sex work and 
other types of labor.  Internal trafficking was particularly common from Russia’s 
rural areas into major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.   
In addition to Russian women and children being trafficked both internally 
and to other states, women and children from less prosperous countries in the region, 
including the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, 
were trafficked to and through Russia for the purpose of sex work and other forms of 
labor such as work in the domestic and agricultural spheres.  There were also cases of 
women and children from Central and Eastern Europe and from Africa trafficked into 
Russia for sex work.  In 2006, it was estimated that there were 80,000-130,000 sex 
workers in Moscow alone, with an additional 20,000-30,000 in Saint Petersburg.
283
  
Experts believe that the majority of women and children involved in commercial sex 
work in these cities are migrants from other countries or from neighboring towns and 
villages, many of whom have been trafficked.
284
  While not as numerous, there were 
cases of Russian men being trafficked into Western Europe for forms of hard labor, 
                                                 
282
 Hartl, 11-12.  
 
283
 Tiurukanova (2006), 36. 
 
284
 Ibid., 36; MiraMed Institute, “Letter from Dr. Juliette M. Engel, Founding Director,” MiraMed 
Institute Annual Program Report 2005 (December 1, 2005), 1. Available online at: 






  Men were also trafficked from other countries in the 
region to and through Russia for construction work, agricultural work, and other 
forms of hard labor.   
Loosened travel restrictions in the post-Soviet period allowed citizens of 
former communist states to travel to neighboring countries to look for work.  
However, their often illegal residency status in these countries and the lack of social 
support networks made them highly vulnerable to human trafficking.
286
  The 2006 
Report of the United Nations/International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
Working Group on Trafficking in Human Beings in the Russian Federation states:  
The growth in migration and the size of the shadow economy exacerbate 
Russia’s labor exploitation situation, with cautious estimates placing the 
shadow economy to comprise up to 22.4 percent of the country’s GDP [Gross 
Domestic Product], with other estimates as high as 40 percent.  This enormous 
demand for mass labor force is met by illegal migrants, of which Russia has 3-
5 million.  Approximately two-thirds of these illegal migrants are from CIS 
countries, operating in the shadow economy, which frequently contains 
elements of slavery and human trafficking.  Over 75 percent of illegal 
migrants are paid cash “under the table,” and 80 percent have no written 
contracts with their employers, creating easy conditions for employers to 
exploit conditions frequently bordering on slavery.
287
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Based on the extensiveness of Russia’s shadow economy, the UN/IOM Report 
concludes that “trafficking for the purpose of exploitation of labor and slave labor, or 
its component parts in general, is the most common type of human trafficking in 
Russia and dominates at least in terms of scale.”
288
  It was estimated that nearly one 
million of the illegal migrants to Russia experienced some form of labor 
exploitation.
289
  The populations most vulnerable to labor exploitation included young 
and middle-aged men and women, especially those with low education levels, and the 
sectors where instances of labor exploitation were most often found included 
construction and renovation, transportation, trade, lumbering, or seasonal farming.
290
   
 One of the primary reasons for the high rate of labor trafficking in Russia was 
the government’s goal of raising its GDP while at the same time experiencing a 
severe demographic crisis, which creates conditions for increased reliance on migrant 
labor in both the immediate and more long-term future.
291
  Jennifer Ann Hartl argues 
that “the government’s efforts to build an economy as cheaply and as quickly as 
possible contribute either directly or indirectly to the perpetuation of human 
trafficking.”
292
  Likewise, Mikhail Kleimenov and Stanislav Shamkov note:   
The recent construction boom in Moscow would never have been possible had 
it not been for slave labor of immigrants from other CIS countries.  Many of 
them come to Russia, find jobs, and stay illegally.  There are well-established 
                                                 
288
 Ibid., 35. 
 
289
 Ibid., 35. 
 
290
 Ibid., 32, 34. 
 
291
 Ibid., 33.  The 2006 UN/IOM report predicted a one million decrease in able working citizens in 
Russia by 2016. 
 
292




recruitment agencies that have offices in neighboring countries and that 
specialize in supplying slave laborers to Russia.  Local authorities choose not 




Thus, Russia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and 
children for both labor and sex trafficking.  However, as in Western countries, the sex 
trafficking of Russian women and girls has received more attention from the Russian 
government, counter-trafficking activists, and the media than other forms of 
trafficking.  Fortunately, trafficking for labor exploitation began to receive increased 
attention from the Russian counter-trafficking movement as it developed in the 2000s.   
 Human trafficking first came to the attention of activists in Russia in the mid-
1990s.  MiraMed, one of the first organizations in Russia to address human 
trafficking, was founded in Moscow in 1991 but only began to devote attention to 
trafficking in the mid-1990s.  MiraMed, which was registered both as an American 
nonprofit and a Russian NGO, began to coordinate with Russian women’s 
organizations on counter-trafficking work.  In 1999, MiraMed, along with several 
women’s organizations, founded the Angel Coalition as a network to unite 
organizations across Russia and the CIS that were undertaking projects on human 
trafficking.  Angel Coalition member organizations conducted informational 
campaigns in order to raise the Russian public’s awareness about human trafficking, 
ran hotlines to provide information on trafficking and help to its victims, opened 
shelters offering rehabilitative services to victims, and worked to build collaborative 
relationships with Russian governmental officials in order to better combat the crime.   
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The issue of human trafficking did not appear on the agenda of the Russian 
government until it signed the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children on December 12, 2000.  In 
April 2001, the Commission on Improving the Status of Women under the Russian 
president held a meeting on the issue of trafficking in women and girls for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation.
294
  The meeting resulted in a “Program of Action” that 
assigned responsibilities to various departments of the Russian government for the 
purpose of combating the sexual exploitation of women and girls.  One of the tasks 
was to develop federal legislation to address human trafficking.  The UN Protocol on 
Human Trafficking called upon states to develop comprehensive policies to address 
trafficking, and Russian NGOs, led by the Angel Coalition, lobbied the government 
for a comprehensive law against human trafficking that would criminalize the various 
components of the crime while developing the infrastructure necessary to help 
victims and the framework for collaboration among governmental agencies.    
Between October 2002 and April 2003, a draft Federal Law to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons in Russia was developed at the initiative of the State Duma 
Committee for Legislation and Judicial Reform with the support of the Office of the 
Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in the Central Federal 
District.
295
   The draft law, however, was never adopted.  Instead, in October 2003, 
President Putin introduced amendments to the criminal code of the Russian 
Federation that would criminalize human trafficking and related offences, such as the 
use of slave labor, both of which could be punished by up to fifteen years 
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imprisonment.  In addition, the amendments increased the maximum punishments for 
crimes such as recruiting minors into prostitution and organizing prostitution rings.  
The amendments were passed by the Duma in December 2003.
296
   
Although the passing of these criminal laws demonstrated that Russia was 
taking some steps to combat human trafficking, its efforts did not meet the minimum 
standards set by the United States.  In the following year’s TIP Report, Russia was 
placed on the Tier 2 Watch List, where it would remain for nine consecutive years 
until it was demoted to Tier 3 in 2013.
297
  The reluctance of the United States to 
demote Russia to Tier 3 for so many years is widely believed to be due, in part, to 
political factors and the risk of damaging U.S.-Russia relations.  However, it is also 
due to other measures Russia took to combat human trafficking during this time, 
including developing collaborative relations with other countries in order to fight the 
crime, establishing specialized counter-trafficking divisions within Russian 
ministries, improving governmental cooperation with counter-trafficking NGOs, and 
providing small grants to support NGO counter-trafficking activities.   
 Hence, the movement against human trafficking in Russia from 1998-2008 
was led by Russian NGOs, most of whom were part of the Angel Coalition, that 
worked to develop cooperative relationships with the Russian government and to 
encourage governmental efforts on the issue.
298
  The Angel Coalition grew into a 
well-connected network consisting of a few leading counter-trafficking organizations 
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across Russia and the CIS and a large number of smaller organizations that carried 
out short-term counter-trafficking projects.  By 2004, the Angel Coalition had 33 
member organizations in Russia and dozens more in other countries.
299
   
As the Russian counter-trafficking movement began to gain momentum in 
2001-2002, a debate over the legalization of prostitution occurred in Russia.  This 
debate paralleled similar discussions taking place in other European countries over 
ways to address prostitution and the growth of sex trafficking.  In 2000, the 
Netherlands, where prostitution was already legal, also legalized the running of 
brothels, and Germany legalized prostitution in 2002.
300
  By contrast, Sweden 
implemented a law in 1999 that criminalized the purchase of sexual services (but not 
the sale of such services in order to protect the women “victims” from 
prosecution).
301
  In Russia, the legalization of prostitution was proposed as a possible 
method of addressing sex trafficking. However, to U.S. abolitionists monitoring the 
allocation of U.S. counter-trafficking funds, even discussing this option was akin to 
“promoting prostitution.” 
 As the counter-trafficking movement took off in Russia, the substantial 
Western support for this movement meant that Western frameworks and concepts 
were also imported into Russia.  The debate between abolitionists and sex workers’ 
                                                 
299
 Johnson (2009), 62. 
 
300
 Marieke Van Doorninck, “A Business Like Any Other?  Managing the Sex Industry in the 
Netherlands,” in Transnational Prostitution: Changing Global Patterns, ed. Susanne Thorbek and 
Bandana Pattanaik (London: Zed Books, 2002), 1; Annegret Staiger, “The Economics of Sex 
Trafficking since the Legalization of Prostitution in Germany in 2002,” The Protection Project Journal 
of Human Rights and Civil Society, n. 2 (Fall 2009), 103. 
 
301
 Arthur Gould, “Sweden’s Law on Prostitution: Feminism, Drugs and the Foreign Threat,” in 
Transnational Prostitution: Changing Global Patterns, ed. Susanne Thorbek and Bandana Pattanaik 




rights advocates that had shaped the Western counter-trafficking movement had less 
grounding in Russia.  As Russian counter-trafficking activists began to grapple with 
these concepts, many made an effort to understand the arguments of each side of the 
debate and to consider what effects each approach would have in the Russian context.  
However, MiraMed and the main office of the Angel Coalition immediately affirmed 
the strict abolitionist approach that they had always promoted.   
As noted, Donna Hughes, an abolitionist feminist affiliated with MiraMed and 
a leading monitor of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia, began to lobby the 
U.S. government to deny funding to Russian organizations that did not clearly declare 
an abolitionist perspective.  In 2002, she claimed that the Angel Coalition had been 
denied U.S. funding that instead went to an organization that she labeled as “pro-
prostitution.”  Hughes was supported by an international coalition of “human-rights 
and women's-rights policy organizations, churches, and faith-based groups” that 
urged Putin to take a stand against U.S. “prostitution supporters” in Russia. 
302
  In 
addition, many abolitionists in the United States sent letters to members of Congress 




 The U.S. conservative lobby was successful in influencing funding patterns to 
Russia as part of the new requirement of the “anti-prostitution pledge.”
304
  As the 
women’s crisis centers implicated in the controversy were left to defend themselves 
to their U.S. funders and Russian supporters, the Bush administration came out in 
                                                 
302
 Hughes.  
 
303
 Johnson (2009), 63.  
 
304




explicit support of the Angel Coalition and invited them to a Washington, D.C., 
conference on trafficking, and the secretary of state praised them in a speech.
305
  In 
the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking funding in 2004, the Angel Coalition 
received a grant of almost half a million dollars to develop more shelters, while only 
one women’s crisis center received a small grant.
306
   
The politics behind these funding decisions left Natalia Khordyreva, then 
president of the Angel Coalition but also a long-time advocate for women’s crisis 
centers, critical of the ways that transnational counter-trafficking organizations 
“subordinate the Eastern organizations… to their standards and frameworks.”
307
  
These funding decisions contributed to a rift between many women’s crisis center 
leaders and the MiraMed/Angel Coalition.
308
  Instead of encouraging cooperation 
among Russian organizations that sought to protect women’s rights, U.S. funding 
policies that encouraged allegiance to one particular ideological stance deepened 
divisions between organizations whose missions were in reality quite similar.  In the 
end, in the debate over prostitution in Russia, the anti-legalization cohort, supported 
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 Since the beginning of the modern Russian movement against human 
trafficking, the Angel Coalition has remained a leading force that works to advance 
the movement by encouraging collaboration among the Russian government, NGOs, 
international organizations, and foreign governments, and by improving services to 
the Russian public and to victims of human trafficking.  In doing so, the Angel 
Coalition has operated both as an organization within Russian civil society and as an 
actor in the transnational counter-trafficking movement.  In the next chapter, I 
examine how the Angel Coalition carries out both of these roles. I argue that a unique 
combination of organizational attributes has permitted the Angel Coalition to 
effectively work toward its counter-trafficking goals as it navigates both the Russian 
bureaucracy and the requirements of foreign funders in order to achieve success in 






Chapter 6:  A Case Study of The Angel Coalition, 1998-2008 
 
In 1990, Dr. Juliette Engel, an America physician who had specialized in providing 
ultrasound exams for expectant mothers, toured Russia for the first time and visited 
several state-run birthing centers.  Appalled by the unsafe conditions in these centers, 
Engel was inspired to contribute her skills to improving maternity care in Russia.  
Searching for a new passion after becoming disheartened with the medical profession 
and selling her radiology and diagnostic practice in Bellevue, Washington State, 
Engel founded the MiraMed Institute in 1991.  MiraMed, whose name derived from 
the Russian words “Mir,” which means both peace and world, and “Med” for 
medicine or healing, was registered in the United States as an international public 
charity and in Russia as a non-governmental charitable organization.  With offices in 
Seattle and Moscow, MiraMed’s initial mission was dedicated to improving maternal 
care in Russia, but within a few years, it expanded to providing aid to orphanages as 
well, in order to address the problem of children abandoned or orphaned at birth.
1
    
 In the mid-1990s, while supplying aid to orphanages, Engel began to notice a 
disturbing trend of children disappearing from orphanages.  As described by Donna 
Hughes: 
Juliette Engel…discovered the scourge of epidemic trafficking while working 
with orphanages, from which groups of girls were mysteriously disappearing. 
Vans would arrive at the orphanages to take girls on field trips. They packed 
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Engel investigated the disappearances of these children, mostly teenage girls, and 
found that many were victims of human trafficking, a phenomenon that was new to 
her at the time.  As she learned more about trafficking practices and discovered that 
many traffickers specifically targeted orphans, one of Russia’s most vulnerable 
population groups, she became determined to combat trafficking and added this goal 
to MiraMed’s mission of protecting Russia’s orphans.  MiraMed’s campaigns against 
human trafficking grew in strength as Russian civil society’s awareness of the 
problem also expanded.  In 1999, MiraMed, along with a number of Russian 
women’s organizations, founded the Angel Coalition, Russia’s first coalition devoted 
specifically to combating human trafficking.  Through this joint Russian-American 
action, the Russian movement against human trafficking was born.   
 In this chapter, I carry out a case study of the Angel Coalition’s establishment 
and its counter-trafficking work from 1998 to 2008.  I examine the Angel Coalition 
(AC) both as an organization within Russian civil society that had to navigate the 
changing policies of the Russian government toward NGOs, and as an actor in the 
transnational counter-trafficking movement that had to negotiate with camps 
espousing different views on trafficking and prostitution.  I analyze the unique 
combination of organizational attributes that set the Angel Coalition apart from the 
majority of Russian NGOs and that contributed to its success in counter-trafficking 
work both within Russia and in the international arena.  In addition, I examine the 
AC’s funding situation.  As an organization with both Russian and international roots, 






the Angel Coalition struggled to define its identity, and this struggle is apparent in its 
search for funding.  As large U.S. governmental counter-trafficking grants became 
less available to the AC in the mid-to late 2000s, AC activists faced the dilemma of 
increasingly turning to the Russian state for support, and thus losing some of their 
independence, or searching for other international sources of short-term grants, which 
would threaten the organization’s stability and longevity.   
I address these topics through a discussion of the operation of the Angel 
Coalition Trafficking Victims Assistance Center (TVAC) as activists carry out 
counter-trafficking projects and interact with Russian governmental officials, foreign 
contacts, and NGO partners throughout the CIS; analysis of interviews conducted 
with eight AC activists; examination of AC publications, such as brochures, website 
materials, and research reports; and a review of literature published on the AC by 
outside sources, such as articles in newspapers, journals, and other periodicals.  
Through this case study, I seek to provide a compelling illustration of an advocacy 
NGO with both local and transnational identities that strived to advance its activist, 
human rights agenda at home and in the expanding international arena.   
 
6.1 Methodology 
Since a main purpose of my case study of the Angel Coalition is to better understand 
the worlds of activists, with the goal of providing insight into the operation of 
transnational counter-trafficking networks, I rely largely upon the qualitative methods 
of participant observation, interviewing, and textual analysis of materials produced by 




systems of participants in regards to human trafficking and their work in the counter-
trafficking field.  In addition, I employ analysis of textual materials, mainly articles in 
newspapers, magazines, or journals, published about the Angel Coalition by outside 
sources.  This method provided additional data on the history of the Angel Coalition 
and helped me to contextualize my case study.  Analyzing these outside sources also 
provided me with differing perspectives on the work of the Angel Coalition.   
 My research draws from six months of fieldwork that I carried out at the 
TVAC in Moscow, Russia, from November 2007 to May 2008.  Before beginning 
fieldwork, my research protocol was approved by the University of Maryland, 
College Park, Institutional Review Board (IRB) on August 30, 2007.  During my 
fieldwork, I worked as a full-time volunteer intern at the TVAC (40 hours per week).  
My primary duties included translating organizational materials, such as conference 
reports, website materials, and grant applications from Russian to English; searching 
for funding opportunities for AC member organizations; and conducting research on 
human trafficking cases in Russia and counter-trafficking strategies being developed 
by the international community.  While working at the TVAC, I took daily fieldnotes 
based on my observations of AC activists as they carried out counter-trafficking 
projects and communicated with their various partners.  All of my participants signed 
informed consent forms approved by the University of Maryland IRB and were told 
that the research was being conducted for a Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of 
Women’s Studies.
3
  My observations helped me to better understand the many 
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processes involved in effectively carrying out counter-trafficking projects and 
running a Russian civil society organization, while also perceiving the meanings that 
activists imparted to their work.  I reviewed my fieldnotes weekly and wrote memos 
on emerging patterns and themes, and on newly arising questions that I wanted to 
explore further.   
 In addition, I conducted interviews with eight AC activists.  Seven of these 
interviews took place at the TVAC office in Moscow during my fieldwork, and one 
interview took place in the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C., in November 2008 
after I had returned to the United States.
4
  The eight activists I interviewed had all 
directly worked on AC counter-trafficking projects at one time or another.  Seven of 
the activists were working on AC counter-trafficking projects at the time of the 
interview, and one had worked on AC counter-trafficking projects previously.  I use 
the term “Angel Coalition activist” to refer to any private individual, paid or unpaid, 
who was directly involved in the AC’s work.  The AC activists whom I interviewed 
fit into the following categories: past or present employees of the TVAC, past or 
present employees of MiraMed, and past or present volunteers.  My interviewees 
were diverse in terms of the positions they held in relation to AC counter-trafficking 
projects.  Some held leadership positions, some were in mid-level positions, and some 
were volunteers with little authority over AC projects.  I do not include governmental 
officials who worked with the AC in the definition of an “AC activist.”  I have 
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assigned pseudonyms to all my research participants, which I use when reporting my 
data.   
I conducted four of my interviews with CIS activists, and four with American 
activists.  I use the term “CIS activist” to refer to activists from Russia and other CIS 
states.  I group this set of activists together in one category due to my small sample 
size in order to avoid identifying specific AC workers by nationality and also because 
this category was commonly used by AC activists themselves to distinguish between 
the different groups of activists involved in the AC’s work.  All of the activists in this 
group were from a CIS country and were of a CIS nationality.  The CIS, or 
Commonwealth of Independent States, is a union of most of the former states of the 
Soviet Union, including Russia, that cooperate on issues of trade, finance, lawmaking, 
security, and crime control, among others.  While only some activists that I 
categorized as “CIS activists” were Russian, I have given them all Russian 
pseudonyms due to my small sample size to avoid identifying them by nationality.   
In addition to CIS activists, there were also activists from the U.S. and other 
Western countries involved in the AC’s work.  I use the terms “CIS countries” and 
“Western countries,” to honor the meaning-making systems of the activists I studied, 
and to reflect the conversations taking place in the literatures I am exploring.  AC 
activists, from both “the CIS” and “the West,” frequently used these categories and 
contrasted between “the CIS” and “the West” in interviews and in the course of their 
everyday work while I was at the TVAC.  Multiple scholars on Russian civil society 
and Russian feminisms have also documented the common use of these terms among 




scholars over comparing “Russia” or “the CIS” to “the West,” I choose to employ 
these categories in my dissertation to honor the terms used by my participants and to 
reflect the literary conversations within which I am writing.   
The four Western activists that I interviewed during the course of my research 
were all of U.S. nationality, although activists from other Western countries, 
including Great Britain, Canada, and Sweden, had been involved in AC counter-
trafficking projects up to the time of my research.  Although I did not specifically 
seek to interview activists of U.S. nationality, the foreign activists most involved with 
the AC’s work at the time of my fieldwork happened to be Americans.  Additionally, 
as noted, the AC had a history of strong U.S. ties, being co-founded by MiraMed, a 
U.S. organization, and received significant U.S. financial support in the early years of 
its operation.  Thus, I will refer to my second group of interviewees as “American 
activists.”  Regarding the gender of my eight participants, I interviewed seven women 
and one man.   
 The interviews were open-ended/semi-structured in format in order to 
privilege the voices of the participants. I had several main topic areas and several 
central questions that I asked interviewees, but I allowed them some control over the 
flow of the interview.
5
  The goal of my interviews was to better understand the 
perspectives of individual activists on their own work with the AC and on the broader 
goals and ideologies of the organization as it sought to combat human trafficking and 
to build relationships with Russian, CIS, and foreign partners.   
As stated above, I conducted seven of these interviews at the TVAC office in 
Moscow, and one in the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C.  At the TVAC, AC 
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activists shared offices, but I was able to conduct most interviews with some degree 
of privacy.  I conducted most interviews in the kitchen area of the TVAC either 
before or after the lunch break, so that I was alone with the interviewee for the 
majority of the interview.  I conducted other interviews in participants’ offices on 
days when their office companions were out.  In a few cases, I was not able to 
interview a participant in privacy but conducted the interview in a language that their 
office mates did not understand, lending a degree of privacy.  However, I did not feel 
that a lack of complete privacy caused much discomfort among most interviewees or 
led them to hold back information.  AC activists working at the TVAC were close and 
generally very open with each other.  Most of my interviewees seemed open to 
sharing information with me, as they were with their colleagues.  The interview that I 
conducted at the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C., was in a private setting.   
 The length of interviews ranged from approximately thirty minutes to just 
over two hours.  Some of the longer interviews were conducted over two sessions.   
 Five of the interviews were conducted in English, three in Russian.
6
  Seven of 
the interviews were recorded, with my participants’ permission.  For one interview, I 
relied on taking notes during the interview.   Soon after conducting each interview 
(on the same day), I set aside time to reflect on the interview and write a memo on 
how I felt the interview went, in regards to my rapport with the interviewee; their 
reactions to my questions; any problems that arose, e.g., any interview questions that 
were difficult to understand; and any information I gathered during the interview that 
brought up new questions that I wanted to explore.  After completing this process, I 
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began to transcribe the interviews.  For the interviews conducted in Russian, I 
translated them and transcribed them into English.  I began transcribing the 
interviews while conducting my fieldwork in Moscow, but completed most of this 
process in the United States.   
 In addition to carrying out participant observation and interviews, I also 
collected textual materials produced by the Angel Coalition, including website 
materials, informational brochures and pamphlets on human trafficking, reports from 
conferences, a protocol on combating human trafficking in Russia, logs containing 
details on the human trafficking cases reported to the AC’s hotline, research reports 
on human trafficking written by AC staff, among other informational, practical, and 
research materials produced by the organization.  Employing the method of textual 
analysis of organizational materials allowed me to obtain more detailed information 
on many aspects of the organization’s work as compared to the data I had gathered 
during interviews, and also enabled me to compare data gathered from these distinct 
methods to check for consistency.  Overall, I found most of my data, gathered from 
interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis of organizational materials, to 
be consistent.  I did not find any major discrepancies between descriptions of the 
AC’s work shared with me during interviews or participant observation and 
descriptions reported in the organization’s written materials.   
 After completing the data collection stage, I began to focus on analysis of my 
collected materials.  I reviewed all of my qualitative materials, including interview 
transcriptions, fieldnotes, memos, and texts produced by the AC, to look for emerging 




patterns that emerged during reading and re-reading my research materials, instead of 
imposing predetermined categories onto the data.  The interpretive, interactionist 
approach that I took to analyzing my fieldnotes and interview transcriptions follows 
closely that of John VanMaanen, and Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz, and Linda Shaw, 
and also draws upon the interpretive approach described by Kathleen DeWalt and 
Billie DeWalt and the constructivist approach to grounded theory discussed by Kathy 
Charmaz.
7
  According to Charmaz, such an approach “places priority on the 
phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from the shared 
experiences of researcher and participants and the researcher’s relationships with 
participants.”
8
  In using an interpretive approach toward data analysis, I attempted to 
“recognize” themes that emerged from the data; however, at the same time, I 
acknowledge my role as researcher in “interpreting” the data and “constructing” 
codes according to how I understand particular pieces of data.  Hence, unlike 
grounded theorists who view themes and theories as “discovered” in research data, an 
interpretive approach acknowledges both the inductive and deductive features of 
qualitative data analysis.  Although I aimed to develop codes and themes that 
reflected the lived experiences of my participants and the meanings they attached to 
these experiences, I remain aware that my theoretical perspective and my position in 
the field influenced how I interpret the research data. 
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 After identifying consistent themes based on my interpretation of the data, I 
began to code my fieldnotes and interview transcriptions, using words or short 
phrases to signify various themes, concepts, or ideas that I found in the data set.  In 
later stages of coding, after I had reviewed my fieldnotes and transcriptions multiple 
times and refined my codes, I sorted the codes into a smaller number of stronger 
themes to better organize my data and demonstrate how codes related to one another.  
I used the software program Atlas.ti to record the codes on my fieldnotes and 
interview transcriptions.  For the textual materials collected from the Angel Coalition, 
I wrote the codes directly on the materials. 
 In addition to utilizing these qualitative research methods, I also collected and 
analyzed materials published on the Angel Coalition by outside sources, mainly 
articles in newspapers, magazines, and journals, and also some books.  This method 
allowed me to gather additional information on the Angel Coalition and to examine 
alternative perspectives on the organization’s work.  While some of these sources 
were celebratory of the organization’s accomplishments, others were critical.  As 
discussed in previous chapters, the transnational counter-trafficking arena is 
politically divided into several “camps” with very different views on human 
trafficking, especially on trafficking for the purpose of sex work.  Authors with 
contrasting perspectives on human trafficking tended to evaluate the work of the 
Angel Coalition differently.  Analyzing these external sources helped me to flesh out 
the political environment in which the AC operated in the international arena, a topic 




permitted me to view the organization from new perspectives and consider different 
conclusions to my research.   
 During the data collection, analysis, and writing processes, I remained 
reflexive and open to new ideas or conclusions that emerged from my data set to 
avoid relying on preliminary hypotheses from earlier research stages.  I followed the 
approach of DeWalt and DeWalt, who believe that “continual reexamination is an 
essential component of checking one’s conclusions against the real world data.”
9
  I 
utilized the technique of “constant validity check” to continually search in my 
research data for evidence that challenged, as well as supported, my preliminary 
conclusions.
10
  I believe the multiple research methods that I employed helped me to 
develop a deep understanding of many facets of my participants’ worlds and to 
convey this understanding through my case study.  During the writing process, I 
remained reflexive of my presence in the research site and the ways my presence may 
have influenced the data collected.  Although I have explored various viewpoints on 
the Angel Coalition’s work and made efforts to center the participants’ voices in data 
analysis, I acknowledge that this case study represents my interpretation of the Angel 
Coalition’s work and is influenced by my theoretical assumptions, political leanings, 
and relationships in the field.   
 
6.2 History of the Angel Coalition, 1998-2008 
As noted, the MiraMed Institute played a major role in the founding of the Angel 
Coalition.  In 1992, a year after its establishment, MiraMed acted upon a request from 
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the Russian Ministry of Family Affairs to study the plight of children abandoned or 
orphaned at birth.  This effort led to MiraMed’s first aid programs to orphanages.  By 
the mid-1990s, MiraMed was supplying direct aid to several orphanages in Russia 
and also organizing teams of American volunteers to work in orphanages, teaching 
subjects such as English, computer skills, and carpentry.   
In the course of this work, Engel and other MiraMed staffers became aware of 
teenage girls being recruited out of the orphanages into prostitution rings in Eastern 
Europe.  In response, MiraMed staffers began to investigate the phenomenon of 
human trafficking and developed a program to educate at-risk girls about its dangers.  
In 1998, with growing awareness of the extensiveness of the trafficking of girls from 
Russian orphanages into sex work abroad, MiraMed applied for, and received, a grant 
from the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to begin an anti-
sex trafficking educational campaign for high-risk girls in the rural regions of Russia.  
In the course of carrying out this campaign, MiraMed worked with Russian NGOs, 
formalizing partnerships with over 100 of them, many of which addressed the issue of 
violence against women and would later become allies in the fight against human 
trafficking.  These burgeoning partnerships represented the beginnings of an activist 
network that would be formalized the following year as the Angel Coalition.  Also in 
1998, the MiraMed Institute was recognized for its work in Russia by the United 




 Following the success of its 1998 educational campaign against sex 
trafficking, MiraMed received grants in 1999 from the U.S. Department of State’s 
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Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the United States Information 
Service’s Democracy Program to expand its counter-trafficking activities.
12
  With 
funding from these grants, MiraMed carried out a year-long public education and 
media campaign in six Russian oblasts to raise awareness among local NGOs, 
government agencies, and the general public about the trafficking of girls and women 
from Russia and other former Soviet states; organized a series of global chatrooms on 
human trafficking conducted in Russian; and co-founded the Angel Coalition, 
Russia’s first coalition of NGOs dedicated to combating human trafficking, in 
conjunction with twenty Russian women’s organizations.
13
   
 At the time of the founding of the Angel Coalition, a number of Russian 
NGOs had already become aware of the trafficking of Russian women abroad and 
had begun to implement projects to combat this trend.  However, they faced 
difficulties in coordinating their activities across such a large expanse of land and in 
obtaining grants geared toward counter-trafficking work.   The formation of the 
Angel Coalition in conjunction with MiraMed allowed these women’s NGOs to 
improve inter-organizational coordination in their fight against human trafficking and 
to benefit from MiraMed’s international connections and experience in obtaining 
large grants.  Nadezhda, a CIS activist working at the Angel Coalition, described the 
founding of the coalition in her own words: 
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[T]here was a base of women’s organizations, social organizations, that were 
already doing something on this topic, each on their own.  Then they joined 
together and decided, there, we have the Angel Coalition, and that they would 
all work together on these programs.  In my view, this was the right thing to 
do because our society is very big and they are all located very far apart from 
one another, and it’s very difficult if you are in Petrozavodsk and something 
happens, where, in Vladivostok, to do something.… And such enthusiastic 
people decided to found the Angel Coalition.  And of course, Juliette [Engel] 
played a big role.  In general, sometimes we call her “Mama,” because she 
takes care of this organization so much, and it was through her enthusiasm 
that the Angel Coalition appeared…. The MiraMed Institute and the Angel 
Coalition, they are thanks to her.  Afterwards, we started to work on our own, 
but all the ideas and the initiative to create such an organization were hers.
14
 
 Initially, the Angel Coalition was registered in St. Petersburg both as an NGO 
and as an association of women’s organizations, with twenty original member 
organizations.  The first president of the Angel Coalition was Natalia Khordyreva, 
director of the Psychological Crisis Center for Women in St. Petersburg, and the 
crisis center served as the first headquarters out of which the AC operated.  In the first 
years of its operation, the Angel Coalition focused much of its efforts on trafficking 
prevention.   
In 2001, the AC, in partnership with MiraMed, organized a large-scale 
counter-trafficking public education and media campaign across Russia.  This joint 
campaign was supported by grants from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
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Educational and Cultural Affairs and Soroptimists International.  To launch the 
campaign, simultaneous press conferences were held in six cities in five different 
Russian oblasts, which were attended by more than 100 radio, television, and 
newspaper journalists.
15
  The campaign kick-off received extensive media coverage 
in all regions and on the national level.  After the press conferences, Russia’s largest 
daily newspaper, Pravda, ran a series of articles about trafficking, and a national 
Russian television station aired a program about trafficking that reached an estimated 
audience of 20 million people.
16
  As part of the first large-scale national media 
campaign on human trafficking, these reports helped to educate people who knew 
little or nothing about the phenomenon.  During the educational campaign, a 
volunteer “army” in each of the six cities visited schools, colleges, and community 
organizations and met with leaders to educate them about human trafficking.  As a 
result of these visits, Duma representatives in many regions pledged their support for 
new laws against trafficking.  In addition, the campaign helped to establish ties 
between counter-trafficking NGOs and the Russian government and built the 
foundation from which many future collaborative efforts would grow.
17
   
 In 2001, the Angel Coalition also opened a Moscow office, which then 
became the headquarters of the Angel Coalition network of NGOs.  The Moscow 
office took over the responsibilities of building collaborative relations with Russian 
governmental structures and international organizations, coordinating the work of AC 
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member NGOs, and searching for funding for member NGOs.
18
  Because the Angel 
Coalition was not yet self-supporting at that time, the new office, according to the 
AC’s newsletter, was presented to the AC as a “gift” from MiraMed, which also 
covered the salaries of the office’s director and coordinator.
19
  Marianna Solomatova, 
a counter-trafficking activist and organizer from Chelyabinsk, was hired to take over 
as Angel Coalition director.  With a furnished and technologically equipped office in 
Moscow (in close proximity to MiraMed’s office) and two paid staff positions, the 
hope was that these resources would enable the Angel Coalition to attain self-
sufficiency, an aim which would require the staff to devote a great deal of time to 
applying for grants and meeting with Russian and international contacts to establish 
the AC as a legitimate partner in the counter-trafficking field.   
 Also in 2001, the MiraMed-Angel Coalition family expanded to include two 
additional organizations that focused, in part, on human trafficking.  The Russian 
organization Women and Children First (WCF) was founded in Moscow by MiraMed 
in order to extend MiraMed’s mission of protecting Russian women and children.
20
  
Similar to the founding of the Angel Coalition, the establishment of WCF as a 
Russian organization provided further support toward the achievement of MiraMed’s 
mission.  As Russian organizations, the AC and WCF had greater opportunities to 
collaborate with the Russian government, influence Russian legislation, restructure 
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Russia’s social policy, etc., than MiraMed did as a foreign organization.  But whereas 
the AC focused mainly on the trafficking of adults, especially women, WCF’s 
emphasis was on advocating for children, including trafficked children, but also 
children who had experienced other forms of trauma or were living in vulnerable 
situations.   
In addition, in 2001, MiraMed initiated collaboration with the Russian 
organization Theatre for Change, a newly established social action theater company 
in Nizhny Novgorod.
21
  Together, MiraMed and Theatre for Change developed a play 
entitled “Let’s Go to Paris,” which acted out a common trafficking scenario with life-
size puppets to be performed in Russian schools.  Performances of the play were 
combined with discussion on the dangers of human trafficking and distribution of 
AC’s educational materials.  The success of “Let’s Go to Paris” led MiraMed and 
Theatre for Change to apply for a three-year grant from USAID, which they received, 
to create a series of in-school plays focusing on increasing tolerance for socially 
marginalized populations, such as orphans, individuals with disabilities, and those 
living with HIV/AIDS.  Among MiraMed employees and AC activists, these three 
Russian organizations, the Angel Coalition, Women and Children First, and Theatre 
for Change, are understood to be part of the “MiraMed family,” with MiraMed often 
seen as a “parent figure” to these three Russian offshoots that it helped to birth and 
grow toward future independence.   
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 The Angel Coalition continued to expand its counter-trafficking activities in 
2001 by initiating a training program for foreign consulates in St. Petersburg, a 
program that was extended to embassies in Moscow in 2002.  The program was 
targeted toward staff in the visa-granting sections and educated participants on human 
trafficking, particularly patterns of trafficking common in Russia, and on techniques 
to identify potential victims when they arrive in visa sections or as part of tourist 
groups.  Participants were given AC brochures to distribute to individuals applying 
for visas, which warned about the risks of traveling abroad and provided information 
about travelers’ rights and who to contact for help in a foreign country.   The training 
program was conducted mainly in embassies of European countries, including the 




 In 2002, the Angel Coalition began working with the Legislative Committee 
of the Russian State Duma in an effort to pass a comprehensive federal counter-
trafficking law.  As noted, the 2003 draft law was not passed, but amendments to the 
criminal code were adopted in that year that made human trafficking and related 
crimes illegal.  However, there was still no overarching framework to coordinate the 
work of the government and NGOs against trafficking.  Therefore, AC activists 
continued to lobby for a comprehensive law that would allocate funding specifically 
for counter-trafficking work; assign responsibilities to Russian ministries and 
governmental agencies in combating the crime, providing aid to victims, 
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communicating with foreign governments in repatriating victims, etc.; and outline a 
plan of cooperation between the government and NGOs.   
 The Angel Coalition experienced major growth in 2003, the year in which it 
received funding to transform its Moscow office into the Angel Coalition Trafficking 
Victims Assistance Center and, in partnership with MiraMed, to develop a network of 
safehouses for trafficking victims throughout Russia.  A grant from the U.S. 
Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP 
Office) to MiraMed and AC funded the opening of the TVAC in June 2003 and 
provided sub-grants of $20,000 each to five organizational members of the Angel 
Coalition network in St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Petrozavodsk, and Kazan to establish 
regional safehouses.
23
  Oleg Kouzbit, a media and public relations specialist from 
Nizhny Novgorod, was appointed the director of the TVAC.  The main purpose of the 
TVAC was to work with the Russian government and international agencies to 
coordinate the return of Russian victims of trafficking (primarily women) who had 
experienced exploitation abroad.  Victims could then receive rehabilitative services in 
one of the regional safehouses.  These five safehouses were the first for trafficking 
victims in Russia and provided medical, psychological, and legal services to help 
reintegrate victims back into their communities.
24
  According to MiraMed, in its first 
year of operation, the TVAC assisted in the rescue and repatriation of 65 victims of 
trafficking from foreign countries, and over 100 victims received services at the 
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TVAC and the regional safehouses.
25
  In 2004, four new safehouses were established 
with TIP funding in Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, and Irkutsk and 
joined the Angel Coalition network. 
Angel Coalition activists, at both the TVAC and the regional centers, carried 
out several projects related to the opening of the safehouses, including the 
development of a health and rehabilitation protocol to be used in the shelters.  In 
2003, with funding from the Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation to MiraMed, TVAC 
staff organized international exchanges for safehouse staff to visit operating shelters 
in nine European countries that were providing services to Russian victims of human 
trafficking.  Following the visits, participants took part in a five-day “protocol 
writing” session in Moscow along with governmental representatives from the 
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Duma, and the Moscow 
City Duma.
26
  This working group developed the first draft protocol for providing 
assistance to victims of trafficking in Russia; its recommendations were accepted by 
governmental officials as an exemplar of “best practices” for safehouse operation in 
Russia and were implemented in the nine safehouses in the Angel Coalition network.  
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 In 2004, the Angel Coalition initiated one of their most well-known and far-
reaching projects when they launched a toll-free Russian language hotline throughout 
Russia and in several foreign countries.
28
  Initially, the hotline was available in 
Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium; later it was extended to Switzerland 
and the United States as well.  The hotline targeted, first of all, Russian-speaking 
human trafficking victims in Russia or foreign countries who could call the number 
for assistance in being rescued from a trafficking situation, if necessary, and in 
returning home.  In addition, the hotline was designed to provide consultations to 
Russians preparing to travel abroad to inform them of precautions for safe travel and 
provide phone numbers of important contacts abroad in case they should find 
themselves in difficult situations.   
When TVAC staff received calls from victims of human trafficking abroad, 
they worked with their contacts in the Russian government and law enforcement and 
in foreign countries to assist in the rescue of the victims and connect them with 
safehouses in the destination country to receive rehabilitative services until they could 
be repatriated to Russia.  Once victims arrived back in Russia, TVAC employees met 
many of them at an airport or train station and arranged transportation for them to 
travel home or to a safehouse or rehabilitation center.  In addition to receiving calls 
directly from victims, the hotline also received many calls from relatives of victims or 
from those who were fearful a family member had become a victim of human 
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trafficking.  In such situations, TVAC staff connected family members to authorities 
who could further investigate the cases.  The AC also exerted a great deal of effort in 
advertising the hotline, both in Russia and in foreign countries, to increase awareness 
of this service though means such as billboards, posters in metro stations, brochures 
available at Moscow embassies and airports and airports abroad, and pens, tarot 
cards, or other informational materials distributed directly to Moscow sex workers.   
Additionally in 2004, the AC, in partnership with the Swedish women’s 
organization Kvinnoforum, began to organize regional “Safe Rescue and Return” 
conferences and trainings to build the capacity of the TVAC and the regional 
safehouses in coordinating the repatriation of Russian trafficking victims from abroad 
and providing rehabilitative services.  This project was funded by the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) and the U.S. State Department’s TIP 
Office.
29
  From 2004 to 2007, these conferences and trainings were held in Moscow 
and the eight regions of Russia where AC safehouses were located and were geared to 
respond to the specific needs of each region.  In addition to local NGO activists, 
Russian governmental and law enforcement officials and foreign experts in the 
counter-trafficking field participated in the conferences, which helped to build 
collaborative partnerships between these groups.  The President’s Administration of 
the Russian Federation endorsed the “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences and 
mandated that each regional governor appoint representatives to attend.
30
  As a result, 
high-level governmental officials were present at most of the conferences.    
                                                 
29
 MiraMed Institute, “First of five high level regional strategic anti-trafficking conferences begins in 
the Republic of Karelia,” MiraMed Institute Annual Program Report 2004 (December 1, 2004), 3.  





In addition to establishing collaborative relationships, training participants 
contributed to the development of a counter-trafficking protocol that outlined 
recommended procedures to follow during the rehabilitation and repatriation 
processes and a recommended division of responsibilities for various governmental 
agencies and NGO partners in responding to and prosecuting trafficking-related 
crimes.  In 2004, in the absence of an official governmental protocol, the Angel 
Coalition published the “Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action for the 
Russian Federation,” which served as a guide on how governmental structures and 
NGOs should coordinate their efforts to combat human trafficking.
31
  This protocol 
was further revised based on continuing conference discussions and recommendations 
from participants.  The NGO-governmental relationships established during these 
trainings and the protocol were utilized to simplify and improve the repatriation of 
Russian trafficking victims from foreign countries.  In 2007, with renewed funding 
from SIDA, this project was expanded to Central Asia, and conferences and trainings 
were organized in the CIS countries of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.   
 In 2005, the Angel Coalition, with many programs in place to assist women 
victims of human trafficking, turned its attention to the much-neglected issue of child 
trafficking.  Describing the problem of child trafficking in Moscow, MiraMed writes: 
“As the nation’s largest and most influential city [Moscow] serves as a magnet not 
only for homeless children looking for work but for pimps and traffickers who import 
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women and children into Moscow from economically depressed regions and former 
Soviet republics for prostitution.”
32
  MiraMed cites the Moscow militia estimate that, 
in 2005, over 70,000 victims of trafficking for prostitution were living in the city, that 
90 percent of them were women and girls, and that 80 percent were under 18 years of 
age.
33
  Although many of these were teenagers, even children younger than ten were 
found to be victims of sex trafficking.   
Exacerbating the situation was the fact that there was no system of rescue and 
rehabilitation for trafficked children.  In the absence of shelters for victims of child 
trafficking or other forms of child exploitation, police and social service workers 
randomly sent such children to hospitals, shelters for homeless children, or juvenile 
detention centers; children from other regions or countries were commonly deported 
back to their native areas.  Many social workers were aware of the deficiencies in the 
system but did not have the tools or the training to address this problem.  In an effort 
to begin the process of reforming the child welfare system in Moscow to be more 
responsive to traumatized children, the Angel Coalition, in partnership with MiraMed 
and Women and Children First, initiated the Moscow Child Rescue Project in 2005 
with funding from the World Childhood Foundation.  The project aimed to develop 
methodologies for a new rehabilitation model for traumatized children; provide 
training for detention center staff, police, social workers, medical personnel, and 
other workers who frequently come into contact with trafficked or exploited children; 
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and raise the awareness of senior governmental officials of the problem in order to 
begin reforming the system.   
 To carry out the Moscow Child Rescue Project, AC, WCF, and MiraMed 
worked to establish constructive relationships with the Moscow juvenile police and 
staff at the Altufovo Temporary Detention Center for Juvenile Delinquents, which 
was run by the Moscow police and was the only facility in Moscow that provided 
care to street children from other regions and countries.  The relationships established 
with the Moscow juvenile police led AC and its partners to offer a course of police 
training designed by the AC psychologist, an expert in police psychology.  In May 
2006, the Moscow Department of Internal Affairs signed an agreement with the 
Angel Coalition permitting the AC to provide professional training to Moscow law 
enforcement personnel.
34
  From 2006 to 2008, several thousand Moscow police 
officers, detectives, and police psychologists received training on identifying and 
working with trafficked and exploited children.  At the Detention Center for Juvenile 
Delinquents, the AC and its partners created two specially furnished, child-friendly 
rooms: one for relaxation therapy for children, and the other for psychologists to 
interview children while police or social workers watched from the other side of a 
one-way mirror.
35
  The “interviewing room” was also used during AC training 
sessions to demonstrate to participants how to interview children in non-traumatizing 
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ways and how to obtain as much evidence as possible for criminal cases without 
causing further harm.
36
   
 In addition to training law enforcement personnel and creating the child-
friendly rooms in the detention center, the Moscow Child Rescue Project was also 
directed at raising the awareness of senior governmental officials on child trafficking 
in order to implement system-wide reforms.  One of the most difficult aspects of the 
project was transforming the discourse and understanding of city officials of these 
children as “vagrants” or “juvenile delinquents” and demonstrating to them the abuse 
and exploitation that many of the children had experienced.  Although the Moscow 
Child Rescue Project was initiated in 2005, it was not until 2007 that the term 
“trafficked children” was accepted as an official term in discussing the scope of the 
problem.  In an April 2007 meeting sponsored by the AC and WCF and attended by 
city officials, law enforcement officials, and representatives of the Moscow 
Department of Social Protection, the Moscow Department of Education, and the 
President’s Administration, government officials acknowledged the problem of “child 
trafficking” for the first time.
37
  Once the problem of child trafficking was officially 
recognized, government-sponsored agencies and institutes were authorized to begin 
projects addressing the issue on a wider scale, and the Moscow Child Rescue Project 
moved to implement sustainable, long-lasting reform in the system.   
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 In addition to the above-mentioned reforms, the Moscow Child Rescue 
Project also accomplished the following achievements: it developed the concept 
methodologies for a new rehabilitation model for traumatized children that was 
incorporated into a federal governmental project on reforming the child welfare 
system; it set up model therapeutic play rooms at additional pilot sites, including city 
shelters, rehabilitation centers, and orphanages, with staff trained in using the space 
for therapeutic work; it elicited an agreement from the Federal Ministry of Education 
to co-fund pilot rehabilitation programs in city shelters for children; it facilitated the 
open discussion of child abuse and child trafficking among officials on both the city 
and federal levels, along with commitments to address these problems; it developed, 
in partnership with the Moscow University of Psychology and Pedagogy, the first 
trauma rehabilitation module of a new professional qualification for child welfare 
workers; among many other achievements.  These accomplishments represent not 
only the implementation of projects aimed at serving trafficked and abused children, 
but also the construction of a stronger and more responsive foundation from which 
the Russian child welfare system could continue to grow.   
The example of the Moscow Child Rescue Project demonstrates the ability of 
transnational actors to influence reforms in the social welfare system in Russia, which 
is often perceived, both at home and abroad, as a strong state that rejects foreign 
interference.  In this particular project, the World Childhood Foundation, an 
international organization based in Sweden, provided funding to MiraMed, AC, and 
WCF, hybrid Russia-U.S. organizations, to provide services directly to Russian law 




social welfare workers.  The collaborative relationships established through this 
project led to new rehabilitation models, educational curricula, and training programs 
that were accepted by the Russian government and, in many cases, taken over by 
Russian governmental agencies.  Thus, in contrast to Russia’s perceived rejection of 
foreign influence over its domestic affairs, this example illustrates that, on issues of 
importance to all parties, e.g., the welfare of Russia’s children, the parties were 
willing to work together and take advantage of their combined experience to 
implement beneficial reforms for this system.    
 In 2007, reflecting the success of the Moscow Child Rescue Project and the 
need for continued reforms, MiraMed, AC, and WCF received additional funding 
from the World Childhood Foundation to expand the project.  Acknowledging the 
enormity of attempting to reform Russia’s child welfare system, the renewed Moscow 
Child Rescue Project was split into two parts: the Angel Coalition took charge of the 
police trainings and expanded them outside of Moscow city to the broader Moscow 
Region and the city of Nizhny Novgorod; and Women and Children First took on the 
reform of Russia’s shelters and rehabilitation programs.  The renewed program 
focused not just on providing training to professionals in Moscow’s child welfare 
system but also developing a group of committed advocates for change who would 
spread their knowledge to their colleagues and continue to push for system-wide 
reform after the Moscow Child Rescue Project ended.   
As of 2008, the Moscow Child Rescue Project was endorsed by the Moscow 
Ombudsman for Children’s Rights and the Moscow City University of Psychology 






  In 2008, MiraMed received two grants from the Moscow Department of 
Social Protection for the reprinting of educational materials for specialists working 
with child victims of violence and for a rehabilitation program for adolescents in the 
pilot sites.
39
  Women and Children First was invited to apply for further grants from 
the Moscow government to continue developing methods for the rehabilitation of 
children and adolescents.
40
  Thus, in many ways, AC and WCF acted as full-fledged 
partners of the government in the effort to reform the child welfare system in Russia.  
The relationships that AC, WCF, and MiraMed formed with Russian governmental 
structures around the issues of human trafficking and the child welfare system 
demonstrate the willingness of the government to partner with Russian NGOs and 
international organizations when such partnerships further national goals.   
In 2008, the AC further expanded its police training programs by initiating a 
project that focused on police who work with adult victims of trafficking.  
Recognizing the abusive treatment that many trafficking victims faced at the hands of 
Russian police, several law enforcement divisions asked the Angel Coalition for help 
in improving their methods of working with victims in order to protect victims’ 
human rights and encourage more of them to participate in criminal cases against 
traffickers.  In response, the AC, with funding from the European Commission, 
implemented the “Changing Stereotypes, Building Partnerships” project, through 
which they conducted joint police/NGO trainings to educate local police about human 
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trafficking and to further the development of law enforcement-NGO partnerships in 
five regions of Russia.
41
  The AC carried out this project in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, 
Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, and Petrozavodsk in partnership with four of the most 
active AC-member organizations over a 14-month period from 2008 to the beginning 
of 2009.  These training sessions built upon the law enforcement-NGO relationships 
developed during the “Safe Rescue and Return” trainings in these regions.   
The training sessions aimed to teach police to treat trafficking victims as 
victims of crime rather than as criminals; to recognize the exploitation and trauma 
that many of them had experienced; and to understand the human rights of trafficking 
victims and how to avoid violating these rights.  For example, police were taught to 
not use force against individuals who exhibited characteristics of possible trafficking 
victims (i.e., who wore clothing not appropriate for the season, who spoke poor 
Russian, appeared in ill health, etc.), to ensure that these individuals felt they were in 
a safe location before questioning them, and to allow women to be interviewed by 
women police officers or social workers, if possible.  Local NGOs monitored the 
implementation of human right standards for treatment of victims of human 
trafficking in each region.  Trafficking survivors who had undertaken AC-network 
rehabilitation programs also participated in the project and gave recommendations to 
law enforcement on working with victims.  A hope was that, by treating trafficking 
victims more humanely, more would agree to cooperate in criminal proceedings 
against traffickers and their accomplices, thereby increasing the prosecution rate and 
putting more traffickers behind bars (a main goal of the participating police officers).   
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The project resulted in the launching of a website providing law enforcement 
personnel and NGO activists access to counter-trafficking resources; distribution of 
20,000 pocket-sized brochures for police on “identifying potential victims of human 
trafficking” in the participating regions; the publication of a textbook on human 
trafficking developed by the AC in partnership with several governmental 
institutions; the strengthening of partnerships between local law enforcement 
agencies and NGOs; and the development of a police training module that could be 
replicated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in other Russian regions.  In 2008, 350 
participants took part in these training sessions, including 200 key law enforcement 
and governmental officials and 150 NGO representatives.
42
  With most of the 
participating law enforcement officials in leadership positions, the intention was to 
have them pass along the knowledge they gained to their staff.  
In addition to the expanded police training program, in 2008, the Angel 
Coalition implemented a trafficking awareness program to directly educate juveniles 
about the risks of human trafficking and other forms of abuse and exploitation.  
Working with the Moscow juvenile police, the AC conducted training sessions for 
teenagers aged 14 to 17 in nine schools in the Moscow Region and the Altufovo 
Temporary Detention Center for Juvenile Delinquents on recognizing signs of 
potential trafficking situations, obtaining work safely and legitimately, and 
developing decision-making skills to lead healthy and secure lives.  More than 220 
students participated in these sessions through schools, and 58 youth participated at 
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  Additionally, the AC conducted training sessions for juvenile 
police officers and teachers on leading such trainings, with the goal that the program 
would eventually be taken over by the Moscow Department of Education and law 
enforcement officials.  The Moscow Department of Internal Affairs recognized the 
Angel Coalition’s work with a letter thanking the organization for its continued 
education of juvenile police and psychologists.
44
 
In addition, in 2008, the AC prepared to take its first international case on 
human trafficking to the European Court.
45
  The AC lawyer worked on the case, “N. 
M. Rantsev against Cyprus and Russia,” in collaboration with lawyers from London 
and Yekaterinburg.  The AC planned to take a second case to the European Court in 
2009.   
Besides the major Angel Coalition projects outlined above, the AC carried out 
many additional activities between 1998 and 2008, including several educational 
campaigns on human trafficking, many collaborative projects with MiraMed and 
Women and Children First, and continuous efforts to build relationships with 
governmental officials, NGO representatives, and international organizations both in 
Russian and abroad.  From a network of twenty organizations in 1999, the Angel 
Coalition grew to comprise more than sixty NGOs from 27 regions of Russia and nine 
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CIS countries in 2008.
46
  Over the course of this decade, the AC experienced many 
successes in raising the awareness of the Russian public, government, and law 
enforcement on human trafficking; transforming the issue of human trafficking from 
a taboo topic among policymakers to an issue seriously addressed by nation-wide 
committees and federal ministries; directly preventing the trafficking of numerous at-
risk individuals and assisting in the rescue and rehabilitation of many victims; serving 
as a major partner in the reform of the Russian child welfare system and victim 
rehabilitation system; pioneering new models of collaboration between the Russian 
government, international organizations, and Russian NGOs; and leading and 
coordinating the multifaceted Russian movement against human trafficking.  
However, the Angel Coalition faced many challenges in its efforts to combat 
human trafficking and not all of its initiatives proved to be sustainable.  Among other 
obstacles, the AC was hampered by the lack of receptiveness of many government 
structures to working with NGOs, lack of support in Russia for work on women’s 
issues (as compared to children’s issues), dependency on personal ties to 
governmental officials rather than institutional connections, difficulties of 
coordinating with partner NGOs in conditions of poor communication and financial 
infrastructures, and reliance on short-term and project specific funding.   
One of the AC’s most important projects, the network of safehouses that it 
developed, did not last beyond the duration of the grant from the U.S. Department of 
State’s TIP Office.  By 2008, the AC’s safehouses had closed and TVAC employees 
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could only send victims to a rehabilitation center operated by the International 
Organization for Migration in Moscow.  However, IOM’s center focused mainly on 
medical and, secondarily, psychological rehabilitation and victims could stay only for 
up to a month, which was in contrast to the more comprehensive services offered at 
AC’s safehouses, which included educational and career training, legal aid, and 
community reintegration, and which allowed victims to stay for longer periods of 
time.  Additionally, trafficking victims from abroad were offered the opportunity for 
rehabilitation at the IOM center only immediately upon their repatriation without the 
possibility of visiting family members first.  With victims from various regions of 
Russia, many made the decision to return to their home regions rather than remain in 
Moscow for rehabilitation.  Finally, according to TVAC employees, IOM brought in 
police officers to talk to all victims, while AC safehouses had allowed victims to 
choose whether or not to cooperate with law enforcement.  Thus, AC activists felt a 
great void was created by the closing of the regional safehouses, and, during the 
period I was in Moscow, they continuously searched for funding with the hope of re-
opening the safehouses.   
In the following two sections, I explore in more detail the challenges that the 
Angel Coalition faced in working to achieve its counter-trafficking goals and the 
unique organizational factors that enabled the AC to achieve much success both 
within Russia and internationally.  Drawing upon the background research in previous 
chapters, I explore how the Angel Coalition operated both as a part of Russian civil 
society and as part of the international movement against human trafficking and how 





6.3 The Angel Coalition as Part of Russian Civil Society 
As discussed in chapter 3, Russian and foreign NGOs faced numerous difficulties in 
operating as part of Russian civil society in the period from 1998 to 2008.  These 
difficulties related both to NGOs’ efforts to build relationships with the Russian state 
and to NGOs’ efforts to maintain sufficient levels of funding for their organization’s 
survival.  In this section, I address how the Angel Coalition responded to challenges 
in both of these areas.   
 
6.3.1 The Angel Coalition’s Efforts to Build Relationships with the Russian State 
NGOs confronted a number of challenges in attempting to collaborate with Russian 
state structures and in maintaining good standing with the Russian state.  First, the 
tradition of the “strong state” in Russia and the Russian government’s promotion of a 
statist model of civil society led to the development of a system that privileged 
organizations that addressed government-identified priority issues and penalized 
organizations that too overtly challenged state policies.  Thus, advocacy 
organizations, which pressed the government for change, had to work cautiously in 
this politically sensitive environment.  
Second, and related to this, NGOs faced increasingly strict and burdensome 
regulations on the registration and operation of their organizations during this period.  
The substantial time and fees required to complete the official registration process 
and to submit annual reports drained the resources of many organizations, and the 
increasingly strict requirements resulted in more organizations’ registration 




focused on areas of national priority faced greater scrutiny, and foreign NGOs were 
subject to even stricter registration and reporting requirements.  As a result, many 
advocacy NGOs operated in a state of uncertainty about their future in Russia.    
Third, NGOs faced challenges in obtaining financing for their operations, a 
task that proved more difficult than in many Western states due to limited support 
from the Russian public and Russian corporations, whose minimal financial donations 
went largely to state-proclaimed priority areas.  As a result, most active Russian 
NGOs depended on a mix of funding from the Russian state and foreign funders, each 
of which had its own advantages and pitfalls.  A lack of long-term funding for most 
Russian NGOs meant that few had the opportunity to achieve longevity and gain the 
trust and respect of Russian governmental officials in order to significantly impact 
public policy.   
A fourth major obstacle to operating an NGO in Russia was the continued 
lack of understanding and respect of civil society by both the Russian public and 
Russian governmental officials.  Most members of the Russian public and many 
governmental officials were unaware of the meaning of “civil society” or of the type 
of work that NGOs did even during the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008.  This 
lack of understanding hampered the ability of NGOs to garner public support for their 
activities and limited their influence in the political sphere.  In the remainder of this 
section, I examine the work of the Angel Coalition from 1999-2008 and demonstrate 
how the organization tackled and overcame many of these obstacles to implement 




 The Angel Coalition’s unique history distinguished it from the majority of 
Russian advocacy NGOs, many of which struggled for survival with limited funding 
and limited Russian and foreign support.  Co-founded by Engel, a U.S. activist with 
ties to U.S. and international funding agencies and with a history of social activism in 
Russia, the Angel Coalition from the start had access to greater funding opportunities, 
a fledging network of key Russian and foreign contacts, and a degree of status with 
Russian governmental officials due to its association with MiraMed.  While many of 
the Angel Coalition’s partner NGOs in the counter-trafficking and women’s rights 
arenas lived from grant to grant and often suspended operation at times of low 
funding or disbanded altogether after a few years of operation, Engel’s commitment 
to the Angel Coalition over this ten-year period helped the organization to survive 
during tough times and to develop a degree of self sufficiency.  As noted, when the 
Angel Coalition opened its Moscow office in 2001, MiraMed covered the rent of the 
office along with the salaries of the office’s director and coordinator.  These start-up 
funds allowed the AC time to build up its own grant and project history, cultivate 
contacts within the transnational counter-trafficking movement, and establish a 
reputation with Russian governmental officials.    
Depending on grants for organizational survival was a time-consuming 
process, with staff needed to search for grant opportunities, write grant applications, 
ensure projects were carried out to the specifications of the funders, and compile 
reports for funders upon the completion of projects.  Unlike many other NGOs, 
however, the AC had paid staff to carry out these tasks.  At the time of my fieldwork 




TVAC office with the main responsibilities of searching for funding for the AC, 
writing grant applications, and ensuring the requirements of the grants were met.  
With a more permanent base of paid staff than other Russian counter-trafficking 
NGOs, the AC was able to achieve a degree of sustainability and longevity, which 
enabled it to gain the trust of many government officials.  Additionally, the AC and 
MiraMed were able to obtain grants jointly, utilizing their combined Russian and 
international expertise. 
 Thus, the dual U.S./Russian nature of the Angel Coalition provided it with 
advantages that few Russian NGOs had.  U.S. and other Western activists utilized 
their familiarity with the expectations of Western funders and with the terminology 
and theoretical concepts used by these funders to write successful grant applications 
for the AC’s projects.  In addition, they helped the AC make connections within the 
transnational counter-trafficking movement and build international networks to aid in 
their fight against trafficking in Russia.  However, as foreigners in Russia, Western 
activists had little influence over domestic Russian affairs.  Thus, CIS activists used 
their positionality to advocate for the rights of trafficking victims within Russia and 
to press the government for improved counter-trafficking policies.  Describing the 
benefits of having both Russians and Westerners working at the AC, Michael, an 
American activist stated: 
[This collaboration]  [m]akes it more flexible, because operating in Russia is 
extremely difficult for Westerners.  It takes a different type of thinking to 
know how to deal with the government structures and all of that.  You need 




comes from the West, and most of the Russians don’t understand the 
accountability procedures and the report-writing procedures and how to apply 
for a grant properly and all those things and that’s where Western thinking 
and Western expertise is especially important, as well as just making 
connections.  And of course, the language thing.  It doubles the potential of 
the organization.  It can potentially work effectively with the entire English-
speaking world and the entire Russian-speaking world.
47
   
 The unusual organizational characteristics of the Angel Coalition helped it to 
overcome challenges both of working with foreign funders and with the Russian 
government.   Due to the nature of the issue of human trafficking, collaborating with 
Russian government structures was essential to the AC’s work.  As a complex, 
transnational issue, human trafficking demanded a comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary response from many sectors of society, especially the government.  
Although the Russian government did not take on leadership of the counter-
trafficking movement in Russia, the AC continually pushed the government to fight 
this crime, protect victims, and alleviate societal conditions that contributed to 
trafficking.  Svetlana, a CIS activist, discussed the importance of the AC’s 
collaboration with government structures: 
[W]ithout the government we can’t work…. With victims, what can we do?  
We can just help or assist them, but we cannot work against crime and this 
organized crime.  We can’t just fight all these criminals and put them in jail…. 
Governments, they have responsibility, and this is their work, so they must do 
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that work.  So we just try to help them, assist them and cooperate with them.  
Even if they don’t want to continue to do that.
48
   
For AC activists, the most important governmental action needed to fight 
trafficking in Russia was the passage of a comprehensive, federal counter-trafficking 
law.  As discussed, AC activists worked with the Legislative Committee of the 
Russian State Duma during development of a draft counter-trafficking law in 2003.  
The draft law was not passed, but amendments to the criminal code were passed in 
that year that made human trafficking and related crimes illegal.  Since that time, the 
Angel Coalition continued to serve on a legislative working group charged with 
developing a federal law.  Between 2003 and 2008, several CIS countries passed 
comprehensive counter-trafficking laws, but a federal law was never passed in 
Russia.  In the absence of such a law, the AC published the “Counter-Trafficking 
Protocol and Plan of Action for the Russian Federation” in 2004, which served as 
guide on the division of responsibilities among government structures and NGOs in 
responding to human trafficking.   
Reflecting on why the counter-trafficking law was not passed in Russia, AC 
activists felt the government was reluctant to commit the large amount of funds that 
would be required to finance the counter-trafficking activities mandated by the draft 
law.  In addition, some activists reported that a number of corrupt government 
officials were involved in human trafficking operations and opposed the counter-
trafficking law because it would hurt their profits.  In 2004, a witness-protection law 
was passed that provided funds to protect victims and witnesses of crimes, including 
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human trafficking, but the funds allocated for this program were minimal and few 
trafficking victims benefitted from this law.   
When the AC lobbied government structures to support counter-trafficking 
programs, such as assistance for victims or publication of trafficking awareness 
materials, officials often claimed lack of funds to support such programs.  A counter-
trafficking law would resolve this problem by providing a specific budget for counter-
trafficking activities.  Indeed, the Russian government had committed to develop such 
a law and support such programs when it signed the Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the accompanying Protocol on Human 
Trafficking in 2000.  The reluctance of the Russian government to commit such funds 
left the door open for foreign funders to finance Russian counter-trafficking 
programs.  Russian activists took advantage of foreign funding, and the Russian 
government accepted some foreign-financed programs, because these programs 
helped the state meet its international obligations and demonstrated Russia’s 
willingness to fight human trafficking. 
  One of the largest foreign-financed counter-trafficking programs accepted by 
the Russian government was the AC’s training program for Russian police.  
Recognizing the key role that law enforcement officers played in human trafficking 
cases, the AC had sought to establish collaborative relationships with law 
enforcement structures since the early years of its operation.  However, law 
enforcement agencies were reluctant to work with NGOs, due to a lack of familiarity 
with the NGO sector.  In addition, some law enforcement officers expressed 




activists worked sporadically with contacts in law enforcement agencies, but these 
connections were based on personal, not institutional, ties, and the connections were 
often lost when an official moved to a different position or retired.  However, the AC 
utilized these fledging ties and received permission from the Moscow Department of 
Internal Affairs in 2006 to train juvenile police in Moscow as part of the World 
Childhood Foundation-funded Moscow Child Rescue Project.  As noted, in 2007, 
upon receiving permission from the appropriate departments, this project was 
expanded to the broader Moscow Region and to Nizhny Novgorod, and in 2008, the 
European Commission funded a training program that focused on police who work 
with adult victims of trafficking in five regions of Russia.   
These training programs taught police to treat individuals who had been 
trafficked as victims rather than criminals and to implement more humane procedures 
in working with victims to avoid re-traumatizing them.  Human trafficking was a 
difficult crime to prosecute, since it relied on proving coercion or deception rather 
than on physical evidence and since victims were often unwilling to testify; as a 
result, many police officers were reluctant to devote time to the problem.  To 
encourage the participation of police in these trainings, the AC demonstrated how the 
trainings would serve law enforcement’s own interests and help them improve their 
prosecution rates.    
AC activists reported that, as the trainings progressed, they won an increasing 
amount of respect from law enforcement officials.  Through these programs, law 
enforcement officials also became more familiar with the work of the NGO sector as 




Although there were still many law enforcement structures that were hesitant to work 
with NGOs, these training programs opened up more possibilities for AC-law 
enforcement cooperation.  In addition, upon completion of the projects, the 
publications, films, and other resources used during the trainings were distributed to 
law enforcement agencies for continued use during internal police trainings.  Several 
law enforcement agencies expressed interest in taking over the programs and 
institutionalizing them as part of their police education system.  Thus, the projects 
also helped the AC to make progress toward its broader goals of encouraging state 
action against human trafficking and instituting widespread change in the 
governmental response system toward victims.   
However, AC activists reported that they began to lose some of their 
connections to law enforcement after their safehouses were shut down and that they 
no longer worked as closely with police on trafficking cases.  Previously, when the 
safehouses were in operation, police referred trafficking victims to the AC for 
medical and psychological care.  With the AC no longer providing such concrete 
victim services, police were less willing to work with the organization.  This situation 
illustrates the position of the Russian government on working with NGOs, including 
foreign-financed NGOs.  In cases when these NGOs have something to offer that is 
beneficial to the state, government structures have shown a willingness to take 
advantage of such offers.  In the case of police training, government structures 
recognized the importance and value of the trainings, as they contributed to the state 
goals of fighting crime, increasing prosecution rates, and demonstrating to the 




Although human trafficking was not one of the state-identified priority areas for 
social activism, AC activists demonstrated how the interests of the government and 
counter-trafficking NGOs collided on this issue.   
While these trainings allowed the AC to form closer relationships to law 
enforcement structures, the AC never secured the status of a full partner to the state.  
Instead, the AC, like other Russian NGOs collaborating with governmental bodies, 
viewed its role more as a help-mate to a powerful state.  Nadezhda, a CIS activist, 
explained the attitude of state and law enforcement structures toward NGOs and why 
the idea of law enforcement paying NGOs for a service was unrealistic: 
[I]n Russia, there is the idea that if you are civil society activists 
[obshchestvenniki], then you work for society.  What money?  What, you 
need money for your work?  So, you also need to understand the psychology 
of the system in our country and the relationship between society and those in 
power, and that… budget workers [biudzhetniki], they sit with the budget in 
the law enforcement agencies, they don’t earn too much, and if they pay us, 
that also wouldn’t work out.  Not only ordinary people who work there, but 
also the bosses.  So, because of such complicated relationships, it is difficult 
to say that we demand money from law enforcement agencies.  First of all, 
they don’t have it, and second of all, the structure of relationships is not such 
that they can do it.
49
   
As reflected by this statement, similar to the situation in many Western 
democracies, civil society in Russia is often perceived as the “feminine” sphere of 
social activism as compared to the “masculine” sphere of state control.  Civil society 
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is seen as the “soft” sphere, in which people work out of the good of their hearts, not 
for compensation.  And indeed, it is a sphere that many well-educated and 
professional women turned to in the post-Soviet period when women’s representation 
in the government was minimal and women’s issues were neglected by the state.  In 
the transition period, as the state focused on strengthening the economy and 
rebuilding Russia as a global power, civil society was left to take on the issues that 
were no longer state priorities, including responding to the needs of vulnerable 
populations such as abused women, trafficking victims, exploited children, and 
orphans.  Only when civil society activism coincided with state interests did the 
government prove receptive to activists’ overtures in these areas.  As the sphere of 
civil society remained undervalued and underappreciated by both the Russian public 
and the Russian state, activists continued to advocate for the needs of vulnerable 
groups and push the government for action on these issues. 
 Another way that the AC stepped in to fill a void in the Russian trafficking 
response system was through the launch of their toll-free international counter-
trafficking hotline in 2004.  As mentioned, this Russian-language hotline operated in 
Russia and in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
States.  Like most AC projects, the hotline was supported mainly by foreign funds.  
According to AC activists, when they were preparing to launch the hotline, the U.S. 
Department of State was set to fund this project, but then U.S. funding was suddenly 
canceled.  Since then, the AC was able to secure little direct funding to cover the 
operation of the hotline.  Instead, they wrote hotline operating costs into the budgets 




fund different aspects of the hotline.  For example, in 2006-2007, the AC received 
funding from the Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development to specifically 
finance the Swiss portion of the hotline.   
 In addition, the AC relied on small grants from various sources to fund hotline 
advertising campaigns in order to raise public awareness of this resource.  For 
example, in 2006, the AC obtained some of its first offers of support from Russian 
government sources when the Moscow Duma and the government of the Moscow 
Oblast provided the in-kind donations of free advertising space on billboards, bus 
stops, and metro stations in the Moscow Region for hotline advertisements.  The 
design and production of the advertisements were covered by the general Angel 
Coalition budget.  In 2007-2008, the International Women’s Club of Moscow 
supported the AC’s distribution of brochures advertising the Russian, European, and 
U.S. hotlines and the production of billboards for this purpose, and the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation funded the distribution of brochures specifically 
promoting the Swiss hotline.  The City of Moscow provided advertising space for this 
2008 informational campaign.   
 The Angel Coalition used the contacts it had established with Russian 
government and law enforcement officials and with law enforcement and NGOs in 
other countries to take a leadership role in coordinating the rescue and repatriation of 
Russian-speaking trafficking victims who called the hotline, along with other victims 
who were referred to them.  Since the AC’s hotline served as the first point of contact 
for many trafficking victims seeking to escape their situations, the AC took 




days a week.  Generally, the hotline received several thousand calls per year from all 
the countries it covered, with several hundred calls coming directly from trafficking 
victims.  In 2004, the hotline’s initial year of operation, hotline calls led to the rescue 
of over 350 victims;
50
 in 2008, the hotline received 5434 calls, with 1141 calls 
directly from trafficking victims.
51
  Based on statistics collected on calls received in 
2008, the age of the trafficking victims who called ranged from 20 to 53 years old; in 
terms of gender, 996 callers were women and 145 were men.
52
  In addition to calls 
directly from trafficking victims, the hotline also received calls from people whose 
family members were missing or who they feared were in situations of human 
trafficking; from average citizens reporting suspicious activity; from students, 
journalists, and others seeking more information on human trafficking; and from 
individuals preparing to travel abroad.   
 Calls to the AC’s hotline were answered at a call center in Moscow contracted 
by the AC.  Call center operators underwent training to answer general questions 
about the AC and about human trafficking.  When calls came in from victims, 
victims’ family members, or others needing urgent attention, operators transferred 
these calls to AC staff members.  Responsibility for answering hotline calls outside of 
working hours rotated among AC staff members, so that one person was available to 
answer calls at all times.  When individuals in situations of trafficking called the 
hotline, they were often in need of immediate help.  AC activists would notify their 
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appropriate governmental and law enforcement contacts to try to initiate a rescue, if 
needed, and local NGO contacts to provide rehabilitation or other assistance to the 
individual.  In addition, AC activists contacted embassy officials who could restore 
the passports, visas, work permits, etc., of victims whose documents had been taken 
from them.  However, AC activists had to deal sensitively with issues of privacy and 
confidentiality, as some victims did not want to cooperate with police investigations 
and some did not even want family members to know about their situations.  Larisa, a 
CIS activist, describes the situations of such callers: 
[T]here have been cases in which girls themselves called, but they are very 
scared that their parents will find out what kind of work they are doing.  They 
left to make a career for themselves abroad, to earn money, to support and 
help their family, and when they arrive and are forced to engage in 
prostitution, sometimes a girl doesn’t want to talk about this with her parents.  
Usually, these girls are from villages, not big cities, where everyone knows 
everyone.  So if one goes back to her village, her small town and this 
information becomes known, the girl simply won’t be able to live.  Everyone 
will say, “Look at her, a prostitute.”
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A larger number of calls came from victims’ family members or friends, who 
many times had been contacted by the victim in need of help.  Other times, family 
members suspected a case of human trafficking because a relative had traveled abroad 
and had not been in touch for a long period of time.  In these cases, AC activists 
helped them to file a missing persons report or to initiate an investigation if the family 
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members had information about their relative’s location, employer, etc.  Larisa 
describes typical calls from family members: 
There are various types of calls to the hotline.  If someone calls and says, “My 
daughter disappeared.”  How did she disappear?  We begin to ask additional 
questions.  What do you mean, she disappeared?  She walked out onto the 
street and disappeared?  It has happened.  She went to go visit her girlfriend 
and didn’t return?  It has happened.  Here, specifics are needed…. We ask, 
“How did she disappear?”  “Did she travel abroad?”….  “She walked outside 
and disappeared” may mean she ran away to a lover and she doesn’t want her 
parents to know about it….   
Next, if she disappeared and has been missing a long time… we ask if 
they have filed a statement with law enforcement agencies or the prosecutor’s 
office.  If such a statement hasn’t been filed, then we make parents understand 
that they have to go and file such a statement…. Because without a statement, 
we don’t have the right to start any kind of further investigation.   
But if there are obvious signs—a statement hasn’t yet been filed, but 
there is information that yes, their daughter traveled to Spain or Italy and they 
have her telephone number and she has already made attempts to let her 
parents know that there is a problem, then we of course begin to take action 
even without a statement…. We ask the parents for her telephone number, we 
call the girl and start to talk to her. We begin to clarify what kind of situation 




The first question is “Can you talk or not?  Are you free to talk now?”  
If the girl says, “Yes, I can talk,” we continue the conversation.  If the girl 
says, “No, I can’t talk now” or gives the impression that she simply cannot 
talk, we try to connect with her and give her the number of the hotline so she 
can call us.  If she is in [a country where the hotline operates], she can call us 
for free.  If she is in some other country, then we try to call her periodically 
and find out how serious it is.
54
   
 Although the hotline is operational in only six countries, the hotline response 
team has intervened in trafficking situations in many other countries as well.  
Through its governmental, law enforcement, and NGO contacts in many regions of 
the world, the AC has assisted in the rescue and rehabilitation of trafficking victims 
throughout Europe, North America, the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia.  Outside 
of Russia, the countries with the highest number of victim assistance cases 
coordinated by the AC were Israel, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, with the 
number of cases in Italy, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States 
growing during the period of my fieldwork in 2007-2008.  For these countries, the 
AC coordinated the return of Russian-speaking victims to Russia or other CIS 
countries.  However, by this time, Russia had become a leading destination country 
for human trafficking as well, with many cases of internal trafficking of individuals 
for sexual or labor exploitation from remote regions of Russia to large cities, 
especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, and with a great deal of regional trafficking 
from other former Soviet states, especially Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and 






Uzbekistan.  In these cases, the AC helped to coordinate the return of individuals to 
their home region within Russia or in other CIS countries.
55
   
In speaking with AC activists, several told me that it was often easier to work 
with police in foreign countries in coordinating rescues than in CIS countries.  In 
Western countries, police would respond to a tip from the AC about a trafficking 
situation almost immediately.  In contrast, in many cases, Russian police structures 
were reluctant to respond to tips from NGOs and, when they did, they required a 
written request and detailed information about the situation, which was often difficult 
for the AC to obtain in advance.  Svetlana describes the AC’s efforts to work with 
law enforcement: 
[W]ith other countries, of course, it’s easier.  We can directly call the police 
and they will react really quickly and start to work.  They don’t need any 
official things.  But to cooperate with our law enforcement, you can’t call and 
tell them and they will start their work.  They’ll ask you for an official letter to 
be sent to the head and then to someone else and then to someone else.  But 
it’s also because of the law.  This is the reality.  We have such legislation 
which says that they cannot get the information only over the phone.  They 
have a special procedure…. If the legislation will change, of course, they will 
work more easily.  So this is a big problem.  Not only with them [Russian 
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police] that they don’t want to work, but also because of the legislation and 
some bureaucratic things which is really different in Europe and in U.S.
56
   
 To illustrate the work of the AC in providing assistance to trafficking victims, 
I will provide specific examples of two different cases, which were described by the 
AC on their website (with identifying characteristics of victims changed).
57
  In the 
first case, the International Organization for Migration’s Belarus office had contacted 
the AC and requested help for a Belarusian citizen, “Liudmila,”
58
 who was believed 
to be in a situation of sexual slavery in the Moscow Region.  Liudmila had called her 
boyfriend in Belarus and asked for his help.  She told him that she was being held in 
an apartment under the watch of a “madame” who would not allow her to leave.  The 
AC was able to contact Liudmila on her cell phone and asked her to call a taxi and to 
think of an excuse to leave the apartment.  Liudmila told the madame that she was 
going to see a client, and she was able to leave the apartment.  She took the taxi to the 
nearest metro station, as per the instructions of the AC.  Liudmila then called the AC 
on her cell phone to give them her location.  She did not have any documents on her.  
An AC activist took the metro to meet Liudmila, and paid the taxi driver.  Liudmila 
then told the AC activist her story, which is as follows.   
A young, single mother, Liudmila had been living with her adoptive parents in 
Belarus.  Her adoptive mother had some acquaintances who told her about an 
opportunity to work in a McDonald’s Restaurant in Moscow.  Liudmila would be able 
to send her earnings home to support her son.  Liudmila agreed to take the job.  The 
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acquaintances bought Liudmila a train ticket, and when she arrived in Moscow, a 
woman met her at the train station and took her to her home.  The woman took 
Liudmila’s documents for “safe keeping,” bought her clothes, and fed her well.  After 
a few days, Liudmila was taken on a train to a small town outside of Moscow.  There 
she was led to a guarded “market,” where girls were sold for the purpose of 
prostitution, and Liudmila then understood her intended occupation.  Liudmila was 
sold for 9,500 rubles and taken to a new apartment.  She ran away from her first 
client, but without her documents, e.g., passport, work permit, she felt there was no 
place she could go, so she returned to the apartment.  She was sold a second time for 
7,000 rubles and began servicing clients.  One of her clients picked her up in his car, 
and then stopped to pick up three of his friends.  The four of them took her to a forest 
and raped her.  After this experience, Liudmila had called her boyfriend for help.  He 
contacted IOM Belarus, which contacted the AC, which coordinated Liudmila’s 
escape.  After meeting Liudmila, the AC activist took her to the IOM Rehabilitation 
Center.  The AC then transferred Liudmila’s case to IOM Belarus, which coordinated 
the restoration of Liudmila’s documents and her travel home.   
 Second, I would like to illustrate a case of the AC assisting in the return of a 
Russian trafficking victim abroad back to Russia.  “Ekaterina” called the AC’s hotline 
and reported that her sister “Irina” was being forced to work as a prostitute in Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates.  Irina was from a small town in the Russian Urals and had 
lived with her grandmother since her parents died in a car accident several years 
earlier.  An acquaintance of Irina who knew that she was looking for work had told 




who had also agreed to the job, were promised “clean work” that did not involve the 
provision of sexual services.  The aforementioned acquaintance had travel documents 
processed for Irina and her friend, and they flew to Dubai.   
However, when Irina and her friend arrived in Dubai, they found that they 
would be forced to work as prostitutes.  Irina called her sister, who was also living 
outside of Russia at the time, and asked her for help.  Irina told her sister that she was 
forced to work all night and that if she didn’t get help soon, she would kill herself.  
She said that the “trafficker” had threatened her and the other girls, saying that if any 
of them contacted the police, he would kill them and no one would know.   
Irina’s grandmother “Elena” also called the hotline to provide additional 
details on the case.  She said that two girls who were friends of Irina and who had 
engaged in the same type of work in Dubai had already returned home.  One had been 
deported and the other had been rescued by a Russian man who met her and flew her 
back to Russia.  Elena spoke to Irina by phone and told her to go to the Russian 
embassy in UAE, but Irina said that she was fed very little and that she didn’t have 
enough strength to go to the embassy.  Irina’s grandmother was worried that she 
would kill herself.   
AC activists contacted an NGO that they worked with in Dubai, the Dubai 
police, and international law enforcement structures.  Irina was found and was freed 
from her situation.  She spent some time in prison in UAE, but as a witness, not as a 
criminal, while her travel documents were being restored.  When Irina’s documents 




her a course of rehabilitation.  However, Irina wanted to return home, and the AC 
activist assisted her in continuing her journey back to her home town.   
 As seen from the above cases, the AC offers services to individuals who have 
been qualified as a trafficking “victim,” but victims do not always accept these offers 
of help.  Victims are given some freedom in deciding which services they wish to 
receive.  Likewise, the AC does not force victims to work with the police, but offers 
them this opportunity and encourages them to do so.  Larisa explains how the AC 
handles the many situations in which victims do not want to work with police: 
Many girls don’t want to work with the police for the reason that they are 
there [in a foreign country] illegally.  Their visa has expired.  Three months 
have passed, and they can deport her.  So she doesn’t want to work with the 
police.  When there are difficult circumstances like rape—there have been 
cases in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey—…they need immediate help.  
But if the girl doesn’t want to, we don’t have the right to force her or compel 
her to, “You are required to work with the police.”  It is her choice.   
Maybe…we have a debate about whether we should force her, but 
unfortunately, our policy is such that we don’t force the girls.  But, if we force 
a girl, she may stop talking to us.  She’ll become scared and say, “I won’t give 
you any information at the present time” and she won’t respond to our calls.  
So with the police, we are of course very careful, but of course for results, we 
say, “You need to work with them.  Today it’s you, tomorrow it will be 
someone else.  Think about other girls like you.”  We try to raise their 




information about traffickers located outside of Russia…. But there are also 
recruiters who are located in Russia….  Girls don’t give information about 
Russia, about recruiters here, because there will be… calls to her family.  If 
she opens her mouth, then her family—most of them are women and girls who 
have children…—unpleasant things will occur.   
And, unfortunately, our police can’t protect them. They can offer to 
put them in a safehouse, but there are so many girls, where can they go?  We 
have a safehouse here, the IOM rehabilitation center, but girls can only stay 
there a month, maybe a little longer.  But if a court case is started, the girl 
needs to be hidden one or two months, it can go on for a few years.  And you 
don’t only need to hide her, but her whole family that she is worrying about.  
So girls don’t cooperate here in Russia, but they do give information on what 
is happening abroad.
59
   
As pointed out in Larisa’s statement, the absence of an adequate number of 
safehouses created many problems in Russia’s counter-trafficking efforts.  Not only 
did many trafficking victims suffer from lack of appropriate rehabilitative services, 
but many also declined to press charges against their traffickers or to participate in 
court cases because of the weak protection for victims in Russia.  Thus, the lack of 
victim services directly impacted the prosecution rate in trafficking cases.  As noted, 
after the AC’s network of safehouses closed in 2007, the International Organization 
for Migration Rehabilitation Center in Moscow was the only shelter for trafficking 
victims.  AC activists felt the operation of regional safehouses was essential to 
combating trafficking in Russia, and they continued to search for funding for shelters.  
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Despite the closing of the shelters, the safehouse project provided invaluable 
experience in the counter-trafficking field to the nine AC-member organizations that 
had run the shelters, many of which continued to provide some types of services to 
trafficking victims.   
In contrast to the TVAC, few other AC-member organizations in Russia had 
consistent levels of funding, and for this reason, few carried out large projects on a 
permanent basis.  Instead, the operation of many AC-member organizations tended to 
ebb and flow, with activity increasing when they received a grant and decreasing in 
periods of little to no funding.  However, even in periods in which they had little 
funding, activists in these smaller organizations displayed commitment to the cause of 
fighting human trafficking, and many continued to help victims.  Discussing some of 
the AC’s smaller organizational partners, Svetlana noted: 
Some of them are not really active.  But when we need any help, in that region 
for example, if we have a victim, we always can call there and ask “Can you 
help?” and usually always they help.  Even if they don’t have money.  But we 
don’t always need to assist victims with money, so they can just meet them in 
the airport, they can help us to find their relatives there, or other information.
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Hence, in a period in which the Russian government failed to take a leadership role in 
Russia’s counter-trafficking movement and in which foreign funding offered only an 
unstable means of support, the AC and its partners took on a large part of the 
responsibility of leading this movement through programs to combat trafficking and 
assist victims. 
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 Finally, another obstacle presented by the Russian government to NGOs 
seeking to work in Russian civil society were the regulations on NGO operation, 
especially foreign NGOs and Russian NGOs with foreign workers.  During the time 
of my fieldwork in 2007-2008, Angel Coalition and MiraMed activists were still 
adapting to the new regulations on NGOs put into effect by the Russian government 
in 2006.  As discussed in chapter 3, the 2006 law increased the registration and 
reporting burden on NGOs, which were required to file substantial amounts of 
paperwork to re-register their organizations with the state and to submit reports on 
their activities and finances on a regular basis.  These regulations impacted both 
Russian and foreign NGOs, although foreign NGOs, such as MiraMed, had to 
complete additional paperwork and faced stricter registration requirements.  In 
addition, the law expanded the reasons for which registration could be denied, 
including NGOs having goals or objectives that posed a threat to the sovereignty or 
“national interests” of the Russian Federation, criteria that were to be interpreted by 
registration officials.  As a result of the law, the government increasingly denied the 
registration of organizations.  In MiraMed’s 2006 Annual Report, Russia Country 
Director Vladislav Suprunov addressed the new legislation and how MiraMed was 
responding to it: 
Fears have been raised that [the new legislation] will be a way of screening 
out human rights groups and NGOs supporting political opposition.  
Additional panic was raised when each of the first 60 NGOs to submit their 








While MiraMed and the AC’s re-registration applications were ultimately 
accepted, the new regulations created bureaucratic difficulties in running both 
organizations.  The additional paperwork that was required substantially reduced the 
amount of time staff had to devote to other projects, and stricter requirements for 
foreigners to work in Russia made it difficult for MiraMed and the AC to invite 
foreign workers.  In addition, as a Russian organization, the AC had a limit on the 
number of foreigners, including citizens of other CIS countries, that it could employ, 
and these individuals had to obtain a Russian work permit.  Finally, during the time of 
my fieldwork, it became known that the government was planning to introduce new 
requirements for foreign volunteers, which would permit them to stay in Russia for 
only three months at a time.  Thus, there was concern that I, along with my fellow 
interns, would be the last group of foreign volunteers permitted to remain in Russia 
for longer periods.    
  
6.3.2 The Angel Coalition’s Efforts to Obtain Stable Funding 
In addition to the obstacles in working with Russian governmental structures, the AC 
also confronted challenges in obtaining funding in order to carry out its role as leader 
of the Russian counter-trafficking movement.  As noted, the minimal Russian support 
for counter-trafficking efforts led the AC to rely mostly on foreign support for its 
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projects.  This reliance on foreign grants led to a sense of instability in the 
organization, as activists were never sure if they would receive another grant to fund 
their activities and, if they did, what the amount and conditions of the grant would be.  
However, its partnership with MiraMed provided the AC with several advantages.  
First, MiraMed and the AC frequently applied for grants jointly, and their combined 
Western-Russian expertise was often valuable in the eyes of funders, making them 
more likely to receive grants.  Second, although there was little tradition of charitable 
giving and fundraising in Russia, and Russian citizens were unlikely to give 
donations to a counter-trafficking organization, AC’s partnership with MiraMed 
allowed it access to U.S. fundraising dollars.  As a result, the AC did not feel 
pressured to apply for grants on the latest “funding fad” just to keep their organization 
running.  Nor did they feel the need to change their organization’s philosophy just to 
suit the demands of donors.  From the time of its establishment, the AC had worked 
from an anti-prostitution perspective on trafficking.  That is, they did not work with 
current sex workers on harm reduction or apply for grants that would require them to 
service this population.   
However, beyond keeping its issue of focus—human trafficking—and its 
perspective on this issue—the anti-prostitution view—intact, the AC did adapt its 
projects to meet the specific demands of foreign grants.  For example, providing 
training to police had not been an original goal of the AC, but when funding became 
available in this area, they applied for and received a grant for this purpose.  In 
addition, although in the early 2000s, human trafficking was a “hot topic” among 




the latter part of the decade, funding on the issue had declined.  However, children’s 
issues remained a priority issue of many international donors.  The availability of 
grants to work on child trafficking contributed to the AC’s decision to expand their 
work in this area.  Thus, while the AC expanded its work in various areas as 
determined by the grants it received, activists did not lose sight of their overall goals 
and objectives.   
 Second, the superior resources and the relative stability of the AC also helped 
the organization to meet the demands of funders more readily than could other 
Russian NGOs.  With Westerners working at the AC, the organization was better able 
to write up reports in the required format and to keep their accounts in the manner 
expected by donors.  However, even with the aid of Westerners to communicate with 
funders, donors’ expectations of efficiency and predictability often conflicted with 
Russian realities.  The AC sometimes had difficulty in explaining to donors the 
conditions of Russian life that could complicate the fulfillment of a project.  For 
example, the reluctance of some governmental officials to work with the AC and the 
overall slowness of the Russian bureaucracy delayed the achievement of some project 
goals or changed the direction of a project.  Especially when the AC served as the 
sub-granter of funds to smaller organizations, such as with the safehouse project or 
the regional conferences and trainings, the AC had to account to donors on why 
conditions in these local areas often held up the achievement of project goals.  In such 
instances, the power differences between the donor and the AC were clear, as 




AC developed a strong track record of successfully implementing grants in the 
unpredictable Russian environment, they gained the trust of many funders. 
 A third common challenge facing NGOs with foreign funding was how to 
remain connected to their local communities while carrying out the extensive work 
required to fulfill the conditions of their grants.  Again, the AC’s superior resources 
helped them to overcome this challenge.  With several permanent staff members at 
the AC and a grant writer employed by MiraMed, the AC had enough staff to work 
on multiple fronts.  The AC remained connected with their broader target audience, 
the Russian public as a whole, including potential trafficking victims and family 
members of victims, through their educational and media campaigns and the 
operation of the hotline, which received calls from CIS citizens with a range of 
questions.  In addition, the AC directly serviced trafficking victims through the 
operation of the hotline, the coordination of victim rescue and rehabilitation, and the 
provision of rehabilitation services through its safehouse project.  These far-reaching 
activities raised the awareness of many members of the Russian public about the 
work of the Angel Coalition, in contrast to the situation of many smaller NGOs that 
had little public recognition.  Thus, although AC activists always had hectic schedules 
and were pressed to meet their deadlines, they did not suffer the burn-out experienced 
at many smaller NGOs that were run by only a handful of activists, and sometimes 
only by one.   
 A fourth common challenge to NGOs with foreign funding was the tendency 
to horde resources and enter into relationships of competition, rather than 




one of the AC’s main goals was to build and support a network of NGOs throughout 
Russia and the CIS in order to provide services to trafficking victims and raise the 
Russian public’s awareness of the problem.  While the AC started as a network of 20 
NGOs in 1999, by 2008, it had grown into a network of more than sixty NGOs from 
27 regions of Russia and nine CIS countries.  The main AC office, the TVAC since 
2003, provided support to AC-member organizations in writing grants and making 
international connections.  The TVAC worked closely with the most active NGOs in 
this network, which partnered with the TVAC in hosting conferences and trainings in 
their local regions and, for several of them, in running safehouses.  In addition, the 
TVAC maintained close working relationships with many of its partners in 
coordinating the rescue and rehabilitation of trafficking victims.  Building a strong 
NGO network was key to the AC’s overarching goal of achieving long-term, 
sustainable change in the Russian trafficking response system.   
However, previous research suggests that U.S. governmental funding to the 
AC during a period of debate over legalizing prostitution in Russia contributed to a 
split within the crisis center movement in the early 2000s.  As discussed in chapter 5, 
as the Russian movement against human trafficking was taking off in 2001-2002, a 
debate took place over the possibility of legalizing prostitution as a way to fight 
trafficking.   Donna Hughes, an abolitionist feminist affiliated with MiraMed and a 
leading monitor of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia, had lobbied the U.S. 
government to deny funding to Russian organizations that did not proclaim a strict 
abolitionist perspective.  The lobbying efforts that Hughes inspired were successful in 






  In the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking funding after this 
controversy, in 2004, the Angel Coalition received a grant of almost half a million 
dollars to implement its second set of shelters, while only one women’s crisis center 
received a small grant.
63
    
Janet Elise Johnson argues that this controversy and the charges against NGOs 
that did not take a strict abolitionist perspective “created a painful rift, both 
institutional and ideological, between many women’s crisis center leaders and the 
MiraMed/Angel Coalition.”
64
  In this case, MiraMed and the AC used their strong 
international connections, including with the U.S. government, the leading funder of 
counter-trafficking activities in Russia at the time, to advocate for the position on sex 
trafficking that they believed was most valid—the abolitionist perspective.   
Based on my research at the AC, I did not find the organization’s actions as 
reported in the controversy opportunistic.  The AC has proclaimed an abolitionist 
perspective since its founding and has consistently promoted this perspective in 
fighting trafficking.  AC activists do not accept funds that require them to work with 
sex workers or to accept the sex workers’ rights perspective.  In addition, they do not 
collaborate with international organizations that support the sex workers’ rights 
perspective, such as GAATW.  Thus, while it is consistent with my findings that the 
AC would decline to work with non-abolitionist organizations, their overall policy 
has been to promote networking and collaboration among Russian NGOs.  The AC 
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may not collaborate with non-abolitionist counter-trafficking organizations, but their 
reasons are ideological, not a desire to protect a funding source.   
Another major challenge for NGOs that relied on foreign funding was 
achieving sustainability.  As discussed above, although far from stable, the AC 
achieved greater sustainability than many Russian NGOs thanks to its ability to win 
large foreign grants and its access to MiraMed’s fundraising dollars.  This stability 
allowed the AC to survive through several tough economic periods when other NGOs 
failed.  Through this longevity, the AC was able to build a reputation for itself based 
on its successes both with foreign funders and within Russia.  The relationships that 
the AC established with Russian governmental officials allowed it to have a greater 
impact in policy circles and to gain support for its work in training law enforcement 
officials and in coordinating with law enforcement, embassies, the prosecutor’s 
office, etc., in working on trafficking cases and coordinating rescues.  These 
relationships also led to the first offers of Russian governmental support for the AC’s 
counter-trafficking work, e.g., through the in-kind donations of free advertising space.  
Finally, the relationships that the AC built with Russian government officials and the 
effectiveness of its work led officials to begin to institutionalize AC’s projects into 
government programs, which contributed to the achievement of the AC’s goal of 
long-term transformation of the Russian trafficking response system.  Hence, 
although the long-term survival of the AC was always a concern to activists, their 
counter-trafficking projects and methodologies achieved a degree of sustainability 
through the government’s support for their work and its take-over of several AC 




Thus far, I have demonstrated how the AC overcame many of the common 
challenges of relying on foreign funding through their unique organizational features.  
However, there were also some criticisms of foreign funding that remained applicable 
to the organization’s operation, namely, the tendency of funders to provide additional 
grants to organizations with which they had established trust and the development of 
a “civic elite” in Moscow.  First, as discussed, the degree of sustainability that the AC 
achieved allowed it to build a reputation with donors and to show a strong track 
record of successfully implementing grants.  Many funders were more likely to award 
grants to organizations with which they had a personal connection and which could 
demonstrate past successes.  Again, this was an advantage that the AC had over many 
smaller organizations.  Second, this pattern of funding contributed to the development 
of a “civic elite” in Moscow.  The AC can be considered part of the “civic elite,” or 
an organization with well-educated and professional activists, many of whom have a 
good command of English and have traveled internationally.  With its Western roots, 
MiraMed and the AC were structured in a similar way to many Western 
organizations, making their accountability procedures more acceptable to donors.   
These tendencies, to re-fund successful organizations and to support the 
development of a civic elite, have several downfalls, as such funding priorities can 
overlook smaller, grassroots organizations that carry out beneficial work and that 
maintain stronger ties to their local communities than many “NGO-ized” 
organizations.  Such tendencies make it difficult for smaller organizations to break 
into funding circles and make the connections they need to secure grants.  In a 




many sub-groups of NGOs cut off from foreign funding.  Finally, these tendencies 
open the way for personal alliances and ideologies, rather than quality of grant 
applications, to drive funding decisions.  Such practices have allowed well-
established, Moscow-based organizations, such as the AC, to thrive while smaller 
organizations in the regions struggle.  In the AC’s case, although organizational 
factors allowed it to survive and grow while other NGOs failed, the AC did not horde 
its resources but shared them with smaller organizations within its network.  As one 
of the AC’s main goals was to support the development of a strong counter-
trafficking movement in all regions of Russia, and in the CIS, activists placed a great 
deal of importance on helping regional organizations grow.   
The AC experienced much success, not only in achieving a degree of 
sustainability for itself, but also in supporting the growth of its partner organizations.  
In the case of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement, such a structure may make 
sense.  Few of the AC’s partner organizations had comparable success in grant-
getting or in collaborating with foreign partners.  The AC’s experience “trickled 
down” to help its partners in these areas.  In several of its projects that included sub-
grants to partner organizations, the AC played the role of “translator” between local 
activists and foreign funders, as many CIS activists did not speak English or were not 
familiar with the expectations or the particular discourse of funders.  Hence, in the 
case of the Angel Coalition Network of NGOs, the centralized structure with the head 
in Moscow and smaller NGOs in the regions worked well in coordinating between 
funders and local activists and in providing resources to smaller NGOs that otherwise 




structure.  As noted in the discussion of the funding controversy in the early 2000s, 
the AC collaborated mainly with organizations that shared its ideology on sex 
trafficking.  Thus, organizations that supported sex workers’ rights or provided 
services to sex workers could be left out of this network.  This is one downfall of such 
a centralized structure.   
Many Western governmental agencies, foundations, and international 
organizations have recognized the common pitfalls of funding practices and have 
made attempts to improve their practices in recent years.  Some funders have dropped 
the practice of automatically re-funding previously successful grant recipients in 
favor of more transparent procedures, while others have decided to provide long-term 
funding to one organization only in order to advance the sustainability of the chosen 
organization.  In spite of this critique of foreign funding practices, however, it is 
important to emphasize the benefits that such funding has granted to organizations.  
Although imperfect, the AC has helped numerous trafficking victims and their 
families who otherwise would likely have had nowhere to turn and has raised the 
awareness of the Russian public as a whole, with special attention given to high-risk 
populations.  In addition, the AC has utilized its resources and connections to make 
inroads into the “closed” Russian governmental structures in order to spur the 
government to action on the issue of human trafficking.
65
  In the absence of 
substantial funding from the Russian government, foreign funding provided an 
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invaluable resource that permitted AC activists to work toward the important goal of 
combating human trafficking in Russia.  
In conclusion, the unique organizational characteristics of the Angel Coalition 
allowed it to overcome many common challenges of working both with the Russian 
government and with foreign funders in order to serve as the leader of the Russian 
movement against human trafficking.  The dual Western/CIS nature of the AC, 
combined with its access to more substantial and more stable sources of funding, 
enabled the AC to thrive while other foreign-funded advocacy NGOs struggled.  Such 
stability permitted the development of long-term relationships with governmental 
officials and structures, which furthered the AC’s counter-trafficking work.  The 
AC’s success was also in large part due to the commitment displayed both by Juliette 
Engel, the co-founder of the AC, and by the CIS activists who worked there on a 
daily basis.  For over a ten-year period, Engel committed immense time and resources 
to helping the AC grow, with the goal of eventually developing it into a self-
sustaining Russian organization.  Engel’s financial and leadership commitment over 
this ten-year period allowed the organization to survive and remain active through 
several difficult periods.   
Equally important to the AC’s success was the commitment of the CIS 
activists who worked for the organization.  The activists that I met displayed a 
passion and drive to combating human trafficking, by helping as many victims as 
possible and fighting through seemingly endless government red tape to reach their 
objectives.  Although many activists had families of their own, they worked late and 




of the night and began coordinating assistance to victims.  Activists carried out this 
work despite the relatively low pay and benefits of working for a Russian NGO.  
Although the AC’s office was located in central Moscow, many activists could not 
afford the high rents of living in Moscow City, and traveled long distances on public 
transportation to get to work every day.  None of the activists with whom I worked 
owned cars.  Their paychecks, dependent on the receipt of grant funds, were often 
delayed. 
Despite the limited compensation they received, activists went beyond their 
work duties to help victims.  Often, when victims returned from countries with 
warmer climates, such as Israel, Turkey, or the United Arab Emirates, they brought 
with them few belongings and no warm clothes.  In these cases, AC activists 
frequently donated their own clothes and shoes to victims.  In addition, although the 
official focus area of the AC was human trafficking, activists tried to respond to all 
calls for help on their hotline, even if the caller’s problem was not a clear-cut case of 
trafficking.  For example, numerous calls came from migrant workers from other CIS 
countries working without contracts on Russian construction projects or agricultural 
areas.  In such cases, callers had often worked for months without being paid, and 
were left with no way to travel back to their home country.  If employers had not 
taken these workers’ travel documents and they were free to leave the worksite, the 
case was not considered human trafficking.  However, AC activists still responded to 
these calls and tried to put callers into contact with organizations in their local areas 
that could help them further.  Additionally, AC activists often responded to calls from 






  The passion that AC activists displayed for their work is 
a major factor behind the success the AC experienced in transforming the Russian 
trafficking response system.  In the face of the often emotional and draining work of 
helping trafficking victims in very traumatic situations, the activists I met were fully 
committed to continuing their work of leading the Russian counter-trafficking 
movement.   
 
6.4 The Angel Coalition as Part of the Transnational Movement against Human 
Trafficking 
In chapter 5, I discussed the development of the transnational counter-trafficking 
movement and the work of this movement in pressing national governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and international NGOs for change.  In this section, 
I examine how the AC acted as part of this transnational movement and worked to 
influence counter-trafficking policies on the international level.   
 As noted previously, during the period that I am studying, the transnational 
movement against human trafficking was sharply divided into two networks with 
strikingly different views on how to fight trafficking.  One network, led by CATW, 
was comprised of organizations that promoted the abolitionist perspective and 
focused on fighting sex trafficking (especially of women and children), which they 
saw as the most severe form of human trafficking.  The second transnational counter-
trafficking network, led by GAATW, connected organizations that promoted a human 
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rights, or sex workers’ rights, perspective on human trafficking.  Organizations in this 
network viewed sex trafficking and labor trafficking as equally reprehensible and 
sought to combat both, while supporting the right of individuals to choose to work as 
prostitutes.   
As discussed, the Angel Coalition adopted an abolitionist position in its 
counter-trafficking work and, on the international level, it acted as part of the 
abolitionist network against human trafficking.  However, while the AC was founded 
with a specific focus on the trafficking of women and children, it broadened its 
projects to include attention to the trafficking of men as well when activists became 
aware of such cases.  Thus, the AC’s area of focus was broader than that of other 
abolitionist organizations that aimed only to help women and children victims of 
trafficking.   
The AC partnered with CATW on several occasions.  For example, in 2006, 
the AC, along with MiraMed, partnered with CATW to carry out a public awareness 
campaign on human trafficking in three cities in Russia’s Volga region.  The 
“Campaign on the Volga River” aimed to “change the community’s attitude toward 
trafficking as an organized crime against women”
67
 and “publicly link prostitution 
and trafficking to demand.”
68
  Reporting the outcomes of this campaign, MiraMed 
writes, “Results show an increased awareness in the population about human 
trafficking and how to better ensure one’s own safety…, as well as a decrease in the 
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number of women expressing a desire to go abroad, particularly in hopes of finding a 
spouse or a job.”
69
  As such reports demonstrate, the AC based its educational 
campaigns on an abolitionist approach, in contrast to a human rights or sex workers’ 
rights approach, which would include attention to the needs of sex workers.  In 
addition to partnering with international counter-trafficking organizations espousing 
the abolitionist perspective, the AC partnered only with foundations and government 
agencies that supported work in line with this perspective.  Prior to receiving grants, 
the AC made its abolitionist approach clear to funders, and accepted only grants that 
did not require it to comprise its values.   
Within Russia and the CIS, the AC also partnered with NGOs that espoused 
similar views on the connection between prostitution and trafficking, and its coalition 
did not include any sex workers’ rights organizations.  In contrast to the situation in 
some countries, there had been few efforts by Russian sex workers to organize and 
lobby for their interests, and few organizations that service sex workers existed in 
Russia.  Thus, it is not surprising that the AC did not count any such organizations 
among its partners.  However, it is curious as to why the AC did not partner with the 
leading crisis centers for victims of gender violence in Russia, which were also 
located in Moscow.  As noted, Johnson points to U.S. funding policies on counter-
trafficking projects as contributing to a long-term rift between leaders of these 
national movements.   
The complete lack of mention of crisis centers by AC activists during my 
interviews and participant observation provides some support to Johnson’s argument 
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that such a rift occurred between these organizations, and suggests that a rift indeed 
still existed at the time of my fieldwork.  When I questioned AC activists about their 
NGO partners in Moscow, I was told that their only Moscow partners were IOM, an 
international NGO, and Kesher, a Jewish organization that carried out educational 
campaigns on human trafficking targeted mostly toward Jewish women.  This 
example shows how U.S. funding policies influenced the composition of the AC’s 
NGO network and discouraged the inclusion of Russia’s crisis center movement 
leaders, who could have potentially served as valuable members of the network, with 
their more flexible ideological perspectives and connections to broader 
constituencies.     
During my fieldwork at the Angel Coalition, activists discussed their 
perspectives on prostitution and human trafficking with me, and I observed several 
instances of how this perspective was applied in the AC’s work.  All of the activists 
with whom I discussed the issue expressed support for the “Swedish approach” to 
fighting sex trafficking.  The “Swedish approach” is based on the legislation 
implemented in Sweden in 1999 that criminalized the purchase of sex, along with 
pimping and the running of brothels, but not the selling of sex.  The Swedish 
approach is based on the assumption that all those who sell sex are victims of 
exploitation due to the lesser power they wield in relations with clients.  In this 
approach, while clients, pimps, and brothel owners are punished, prostitutes are 
offered rehabilitative and vocational services in order to help them get out of 




Much of the AC activists’ knowledge about this approach stemmed from 
several collaborative projects the AC had carried out with Swedish partners and trips 
activists had taken to Sweden.  Most notably, the AC partnered with the Swedish 
women’s NGO Kvinnoforum on several occasions, e.g., in organizing the “Safe 
Rescue and Return” conferences and trainings in nine regions of Russia and in 
Central Asia from 2004 to 2007.  In addition, the AC maintained relationships with 
Swedish funders, such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
which funded these conferences.  These collaborations with Swedish partners 
strengthened and reaffirmed the AC’s abolitionist perspective.   
In contrast to the broad support for the Swedish approach, AC activists 
expressed opposition to the approach of countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands, which had legalized prostitution.  Activists stated that visits to these 
countries and conversations with partners in Germany and the Netherlands had 
confirmed their position that legalization of prostitution is not the best way to fight 
trafficking.  Larisa stated: 
I’m against the legalization of prostitution…. In countries where prostitution 
is legal, they also have human trafficking.  For example, we work with 
Germany.  Prostitution is legal there and our girls are constantly transported to 
Germany and they work there illegally.  Why? …. At a conference in Kiev, I 
also asked [German representatives] the question, “Why, if you have legalized 
prostitution, are our girls still working there and providing services and end up 
in very difficult situations.”  As matter of fact, they said, when a person goes 




amount of money and that girl has to do such and such things.  But that girl 
does not permit violence and does not provide types of intimate services that 
she doesn’t like.  There are rules in every house….  Many don’t go for that.  
They want a girl, to carry out some form of violence on her, to be the exploiter 
of this girl.  So, they pay less for them.  So, they transport girls from Russia 
and other regions, the CIS as well, who work illegally and the clients that they 
receive, they pay a lot less for them, first of all, and second of all, they can do 
anything that they want with this girl.  They can be violent—do perverted 
things to her…. So, for more services, they use illegal girls.
70
  
As Larisa explains, even in countries with legalized prostitution, trafficked women 
are desirable because they can be forced to provide services that legally working 
prostitutes will not, and for lower prices.  Thus, the already established demand for 
sex services in these countries, along with the societal acceptance of prostitution as a 
legitimate business, fuels the desire for more prostitutes and more sex services to 
meet this demand.   
 Because AC activists favored an abolitionist approach, they did not carry out 
projects geared toward sex workers, including harm reduction projects such as the 
distribution of condoms or the provision of health services, because they saw such 
services as encouraging women to remain in prostitution.  In multiple instances 
during my fieldwork, AC activists made clear that their target audience was “victims” 
of human trafficking, or individuals who had been forced or coerced into prostitution 
against their will.  An activist explained the AC’s area of focus to a person who called 
over the phone: 
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No, we don’t help prostitutes.  We help women who got into prostitution 
against their will or want to get out of it and don’t know how.  Our first task is 
to help people, especially women and children, who are victims of human 
trafficking.  People who were sent somewhere against their will or forced to 
work against their will.  Basically, we help women who have not been 
working as prostitutes very long, women who have been forced into it.  These 
women do not see prostitution as work.  We think it is hardly possible for a 
woman to choose to be a prostitute.
71
 
However, although the AC’s projects were not directed toward currently 
working prostitutes or women who had chosen the profession freely, the organization 
also did not turn away any prostitutes who came to it for help.  Svetlana explains the 
AC’s understanding of all prostitutes as victims: 
[F]or us, a prostitute is a victim.  Because prostitutes never work alone.  If any 
third person gets money from that, it’s prostitution.  So, for us, they are all 
victims.  Even if we meet sometimes… people and women who are very 
happy and say, “I like this work.  I make lots of money, and I like it, and I will 
go and work again.”  For us, she is still a victim, because she is so 
traumatized.  Maybe now she says that.  After a week, if we will work with 
her and psychologists will work with her, she will say something else.  She 
will say really what she thinks about this.… Our experience shows that 99 
percent, 98, 99 percent of victims, they were from difficult families.  They 
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Nadezhda also offered some explanation as to why the AC was willing to help 
all women who came to it for help, even those who may initially have chosen to work 
as a prostitute.  In describing her understanding of the definition of human trafficking, 
Nadezhda stated: 
Here, naturally, I am talking about trafficking.  I am not speaking about 
situations when a woman on her own says, “Take me, I am ready to work as a 
prostitute.  I want to earn money.”  I am not talking about such situations.  I 
don’t think that that is trafficking.  However, in principle, this can be 
considered trafficking, because if they beat her, brutalize her, there are many 
such situations.  She is still a victim, she has suffered.  And, in general, to 
some degree, on a philosophical level because prostitutes are women who, we 
are speaking about women who decided to become prostitutes, it is also not 
their choice.  Something happened to them, for them to say, “I don’t have a 
good relationship with my family, so I choose this. It will give me a better 
life.”
73
   
While the AC was willing to provide services to women who initially decided 
voluntarily to work as prostitutes, Russian law enforcement did not accept these 
women as true “victims.”  Larisa explains:  
Law enforcement agencies don’t work with girls who left [Russia] 
voluntarily…. We take them, we work with them, but law enforcement 
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agencies don’t want to work with them, even if she has been recognized as a 
victim, if she was really exploited by a third person who took a percentage of 
her money.  Law enforcement agencies won’t work with such girls.  They 
think that they went on their own, they, um, agreed to that on their own, and 
that once she receives monetary assistance, she will go to work doing the 
exact same thing the next day, work as a prostitute.  That is, she agreed to let a 
third person take a percentage of her money….  When those girls who left on 
their own and worked on their own return, we still work with them.
74
   
Thus, while AC activists had difficulty evoking police sympathy even for 
trafficking victims who had been physically forced into prostitution, they found it 
nearly impossible to gain police support for cases in which a woman had initially 
agreed to work as a prostitute.  Although prostitution was illegal in Russia, it was not 
considered a serious crime by police, and most punitive action taken in such cases 
was directed at the prostitute rather than the client or pimp.  Many law enforcement 
officials believed that women who agreed to work in this criminal profession should 
be punished and had difficulty understanding the difference between trafficking cases 
and non-trafficking cases.  With the AC’s philosophy that viewed all prostitutes as 
potential victims, however, the organization extended its services to all women (and 
men) who came to it for help.    
 As noted, the AC acted as part of the abolitionist network against human 
trafficking on the international level.  It worked mainly with international abolitionist 
organizations, and it maintained close ties with many foundations and governments 
that voiced support for the abolitionist perspective.  Because it became a part of the 
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transnational counter-trafficking movement only in 1999, the AC had little 
involvement in the development of two of the leading international counter-
trafficking instruments, the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, both of which were passed in 2000.  However, since 
then, the AC has actively participated in this global movement and has worked to 
influence international policies on human trafficking.   
Since 1998, MiraMed has held Special Consultative Status with the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN and has appointed UN representatives to 
lobby for MiraMed’s and AC’s interests on the international level.  Until 2004, 
MiraMed’s UN representative was Dr. Anele Heiges, and from 2004-2008, the 
representative was Lois Herman.
75
  Although officially the representatives worked for 
MiraMed, in practice, they represented the interests of both MiraMed and the AC in 
UN affairs.
76
  As early as 2000, Heiges was speaking out against human trafficking 
on behalf of MiraMed and the AC, as she participated in the UN Commission on the 
Status of Women meetings in New York in March along with Soroptimist 
International and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women.
77
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In April 2004, newly appointed representative Herman visited the United 
Nations Geneva office with MiraMed Russian Country Director Vladislav Suprunov, 
who addressed international delegations on the necessity of counter-trafficking 
cooperation between sending and receiving countries and presented the Angel 
Coalition Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action.
78
  Herman continued 
Heiges’s role in attending UN Commission on the Status of Women meetings, and 
also participated in the UN Human Rights Commission, served as a consultant for the 
UN Secretary General’s Violence Against Women Study, and worked as coordinator 
of the Women’s UN Report Network.
79
  In addition, Herman maintained regular 
communication with the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons and the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.  Outside of the UN System, 
Herman participated in many international conferences on women’s rights and human 
trafficking, such as International Interdisciplinary Congresses on Women (also known 
colloquially as “Women's Worlds Congresses”) and Network for European Women’s 
Rights conferences.
80
  In 2006, MiraMed took part in the launching session of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva and participated in the one panel at 
the session dedicated to gender issues.
81
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In addition to work at the United Nations, MiraMed and the Angel Coalition 
have participated in meetings of many transnational organizations and councils.  For 
example, both MiraMed and AC representatives have taken part in meetings on 
human trafficking at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and served on an OSCE counter-trafficking working group.  Additionally, an 
AC representative worked with the Council of Europe in Strasburg, France, and 
represented Russia in the writing of the European Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings.
82
  As noted previously, the AC has also worked in 
close cooperation with the International Organization for Migration both within 
Russia and the CIS and with IOM offices in other countries.  In meetings and 
conferences with these international organizations, the AC shared its experience and 
its perspective on combating human trafficking and lobbied for an abolitionist 
approach to be included in international counter-trafficking practices.  At the same 
time, participation in these meetings granted the AC an opportunity to expand its 
international contacts and to establish the AC’s international presence.    
As the Angel Coalition’s visibility in the international arena grew, members of 
the transnational counter-trafficking community came to recognize the AC’s expertise 
on human trafficking in Russia and the broader CIS region.  AC activists increasingly 
were invited to speak on panels and serve on committees and working groups on 
human trafficking.  In 2006, the AC was invited by the U.S. House of Representatives 
International Relations Committee to give testimony on the trafficking of Russian 
women to Germany for prostitution in order to warn the international community 
about the possibility of increased trafficking during the World Cup of soccer being 
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held in Germany that year.  Since prostitution was legal in Germany, it was a 
common destination country for women from Russia and other CIS countries 
trafficked into prostitution.  In two different sessions, in April and June of 2006, 
Juliette Engel and two trafficking survivors assisted by the AC testified before the 
Committee on the extensiveness of sex trafficking to Germany and the harm the 
practice does to victims.
83
 
Finally, the AC worked to combat human trafficking on the international level 
by taking cases to the European Court.  As mentioned, in 2008, the AC initiated its 
first international legal case, N. M. Rantsev versus Cyprus and Russia, in 
collaboration with lawyers from London, United Kingdom and Yekaterinburg, 
Russia, which it presented to the European Court.  At the time, the AC was also 
preparing to take a second case before the European Court.
84
   
In discussing the AC’s international advocacy with activists, they reported 
many positive outcomes of international collaboration in that it allowed them to make 
contacts in other countries and develop networks to better assist trafficking victims.  
In addition, because many anti-trafficking organizations in other parts of the world 
had longer histories than the Angel Coalition, AC activists were able to learn a great 
deal from the experience of these organizations in fighting trafficking.  However, one 
difficulty AC activists reported in working with organizations outside of Russia was 
understanding the different standards used for identifying victims and trafficking 
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crimes, and the different methods used to respond to trafficking cases.  For example, 
Nadezhda states: 
Standards for transporting victims are different in every organization.  For 
example, in Germany, in Turkey, in Russia, they are different.  That is a big 
problem because then we have to come to agreement….  Also identification of 
victims.  The rules of identification are different everywhere…. There should 
be some kind of single standard.  Whenever we go to international 
conferences, we always speak about that and we understand that it is very 
difficult, and we need to try to understand one another.
85
 
Additionally, activists reported that different standards of rehabilitation left 
trafficking victims from Russia and CIS countries unprepared for the limited 
rehabilitative services available in the region.  Larisa discusses the expectations of 
some trafficking victims who received rehabilitation services in other countries before 
returning to Russia: 
[W]hen a victim ends up in a rehabilitation center abroad, social workers, they 
treat them like victims…. Social workers, abroad that is, treat victims with 
pity…. But, in fact, we don’t need to pity victims, but to make them 
understand that “After you leave the doors of the rehabilitation center, you 
will enter real life and you will need to make your own decisions and you will 
need to adapt on your own and nobody will be solving your problems for 
you.”  This especially concerns those victims who went through a long period 
of rehabilitation in a center, and when they return home, to their native 
country…, we can’t constantly support them…. We often have situations in 
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which we give them our telephone number and victims, girls, they turn to us 
for help… because “You are obliged to help us.  We are victims.”….  And 
when… you start to talk to the girls, you understand why, why she acts that 
way, why she thinks that she is entitled.  It’s because “That’s what they told 
me there.  They said that you have to give me money. And you have to pay 
me some kind of stipend.”
86
 
The mismatch between the availability of rehabilitative services in Russia as 
compared to many countries where trafficking victims originally received services, 
e.g., Germany, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, came as a shock to many victims 
returning to Russia.  As AC activists emphasized, unifying standards on rehabilitative 
care on the international level and giving victims realistic expectations of what type 
of services to expect once they are repatriated to their home country is important to 
avoid further alienating victims on the already difficult road to recovery.  
 Since its entry into the international counter-trafficking arena, the AC has 
advocated for polices that reflect its counter-trafficking position and that are centered 
on the needs of victims.  Signifying the respect it has gained within the international 
community, the AC attended meetings with high-level national and international 
officials, served on international committees, and testified on human trafficking 
before the U.S. Congress.  The longevity and visibility of the AC led it to become a 
leading representative of the counter-trafficking movement in Russia and the broader 
CIS in the international arena, and it often served as the voice of counter-trafficking 
NGOs in the region.  Although the international counter-trafficking arena grew 
dramatically from 1998-2008, the AC continued to draw attention to gaps in the 
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international trafficking response system, to advocate for the specific needs of 
Russian and CIS populations, and to reaffirm the efficacy of the abolitionist approach. 
 
6.5 The Angel Coalition Looking into the Future: Moving Closer to Foreign Funders 
or to the Russian State? 
Since its founding, the Angel Coalition relied largely on grants from foreign 
governments and foundations to support its counter-trafficking work.  Indeed, the 
AC’s founding in 1999 resulted in part from a U.S. State Department grant to 
MiraMed to expand the organization’s counter-trafficking activities, and in 2003, the 
U.S. State Department provided additional funding to support the opening of the 
AC’s TVAC office in Moscow.  Nearly all of the AC’s activities, including the 
coordination of nine safehouses through Russia, the international hotline, police 
training programs, embassy training programs, public information campaigns, and so 
forth, had been funded by foreign sources, with the Russian government providing 
only minimal support, usually through in-kind donations of billboard or poster space 
for advertisements.   
However, at the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008, the situation had begun 
to change.  AC activists had grown dissatisfied with the process of constantly 
searching for grants and the time it took away from carrying out their programs.  The 
U.S. government, which had been one of the leading funders of the AC since its 
founding, had reduced funding to Russian counter-trafficking projects.  Meanwhile, 
the AC’s relationship with Russian governmental structures was improving.  This 




closer relations with the Russian state, even perhaps becoming part of a Russian 
governmental structure, rather than continuing to depend on foreign funding.  
However, other AC activists noted the difficulty of obtaining funding for counter-
trafficking projects, and projects on other women’s issues, within Russia and believed 
that the AC should continue to seek foreign sources of support.  Nadezhda shared a 
sentiment common among AC activists.  When asked how the organization’s funding 
situation could be improved, she stated:  
[T]he simplest way would be if some of our programs were funded by the 
government.  For example, the shelters could be financed by the government, 
but that’s not realistic.  We could try it, but our present-day political and 
economic situation doesn’t allow that to happen.  And the level of societal and 
governmental awareness of this problem doesn’t allow that to happen.  So, as 




 Recognizing the challenges of maintaining stable and consistent funding for 
the organization, some activists, like Nadezhda, recommended that the organization 
look for ways to broaden its foreign support.  Activists suggested that the AC, in 
cooperation with MiraMed, increase fundraising efforts in the United States.  Another 
suggestion was for the AC to hire a grant specialist to interact and meet regularly with 
funders and give presentations on the AC’s work.  Several activists recognized the 
importance of continuing to have Westerners work at the AC to write grant 
applications.  Finally, some activists stressed the importance of AC’s ties with 
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MiraMed and the need for this relationship to continue in order for the AC to flourish.  
As Natalie, an American activist stated:  
[W]ithout MiraMed, Angel Coalition would be much smaller, much less 
effective... and also Russian law is so strict for NGOs…. There’s so much 
reporting.… It requires so much support and we can’t fund that all through 
grants.  I mean, we have to do fundraising.  And we can’t do fundraising in 
Russia, so we have people in the United States to do fundraising, and that 
supports all the extra people.
88
  
 Those activists who believed that continuing to rely on foreign funding 
represented the best option for the AC’s future success pointed to the Russian 
government’s lack of commitment to the issue of human trafficking and the difficulty 
of obtaining funding from any Russian source, governmental or non-governmental, 
for such a controversial and unpopular issue.  As discussed previously, many activists 
felt that the difficulty in getting a comprehensive counter-trafficking law passed in 
Russia stemmed from the government’s unwillingness to pledge substantial funds to 
address the problem.  Although the Russian government signed the UN Protocol on 
Human Trafficking, it had not provided the funds to back up its verbal commitment to 
the issue.   
 A second reason some activists were reluctant to become dependent on 
Russian sources of funding was the unpopularity of the issue of human trafficking in 
Russia.  While charitable giving by Russian corporations, businesses, and even 
individuals, had slowly become more common during the Putin era, such donations 
were largely directed toward the government-identified priority issues of improving 
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Russians’ healthcare, housing, agriculture, or education, and especially toward 
children’s issues.  By contrast, human trafficking remained a controversial issue that 
many Russians were reluctant to talk about, let alone combat through monetary 
donations.  Likewise, “women’s issues” in general received little support from 
Russian citizens or corporations, who preferred to donate to children’s or family 
causes rather than those that focused on women alone.  For example, while the AC 
struggled for Russian support, its partner organization Women and Children First, 
with its focus on children’s and family issues, received a great deal of domestic 
governmental and charitable support and was transitioning much more quickly from a 
Western-founded and -funded organization to an indigenously supported Russian 
organization.   
 With an emphasis on human trafficking, the AC remained vulnerable not only 
to the lack of support within Russia but also to the instability of funds for human 
trafficking internationally.  While the popularity of children’s issues, both nationally 
and internationally, allowed Women and Children First to thrive and envision a stable 
future, the continued availability of large grants for counter-trafficking work was 
much less certain.  Although human trafficking was a “hot topic” of funding agencies 
at the turn of the twenty-first century, some governments and foundations had already 
begun to turn their attention to other issues and to reduce funding for counter-
trafficking work in Russia.  The AC took advantage of the emphasis on children’s 
issues by winning grants specifically to implement projects on child trafficking, but 




 Given the uncertain future of foreign funding for counter-trafficking work in 
Russia, some AC activists voiced a preference for the stability that Russian 
governmental support would provide.  When asked about the goals of the AC, Larisa 
responded:  
[O]ur goals are, of course, to be, live, and work with governmental structures.  
And so that our organization didn’t have to, for example, apply for grants and 
constantly ask for money and prove that such a problem [human trafficking] 
exists.  To be like a governmental structure.  Since we already have work 
experience, we would like the government to accept us and, um, the potential 
of the experience we have on this problem, our staff, our information, our 
hotline…. But when that will happen, and if it is even possible… we don’t 
know.
89
   
Further emphasizing this argument, when asked about the future development of the 
AC, Larisa said: 
If it is as an organization that is part of the government structure, as a Russian 
governmental structure, then we won’t worry about if we will be able to 
provide help tomorrow, if we will be working tomorrow, if we will have 
problems with our grants.  Honestly, I, like my co-workers, worry about the 
hotline closing.  Because, if funding ends, the hotline ends.  So, people who 
won’t have anywhere to turn, we receive many words of thanks from them on 
the telephone, from the relatives that we helped, and they… have even lit 
candles in churches for our work, the work that we do and for everything we 
do for those people that society has just turned its back on.  I’m speaking of 
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even law enforcement agencies that you turn to when your daughter leaves to 
work as a prostitute.  Nobody will work on it….  So, here, I feel a lot of 
significance in that our organization is so needed and our… hotline is so 
needed and that we provide help, maybe not to everybody that we would like 




Like Larisa, the majority of AC activists whom I interviewed, from both the 
CIS and the West, indicated that receiving Russian governmental funding would be 
the ideal situation for the organization, although only a few considered this as a 
realistic possibility in the near future.  In contrast to the fear expressed by many 
theorists on Russian civil society that government support for NGOs would lead to 
cooptation and loss of independence for organizations, many AC activists welcomed 
the idea of such a take-over and emphasized their role in “helping” the state to take 
action against human trafficking.  Whether the end result of such an arrangement 
would still allow substantial input from counter-trafficking experts in the civil sector 
is questionable, but, with the relationships of trust that had been established between 
AC activists and many government officials, activists were willing to take this 
chance.  However, as noted, governmental support at the time of my fieldwork was 
minimal.  Thus, while AC activists continued to build strong relationships with 
government officials and to place their hope in the passing of the counter-trafficking 
draft law, they also continued to search for alternative means of funding.   
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6.6 The Angel Coalition: Insights of the Case Study for Counter-Trafficking 
Movements and Transnational Feminist Networks 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the unique organizational characteristics of 
the Angel Coalition enabled it to overcome many of the challenges of working with 
the Russian state and managing the requirements of foreign funders in order to 
successfully influence counter-trafficking policy both within Russia and on the 
international level.  The commitment that Juliette Engel and the CIS activists 
displayed both to fighting human trafficking in Russia and to upholding the AC’s 
core values allowed the organization to survive during difficult periods and attain a 
degree of longevity and sustainability that earned it the respect of officials on the 
national and international levels.  This longevity was made possible, in large part, 
through the AC’s partnership with MiraMed, an American organization with pre-
established connections to many international funders and counter-trafficking 
networks and with fundraising capabilities in the United States.  The superior 
financial resources of the AC compared to most other foreign-funded Russian NGOs 
enabled it to thrive while many other NGOs struggled for survival.  Finally, the dual 
Western/Russian nature of the Angel Coalition provided it with an important 
advantage, as the contributions of both Westerners and Russians were necessary to 
make the work of the AC possible during the period of my study.  Thus, I argue that 
these unique organizational characteristics enabled the AC to attain the status 
necessary to be accepted as a partner to the Russian government and a member of the 
international community, and to influence policy on both the national and 




 In addition to these organizational characteristics, another factor that 
contributed to the AC’s success was its focus on the issue of human trafficking.  
Although the Russian state had not declared combating human trafficking as one of 
its national priorities, the state signaled the importance of the issue through the 
signing of the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and domestic efforts to criminalize 
this practice and prosecute traffickers.  However, despite taking these initial steps and 
verbally committing to combat human trafficking, the state did not follow through 
with the allocation of substantial funds to support counter-trafficking efforts.  As a 
result, NGO activists took over leadership of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement 
and pressed the government to fulfill its commitment to the problem.   
In a situation with scarce domestic resources for this governmental 
commitment, the state was willing to partner with Russian NGOs and accept foreign 
funds to advance toward its counter-trafficking goals.  However, the Russian state 
ensured that it remained the dominant partner in such partnerships and retained 
control over the implementation of these foreign-funded projects.  AC activists 
accepted their status as a “junior partner” in these relationships and saw the 
arrangement as fulfilling their role as a “helper” to the state.  After all, the AC’s main 
goal was to spur the government to action on the issue of human trafficking and urge 
it to fulfill its own obligations to the issue.  In the process, the AC also demonstrated 
the ability of transnational networks to influence the domestic policy of the Russian 
state.   
 In studying the Angel Coalition, another question I pose is whether the 




(including the AC’s network within CIS countries) could be considered part of the 
transnational feminist movement.  Although the AC helped men as well as women 
and children, it was founded with a focus on women, and most of its partner NGOs 
also focused on women as victims of human trafficking.  Additionally, many of its 
educational and media campaigns were targeted toward women as potential victims 
of human trafficking.   
Furthermore, most of the AC’s projects, even those that were not directed 
toward women, such as the police training programs, were based on the 
methodological approaches of a “gender perspective,” an “empowerment 
perspective,” and a “human rights perspective,” with the first two of these approaches 
focused specifically on promoting women’s rights.
91
  Employing a “gender 
perspective” means devoting attention to the unequal gender relations between men 
and women that leave women in positions of vulnerability, in this case in danger of 
being trafficked, while the “empowerment perspective” emphasizes the importance of 
empowering women to regain a sense of self-worth after surviving situations of 
trauma and abuse.   
The AC’s philosophy on gender issues was influenced by several of its 
partners, most notably by its strong partnership with Swedish women’s groups, which 
devoted a great deal of attention to issues of gender inequality and women’s 
empowerment.  In this way, although the AC did not label itself a “women’s 
organization” or a “feminist organization,” I include it as part of the transnational 
women’s movement due to its primary focus on women and the extensive work it has 
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done to protect women and uphold women’s rights in Russia and abroad.  In addition, 
most of its organizational partners, both in Russia and abroad, are self-identified 
women’s organizations.   
 In examining the AC as part of the transnational women’s movement, it is 
necessary not only to study the impact of the AC in influencing national and 
international counter-trafficking policies, but also to question how insights gathered 
from the organization’s experiences can contribute to the development of 
transnational feminist theory.  The aim of transnational feminist theory is not simply 
to influence social policy but also to continuously develop as a body of knowledge 
and practice that is capable of reshaping itself to respond to constantly emerging 
global challenges and representing the interests of its participants on an egalitarian 
basis.   
 As discussed throughout this dissertation, the relationships that ground the 
transnational feminist movement, including relationships between funders and 
recipients, relationships between women activists in the North and West with those in 
the South and East, and relationships between established women’s networks and 
fledging women’s groups, have been hampered by historical and institutional power 
imbalances.  While working to reduce gender inequality and ameliorate the harmful 
effects of long-standing economic and political disparities on women around the 
world, many transnational women’s networks have reproduced the very power 
dynamics that they sought to combat.   
 In the conclusion chapter that follows, I present my findings on the Angel 




influence counter-trafficking policies on the national and international levels, and as a 
site of global-local intersection in the transnational feminist movement.  Analyzing 
the work of the AC, I question what insights transnational feminism can draw from 
this case to further the development of egalitarian, dialogic, and reflexive practices 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
In this conclusion chapter, I present my findings on the effectiveness of the Angel 
Coalition, and the larger transnational counter-trafficking movement of which it was a 
part, in influencing actions of the Russian state on the issue of human trafficking from 
1998 to 2008.  My conclusions in this area build upon the findings of scholars on 
transnational civil society who demonstrate the growing power of transnational 
advocacy networks and other civil society actors in influencing the policies of states 
on social issues that are important to citizens in countries around the world.  
Additionally, I examine the Angel Coalition as a site of local-global intersection in 
the transnational women’s movement and question how insights from this case study 
can aid in the development of more egalitarian and democratic networks between 
activists from different corners of the globe.  In its efforts to create more open and 
responsive forms of dialogue, the transnational feminist movement can serve as a 
leader in the area of cross-cultural communication for other transnational social 
movements, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of these movements in representing 
the voices of average citizens and pushing states and intergovernmental organizations 
for change.    
 
7.1 Contribution to Scholarship on Transnational Civil Society 
In recent decades, theorists of transnational civil society have noted the expanding 
role that transnational civil society actors play in world politics and the increasingly 




My research in this dissertation provides additional support to this conclusion as I 
demonstrate the ability of the transnational counter-trafficking network to impact the 
actions of the Russian government, a government notably unwelcoming to the 
interference of foreign states or of Russian civil society actors in domestic affairs.  In 
its first decade of operation, the Angel Coalition, a joint Russian-American 
organization, led the Russian counter-trafficking movement, and through the 
passionate work of activists who were committed to fighting trafficking, they 
demonstrated to the Russian government the benefits of state-civil society 
collaboration on this issue.  Positioning themselves as “helpers” or “junior partners” 
to the Russian state, these activists were successful in getting the Russian state to take 
action against human trafficking and to accept the expertise of civil society actors in 
designing and implementing counter-trafficking programs.  The case study of the 
Angel Coalition demonstrates that, when transnational activists work creatively and 
flexibly in response to the particular opportunities and constraints of the policy 
environment in which they operate, they have the potential to impact the actions of 
even relatively “closed” states such as Russia.   
 However, due to the shifting policies of foreign aid to Russian civil society 
organizations and the increasingly strict policies of the Russian state towards foreign 
aid, the success of the Angel Coalition in this ten-year period does not guarantee 
future success, or even survival.  AC activists, along with other Russian civil society 
activists, must continually search for funds to support their activities and find new 
ways to engage in dialogue with a state sector that is in constant flux.  In the period 




Russian civil society became even more strict.  In July 2012, Vladimir Putin, once 
again President of the Russian Federation, signed into law a bill requiring foreign-
funded NGOs to register as “foreign agents” in Russia and allowing an unlimited 
number of inspections and checks on these NGOs.
1
  In defending his signing of this 
bill, Putin stated: 
No one has the monopoly of speaking on behalf of the entire Russian society, 
let alone the structures directed and funded from abroad and thus inevitably 
serving foreign interests.  Any direct or indirect meddling in our internal 




A few months later, in September 2012, the Russian Federation expelled 
USAID after accusing the agency of meddling in Russian politics.  Prior to the 
expulsion, USAID had worked in Russia for two decades and spent nearly 3 billion 
dollars in aid towards democracy and development, including towards Russian civil 
society.
3
  A statement from Russia’s foreign ministry explaining the ejection stated: 
The decision was taken mainly because the work of the agency's officials far 
from always responded to the stated goals of development and humanitarian 
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As these actions and statements suggest, the Russian state has often interpreted 
foreign, especially Western, aid to Russian civil society as an attempt by foreign 
actors to influence Russia’s internal affairs and promote policies that are 
contradictory to Russia’s national interest.
5
 
While many transitional and post-communist countries have “graduated” from 
foreign development and democracy assistance programs once they reached a certain 
level of development, the ways in which Russia unilaterally declared its own 
graduation from these programs and the tone in which it did so reflects the historic 
power relations between Russia and the West, especially the United States.  Since the 
end of the Soviet period in the early 1990s and the arrival in Russia of many Western 
advisors, foundations, and government agencies pressing liberal-style reforms on 
Russia, the Russian government has accepted many of these offers of help, while 
attempting to retain control over how foreign resources are deployed on Russian soil.  
In the chaotic political era under Yeltsin, the Russia government lost a degree of 
control over the reform process as Russian oligarchs and Western advisors financially 
benefited from Western-led programs to reshape Russia’s economy.  However, 
following the Yeltsin era, the Russian government under Putin and Medvedev 
tightened its reins over Russia’s internal affairs and increased oversight over foreign 
agencies and foreign-funded Russian organizations operating in Russia.   
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When foreign assistance programs proved useful to the Russian government, 
Russian officials took advantage of them and used these resources to further national 
development goals and strengthen the Russian state.  As the Russian economy 
expanded and the state reclaimed a level of political prominence on the international 
stage, it gradually expelled foreign organizations that no longer proved useful and 
implemented checks on Russian organizations that accepted foreign aid.  To provide 
some examples, in 2002, Russia expelled the U.S. Peace Corps, which had been 
operating in Russia for ten years, with the charge that some Peace Corps volunteers 
had been working as U.S. spies.
6
   Additionally, as discussed in chapter 3, in 2007, 
the Russian state ordered the closure of two regional offices of the British Council, 
claiming that they were operating illegally.  After working in Russia for almost 
twenty years, conducting English classes and sponsoring cultural activities, the 
Council was left with only its main office in Moscow out of which to conduct its 
activities.  Finally, in 2012, the Russian state expelled USAID from the country. 
Commonly, the graduation of countries from development and democracy 
assistance reflects broader political relations between the donor and recipient 
countries involved.  Regarding U.S. development aid, as of 2004, 25 countries had 
graduated from U.S. assistance programs after moving out of the category of 
“developing countries” into the category of “middle income countries.”
7
  Notable 
graduates of U.S. aid programs that effectively utilized this aid to help them build 
strong economies were Chile, Costa Rica, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Some of these 
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25 graduating countries went on to develop foreign aid programs of their own.
8
  As of 
2011, USAID, the main U.S. agency distributing development aid to foreign 
countries, still had 80 aid missions and programs in over 100 countries, with a plan to 
graduate additional countries (not including Russia) by closing seven programs by 
2015.
9
   
In planning a country’s graduation, USAID prefers to identify in advance, 
often in consultation with the recipient country, a suitable pull-out date after a 
significant number of development objectives have been met, and to develop a 
transition plan to facilitate a shift in the country’s relationship with the United States 
from aid recipient to partner.  As Daniel Runde argues:  
If USAID country missions are closed without establishing a plan to transition 
bilateral relationships, then the United States risks throwing away a number of 
years of effort and often hundreds of millions of dollars of investment.
10
  
Many countries, especially those who desire to maintain positive relations 
with the United States, have cooperated with USAID in closing missions in their 
countries and transitioning to bilateral relationships based on partnership.  However, 
other recipient countries have taken control of the process by “graduating” 
themselves from these programs and expelling USAID in order to send a political 
message that it is no longer in need of U.S. aid, or that it opposes U.S. policies or 
activities within its borders.   
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For example, in June 2012, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), an international cooperation organization promoting social, 
political and economic integration of the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, published a resolution calling upon heads of states of alliance 
members to expel USAID missions from their countries due to the interference of 
USAID in the national politics of ALBA countries through “financing non-
governmental organizations and actions and projects designed to destabilize the 
legitimate governments which do not share their common interests.”
11
  The resolution 
was signed by the governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominica, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela.
12
   
In May 2013, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales followed through by expelling 
USAID while criticizing U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s remark calling the 
Western Hemisphere the United State’s “backyard.”
13
  Morales’s action raised fears 
within the United States that other countries in the region would similarly expel 
USAID or drastically restrict the type of aid that they would accept.  In a similar way, 
Russia’s expulsion of USAID in September 2012 sent a political message regarding 
its relations with the United States.   
The provision and receipt of foreign aid constitutes only one of several 
dimensions of political relations between countries, with diplomatic, military, 
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economic, institutional, and cultural dimensions also playing major roles in these 
relationships.
14
  The various dimensions of political relations between countries 
frequently overlap and influence one another.  As such, the decision to provide or 
accept foreign aid often reflects developments in other spheres of these relations and 
serves as a symbol of the form and strength of these relations.  Similar to the belief by 
many analysts that Russia’s decision to close the regional offices of the British 
Council was a result of controversy surrounding the British investigation into the 
poisoning death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian secret service agent, in 
London in 2006,
15
 along with many other cases of tit-for-tat punitive measures 
between Russia and Western countries, observers have also interpreted deeper 
political meanings behind Russia’s ejection of USAID.
16
  Indeed, after the closure of 
Russia’s USAID office, the United States retaliated by quitting the joint U.S.-Russia 
Civil Society Working Group to protest Russia’s increasingly strict restrictions on 
civil society.
17
   
Reflecting the contentious relationship between Russia and the United States, 
Russia’s decision to expel USAID most likely was intended not only to provide a 
check on the growing strength of Russia’s civil society, especially of some 
oppositional groups, but also to signal a growing wariness of U.S. intervention into its 
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internal affairs.  With Russia’s return to a position of international prominence, it 
sought to shift its relationship with Western countries from one of recipient of foreign 
aid to one of equal partner, or in some cases, adversary.  During the period in which 
Russia did receive significant amounts of foreign aid, the United States and other 
Western countries implemented programs to promote a vision of a stable, democratic 
Russia in line with their own values and goals.  At the same time, Russia’s leaders 
increasingly sought to control the direction of this aid through expanded regulation 
and oversight of foreign organizations and foreign-funded Russian organizations.   
 With the availability of foreign funding for Russia’s civil society dependent 
both on decisions by foreign governments and their citizens to provide these funds 
and on the authority of the Russian government to permit or deny the disbursal of 
these funds, Russian civil society activists are caught in the middle.  At the start of the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, domestic sources of financial support 
remained scarce, leaving activists to continually search for new means to support 
their organizations and initiatives.  Although the shifting sphere of civil society aid, 
both foreign and domestic, will likely have a significant impact on the shape of 
Russian civil society for years to come, Russia activists have shown that they are 
willing to fight through tremendous obstacles to achieve their aims.  Regarding the 
Russian counter-trafficking movement, the strong networks that have been built 
within Russia and the CIS, and with organizations in other countries and regions, 
have created a solid foundation for the continued work of the movement into the 
future.  With strong links to transnational networks, a deep commitment to its cause, 




Russian movement against human trafficking is well positioned to continue its work 
in influencing Russian state action against human trafficking. 
 This dissertation has demonstrated that transnational advocacy networks, in 
collaboration with national-level organizations, can have a significant influence on 
the actions and the policies of even “closed” states such as Russia.  In my case study 
of the Angel Coalition, two factors proved particularly important for the success of 
the organization and the transnational counter-trafficking network of which it was a 
part: 1) counter-trafficking activists evinced a practiced understanding of the political 
environment of Russia, the state in which they sought to effect change, and 2) they 
effectively communicated to the state how it would benefit from collaboration with 
civil society groups and from taking action on their particular advocacy issue, human 
trafficking.   
In regards to the first factor, understanding the political environment, activists 
gained knowledge and experience of governmental policies and practices through 
several years of progressively advancing collaboration with state officials and 
structures, which they drew upon in designing counter-trafficking initiatives that 
involved partnering with state structures or that required state approval.  In regards to 
the second factor, communicating the benefits of state collaboration with the counter-
trafficking movement, activists effectively demonstrated to the state how it would 
benefit from working with counter-trafficking organizations to combat human 
trafficking, namely, that such collaboration would advance the national goals of 




obligation to combat trafficking as a signatory of the UN Protocol on Human 
Trafficking.    
 Despite many statements by Russian governmental officials, especially after 
the start of Putin’s first presidency in 2000, that the state rejected the influence of 
foreign actors or foreign-funded Russian advocacy organizations, and despite 
regulations implemented to restrict foreign organizations and foreign-funded 
organizations, the Angel Coalition and the transnational network of which it was a 
part were able to overcome these barriers through the strategic use of the two tactics 
discussed above.   
These tactics helped the Angel Coalition to influence Russian state actions 
against human trafficking in many ways, including the following examples.  In 2003, 
the AC organized a workshop to develop a protocol on providing assistance to 
victims of trafficking in Russia and invited governmental representatives to attend.  
Representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State 
Duma, and the Moscow City Duma attended this workshop and contributed to the 
development of the protocol.  Upon publication of the “Trafficking Victims 
Assistance Protocol” by the AC, it was accepted by governmental officials as an 
exemplar of “best practices” for safehouse operation in Russia.   
Beginning in 2004, the AC organized “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences 
in various regions of Russia, which the President’s Administration mandated that 
regional representatives attend.  In these conferences, NGO and governmental 
representatives collaboratively developed a counter-trafficking protocol that outlined 




human trafficking.  Upon publication of the “Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan 
of Action for the Russian Federation” by the AC in 2004, it was accepted by 
governmental officials as a guide on government-NGO cooperation on the issue.   
Starting in 2005, the AC served as a leader in the reform of the Russian child 
welfare system through the Moscow Child Rescue Project, in which the AC, along 
with MiraMed and WCF, trained state workers, such as juvenile police, social 
workers, medical personnel, and detention center staff on serving trafficked and 
exploited children; created new methodologies for rehabilitation programs for 
children and new training programs for workers to be taken over by state structures; 
and raised awareness and helped change the discourse of senior governmental 
officials on the issue.  During the course of the Moscow Child Rescue Project, state 
structures took over and institutionalized some of the programs created by AC, WCF, 
and MiraMed, and even provided some funding for the project, thereby demonstrating 
the state’s acceptance of these organizations as legitimate partners in the reform of 
the child welfare system.   
In 2008, the AC implemented a program to train Russian law enforcement 
officials who work with adult victims of trafficking in several regions of Russia.  In 
addition to leading the trainings during this project, the AC also published a textbook 
on human trafficking in partnership with several governmental institutions, and 
developed a training module that could be replicated by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in other Russian regions.   
These are just some of the examples that demonstrate the Angel Coalition’s 




allowing the AC to serve as the leader of this national movement and to act as a 
partner to the state on counter-trafficking initiatives, the Russian state permitted the 
AC to take on some governmental functions and authorized the AC’s programs to 
become state programs.  Hence, the AC not only influenced state action against 
human trafficking, but in fact replaced the state in some policymaking settings.   
 My research findings support previous scholarship on the ability of 
transnational advocacy networks and other transnational civil society actors to 
influence the actions of states by authors such as Keck and Sikkink, Ann Florini, and 
Daphne Josselin and William Wallace.  These scholars note that, although TANs and 
other civil society actors aim to influence state policy and practice on specific issues, 
the boundary between state and civil society is often blurred, as state actors work in 
partnership with or participate in civil society organizations and networks and as civil 
society actors take on state roles.
18
   
Focusing specifically on TANs, Keck and Sikkink examine the ability of 
TANs to influence states in a variety of ways and argue that key factors affecting 
their ability to exert such influence are “issue characteristics” and “actor 
characteristics.”
19
  Regarding issue characteristics, they contend that, in order for 
TANs to encourage states to act on an issue, 
[E]ither the values in question must plausibly coincide with the “national 
interest” or the government acting must believe (correctly or not) that the 
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action is not costly (or at least that it is less costly than not acting).  Part of 
what networks do is try to transform state understandings of their national 
interests, and alter their calculations of the costs or benefits of particular 
policies.  Moreover, the activists promoting the issue must seek state actors 
who are either network members themselves (in terms of their willingness to 




Keck and Sikkink posit that two types of issues, those involving bodily harm 
to vulnerable individuals and those revolving around legal equality of opportunity, are 
likely to be influential across different political and cultural contexts.
21
  My research 
supports the argument on the importance of issue characteristics for the success of 
TANs in influencing states, as I argue that part of the AC’s effectiveness stemmed 
from its ability to demonstrate to the Russian state how taking action against human 
trafficking, an issue involving bodily harm to vulnerable populations, coincided with 
the national interest to fight crime and meet state obligations to international treaties. 
 In terms of actor characteristics, Keck and Sikkink emphasize characteristics 
both of the network seeking to affect change and of the target state or institution.  
They argue that the most effective networks are “dense, with many actors, strong 
connections among groups in the network, and reliable information flows.”
22
  The 
most effective networks also contain “nodes,” or well-connected organizations, 
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within the target country.
23
  These characteristics fit the TAN that I studied, with the 
Angel Coalition a well-organized domestic NGO operating as part of a dense and 
dynamic transnational counter-trafficking network.   
Additionally important are characteristics of the target state.  Keck and 
Sikkink maintain that in order to be open to the influence of TANs: 
Target actors must be vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions 
from outside actors, or they must be sensitive to pressure because of gaps 
between stated commitments and practice…. Countries that are most 




They contrast countries with open political structures and those with closed 
political structures and argue that “closed political structures in societies where 
participatory channels are blocked or limited may lead citizens to seek international 
linkages to press their claims more effectively.”
25
  Keck and Sikkink refer to this 
practice as the “boomerang pattern,” in which domestic NGOs bypass their state and 
reach out to international allies to try to bring pressure on their state from outside.
26
  
In my case study of the influence of a transnational counter-trafficking network on 
Russia, Russian state officials claimed to be “closed” to influence both by domestic 
advocacy organizations funded from abroad and by foreign organizations and states.  
Thus, Russian counter-trafficking activists did not activate the boomerang pattern, but 
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partnered with transnational networks and successfully circumvented this blockage by 
utilizing the two factors discussed above, namely, basing their actions on a practiced 
understanding of the Russian political environment and demonstrating to the state the 
benefits of taking action against the issue of human trafficking, factors also identified 
as important in Keck and Sikkink’s theory of transnational advocacy networks.   
 In addition to Keck and Sikkink’s examination of the ability of TANs to 
influence states, they, along with Florini and Josselin and Wallace, also point to the 
eroding boundaries between TANs, other transnational civil society actors, and states, 
as states partner with and participate in TANs, and as civil society actors take on state 
roles.  My research supports this finding as I demonstrate how the Angel Coalition 
went beyond simply influencing the Russian state to taking on state roles in leading 
the Russian counter-trafficking movement.  The Angel Coalition drew upon financial, 
informational, and tactical resources from the broader transnational counter-
trafficking network of which it was a part to create training programs for state 
employees who encounter the issue of human trafficking in their work; develop the 
first safehouses for victims of human trafficking in Russia along with the state-
approved methodologies for operating them; take a lead role, along with MiraMed 
and WCF, in the reform of Russia’s child welfare system; and publish a government-
approved protocol outlining the responsibilities of NGOs and various government 
ministries in combating human trafficking and a plan of coordination of the work of 
these units; along with many other initiatives to fight human trafficking in Russia and 




 The contribution of my research to the literature on transnational civil society 
is to extend the scholarship on the effectiveness of transnational civil society actors in 
influencing and interacting with states by scholars such as Keck and Sikkink, Florini, 
and Josselin and Wallace.  My research supports many of the conclusions of these 
authors on state-civil society interaction outlined above while illustrating the specific 
example of one domestic advocacy organization working in conjunction with a 
transnational network to influence the Russian state in a particular time period.   
In my case study of the Angel Coalition, I argue that two factors were 
especially important to the AC’s success in influencing Russian state actions against 
human trafficking and leading the Russian counter-trafficking movement: a practiced 
understanding of the political environment of Russia and the ability to demonstrate to 
the Russian state the benefits of taking action on this issue.  Moreover, I argue that 
the unique organizational factors of the AC, including its dual Russian-Western 
nature, the long-term commitment of its members, and its flexibility and creativity in 
responding to obstacles in the political environment, enabled it to put these factors 
into play in its relationship with the Russian state.  While my findings reflect the 
influence of one particular TAN, a transnational counter-trafficking network, in the 
specific domestic political environment of the Russian Federation from 1998-2008, 
they also offer support for the broader theory on the influence of transnational 
advocacy networks worldwide and can be used to extend this theory to contexts in 
which domestic political structures are relatively closed both to the influence of 
oppositional domestic organizations and to the influence of foreign actors.  Further 





7.2 Contribution to Scholarship on Transnational Feminism 
In its efforts to fight human trafficking, the Angel Coalition focused not on crime 
control, border protection, or labor markets, as did many states and intergovernmental 
organizations, but on the human rights of victims and potential victims of human 
trafficking.  More specifically, during the period of 1999-2008, the Angel Coalition 
focused most of its counter-trafficking programs on protecting women and girls from 
the dangers of sex trafficking, although it also addressed other forms of trafficking 
and the trafficking of men and boys when such cases came to its attention.   
On the issue of sex trafficking, the AC used a strict abolitionist approach to 
guide its programs, through which it advocated the eradication of prostitution as the 
most effective way to combat trafficking.  The organization aimed to support women 
and girls in leaving the profession of prostitution, and it did not carry out harm 
reduction programs geared toward currently working sex workers.  In designing its 
counter-trafficking efforts, the AC based many of its programs on the methodological 
approaches of a “gender perspective,” an “empowerment perspective,” and a “human 
rights perspective,” the first two of which focused specifically on promoting women’s 
rights.  Although the AC did not identify itself as a “feminist organization” or a 
“women’s organization,” its emphasis on advocating for women’s rights and its close 
links with many women’s organizations throughout Russia and the CIS and abroad 
led me to include it as part of the transnational women’s movement.  I argue that the 
extensive work of the AC within transnational women’s networks has contributed to 




 In examining the AC as a part of the transnational feminist movement, I 
question not only how it influenced Russian state actions against human trafficking, 
but also how insights gained from its operation as a joint Russian-Western 
organization can contribute to the development of transnational feminist theory.  The 
goal of the transnational feminist movement is not only to improve the position of 
women in a globalizing world, but to challenge the global structures that maintain this 
inequality, while struggling to uphold egalitarian practices within its own networks.  
The unique nature of the Angel Coalition, as an organization founded and 
successfully run over a ten-year period by activists from both the CIS and the West, 
has the potential to offer important insights that can aid the further evolution of 
transnational feminist theory.   
 As discussed in chapter 4, relations between Russian women activists and 
their Western partners, especially Western feminists and Western funding 
organizations or agencies, in the post-Soviet period were built on a foundation of 
historic power imbalances and cultural and political misunderstandings.  Wielding 
greater power in these relations, with superior financial, institutional, and ideological 
resources, Westerners arrived to import their versions of feminism, civil society, and 
democracy into Russia.  While the values they advocated emphasized the importance 
of equal participation, two-way dialogue, respect for difference, and openness to 
reciprocal learning in building these new relationships, many times assistance 
programs had the opposite effect.  In structuring many of these relationships as the 
deliverance of the necessary Western expertise to rebuild Russia’s transitional 




financial contributions to these relationships, but also as to the superiority of their 
political and economic values.  As a result, many relationships between Russian 
activists and their Western supporters got off to a shaky start, with many Russians 
feeling that their knowledge, experience, and viewpoints were underappreciated by 
their Western partners.   
 In response to the challenges that arose in many Western-Russian women’s 
networks, scholars on Russia’s women’s movement have suggested ways to address 
these conflicts and misunderstandings.  Several note that simply calling these 
networks “partnerships” is not enough, as the practice obscured the power imbalances 
that characterized these relationships.  Instead, they seek to draw attention to ways in 
which Western and Russian participants in these networks both contributed to and 
benefited from these collaborations.  One of the points that Sperling, Ferree, and 
Risman make is that benefits are not merely economic.  Although greater financial 
resources did flow from West to East in these relationships, other benefits flowed 
from East to West.  For example, Western women have gained many career benefits 
from their work with Russian women’s organizations, such as “increased credibility 
among sponsors and reputation building that could be transferred to their own related 
activist or academic enterprises.”
27
  Many Western scholars have published books and 
articles about their work with Russian women that have enhanced their careers.
28
  In 
addition, despite the longer tradition of feminist scholarship in the West, Russian 
women have valuable knowledge to contribute to emerging theories on transnational 
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feminism and to scholarship on women’s issues in locales around the world.
29
  As 
Kay points out: 
[A] more flexible approach to funding is needed, and above all a new 
awareness that expertise and insight emerging from within Russia may be 
used to adapt Western experience, theories, and practices.  Persistent 
assumptions that “know-how” lies in the West and that it can and should be 
imported wholesale to the East deprive both sides of what could be a mutually 
beneficial process of exchange and two-way learning and development.
30
 
 While my focus in this dissertation has been on the inequalities in 
relationships between Russians and Westerners in building Russia’s civil society, and 
especially in developing Russia’s women’s movement, transnational feminist 
scholarship has demonstrated that difficulties in building egalitarian relationships are 
common in transnational feminist networks around the world.
31
  Scholars such as 
Valentine Moghadam have lauded the rise of transnational feminist networks as a 
force to counter globalization practices that disadvantage women and sharpen 
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inequalities within and among countries.
32
  Highlighting the potential of TFNs to 
oppose global hegemony and oppression, Moghadam argues: 
The network form of feminist organizing… suggests a form of organization 
that may be more conducive to the era of globalization, as well as more 
consistent with feminist goals of democratic, inclusive, participatory, 
decentralized, and nonhierarchical structures and processes.
33
  
Making use of new information and computer technologies, Moghadam notes, “TFNs 
are now able to perform optimally without having to become formal or bureaucratic 
organizations.  Avoiding bureaucratization is particularly important to feminists.”
34
  
Moreover, while Moghadam acknowledges cultural, class, and ideological differences 
among women around the world, she emphasizes that class boundaries are 
increasingly blurred as TFNs bring together women from diverse backgrounds who 
find common cause around personal, economic, and social issues.
35
 
 In contrast to Moghadam’s generally positive view of TFNs, other scholars of 
transnational feminism have noted the reproduction of hegemonic and bureaucratic 
tendencies within these networks.  These tendencies are well illustrated by 
transnational feminist work on the issues of violence against women, prostitution, and 
human trafficking.  While one category of women, the professional feminist, is 
constructed as an expert, another category, the victim of domestic violence, rape, 
prostitution, or sex trafficking, is constructed as a potential client in need of her 
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assistance.  Professional transnational feminists have assisted in the implementation 
of international gender norms outlined in such documents as CEDAW and the UN 
Protocol on Human Trafficking in countries around the world.  Working within the 
mandates of funding agencies, professional feminists often have little need to consult 
with local women who are designated as the recipients of these new rights.  Criticism 
of this trend, in which professional feminists speak for “voiceless” local women, has 
led some transnational feminist scholars to instead call for the creation of spaces in 
which underrepresented populations can speak for themselves, defend their own 
interests and rights, and pursue opportunities to improve their lives.
36
   
Transnational feminist scholars have pointed to the bureaucratization of 
women’s organizations and their dependency on international funding agencies as a 
major reason for the furthering of hegemonic and divisive tendencies through this 
transnational movement.  Discussing the development of transnational networks 
between women’s organizations in Mexico and international women’s organizations 
in the early 1990s, Sylvia Marcos notes that, after several years characterized by 
mutual enthusiasm and hopeful networking, she began to notice a change in direction.  
She states: 
[T]he moment when it started to develop into an institutional organization 
where you need to have an infrastructure, where you need to have hours of 
work, salaries or other forms of payment, all these nitty-gritty daily things, the 
spirit of the movement started to change.  First you almost do not recognize it, 
then it starts to be manipulation and finally sheer imposition.  In North 
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America the funding agencies will simply not give the funding if you do not 
comply with their excessive and sometimes elusive requirements.
37
  
Marcos notes that her attempts to teach the American women involved in these 
networks “different but equally valuable” ways of organizing that may have been 
more suited to the Mexican context failed.  Instead, she discovered, “All they wanted 
from me was to operate like an American with a Mexican face and Mexican 
language, looking like a Mexican and acting like an American.”
38
  That is, instead of 
treating Marcos as an “other,” the American women wanted her to join their group, 
but without taking the time to understand her individual viewpoint or the viewpoint of 
her community.   
In her years of experience with transnational feminist networks, Marcos found 
this trend common among international feminists.  Many were interested in 
expanding their networks to more and more countries, often with the aim of truly 
helping women, but few made an effort to understand the specific concerns of women 
in different parts of the world.  Instead, they recruited “Third World” women to act as 
ambassadors of international feminism, frequently with the promise of funding and 
support.  As these women became more involved in transnational networks and closer 
to funding agencies, many lost ties to their constituencies at home.  Marcos argues 
that this trend gave rise to an “international breed of women who are no longer rooted 
anywhere.  They are global products.”
39
  As Marcos illustrates, the bureaucratization 
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of the transnational women’s movement and its dependency on funding agencies 
contributed to an environment in which much of the movement’s work is geared 
towards fulfilling bureaucratic objectives, e.g., expanding to more countries, 
recruiting more local representatives, etc.  In contrast to such a top-down 
organization, in which local women are expected to act in the interests of the 
hierarchal movement structure, Marcos favors a flexible structure that is more 
responsive to women in multiple locations and that values and facilitates an open 
exchange of ideas among women around the world.   
 In recognition of the difficulties of communicating and collaborating across 
cultural and power differences, transnational feminist theorists have searched for 
ways to overcome these obstacles.  Several feminist theorists have focused on the 
need for improved dialogue to ensure that all parties in these networks have the 
opportunity to express their viewpoints and contribute equally to transnational 
feminist projects.  Michele Rivkin-Fish calls for prioritizing the very act of dialogue 
itself, instead of simply viewing it as a means of accomplishing transnational feminist 
goals.
40
  Similarly, Natalya Riegg proposes a “communicative approach” to women’s 
empowerment, which she defines as a “two-way dialogue” and “subject-to-subject” 
(as opposed to “subject-to-object”) communication.
41
  Riegg calls for women in 
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transnational networks to communicate openly with each other about their lives and 
their struggles, instead of lecturing about the proper way to live.  Discussing the 
benefits of a communicative approach to empowerment, Riegg argues: 
Discursive practices could also better reflect a truly inclusive, equality-based 
spirit of democracy than does the current, domineering style of the Western-
type empowerment.  Women even would have a better hope for inspiring each 
other cross-culturally by expressing their passions and convincing each other 




Basing transnational feminist networks on subject-to-subject dialogue, rather than 
assuming that the “less developed” parties are to learn from the “more developed” 
parties will enhance the transnational learning process for all parties and ground the 
networks in a firmer, more egalitarian foundation from which to work towards shared 
strategic goals.  
 Marguerite Waller draws inspiration from “chaos theory” in developing an 
approach to challenge the hierarchical and homogenizing tendencies of Western 
feminism.  She writes: 
“White” academic feminism in the United States has, in fact, been criticized 
for at least the past three decades for its tendency to domesticate difference, to 
see as its mission the choreographing of heterogeneous phenomena into 
something like the unified field theory sought by Western physics.  Even 
U.S.-based feminist theory that draws to one degree or another upon 
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deconstruction has found itself forging powerful, ontologically definitive 
metaphors that aim for a certain epistemological mastery.
43
 
Waller argues that U.S. academic feminism, like the broader academic fields 
of the humanities and social sciences, privileges the assertion of expertise over the 
facilitation of exchange in order for scholars to establish their professional 
reputation.
44
  When U.S. academic feminists began to network with women in other 
countries, this tendency often extended to these relationships as well, as U.S. 
feminists tried to fit these women’s stories into the academic frameworks they 
devoted their careers to building and defending.  Their relationships with women in 
less developed countries often were directed at trying to “fix” the problems of these 
women with their expert knowledge, instead of remaining open to new viewpoints 
and perspectives that may have challenged the assumptions upon which their theories 
are based.  The conflict between these two different approaches to transnational 
networking frequently led to break-downs in communication, which stalled the 
development of these networks.   
 In order to open up space for exchange among differently situated subjects, 
Waller suggests that feminists consider the insights raised by scientific scholars of 
chaos theory.  Scientists use this theory to explain nonlinear systems, characterized by 
complex interactions, such as those involved in weather and fluid dynamics, that 
seemingly break the “laws of nature.”
45
  They note that the “laws of nature” shown in 
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textbooks operate only under controlled conditions.  When exposed to non-controlled 
conditions, or chaos, these laws prove untenable.  In such conditions, “the solvable, 
orderly, linear systems” prove to be the aberrations.
46
   
Waller uses chaos theory as a metaphor “for the ‘knowledges’ that become 
possible when and where exclusionary and universalist logic breaks down.”
47
  For 
example, Waller discusses the Western concept of “identities” as discrete entities that 
are measurable, predictable, and self-consistent.
48
  She notes that this concept was 
developed in patriarchal societies, where constructed categories presuming sameness 
of all those included facilitated the domination of some identity categories over 
others.  Despite their efforts to dismantle patriarchy, U.S. feminists still rely on 
notions of identity and difference that permit the valuation of some identity categories 
over others.  In order to enter into true dialogue with women in other regions, U.S. 
feminists need to be open to other frameworks, or cosmologies, of understanding the 
world.  In contrast to the individualistic, hierarchical Western concept of identity 
categories, for example, some cultures rely on more collectivistic understandings of 
identity focused on the idea of the complementarity of, rather than competition 
between, social categories.  That is, instead of seeing difference as a weakness that 
needs to be overcome, difference can be viewed as a resource to strengthen the 
potential breadth and impact of transnational feminist networks.   
 In sum, scholars on transnational feminism have detailed the tremendous 
progress that has been made in building progressive, reflexive, and effective 
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transnational networks among women in order to counter the practices of 
globalization that have exacerbated inequality among and between nations and that 
have furthered gender discrimination.  At the same time, feminist scholars have 
pointed out work that still needs to be done to strengthen democratic and dialogic 
practices within these networks.  As TFNs pressure states and intergovernmental 
organizations to implement more egalitarian policies, they also continue to reaffirm 
egalitarian practices within their own ranks.  The challenge to transnational feminists 
is to remain constantly vigilant and to work to resolve the exclusions and silences that 
arise within their networks.  Importantly, the possibility to continue this work has 
been assured through the existence of numerous TFNs already working to advance 
women’s rights worldwide.  As more TFNs emerge, the strength and impact of cross-
cultural dialogue and connections will undoubtedly increase.   
 In light of the on-going conversation among transnational feminist scholars on 
how to strengthen TFNs by recognizing and valuing differences among women 
worldwide, my dissertation offers some practical insights on how to address 
challenges of transnational women’s networking.  Within the Russian-Western 
counter-trafficking movement that I studied, one of the leading factors contributing to 
the success of the Angel Coalition as a vibrant activist network and leader of the 
Russian counter-trafficking movement was the commitment displayed to this cause 
by both Western and CIS activists.  The level of commitment displayed by AC 
activists stood in marked contrast to the common pattern of Russian-Western activist 
networks in the 1990s and 2000s, which were typically temporary in nature, with 




projects.  In point of contrast, the commitment of American co-founder Juliette Engel 
to growing and maintaining the AC over a ten-year period was a major factor that 
enabled the organization to thrive and partner with the Russian state on several 
counter-trafficking initiatives.  Engel’s connections to Western funding agencies and 
to key players in the international counter-trafficking movement helped the 
organization to obtain necessary financial support and to establish its standing in the 
international community.  Equally important was the commitment of CIS activists, 
who used their in-depth knowledge of the domestic political and social environment 
to lead implementation of the AC’s projects in Russia and to build ties with Russian 
governmental officials.   
 The experience of the AC can serve as a resource for other transnational 
activist networks working through cross-cultural differences.  One reason the AC 
thrived was the mutual respect afforded to the contributions of activists from both the 
CIS and the West.  The knowledge and experience of activists from both parts of the 
world was valued and utilized to make the network stronger.  Although conflicts 
related to cultural, language, and power differences did arise among AC activists, the 
commitment to seeing these conflicts through helped activists to overcome their 
differences and build a strong multi-national collective.  Thus, while the goal of 
combating human trafficking was the initial impetus that brought AC activists 
together, organizational practices that emphasized mutual respect and cross-cultural 
understanding enabled the organization to build a strong sense of community and to 




Finally, my case study of the AC emphasizes the importance of maintaining 
ties to a constituency and grounding a network’s actions on issues of concern to a 
community.  Unlike other Russian-Western women’s networks that focused their 
efforts on building a professionalized women’s movement in Russia, with few links 
to the Russian public, the AC forged strong connections to a sector of the Russian 
population in need of representation and assistance.  Hence, the AC was successful in 
balancing its responsibility to fulfill the requirements of its funders with its mission of 
serving the Russian public.  The AC’s commitment to its constituency provided it 
with the motivation to fight through seemingly endless Russian governmental red-
tape to maintain its presence in Russia and to constantly apply for foreign grants in 
order to fund its work.  It was this constituency that inspired the AC to continue to 
struggle for existence in times when financial and governmental support was weak.      
My findings echo those by other scholars on transnational feminist 
movements that the short-term investments commonly made by international funding 
agencies and professional feminists are often not adequate to allow them to gain a full 
understanding of problems faced by local communities or to develop initiatives 
comprehensive enough to address these problems.  Instead of seeking quick fixes to 
ingrained problems, more energy needs to be devoted to enhancing dialogue, listening 
to women in diverse settings, and practicing mutual respect.  My research, along with 
the growing body of transnational feminist literature, suggests that these skills will 
empower activists to build effective and democratic transnational networks that can 
challenge states and intergovernmental organizations on issues of importance to 






In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how activists for women’s rights from 
various parts of the world can successfully work together towards shared goals.  My 
research builds upon and contributes to literature on transnational civil society by 
emphasizing two key factors that were essential to the success of the Angel Coalition 
in influencing Russian state action against human trafficking between 1998 and 2008: 
a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia and the ability to 
demonstrate to the Russian state the benefits of taking action on this issue.  
Additionally, drawing upon and contributing to literature on transnational feminist 
theory, my research stresses the importance of dialogue, openness to different ways of 
knowing, and respect for diversity in building strong, resilient transnational networks 
capable of influencing states and intergovernmental organizations.  My research on 
the Angel Coalition suggests that key features of transnational networks are flexibility 
and creativity in finding ways to operate in different cultural and political 
environments.  Lastly, my research highlights the necessity of equal commitment by 
all parties in transnational networks to working through and with difference and to 
achieving shared, strategic goals.  Through its attention to developing egalitarian and 
representational cross-cultural networks, the transnational feminist movement can 
serve as a leader in the area of effective and communicative organizing practices in 











1895 The Penitentiary Congress of Paris, the first international conference 
on trafficking in women, was held.   
1904 The International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave 
Traffic was passed.   
1910 The Mann Act was passed in the United States.   
1910 The International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave 
Traffic was passed.   
1921 The Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and 
Children was adopted by the League of Nations.   
1933 The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in 
Women was adopted by the League of Nations. 
1949 The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of 
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others was adopted by the 
United Nations.   
1974 The United Nations established a “Working Group on Slavery.” 
1975 The first UN World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City, 
Mexico; it adopted the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of 
Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace.  
1979 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations.   
1980 The second UN World Conference on Women was held in 
Copenhagen, Denmark; it produced the Report of the World 
Conference of the United Nations for Women, Equality, Development 
and Peace. 
1983 The Global Feminist Workshop to Organize Against Trafficking in 
Women was held in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
1985 The third UN World Conference on Women was held in Nairobi, 
Kenya; it produced the Report of the World Conference to Review 
and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for 
Women: Equality, Development and Peace. 
1993 (June) The UN World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna; it 







The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was 
passed by the United Nations. 
1994 
(March) 




The International Conference on Traffic in Persons was held in 
Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
1994 
(December) 
The United Nations adopted a Resolution on Traffic in Women and 
Girls. 
1995 The fourth UN World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, 
China; it adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 
2000 
(October) 
The U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act was 
signed into law. 
2000 
(November) 
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
2004 The United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in 












Interview Guide in English 
 
 
Theme 1: Personal Background and Anti-Trafficking Work 
 
1. What led you to become involved in campaigns against human trafficking?   
When did you first become involved in this type of work?  
 
2. What personal goals do you have in your anti-trafficking work? 
 
3. Describe “trafficking” in your own words. If someone asked you to define 
“trafficking,” how would you define it? 
 
4. How did you understand “trafficking” before you began to work for this 
organization? 
 
5. How do you understand “trafficking” now? 
 
6. If your understanding has changed, what led you to understand “trafficking” 
differently? 
 
7. How did you become involved in this particular organization? When did you 
begin to work here? 
 
8. What is your role in the organization? What are your job responsibilities?  If 
you have worked on anti-trafficking projects, describe the projects you have 
worked on.  
 




Theme 2: Structure and History of the Organization 
 
10. Tell me about the history of your organization.  When was it founded? Who 
founded the organization? If your organization is part of the Angel Coalition, 
how did it become part of the Coalition? 
 
11. Describe the structure of your organization. Does the organization have 
different departments or divisions?  If so, what are they?  What is the 
management structure? 
 





13. How does having both Russians and foreigners collaborating in the 
organization affect its work?  What would be different about the 
organization’s work if it was conducted only by Russians or only by 
foreigners? 
 
14. What are the challenges of Russians and foreigners working together? Do any 
challenges arise due to language or cultural differences?  Do any challenges 
arise due to different understandings of trafficking? 
 
15. How have activists in your organization responded to these challenges?  How 
to activists react when conflicts arise?  
 
16. Do any other challenges arise in collaborative work among activists?  If yes, 
how have activists responded to these challenges?   
 
17. What are the benefits of Russians and foreigners working together? 
 
18. What do Russians contribute to the organization’s work? 
 
19. What do foreigners contribute to the organization’s work? 
 
Theme 3: Organizational Anti-Trafficking Strategies 
 
20. In your opinion, what factors contribute to trafficking from Russia?  How do 
economic, political, social, or other factors contribute?   
 
21. In your opinion, what are effective ways to combat trafficking? Which 
approaches are best at combating trafficking? 
 
22. How does your organization combat trafficking?  What types of projects 
and/or campaigns does it sponsor? 
 
23. What do you think of the organization’s work? 
 
24. What challenges does your organization face in achieving its goals? 
 








Interview Guide in Russian 
 
Тема 1. Личный опыт и работа по борьбе с торговлей людьми 
 
1. Что заставило Вас заняться борьбой против торговли людьми? Когда Вы 
занялись этим впервые? 
 
2. Какие личные цели у Вас есть в Ваше работе при борьбе с торговлей 
людьми? 
  
3. Опишите, что значит «торговля людьми» своими словами. Если Вас 
спросят дать определение «торговле людьми», как Вы бы ответили? 
 
4. Каково было ваше понимание «торговли людьми» перед тем,  как Вы 
начали работать на эту организацию? 
 
5. Как Вы понимаете «торговлю людьми» сейчас? 
 
6. Если Ваше понимание изменилось, что заставило вас изменить свое 
мнение о торговле людьми? 
 
7. Как Вы ступили в эту организацию? Когда Вы начали работать здесь? 
 
8. Какую роль Вы играете в организации? Каковы ваши обязанности? Если 
Вы участвовали в проектах по борьбе с торговлей людьми, расскажите 
об этих проектах. 
 
9. Помогает ли работа в этой организации достичь личных целей? Если да 
то как? 
   
Тема 2. Структура и история организации 
 
10.  Расскажите мне об истории организации. Когда она была основана?  Кто 
был основателем?  Если Ваша организация часть Коалиции Ангел, то, 
как она стала частью Коалиции? 
 
11. Опишите структуру вашей организации. Имеет ли организация разделы 
и подразделения?  Если да то каковы они?  Какова структура 
руководства? 
 





13. Как сотрудничество русских и иностранцев влияет на работу 
организации? В чем было бы различие, если организацию составляли 
только русские или только иностранцы? 
 
14. Какие препятствия стоят перед русскими и иностранцами при работе 
вместе?  Возникают ли препятствия в работе из-за культурных и 
языковых различий?  Возникают ли препятствия в связи с различным 
пониманием торговли людьми? 
 
15. Как активисты вашей организации реагируют на такие препятствия? Как 
реагируют активисты на возникновение конфликтов? 
 
16. Возникают ли какие другие препятствия при совместной работе среди 
активистов? Если да, то, как они на них реагируют? 
 
17. Какова польза от сотрудничества русских и иностранцев? 
 
18. Какой вклад вносят в работу организации русские? 
 
19. Какой вклад вносят в работу организации иностранцы? 
 
 
Тема 3. Организационная работа при борьбе с торговлей людьми 
 
20. По вашему мнению, какие факторы способствуют развитию торговли 
людьми в России? Как экономические, политические, социальные и 
другие факторы влияют на это? 
 
21. По Вашему мнению, каковы самые эффективные методы по борьбе с 
торговлей людьми? Какие способы являются наиболее эффективными? 
 
22. Как ваша организация борется с торговлей людьми? Какие кампании она 
спонсирует? 
 
23. Что Вы думаете о работе организации? 
 
24. Какие препятствия стоят перед организацией при осуществлении 
намеченных целей? 
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